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Abstract
The thesis proposes cognitive linguistics, and in particular cognitive approaches to 
presupposition, as a suitable theoretical basis for critical discourse analysis, and 
explores empirically a sample o f texts in order to examine knowledge management in 
relation to gender, sexuality and sexual health in Greek lifestyle magazines.
I claim that theorising language in terms o f cognition can account for the constructive 
aspect o f discourse th.ough the accumulation o f cognitive effects, while at the same 
time discourse is constructed by and reflects social structure in that discourse 
production draws on shared and commonly accepted knowledge and attitudes in any 
given context (Ch. 2). I argue that the way knowledge is not only drawn on but also 
reproduced or contested in discourse is related to the study o f presupposition, 
including the presentation o f propositions as ‘given’ (known and commonly accepted) 
and/or backgrounded and therefore incontestable.
Presupposition has been defined and identified in very different ways within the 
critical study o f discourse, and part o f this thesis (Ch. 3) has aimed to disentangle this 
confusion by exploring the theoretical underpinnings and empirical applications o f the 
concept within the field. I propose studying presupposition more systematically by 
explicitly taking into account the three parameters which seem to have always 
influenced the study of presupposition (defined prototypically as a figure-ground 
distinction where the ground is also triggered and necessary for meaning making): 
how open to contestation a belief is, how fore- or backgrounded it is, and whether 
(and to what extent) we can assume it to be known to potential audiences o f a text (Ch.
4).
ii
In terms o f methodology 1 suggest a method similar to the study o f category norms in 
order to find out which items are considered prototypical members o f a category at a 
particular point in time among a specific population; in this case the focus has been on 
discovering prototypical lifestyle magazine titles for the Greek public (see 5.2). I 
further explore the classification o f texts in ‘genre categories’ based on 
communicative purpose when a discourse community does not have specific names 
for such categories (see 5.3); in this case, in Greece there are not always specific 
names for the different types o f texts to be found in lifestyle magazines, at least 
among non-professionals. Finally, within each text I propose distinguishing among 
different levels o f presupposition, from looking at framing activated by single lexical 
items to examining broad systems of belief or ‘discourses’ pertaining to the data (4.5 
and 5.5).
In terms o f empirical critical discourse analysis, I chose to examine three texts on the 
issue o f sexual health, one from Status (m en’s magazine), one from Cosmopolitan and 
one from Marie Claire (wom en’s magazines) in relation to the negotiation between 
traditional and more recent (hetero)normative beliefs in relation to gender and sexual 
conduct. The analysis has focused on the frame and sentence levels and has indicated 
that although there is a higher degree o f permissiveness in relation to female sexuality, 
women in Greece still have to choose or balance between traditional ideals o f chastity 
and modesty and equally pressing imperatives o f (penetrative heterosexual) sexual 
activity circulated (and taken for granted) in popular culture texts.
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In the broadest sense, this thesis emerged out o f an academic and political interest in 
discourse, society and cognition, and a firm belief that the three are interrelated. Thus, 
one o f its main aims is to further an interdisciplinary synergy o f relevant fields.
Cognitive Linguistics, and Cognitive Semantics in particular, have, in my view, 
provided a more convincing account o f natural language meaning than logical and 
generative approaches, while Sociolinguistics in the broadest sense (including, among 
other fields, those known as Feminist Linguistics and Critical Linguistics/Critical 
Discourse Analysis) provides powerful accounts o f the role o f language in the 
establishment and contestation o f stereotypes, ideologies and, ultimately, social 
injustice and social change. These, and other related fields, have developed largely 
independently o f each other, making significant contributions to our understanding of 
the way our mind, knowledge, discourse and society work. However theoretical 
approaches and findings from these fields have not, overall, been utilised to advance 
one another’s research agendas. Bringing these accounts together follows from 
believing that the way we think, the way we act and the way we speak influence each 
other (formulated by Teun van Dijk as the Discourse-Cognition-Society triangle).
The study o f cognition, in particular, is relatively new to the critical analysis of
discourse, although van Dijk has been advocating a theoretical socio-cognitive
account o f ideology and discourse since at least the late 1970’s (van Dijk, 1977; 1990;
1994; 1997; 1998; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2008). However, van D ijk’s theoretical
approach, rooted to a large extent in classical Social Psychology, even if heeded,
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appears to be particularly difficult to operationalise without recourse to traditional (not 
necessarily cognitively informed) theories and methodologies o f discourse analysis (as 
in van Dijk, 2000; 2001a -  but see more recent work such as van Dijk, 2005 and 
Bekalu, 2006). Social Psychology has been utilising insights in the workings of 
cognition, considering, for example, issues o f attention, processing o f information and 
prototypicality effects (see, for example, Fiske and Taylor, 1991; 2013). However, it 
has not always focussed on language, or at least not always engaged with a detailed 
theorisation o f language and cognition.
Cognitive Linguistics with its tenet that linguistic/semantic knowledge interacts with 
‘world (encyclopaedic) knowledge’ (Fillmore, 1985; Croft and Cruse, 2004: Ch. 1) 
seems particularly suited to make links between cognition, language and the social 
world. Such an understanding o f language would explain how our understanding o f 
the world can be influenced by the language we are exposed to, as well how our world 
experiences and beliefs about the world influence our production o f discourse. 
However, Cognitive Linguistics is a relatively young field. It has made progress over 
the past 30 years in advancing a cognitive theorisation o f language without extending 
its theoretical insights into the study o f discourse and society. Despite early work 
notably by Chilton (1985; 1987; 1988; 1996) and, more recently, George Lakoff 
(1991; 2002; 2003; 2004), it is only very recently that calls have been increasing for a 
systematic theoretical and methodological cross-fertilisation between cognitively- 
oriented and socially-oriented approaches to language (e.g. Dirven, Hawkins and 
Sandik^oglu; Dirven, Frank and Ilie, 2001; Chilton, 2005; 2011; Oswald, 2010; Hart. 
2010; Sarazin, in preparation).
The fact that Cognitive Linguistics has confined itself to linguistic structures usually 
no longer than a few sentences at most, and its research focus on language and
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cognition as opposed to social context, does not make it immediately apparent in what 
ways studying cognition might be not only an academic but also a political endeavour. 
Indeed most calls for a synergy between critical discourse analysis and cognitive 
research, from van Dijk to Chilton and Hart, have focussed on the explanatory power 
o f cognitive approaches in relation to the effects o f discourse. Critical social research, 
on the other hand, or at least one understanding o f it, can be seen as aiming not only to 
explain but also to evaluate, if not attempt to alter, the social context(s) under study. 
This understanding o f critical research involves different aims and research agendas, 
starting with a social issue the researcher sees as requiring further attention and 
potential action (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; 2009b). However, it needs to be borne in 
mind that understanding and explanation o f social phenomena, including the use of 
language, is necessary for action -  indeed action is determined by understanding and 
explanation. Thus, we do not only need to determine how discriminatory action, for 
example, follows from discriminatory beliefs o f the perpetrators, but also what beliefs 
we, as academics and political beings, hold about the way discourse and the mind 
work in producing in such discriminatory action, if we are to advocate ways to end 
discrimination. On the other hand, a study o f society in itself (regardless o f whether it 
focuses on cognition or not) is not necessarily critical if it merely aims to describe and 
explain social phenomena without offering social critique, and such work can be and 
is being done in both Social Psychology and Sociolinguistics. In that sense, Cognitive 
Linguistics can be and is critical insofar as it is applied to the study o f discourse in 
context, and expanded to critique the social context(s) in which the discourse under 
study occurs and operates.
Applying Cognitive Linguistic theories to the study o f discourse in context, and 
further to the critical analysis o f discourse bound to specific social contexts, is clearly
not straightforward. Apart from the need to further develop theory and methodology 
to suit these newly found aims, ‘discourse’, ‘society’ and ‘cognition’ are complex and 
fluid, and no one single piece o f research can account for this complexity (for further 
discussion on the discourse-society-cognition interrelation, see Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, I maintain that studying cognitive phenomena and discourse in relation 
to specific social problems remains a worthwhile endeavour, to which I have 
attempted to make a small contribution in the present thesis.
Thus, although the main focus o f the thesis is the theoretical and methodological link 
between socially and cognitively oriented approaches to discourse, there is also a 
strong focus on exploring aspects o f the social issue o f gender relations in Greek 
society. In the following section I would like to provide a general background in 
relation to this latter area before I move on to delineating my specific research 
questions and providing an overview o f the contents o f the thesis.
1.2. Gender relations in contemporary Greece
It is in the past few decades that Greek society has been moving from what we might 
crudely call a traditional patriarchy to a post-feminist stage (see Kosetzi, 2007, for a 
detailed account). Especially since the 1980s, Greek women have been afforded a 
range o f newly founded privileges and freedoms more on a par with those o f men, and 
legislative measures have been explicitly geared towards promoting gender equality, 
while at the same time there has been an increase o f covert sexism, with gender 
equality officially paid lip-service to, but not necessarily applied in practice.
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In this context I have been particularly interested in examining the tensions and 
challenges faced by a generation o f women who ‘have nothing to complain about’, 
and who grew up believing they are equal with men, or at least as equal as they 
needed to be. The more I have been learning about the conditions o f w om en’s lives 
historically and across social and geographical contexts (Barker and Adkins, 1996, has 
offered some particularly memorable accounts), the more aware I have been becoming 
o f the privileged position I was in. I have been observing that women of my 
generation were educated, and allowed to complete higher education without question 
(indeed encouraged to do so), were expected to enter paid employment and even 
actually get some satisfaction from their careers, they generally assumed that they 
would receive a certain amount o f respect from their husbands and co-workers and not 
live in fear o f violence or their reputations being damaged for enjoying their sexuality. 
Appreciation o f these advantages can easily obscure the fact that women in Greece 
nowadays are still expected to get husbands and procreate, at least eventually, they 
still need to police their heterosexual desires within acceptable limits (broader than in 
the past, but still more restrictive in comparison to m en’s), and that they need to if not 
suppress, at least be very ‘discreet’ and careful about whether and how they might 
have and express any homosexual desires (see Chapter 6 for a more detailed account 
o f aspects o f heteronormativity in contemporary Greece). Also in the home and 
workplace, middle-class Greek women who ‘have it a ll’ in fact still shoulder the 
majority o f housework and childcare duties, work less and in less gainful employment 
than men, and follow an unequal gender differentiation o f prescribed behaviours and 
roles, often uncritically accepted and thus not seen as cause for concern, let alone 
social unrest.
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Tensions between centuries o f tradition and the range o f opportunities available to 
Greek women today (at least in theory) have given rise to a range o f new social 
practices and discourses concerning what it means to be a woman and what it means 
to be a man (or what would be the ‘ideal w om an’ and ‘ideal m an’) in contemporary 
Greek society. Such ideological constructs are available to men and women through 
discourses they are exposed to (and use themselves) daily. Examining mass media 
discourse provides insights into these ideological beliefs, and the impact o f media 
discourse is more immediate and prevalent than, say, institutional discourse such as 
legislation and guidelines. ‘It is in part through such representations that we come to 
know what the world is like, and our ‘lived realities’ are scarcely independent o f that 
media-derived knowledge’ (M einhof and Richardson, 1994: 4). I am interested in 
examining lifestyle magazines as a snapshot o f the trivial —  the discourse which we 
all may encounter at various points and to different extents and which usually is not 
seen as anything more important than a cursory leafing through to kill time. In short, 
lifestyle magazines present one type o f discourse that is unmarked in many ways, yet 
is everywhere, and thus in many ways represents what is normal. This is of course an 
oversimplification —  at least, in the pages o f these lifestyle magazines many readers 
declare their allegiance to the magazine as a valuable friend, a source not only of 
entertainment but also o f comfort and knowledge (cf. Hermes, 1995). At the same 
time the fact that for many people lifestyle magazines are trivial does not mean that 
their contents are viewed with approval —  indeed a more traditional viewpoint would 
readily condemn the hedonistic consumerism, vanity and sexual liberation advocated 
in the pages o f  the magazines as not very far from a moral catastrophe. Nevertheless, 
the generations o f young Greek men and women born from the 1980s onwards have 
been continuously exposed to such ‘lifestyle discourses’, not only through magazines
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but also through TV, radio and the Internet, in a way that previous generations have 
not. Moreover, while old-fashioned Greek family-centeredness and morality are often 
faced with scorn from the younger generations, they still hold strong in influencing 
their behaviours and lives, sometimes meeting the newer ‘lifestyle discourses’ 
halfway, sometimes in surprising consonance with them when it comes to 
perpetuating ideas o f gender difference (and inequality).
Both men and wom en’s lifestyle magazines thus oscillate between rejecting some 
aspects o f old-fashioned overt sexism, repackaging some of them in more fashionable 
wrapping paper, and advocating new beliefs which are often covertly sexist. In 
wom en’s magazines, consumer feminism and the conflation o f sexual liberation with 
new normative demands o f the so-called ‘raunch culture’ are two examples o f the 
most common new forms of covert sexism (Walker, 2010; Power, 2009, both cited 
and reviewed in Dolezal, 2010; Levy, 2005). M en’s magazines similarly aim to avoid 
appearing old-fashioned, while simultaneously capitalising on material and symbolic 
privileges traditionally bestowed on men. New forms of sexism in Greek m en’s 
magazines seem to stem from and indeed surpass more traditionally sexist beliefs. In 
place o f the traditional ideal o f the male ‘breadwinner’ who is entitled to do no 
housework, we now have a tongue-in-cheek celebration o f dirtiness as an essentially 
masculine trait (Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009). The stereotypical dichotomy of men as 
rational and women as emotional creatures, in conjunction with beliefs about m en’s 
uncontrollable sexuality (Hollway, 1984) evolves in celebration o f casual, 
unemotional sex and in sanctioning the objectification o f women as not simply a 
necessary evil but a desirable state o f affairs, to be pursued at all costs. Such 
exaggerated open sexism is certainly made possible by the utilisation o f irony and 
humour (Benwell, 2002; 2003; 2004), but it is still significant that such jokes would
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not have been acceptable fifty years ago, and would potentially be more widely seen 
as offensive to men, being at odds at least with the ideal o f the good provider and 
pater fam ilias.
M iddle class women aged approximately between 18-45, the most privileged group of 
women, are still evaluated and encouraged to evaluate themselves on the basis o f their 
sexual appeal to men and a presentation o f ‘tasteful’ self to other women. 
Relationships, no longer under the strict perscriptiveness o f previous generations, 
become personal projects to be developed through a set o f normative ‘guidelines’, 
while men, through a ‘Battle o f the Sexes’ discourse, are normatively expected to do 
everything in their power to ‘sabotage’ the project. It is perhaps easy to see that a 
project/war approach to relationships is self-defeating. At the same time, men and 
women do not blindly follow the relationship and lifestyle ‘manuals’ provided in 
magazines (heterosexual relationships do continue to exist after all, which entails the 
participation o f men, not only women, and not all o f them necessarily in the 
continuous state o f doubt and tension described in lifestyle magazines), and there is no 
coercion, at least at an institutional, overt level, to follow any o f the advice given or 
accept any o f the proclamations made in the magazines.
Thus, what men and women think actually matters, insofar as they have a range of 
choices available as to how they will live their lives. Presuming that the main aim of 
lifestyle magazines as media products is to maintain an appeal with their audiences 
and continue selling copies, rather than to advocate particular beliefs about how 
society is or should be, common ground with the audience will be sought on matters 
taken to be the beliefs o f the audiences, while other agendas (such as consumerism) 
will not necessarily be explicitly stated and promoted — they may be presented 
tentatively, with a high degree o f mitigation and perhaps arguments in their favour, or
they may be presented as taken for granted, incontestable truths which everybody 
already agrees on.
One o f the aims o f this thesis, then, is to examine issues such as the ‘common 
knowledge’, presumed to be shared among magazine readers and magazine producers 
alike, and the representation o f ideological beliefs as incontestable and taken for 
granted. As the instruments for pursuing this aim, it seems natural to draw on, and 
develop the theory o f presupposition, a phenomenon often linked to both common 
ground and incontestability, and thus in principle to the kind o f socially shared 
ideologies I have ju st outlined. In the following section I formulate these goals as 
research questions and provide a brief rationale for their choice.
1.3. Research questions
My research questions consist o f one broad theoretical/methodological question, one 
more specific methodological one and an empirical one, which I present here in order 
o f primacy:
RQ1
How can presupposition be theorised and applied in a cognitively and pragmatically 
informed methodological framework for the critical analysis o f texts, and for the 
exploration o f gender and language in particular?
RQ2
More specifically, how can presupposition as an analytical category be operationalised 
for critical discourse analysis based on theoretical insights from Frame Semantics, 
Conceptual M etaphor Theory and Mental Space Theory, and what further 




What are the ideological assumptions regarding gender and sexuality underlying 
Greek m en’s and w om en’s lifestyle magazines, namely Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan 
and Status '?
Below I discuss the rationale underlying these research questions, and the means 
employed to explore them.
RQ1 - Theoretical/methodological
How can presupposition be theorised and applied in a cognitively and pragmatically 
informed methodological framework for the critical analysis o f texts, and for the 
exploration o f gender and language in particular?
In order to answer this question I have reviewed a range o f theoretical approaches to 
presupposition and examples o f the application o f presupposition in the critical 
analysis o f discourse including, among other topics, the analysis o f ideology and 
power in relation to gender in discourse (Chapter 3). These approaches have not 
necessarily been informed by cognitive approaches to language but follow a largely 
truth-conditional account. Furthermore, methodologies o f presupposition 
identification and analysis have not always been explicit, and it appears that different 
scholars have different understandings o f presupposition even when they work in the 
same or closely related field(s) of discourse analysis. Thus, answering this research 
question has required a re-theorisation and systematisation o f the concept of 
presupposition and the levels o f analysis for its application.
Starting from cognitive and pragmatic theories, I have defined presupposition broadly 
as
a proposition/belief, concept or system of beliefs forming the ground in a figure- 
ground distinction in discourse. Prototypically, presupposition is the proposition
10
forming the ground which surfaces in the discourse on sentence level and is attributed 
to the mutually accepted Reality Space of the participants in the interaction.
Thus, I propose (Chapter 4) that a systematic framework o f presupposition analysis 
should examine whether, in the co-text, information is presented as shared or new, 
whether it is presented as incontestable or open to contestation, and whether it is 
foregrounded or backgrounded. For methodological reasons one also needs to 
acknowledge that ‘figure’ and ‘ground’ are differently manifested at different levels o f 




discourse level and 
pragmatic competence level.
Any method o f categorising parts o f discourse is bound to contain a certain degree o f
artificiality and objectification o f what is a complex dynamic process. It is important
to acknowledge that in terms o f meaning-making all o f the above categories are
processed simultaneously, and that the above levels interact -  for example, an
essential part o f understanding sentences and texts is understanding the frames
activated by specific lexical items (e.g. noun or verb phrases), while at the same time a
recipient’s understanding o f the overall communicative purposes o f a text and the
discursive and social contexts in which it occurs will influence how specific lexical
items will be interpreted. Nevertheless, when analysing texts this level distinction
allows us to point with more precision to the elements o f the text which have
prompted the analyst’s interpretation and the analyst’s claims about, for example, the
activation o f ideological beliefs.
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In this thesis I specifically focus on the first two levels o f the framework, examining 
the frame level and partially the sentence level o f figure-ground distinctions in 
discourse and exploring the triggering o f shared information vs. presentation o f new 
information, degree of contestability and degree o f foregrounding. To this end I 
employ Frame Semantics and Conceptual M etaphor Theory in respect to triggering 
metaphorical frames, and Mental Space Theory in examining sentence-level 
presuppositions, aiming to explore the development o f methodological tools based on 
these theoretical perspectives in order to address RQ1. This gives rise to my second 
Research Question, subsidiary to RQ.
RQ2 - M ethodological
How can presupposition as an analytical category be operationalised for critical 
discourse analysis based on theoretical insights from Frame Semantics, Conceptual 
M etaphor Theory and Mental Spaces, and what further observations can be made 
when applying the theories and relevant methodologies to Greek language data?
In order to approach this question I applied the theoretical observations and 
methodological framework developed in Chapter 4 to the analysis o f a selection of 
texts from Greek lifestyle magazines (Chapters 7, 8 and 9). The framework enabled 
me to conduct a detailed qualitative analysis o f the texts and provide empirical 
evidence indicating the heteronormative ideologies underlying them. Despite the 
limited sample o f data (three texts), there are some initial indications that the theories 
o f Frame Semantics and Mental Spaces as operationalised through presupposition 
analysis1 can indeed work well with a range o f languages, in this case Greek data.2
1 C ognitive linguistic theorising has been informed by theoretical explorations and typological research 
on a variety o f  languages. G iven the claim  that cognitive linguistics exam ines the w ays in which  
(presum ably universal) aspects o f  cognition interact with language (despite local/context-bound  
variations) cognitive linguistic insights should, in theory, apply to all languages. N evertheless, the
current study does not focus on com paring a specific  cognitive linguistic parameter across languages, 
but rather exam ines stretches o f  naturally occurring discourse in the Greek language with the additional
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RQ3 - Empirical
What are the ideological assumptions regarding gender, health and sexuality 
underlying Greek men and wom en’s lifestyle magazines, namely M arie Claire, 
Cosmopolitan and Status?
As discussed in 1.1 and 1.2, apart from the theoretical and methodological concerns o f 
this thesis, there is also the aim o f exploring aspects o f gender relations and ideologies 
in the contemporary Greek context. For the study o f covert, mundane ideological 
beliefs about the everyday lives o f men and women I chose to look at lifestyle 
magazines. For the purposes o f narrowing down the dataset I chose to focus on texts 
providing advice, with the assumption that these texts would be particularly 
appropriate sites to examine the normative textual construction o f gender. I further 
narrowed down the scope to examining aspects o f representations o f sexual 
relationships as discussed in the magazines, and more specifically to aspects of 
representations o f sexual health. Although health does not necessarily need to be a 
gendered subject (yet it often is), sexuality, on the other hand, is closely related to and 
regulated by ideologies about appropriate gender conduct. I therefore was interested to 
examine how the seemingly ‘objective’ and ‘non-judgemental’ discourse o f science 
and medicine would interact with discourse about the emotionally and ideologically 
loaded topics of sex and sexual relationships.
The limited dataset allows for only cautious generalisations, but in comparing a 
magazine for younger women (Cosmopolitan, aimed at below 35 year olds 
approximately), a magazine for women up to the age o f about 45 (Marie Claire) and a 
m en’s magazine with a marked (upper) middle class orientation targeting men over 30
aim o f  exam ining the application o f  these theories to discourse not sp ecifica lly  selected because o f  the 
presence o f  sp ecific  linguistic features.
2 C ognitive M etaphor Theory has successfu lly  been applied to Greek data before (e.g. Canakis, 2003; 
Polyzou, 2004; G ogorosi, 2005; 2009).
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(Status), some similarities and differences did in fact emerge. Lifestyle magazines, 
whether for men or for women, assume a position o f authority and wisdom in relation 
to the reader, while at the same time an impression o f closeness is created through the 
personal nature o f the topic, through humour and through expressions o f solidarity. 
There is variation in that a humorous, light hearted approach seems to be employed 
more extensively in Status, while the wom en’s magazines focus more on emotions o f 
fear, unpleasantness and insecurity associated with sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs). Status in this case includes also a promotional element, presenting condoms 
as commercial products (rather than simply measures to prevent the transmission of 
disease).
All magazines presuppose a heterosexual, sexually active reader and seem to exclude 
the possibilities that one may be gay or may abstain from sex by choice, for example. 
Marie Claire and Cosmopolitan also seem to evoke and take for granted the 
(knowledge of) the existence o f a relatively stable partner, employing, among other 
devices, existential presuppositions such as ‘your partner’ and ‘your boyfriend’. By 
contrast, Status does not frame the sexual partners o f the readers in any particular way 
- only once is a female sexual partner mentioned, as ‘her’, which is sufficient to 
trigger the shared knowledge/expectation that the (male) reader has a female sexual 
partner, but no further indication is given as to the nature o f her relationship with him.
It needs to be pointed out here that, as reflected in the order o f presentation o f the 
research questions, the main focus o f the thesis is theoretical. It is largely concerned 
with building a theoretical model o f presupposition in line with the goals and 
principles o f Critical Discourse Analysis, and secondarily with the operationalisation 
o f the model for analysing discourse (RQ2). It is within the ramification o f these aims 
that I have conducted the analysis, namely, in order to test and further inform the
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model. Thus, despite some observations in relation to lifestyle magazines, gender and 
ideology in the Greek social context (RQ3), it needs to be emphasised that clearly the 
limited amount o f data does not allow for generalisations in that respect. In relation to 
testing and informing the model, and thus helping answer RQs 1 and 2, the analysis 
has already informed the methodology by pointing towards refining the analytical 
categories by including sub-categories. In particular, through the analysis it became 
apparent that framing in discourse can be examined in a variety o f different ways 
(some o f which occurred in the data, namely, metaphorical framings, vague framings 
and evaluative/emotional language -  see Chapters 5 and 7 for further discussion), and 
that conditionals in advice texts can be further sub-categorised as triggering different 
types o f hypothetical mental spaces (Chapter 9).
1.4. Outline of the thesis
In the following chapter (Chapter 2) I elaborate on the interrelation between cognition, 
discourse, and society, and advocate a cognitive approach for the study o f the latter 
two. To this end I examine non-cognitive oriented strands o f critical research 
including Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), Post-structuralist and 
Discursive Psychology approaches, addressing criticisms commonly levelled at 
cognitive approaches. I provide the basics o f a social cognition oriented approach, 
defining ‘ideology’, ‘knowledge’, ‘mental m odels’ and ‘stereotypes’ as crucial 
building blocks o f social cognition. In section 2.6 o f the chapter I review work on 
gender and discourse, highlighting the links between Feminist Linguistics and CDA, 
and claiming that a socio-cognitive discourse analytical approach can be a fruitful 
endeavour in the study o f gender identity and gender discourses and ideologies.
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In Chapter 3 I provide a selective review o f literature on presupposition. I discuss 
some o f the theoretical and empirical weaknesses o f the Truth-Conditional account o f 
presupposition, and examine how concepts o f presupposition have been applied in 
socially oriented critical analyses o f discourse. The review indicates that there are 
inconsistencies in the field as regards the theorisation and application o f 
presupposition, which necessitates a re-theorisation and methodological 
systematisation o f the concept. Based on insights from cognitively informed 
approaches (mainly Marmaridou, 2000), I argue that approaching presupposition from 
a cognitive linguistic perspective would be helpful for identifying instances in 
discourse, as well as examining their function.
Following from this, Chapter 4 proposes a theoretical and methodological framework 
for presupposition, based on principles o f pragmatics and cognitive linguistics. Here I 
discuss more specifically the link between language and underlying mental 
representations, and propose that different levels o f discourse operate by drawing on 
different types o f underlying knowledge. The framework aims to answer Research 
Question 1 and constitutes the main contribution o f the thesis.
Chapter 5 delineates the methodology followed for the application and testing o f the 
framework on the discourse o f Greek lifestyle magazines. It presents in detail the 
stages followed for data selection, starting with the selection o f prototypical 
magazines for analysis. It then discusses the process o f identifying and selecting for 
analysis the advice genre, and the rationale o f selecting genres specifically on sexual 
health. The analysis follows the methodological framework proposed in Chapter 4, 
and section 5.5 presents some more details on how the selected aspects o f the 
framework are applied to the data. Section 5.6 provides a brief discussion on 
translating the data from Greek to English.
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In Chapter 6 I discuss aspects o f the Greek social context pertaining to relationships 
and sexual health, hoping to present some o f the tensions between traditional 
patriarchal and contemporary permissive beliefs in the Greek context, resulting in 
what I have termed ‘transitional heteronormativity’. By that I mean attitudes and 
norms regulating young people’s sexual activity, which allow a range o f freedoms 
hitherto impossible but are still geared towards achieving the Greek (patriarchal) 
family ideal.
The analysis in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 aims to operationalise the framework outlined in 
Chapter 4, while simultaneously attempting to shed some light to the role o f lifestyle 
magazines in establishing and reproducing contemporary transitional 
heteronormativity. In Chapter 7 I consider frame-level mental representations 
activated via lexical items and expressions in the data, including metaphorical 
expressions. In Chapter 8 I examine the role o f assertions in providing presumably 
new information while resting on assumptions about knowledge already shared 
between text producer(s) and text recipient(s), and the role o f relative clauses in 
providing backgrounded and not readily contestable information. Chapter 9 examines 
the setting up o f hypothetical ‘worlds’ or Mental Spaces, through which the 
magazines present possible problems and solutions related to sexual health.
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Chapter 2: Discourse, Cognition, Society
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I present the broader theoretical background underpinning the thesis. 
Broadly this could be situated in what we might call a critical turn in cognition 
research, or a cognitive turn in critical discourse research. I will discuss the 
interrelation among discourse, cognition and society, in order to further build a more 
detailed theoretical socio-cognitive approach to presupposition phenomena against 
this background. Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach to Critical Discourse Analysis 
provides a broad theoretical background for such an endeavour. However, this broad 
theoretical framework needs to be operationalised and informed by more detailed 
methods o f analysis which are at the same time consistent with a cognitively oriented 
discourse analysis. Thus, I present some basic concepts from a variety o f approaches, 
most o f them broadly compatible with van Dijk, and also o f use in the discussion of 
presupposition and analysis later on. Finally, I will briefly discuss how socially 
oriented discourse analytical approaches have been applied to the study o f gender 
specifically as a social issue, and how they may be complemented by a more socio- 
cognitive approach, before I conclude the section.
From the outset, the objective o f adopting a socio-cognitive approach to ideology and 
discourse calls for a definition o f terms. The terms ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ are 
notoriously controversial, and ‘socio-cognitive’ could do with some explanation. 
Below I will review a range o f definitions from the literature and present the 
definitions adopted in this thesis for these terms, mainly following van Dijk, but 
reviewing and taking into account other critical and/or cognitive approaches to 
discourse.
2.2 Interrelation of Discourse, Cognition and Society
2.2.1 Discourse
Van Dijk defines discourse as ‘conversational interaction, written text, gestures, 
facework, typographical layout, images’, that is ‘all semiosis’ (van Dijk, 2001a: 98), a 
view generally adopted in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Moreover, discourse as 
‘language (or semiosis) in use’ (Brown and Yule, 1983) is juxtaposed to ‘language as 
a system ’ which is stored in our memories -  putting the system ‘in use’ automatically 
brings in a specific setting and participants (with specific aims and relations to each 
other), situated in a social context (see also Cameron, 2001: 10-13). Thus, discourse is 
at the same time a social practice (which ‘language as a system ’ is not) (see also 
Fairclough, 1992: 4).3 This means that discourse itself, what is being said, contributes 
to creating, maintaining or disrupting social relations, for example, including unequal, 
oppressive and egalitarian social relations. This is by no means new, as Austin (1975) 
has already highlighted the fact that ‘words are actions’ quite aptly, but CDA focuses 
specifically on actions influencing social relations on a larger scale.
Traditionally (in philosophy) language has been seen as a medium of representing the 
world (or ‘states o f affairs’ in the world -  see Levinson, 1983, on truth conditional 
semantics, and discussion in Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 14-15). In CDA (indeed in 
all non-logical approaches to language) discourse is not seen as being in direct 
correspondence with an objective reality, but mediated by and reflecting (not 
necessarily representing) social context. This has already been a concern o f research
3 This distinction betw een the ‘system ’ and its applications m ay be som ew hat sim plistic, for the sake o f  
explanation. ‘It can be argued that ‘the system ’ o f  human language is ‘d esigned’ for social use (e.g . the 
existence o f  construal and perspective alternatives in grammatical structure) but not for the specific 
social practices that develop in specific  so c ie tie s’ (Paul Chilton, personal com m unication, 2010).
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in variationist sociolinguistics, which found that speakers’ social class and other social
factors (gender, age, area o f residence) correlate with phonetic, morpho-syntactic and 
lexical features in speech (one of the first influential works in this field is Labov, 
1972. See also Milroy, 1980). In discourse analysis the interrelation o f language and 
society is seen in broader terms, in that discourse (including content, lexical and 
syntactic choices) also reflects widely held ideologies, stereotypes etc. emerging from 
the way a society or part o f society (an organisation, institution or community o f 
practice) is structured. Language in use, rather than ‘mirroring’ the world for the 
benefit o f individual hearers/readers, ‘[enables] subjects to experience’ it (Howarth, 
2000: 10). This phrasing automatically indicates that discourse somehow mediates 
between subjects and the world. On the ‘discourse production’ 4 end, no 
‘representation’ is neutral; ‘all representations involve particular points of view, 
values and goals’ (Fairclough, 1995b: 47). On the ‘discourse consumption’ end, ‘de­
coding’ or interpretation o f discourse also depends on the recipients’ points o f view, 
values and goals. From a cognitive linguistic perspective, however, we cannot 
straightforwardly say that language encodes the thoughts o f a speaker about the world, 
rather than the world itself, either. ‘Language evokes ideas, it does not represent them ’ 
(Slobin, 1982: 131-132). Thus, we have two mediating levels between a person and 
the ‘real w orld’: discourse and cognition. Below I will elaborate more on the concept
4 Throughout the thesis I use F airclough’s terms ‘discourse production’ and ‘discourse consum ption’ 
(1992: 7 1 -72), although I am aware that as metaphors they objectify  ‘d iscourse’ in a way not 
corresponding to how  it actually works, and they are also not exactly transparent as to what kinds o f  
processes are involved in either ‘production’ or ‘consum ption’ (cf. O ’H alloran’s critique o f  the term 
‘consum ption’, 2003: 252 f f ) .  Practically, although discourse itse lf is a process im possib le to pin down 
and manipulate, any kind o f  discourse analysis has to resort to som e kind o f  ‘objectification’, whether 
this m eans analysing transcripts, or analysing written texts out o f  context, to som e degree, since an 
‘ana lysis’ context is different to the context in w hich a text may be norm ally read by the audience. As 
for the transparency o f  the terms, Fairclough intends them to mean social processes (w ho produces the 
texts, how  m any people are involved , why, any d iscussions taking place about the text, but also what 
other texts and ideas inform the producers o f  the texts -  and, on the other end, who reads the texts, with  
what intentions, what their social positions are etc., all situated in a particular social context). In 
addition to these, I w ould include cognitive processes o f  producers and consum ers/recipients o f  texts, 
w hich otherw ise m ay be termed ‘en -‘ or ‘de-cod ing’, ‘understanding’, ‘interpreting’, ‘processing’ - in 
general, ‘com m unicating’.
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o f discourse, before moving on to arguing for the study o f cognition in discourse 
analysis.
In the social sciences the term ‘discourse’ is also often used as a count noun, with 
‘discourses’ defined as ‘practices which systematically form the objects o f which they 
speak’ (Foucault, 1972: 49). So ‘a discourse’ is practice, as we see, but one which 
systematically forms objects. In that sense, a discourse is related to (it represents and, 
to some degree, constructs) a particular kind o f (groups of) ‘objects’, a particular field, 
discipline or area o f experience (and ‘from a particular perspective’, Fairclough, 1993: 
135). This is not to say that Foucault defines discourse only, or clearly, this way. He 
points out:
instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’,
I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general 
domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and 
sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements 
(Foucault, 1972: 80).
Discourses as ‘groups o f statements’
correspond roughly to dimensions of texts which have traditionally been 
discussed in terms of ‘content’, ‘ideational meanings’, ‘topic’, ‘subject 
matter’ and so forth. There is a good reason for using ‘discourse’ rather than 
these traditional terms: a discourse is a particular way of constructing ‘subject 
matter’, and the concept differs from its predecessors in emphasizing that 
contents or subject-matters -areas of knowledge- only enter texts in the 
mediated form of particular constructions of them. (Fairclough, 1992: 127- 
128)
Definitions along the same lines are presented very often within CDA by Norman
Fairclough (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 63; Fairclough, 1992: 3; Fairclough,
1993; Fairclough, 2000: 170, 179), but this kind o f definition seems to equate the term
‘discourse’ with the term ‘representation (in discourse/language in use)’. Although
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representation is practice, the term ‘discourse’ as used by Foucault (or Fairclough, for 
that matter) is obviously much more complex than that. In practice, however, 
‘discourse’ is very often used to mean ‘representation’, as in ‘the discourse Man as 
Domestically Incom petent’ (Sunderland, 2004; Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009). In 
addition to discourses being representations, the systematicity o f ‘discourses’ means 
at the same time that ‘discourse’ is broader than ‘representation’, and also that there is 
some kind o f stability -  a ‘discourse’ is not a one-off representation o f an entity or 
action occurring in a text, but rather, the representation draws on a discourse, a 
broader underlying system or set o f representations (or statements, in Foucault’s 
terms), o f which the textual representation is a trace (Fairclough, 1989: 24). Moreover, 
a discourse also includes ‘knowledge and practices generally associated with a 
particular institution or group o f institutions’ (Talbot, 1995: 43), as in ‘medical 
discourse’, ‘political discourse’ etc. This is also in line with the concept o f 
systematicity, if we link the discourse o f institutions to their practices, ideologies, 
policies etc., but it can also be used (uncritically or pre-theoretically) as signifying 
simply the language used by certain institutions.
The various approaches and definitions o f ‘discourse(s)’ in the social sciences have 
led to calls for disambiguation and explicitness in the use o f the term, both from critics 
and proponents o f CDA (van Dijk, 1998: 193, 197; for a critical approach see 
W iddowson, 1995: 158). Although discourse is not to be entirely conflated with 
practice, knowledge, representation or ideology, clearly these are interrelated -  it is 
not possible to have language in use which does not draw on knowledge o f a linguistic 
system. It is not possible to talk about anything without ‘representing’ it in language, 
or represent anything in language without drawing on a mental representation of it. 
And although all discourse is practice/action, indeed a social practice in a variety of
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ways, not all practices are (merely) discourse, and not all discourse, action or 
knowledge is necessarily ideological, or to the same degree (see 4.6). Bearing these 
distinctions in mind, I would nevertheless argue that using the count noun ‘discourse’ 
as a configuration o f speaking, cognitive representation and action is analytically 
useful. Using an alternative term such as ‘practice’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘representation’ 
can place emphasis on different aspects o f one’s data, whereas in my view ‘discourse’ 
brings together ways o f thinking and speaking/writing which result from and 
constitute social practice. Thus, I align m yself with the theoretical position o f CDA on 
the dialectical relation between discourse and society (e.g. Fairclough, 1992: 60, 64), 
and specifically with Teun van D ijk’s argument that this relation is mediated by 
cognition (1993:110).
2.2.2 Discourse and cognition -  Discursive psychology
Foucault and poststructuralist thinking have been o f major influence in the ‘discursive 
turn’ in social psychology, resulting in discursive psychology. One could distinguish 
between two strands, both influenced by poststructuralism (for a brief review see 
Sunderland, 2004: 186 f.). For the purposes o f this discussion I will not distinguish 
between these two, since I address principles common to both, as well as to other 
work drawing on poststructuralism such as Baxter (2003), Butler (1990; 1993) and 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Poststructuralism stems from and shares a number of 
characterstics o f postmodernism, notably ‘its sense o f scepticism towards all universal 
causes, its questioning o f what ‘true’ or ‘real’ knowledge is, and its loss o f certainty o f 
all absolutes’ (Baxter, 2003: 6; 21-28). Further, poststructuralism prioritises
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language/discourse as the site o f construction o f social reality and identities (ibid., see 
also discussion below).
Poststructuralist approaches have often involved definitions o f the term ‘discourse’ 
similar to the ones presented in 2.1 in order to speak o f ‘broad constitutive systems o f  
meaning’ and ‘ways o f  seeing the w orld ’ (Sunderland, 2004: 6, emphasis in original. 
See also Baxter, 2003: 7-11). In discursive psychology, roughly equivalent terms to 
‘discourses’ include ‘interpretive repertoires’ (see Edley, 2001: 210 for a discussion o f 
the similarities and differences o f these terms; also Potter and Wetherell, 1987; 
Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 90) or (cultural) systems of meaning (Weatherall, 2002: 
76, 123). Sunderland (2004: 62) observes that ‘discourses’ correspond roughly to what 
Wetherell, Stiven and Potter describe as ‘the systems of making sense available in ... 
society’ (1987: 59) or ‘collectively shared practical ideologies’, i.e. ‘systems of belief 
o f thought which maintain asymmetrical power relations and inequalities between 
social groups’ (ibid.: 1987: 60).
Discursive psychologists, despite also using terms such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘ideas’, 
are opposed to studying cognition (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 28). I think this 
scepticism concerning cognitively oriented critical research stems from a series of 
misconceptions, some of which I will now discuss.
a. Studying cognition is essentialist
This is not so much a criticism directed towards cognitive approaches by anti- 
cognitivist researchers, as an unfortunate reality o f at least some research on 
cognition, which unsurprisingly does not help the promotion o f non-essentialist 
cognitive research.
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Essentialism is said to stem from the Aristotelian belief that everything has an 
‘essence’, a core, which is its genuine, true nature, independent o f culture or context, 
and which inevitably leads to an end/goal (telos). In the social sciences biological 
essentialism is called the belief that different categories o f people have different 
‘essences’, biologically grounded traits and dispositions that are not only physical but 
also mental and personality characteristics. Essentialism, best understood as not a 
single belief but a system of beliefs, serves to justify on ‘biological grounds’ 
inequalities and unfair treatment o f categories o f people, forging irrelevant links 
between biology and (real or imaginary) traits and behaviours supposedly indexed by 
differences in skin colour, facial characteristics or genitals. The argument goes, if 
these traits are biologically grounded, we can do nothing to change them and w e’d 
better accept them and arrange our lives accordingly -  e.g., by not allowing people do 
things they are not ‘biologically destined’ to do, and forcing them to do what they 
supposedly are.
How can studying cognition be essentialist? This depends largely on the questions one 
asks, the research methodology and the interpretation o f the findings. Presuming that 
there are certain differences among social groups, and that they have a biological 
cause, and consequently setting out to find and measure these differences is bound to 
reinforce at least some initial presumptions (see Brehm and Kassim, 1996: 128 on 
‘confirmation biases’, esp. Johnston and Macrae, 1994). An example o f this type o f 
bias is James W atson’s research on comparing IQ among nationalities5 (see Milmo, 
2007 for media commentary, and Rushton and Jensen, 2008 for a discussion along 
W atson’s lines o f argument). For a critical discussion on essentialism and gender see 
Talbot (1998: 8-13) and Aries (1996; 1997) cited in Weatherall (2002: 66). Both
5 Thanks to Majid K hosraviNik for bringing this research to my attention.
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Talbot and Aries also acknowledge the existence o f biology, but still point out the 
pitfalls o f essentialism (see also Bordo, 1999: 253 for an insightful argument related to 
essentialism in science -  namely, that essentialism is unscientific to begin with). 
Nevertheless, recently a trend has emerged which Deborah Cameron has termed ‘New 
Biologism ’ (2009), based on which male and female behavioural differences result not 
from socio-cultural factors but from biological differences, both physical and 
cognitive, between male and female human beings. Problems related to issues of 
research questions and interpretations are one good reason for scepticism in the social 
sciences about the study o f biology (and, consequently, o f cognition, considered part 
o f biology).
However, Newmeyer observes that Chomsky’s postulation o f the language faculty as 
part o f universal human nature is in fact not essentialist, as it does not attribute 
characteristics supposed to indicate biological inferiority or superiority to groups of 
people.6 Since the language capacity is common in all humans, no human can be 
considered inferior based on a presumed biological ‘language deficiency’ (Newmeyer, 
1986: 76-77). Elsewhere I have also argued that it is much more productive from a 
social critical perspective to acknowledge equal biological status for all humans, and 
further attribute inequalities to environment (Polyzou, 2004). This is not to say that I 
agree with Chom sky’s theory o f the language faculty as a whole. (I do not think that 
innate characteristics are immune to environment, nor that the capacity for language is 
independent o f other mental faculties.) Rather, the same argument made from a 
Chomskyan perspective is being made by cognitive linguistics, focussing on physical 
experience common to all humanity irrespective o f biological or other differences
6 N ew m eyer  m akes this point in relation to Chom skyan linguistics and its postulation o f ‘human nature’, 
but the sam e argument goes for all accounts o f  ‘human nature’, including cognitive approaches to 
language and the mind.
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among individuals or groups o f individuals (see e.g. Johnson’s discussion of 
‘em bodim ent’, 1987: xiv).
Overall it is important to bear in mind that it is one thing to consider work on biology 
in general, or cognition in particular, with caution, and another thing to dismiss such 
work altogether because o f the possibility that it might be misinterpreted (or indeed 
the fact that often it is misinterpreted, and exploited to serve ideological agendas).
b. Studying cognition (in relation to language) means assuming cognition (and/or 
language) to be stable
This might have been an assumption underlying some cognitive research, or it might 
have been a misinterpretation o f this research (Ng, 1990 and Ng, Chan, Weatherall 
and Moody, 1993). For example, Weatherall suggests th a tN g ’s (1990) study assumes 
that ‘ masculine generics are sexist because the words ‘he’ and ‘m an’ have inherent 
masculine m eaning’ (2002: 26). It is unclear what ‘inherent’ means, but most linguists 
(including cognitive linguists) would agree that the meaning o f words is conventional 
rather than ‘natural’, that the meaning o f words changes over time, and that context 
plays a role in discourse interpretation. It seems that W eatherall’s criticism stems from 
the fact that experimental research decontextualises words (ibid.), which is a valid 
criticism, but does not necessarily mean that one has to interpret findings as indicating 
some inherent, unchanging quality in mental representations and their relationship 
with words. Every act o f observation and/or analysis (including all forms o f discourse 
analysis) inevitably isolates and de- or re-contextualises the object studied, albeit in 
different degrees. What research can do is capture a moment in time, say, in N g’s 
case, capture one aspect o f how (these particular) subjects conceptualised the words 
and concepts o f ‘he’ and ‘man’ with minimal (or no) context. In 2.2.1 I have
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deliberately emphasised the relative stability o f ‘discourses’ and mental 
representations — I could just as well have spoken o f relative fluidity, but the operative 
word here is ‘relative’. Therefore, the facts that mental representations have a certain 
degree o f stability and a certain degree o f stability do not need to be mutually 
exclusive, not is it necessary to make a strong claim in favour o f one or the other 
extreme (total stability vs. continuous flux) in order to conduct a critical analysis of 
discourse and cognition.
c. Studying cognition is individualistic
This criticism is rather confusing, as it is not clear what ‘individualism’ means. 
Wetherell and Potter (1992) claim that in social cognition analysis ‘the perceiver often 
remains a lone individual who forms, apparently in isolation, her or his account o f [the 
w orld]’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 29), and thus the ‘socio-cognitive model of 
analysis pits a self-contained individual against the complexities of the real 
environm ent’ (ibid.: 30) (see also Potter, 1996). However, adopting a model whereby 
individuals draw on interpretive repertoires, with the repertoires opening up 
possibilities for them or restraining them (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992) is also open to the same criticism, since also Wetherell and Potter admit 
that discourse does not ‘[work] smoothly and automatically to produce objects and 
subjects’ (1992: 90). The question o f individual agency versus social and discursive 
construction is always an issue in critical research (including Potter and W etherell’s 
own research), and studying cognition does by no means imply that an individual is 
‘self-contained’ and immune to influence from discourse. One could actually argue 
that ignoring the social and cognitive context in which an interaction takes place, and 
focussing only on discourse produced in one discursive event is individualistic, as it 
seems to consider only the discursive practice o f the specific individuals participating
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in the event. Sunderland (2004: 187-188) discusses Potter’s notion o f uptake in 
conversation (1996: 187) and correctly points out that one’s words may or may not 
have a certain effect, depending on whether the recipients are sceptical, credulous, 
drunk, experienced or inexperienced, etc. What I consider individualistic is to only 
take these parameters into account (which are mental states to begin with), and not 
also why  certain recipients are sceptical and others credulous, what it means to be 
experienced or inexperienced (having or not certain kinds o f knowledge), and not 
considering the links among kinds o f audiences and social context.
A good example is W etherall’s criticism o f her own early work, in a study finding, 
roughly speaking, that drawing on gender stereotypes is influenced, among other 
factors, by the subjects’ ‘Attitudes Towards W omen’, measured by a scale (Ng et al., 
1993). The study included learning o f nonsense words associated with pictures o f men 
and women -  Weatherall suggests that the study’s assumptions about language 
learning and meaning could be criticised, but ‘the study was interesting because it 
gave some indication o f how individual cognitive processes may mediate between 
culture and language change’ (Weatherall, 2002: 25). Now one might consider this 
study ‘individualistic’, in that not everyone associated the learnt nonsense words with 
gender stereotypes to the same degree, or in the same way, and this places emphasis 
on ‘self-contained’ individuals as opposed to social constructs like stereotypes. 
However, I would not consider anyone’s ‘Attitude Towards W omen’ to be a strictly 
‘individual’ thing -  it depends very much on the social background and experiences of 
the individual, including previous exposure to related discourse (and this makes it 
very hard to define and measure on a scale, as well). One’s attitude towards women 
can very well be already a cluster o f stereotypes itself. Cameron (1992: 61) points out 
that gender 4should never be used as a bottom line explanation, because it is a social
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construct needing explanation itse lf  (emphasis in original) -  in this case I would add 
that ‘attitudes’ (however defined) are also social (and cognitive) constructs, needing 
explanation themselves. Thus, the problem in Ng et al.’s (1993) study is not that it is 
necessarily individualistic, but that it is interpreted as such, by W eatherall’s 
description o f attitudes as ‘individual cognitive processes’.
d. Cognition cannot be observed and therefore cannot be studied
Problems caused by the use and definition o f terms such as ‘attitude’ have played a 
role in the ‘discursive turn’ in psychology. Studying discourse, especially synchronous 
spoken interaction, allows one to take situational context into account (and other 
things, such as negotiation o f meaning). This has not only been a methodological turn, 
but also a theoretical one (as discussed above) -  for discursive psychology, ‘emotions, 
beliefs and opinions are not private things hiding inside the person: they are created by 
the language used to describe or account for them ’ (Mcllvenny, 2002: 17).
We can define ‘private’ in various ways (difficult or impossible to know, needing 
some elicitation, unique and individual), but on the one hand, ‘private’ does not have 
to mean ‘stable’, and on the other, assuming that something is not private does not tell 
us much about whether it exists independent o f discourse. Also, pointing out that 
cognition is not directly observable does not mean that it is not indirectly observable. 
Van Dijk aptly points out that ‘society’ is also an abstraction (1998: 43-46), which we 
observe indirectly through human behaviour and material effects. He also points out 
that, if we do not posit a cognitive locus for ‘discourses’ or ‘repertoires’, then they 
almost become like metaphysical entities floating around ‘in society’ -  although 
‘discourses’ might ‘float’ in that they are ever-changing, for them to be manifested in 
discourse or action, we need to assume their prior existence in social cognition.
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According to Sunderland (2004: 186), Potter (and presumably discursive psychology 
in general) ‘does not say that there are no ‘in-the-head’ representations or perceptions, 
rather that a study o f ‘fact construction’ is better served by ‘selectively combining 
elements from the constructionism in linguistics, conversation analysis and post- 
structuralism’ (1996: 120)’. Focus on language and not cognition may thus be seen as 
‘analytically more productive’ (Wetherell et al., 1987: 60-61). However, for Cognitive 
Linguistics studying language is studying cognition. Cognitive Linguistics believes we 
can examine/ we have access to cognition through language (‘grammar is 
conceptualisation’, Croft and Cruse, 2004: Chapter 1).
2.2.3 Conclusion
One thus wonders if whether by adopting a poststructuralist approach one is adopting 
a different methodological or a different theoretical approach. Baxter (2003) with 
Feminist Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis claims to be offering a feminist 
methodology. To some extent, we are talking about a difference in focus -  if we are 
looking at how interactions participants negotiate identities and other-representations 
(by drawing on various discourses/repertoires), we still need some idea about the 
content o f these discourses. Although traditional social psychology has not been much 
concerned with this issue, theoretically at least CDA is able to address fluctuations 
and negotiation o f power and identity (see Kosetzi, 2007). In fact, Fairclough calls for 
detailed analysis o f specific interactions exactly in order to avoid one-sided 
impressions o f power and effects o f discourse, something Foucault has been criticised 
o f (Fairclough, 1992: 59).
I would argue that, in theory, any critical cognitive approach could address the issue 
o f negotiation (of meaning and o f power), by adopting a pragmatics-oriented
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perspective (see Chapter 3). At the same time, in order to be critical, we have to take 
into account power relations and representations pre-existing the interaction.
2.3 Discourse and cognition in CDA
Although for the most part CDA does not follow poststructuralism, epistemologically 
or ontologically,7 it has been, as we saw, influenced by the ideas o f Michel Foucault - 
especially the Duisburg group (for more detailed accounts o f the concept o f 
‘discourse’ in CDA, see Reisigl, 2007; Wodak, 2008b; and Reisigl and Sarazin, 
forthcoming). Overall, however, CDA considers the relationship between discourse 
and society as mutually constitutive (see e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), 
rather than following entirely the poststructuralist position o f considering only 
discourse as constructing society. Social conditions (and social cognition -  see next 
paragraph) also influence the production o f discourse.
Despite the frequent use o f concepts such as ‘knowledge’, ‘m eaning’, ideology’, 
‘be lief and ‘thought’ in order to engage in critical research, CDA does not necessarily 
or primarily focus on cognition-related research. CDA is multidisciplinary and 
heterogeneous (see Wodak and Meyer, 2001; Reisigl and Sarazin, forthcoming), with 
van D ijk’s theoretical work placing heavy emphasis on the interrelation o f discourse, 
cognition and society. Wodak acknowledges the significance o f cognition, and 
occasionally draws on concepts o f (social) cognition research (e.g. ‘schemata’ in 
1996: 110), but does not engage extensively with this research herself. Fairclough also 
reviews cognitive approaches to language and finds common points with CDA (1989: 
11, 24, 91), but he also does not give cognition a central place in later work. Chilton
7 N either does C ognitive L inguistics, for that matter, with both C D A  and CL fo llow in g  an anti- 
objectivist, experientialist approach (Stockw ell, 2000: 513).
8 N or can w e necessarily call Foucault a poststructuralist without som e qualification -  but this merits 
discussion  w hich is beyond the scope o f  this chapter (but see Kaur, 2007: 41-42).
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has been incorporating work from Cognitive Linguistics and CDA, as well as 
Pragmatics, both in theorising and analysing political discourse (1985; 1987; 1988; 
1996; 2004; 2005), offering perhaps the most complete approach. However, the 
proliferation o f work applying CDA in the past 20 or so years for the most part does 
not address issues o f cognition, while the most outspoken proponent o f adopting a 
cognitive approaches for CDA, Teun van Dijk, does not propose a methodology for 
analysing discourse from this perspective. He does however offer valuable insights, 
which I will address below.
Van Dijk argues that, in addition to the definition o f discourse as social practice, and 
the mutual interdependence o f discourse and society, (social) cognition should also be 
taken into account, as an interface between ‘discourse and society and between 
individual speech participants and social groups o f which they are m em bers’ (van 
Dijk, 1994: 110); individuals are able to produce and interpret discourse only on the 
basis o f shared knowledge and beliefs, not only because the meanings o f the linguistic 
expressions used are conventional and hence shared, but also because a lot of meaning 
is not linguistically encoded, but still communicated through coherence, 
presuppositions, implicatures and indirectness in general, and these meanings can only 
be understood on the basis o f shared knowledge (van Dijk, 1994; 1998; 2001b; 2003 -  
the argument has been put forward already in Schank and Abelson, 1977).
The very claim that society and discourse mutually influence and construct each other 
can only be explained with the postulation of a social cognitive interface mediating 
between the social context individuals find themselves in and the discourse they 
produce. Thus, on the one hand, ‘social structures can only ‘affect’ discourse 
structures through social cognition’ (van Dijk, 1994: 110). That is, ideologies and 
shared mental representations in general are determined (to a certain extent) by social
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structure and they are expressed by individuals through discourse -  social structures 
themselves are not expressed through discourse directly (van Dijk, 1994; 2001b). On 
the other hand, ‘discourse can only ‘affect’ social structures through the social minds 
o f discourse participants’ (van Dijk, 1994: 110) rather than having a direct impact on 
society. It is difficult to find out how discourse can affect the minds o f discourse 
participants, but arguably certain discourse structures, strategies and moves will 
influence the construction o f online models by the participants - according to van Dijk 
(2001b), discursive strategies like topicalisation or specification (giving a lot of 
details) creates a stronger memory o f the entity represented, and thus can influence not 
only short-term but also long-term mem ory.9 In discourse one might elaborate on the 
positive characteristics o f one’s group and downplay the negative ones, and 
conversely, when talking about another group, with which there may be conflict, one 
will elaborate on the negative aspects o f the Other and downplay the positive ones. 
There is other research exploring the elusive relation between discourse and cognition 
based on empirical/experimental data, which I will not review here in its entirety.10 Of 
interest are also Frank Boers’ work on metaphor affecting decision making (1997) and 
Steve Oswald’s work on discourse and manipulation (2010), while Sarazin (2009) 
observes that Relevance Theory (a cognitive pragmatic approach) seems to be 
supported by psychological work such as Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) and Wilson and 
Matsui (2000).11 Overall, research on the relation between discourse and cognition is 
under way, although the relation is by no means straightforward or easy to study, it 
should be taken into account.
9 ‘M em ory’ as d iscussed here is ‘nothing but a theoretical construct o f  the ‘co g n itive’ part or dim ension  
o f  the m ind, that is, the theoretical location where information is stored and processed’ (van Dijk, 1998:
21).
101 discuss som e experim ents o f  social psychological research in this chapter (2 .5 .3  and 2.6).
11 N um erous references to experim ental work supporting R elevance Theory can be found in W ilson and 
Sperber (2 0 0 4 /2006).
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In particular, in CDA, adopting a cognitive linguistic perspective addresses the 
problem o f selecting a theory o f language. According to Fairclough ‘[tjextual analysis 
presupposes a theory o f language and a grammatical theory, and one problem for 
critical discourse analysis is to select from amongst those available’ (1995a: 10). 
O ’Halloran (2003) points out that another problem can be actually not having an 
explicit theory o f language, as it can lead to problematic analysis. Chilton emphasises 
that, by ignoring cognition and its workings, CDA may appear to be making claims ‘in 
a theoretical vacuum ’ (2005: 34; see also van Dijk, 1998: 43- 46). Therefore, a critical 
discourse analyst must self-consciously and explicitly adopt a theory o f language. I 
would further add that the selected theory must be compatible with the 
epistemological positions o f CDA, and that CL is the one o f the most compatible 
available theories.
Although CL (as well as Relevance Theory) often does not deal with socio-cultural 
aspects o f discourse, as Stockwell observes (2000), it most certainly does not deny 
their importance for language and cognition. From the origins o f Frame Semantics 
Fillmore (1985) chooses to call his approach ‘semantics o f understanding’, 
juxtaposing it to ‘semantics o f truth’ (Truth Conditional Semantics), and 
acknowledges the cultural input to the world knowledge constituting frames (for a 
detailed account o f frames and frame semantics see 2.5.1.
Regardless o f degree o f allegiance to the field currently known as CDA, there has 
been some critical cognitive linguistic research. Apart from the work o f Paul Chilton 
mentioned in 2.3, George Lakoff has been applying his Cognitive M etaphor Theory in 
his critique o f US politics (1991; 2002; 2003; 2004). Cognitive Metaphor Theory has 
also been applied to critical studies o f language and gender (e.g. Polyzou, 2004; 
Roller, 2004), and overall rather enthusiastically embraced for various critical studies
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on representation and ideology, broadly speaking (see Hart, 2010, for extensive 
references). Further critical work employing cognitive linguistics not limited to the 
study o f conceptual metaphor includes Dirven, Hawkins and Sandikfioglu (2001), 
Dirven, Frank and Ilie (2001), Chilton (2004), Hart and Lukes (2007), Hart (2010; 
2011) and Sarazin (in preparation). It seems then that it is in the past decade or so that 
research employing cognitive linguistic theories and methods has started being 
employed for the critical study o f discourse, which I have labelled at the beginning o f 
this chapters ‘cognitive turn in critical discourse analysis’.
2.4 Aspects of social cognition
The term ‘social’ can be understood in at least two ways. Broadly, it refers to anything 
that has to do with human contact and relations, including communication. No 
individual lives in a vacuum, and language is an essentially social institution, as 
communication presupposes at least two communicating individuals (in my view 
soliloquy is not communication). Interpersonal relations, shared knowledge o f a 
specific variety o f a language and conventions such as politeness and the performance 
o f speech acts apply to this aspect o f ‘social’ use o f language. Critical discourse and 
social studies, however, seem to focus on the sense o f ‘social’ as referring to anything 
that has to do with ‘society’ as a total o f structures and processes on a larger scale, 
affecting larger groups o f people and therefore concerned not simply with 
interpersonal contact and relations, but also with group relations, where power is 
exercised, negotiated and potentially (or actually) abused. This can also happen with 
power relations among individuals, but social groups relations are also permeated by 
structures, institutions, laws, policies and conventions beyond the individual. CDA
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overall considers relations o f power among groups situated within the broader social 
context (see e.g. van Dijk, 1993).
Clearly these two aspects o f the word ‘social’ are by no means separate. It is rather a 
matter o f scope, where we participate in any interaction both as unique individuals and 
also as social (and political) animals. Any interaction is at least partly informed by 
socio-cultural, socio-economic and socio-political factors, although to what extent and 
with what implications will vary. The same goes for individual and social cognition -  
the two are not separate entities, occupying different ‘locations’ in someone’s brain. 
Rather, the distinction between the two is a theoretical and methodological one. 
Speaking o f ‘social cognition’ allows us to focus on human mental capacities and 
properties when they are put in use in relation to matters o f ‘society’ as defined above, 
and on shared mental representations (see below).
Van Dijk defines social cognition as follows:
the system of mental structures and operations that are acquired, used or changed in 
social context by social actors and shared by the members of social groups, 
organizations and cultures. This system consists of several subsystems, such as 
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, norms and values, and the ways these are 
affected and brought to bear in discourse and other social practices (2003: 89).
The shared mental structures referred to in the above are what is termed ‘social 
representations’, and, as we can see, van Dijk discusses the fact that they are 
organised in social cognition as ‘knowledge, attitudes and ideologies’.
The terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘attitude’ as significant parts o f social cognition refer to 
clusters o f ‘factual’ and ‘evaluative beliefs’ respectively. Van Dijk defines beliefs 
roughly as ‘building blocks o f the m ind’ (1998: 19); that is, beliefs are ‘units or 
representations’ which can be ‘constructed, stored, reactivated, organized in larger
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units’ (1998: 21), and will further constitute the total o f one’s knowledge or attitude 
about something.
Knowledge is the total o f factual beliefs that are deemed to be true by the truth criteria 
o f a group, community or culture (van Dijk, 1998: 25; 2003). Factual beliefs refer to 
facts, whether something is or is not the case. These factual beliefs may be considered 
wrong or untrue by other truth criteria, shared by other groups or cultures -  hence, 
what is defined knowledge is not ‘objective’ or ‘universal’, but always context-bound, 
true for a specific group (it can only be universal if it satisfies truth criteria which 
happen to be shared by everyone in the world). O f course, apart from shared, social 
factual beliefs, which constitute social knowledge one may have personal beliefs and 
personal knowledge. Moreover, one may have personal or shared evaluative beliefs, 
that is, beliefs not about whether something is or is not the case, but about whether 
something is right or wrong, good or bad etc. A cluster o f socially shared evaluative 
beliefs is an attitude. The distinction between factual and evaluative beliefs, 
knowledge and attitudes, is a useful theoretical distinction, but it is hard to see how 
this would correspond to mental representations. Clearly it is not the case that purely 
factual and purely evaluative beliefs exist and are clustered together in memory, 
separately with each other. Both in linguistic and mental representation o f people or 
groups, evaluation is inextricably linked with expressions and beliefs about what the 
‘facts’ are. Thus, in a group schema one may have o f immigrants, there will be both 
factual and evaluative beliefs, but we may want to separate them in our analysis to
show how attitudes about a group are prejudiced, and how they contribute to, e.g.,
• 12racist or sexist ideologies.
12 One m ethodological problem  with attitudes is that, unlike know ledge, it’s harder to describe them as 
analysts through language -  w e cannot go much beyond ‘positive/negative evaluation’.
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Van Dijk points out that ‘ideologies are [also] clusters o f beliefs in our m inds’ (van 
Dijk, 1998: 26); they are shared, ‘social belief system s’ (van Dijk, 1998: 29) and 
include both knowledge and attitudes. What belief or belief system is ideological is 
ultimately dependent on social factors (e.g. social group membership) and not on 
different cognitive structure. The question then is who shares these belief systems, 
with what goals and with what results. Ideologies are linked to social groups and their
• 1 3 *interests. Social groups are distinguished both from random groups o f people who 
are together by chance (like passengers on the same flight) and from social categories 
defined by socio-biological or socio-economical (more or less inevitable) properties 
like skin colour or socio-economic class. Membership to a social group presupposes a 
sense o f collective identity14 as well as common goals and interests, that is, one 
belongs to a group once one fee ls  part o f the group; a homeless person does not belong 
to the social group o f homeless unless they are aware that it is not only personal but 
also social circumstances involved in his or her position. Thus, not all women will 
share a feminist ideology, but the women who are aware o f the systematic inequality 
and dominance by other groups (i.e. groups o f heterosexual men) over women, and 
who share the common goal o f achieving gender equality, will. The definition of 
social groups in relation to ideology and vice versa is partially or fully circular -  being 
a member o f the social group o f feminist women takes both satisfying the biological 
criterion o f being born female (however this is medically defined in any given 
culture), but also sharing a sense o f collective identity and feminist ideology. There 
are certain social groups, like churches or political parties, where membership is
13 See d iscussion  in van Dijk (1994; 1998).
14 Identity is defined as self-representation, personal when it refers to each individual’s total o f  self- 
representations as a unique human being, or social when referring to the total o f  group self-schem ata  
that constitute the social identity o f  an individual belonging to various social groups (van Dijk, 1998: 
140 ff).
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solely defined by sharing the ideology o f the group. Once one stops having the 
respective religious or political ideology, one stops belonging to the group.15
Van D ijk’s definition o f ideology is compatible with other approaches, which I briefly 
discuss here. The connection o f ideologies and social group interests bears obvious 
similarities to the M arxist definition o f ideology as ‘a view o f society from the 
standpoint o f a particular social class acting in accordance with its own interests’ 
(Jones, 2001: 235). There are, however, two significant differences: in the Marxist 
approach it is the dominant class (or, in the broader terms o f van Dijk, social group) 
that uses ideology as a system of ideas in order to legitimate the unequal social 
relations and make them appear commonsensical (Jones, 2001). Thus, (and this is the 
second difference) ideology is a result o f certain power relations and social structures, 
rather than a pre-existing system of ideas that shapes people’s actions and society. 
Van Dijk though (1998) argues that systems of beliefs that defend the rights and 
interests o f dominated groups are also ideologies (e.g. feminism or anti-racism), and 
suggests a relationship o f mutual constituency between ideology and society. Indeed, 
ideology can be seen as pre-existing and shaping social reality when even members of 
privileged social groups become aware o f social inequalities and are willing to 
participate in social change, such as men contributing to the acknowledgement of 
wom en’s rights or white activists against racism. Social reality may be conductive to 
certain groups developing certain ideologies, in order to perpetuate a privileged 
position or resist domination, but there is no straightforward, fixed group-to-ideology 
correspondence. Thus, in my analysis I am expecting to find both dominant and 
resisting ideologies in relation to gender (even in the discourse o f the same magazine).
15 This is different to ‘social category’, which I w ill define as how  one is categorised by others. I.e., 
‘w o m en ’ is a social category, because all w om en will be at least potentially discriminated against, 
regardless o f  their ow n ideo log ies and social group m em berships, just because they are wom en.
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Fairclough (1992: 87 ff.) also discusses the difficulties with defining ‘ideology’ only 
as a tool for maintaining the status quo -  he points out that struggle to transform social 
(including discursive) practices is ideological and may have an impact on society. 
Therefore, ‘discursive practices are ideologically invested in so far as they incorporate 
significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations’ (1992: 
91). This is perhaps the most clear criterion o f distinguishing ideological from non- 
ideological beliefs, while at the same time avoiding the issue o f truth and falsity.16 
That is to say, it is not the case that ‘ideological’ beliefs are false and oppressive, 
while ‘non-ideological’ beliefs are true and liberating.17 Rather, all (systems of) 
beliefs which are related to unequal social relations in a way that they either affirm or 
contest them (or create them, I might add), are ideological (because contestation in 
discourse at least contributes to a change o f power relations, although it is not the only 
factor). Thus, ultimately, determining whether a belief is ideological or not is not a 
matter o f a different cognitive representation (to non-ideological beliefs), but a matter 
o f the social context in which it emerges, and the social entities it refers to. However, 
van Dijk does observe that ideologies have a very prominent evaluative component in 
mental representation (1998), which I would attribute to their relation to group 
membership and identity, and to (real or created) conflict o f interests and goals among
1 o
groups (see also 2.5.3).
2.4.1 Ideology vs. knowledge
Van Dijk (2005) also distinguishes between (presupposed) beliefs that are considered 
shared knowledge in a particular epistemic community, and ‘presumptions’, which are
16 H ow ever, Fairclough prefers to talk o f  ‘structures’ or ‘orders o f  d iscourse’ rather than system s o f  
beliefs (1992: 9 7  ff.).
17 An approach w hich seem s to be the reason for Foucault’s ‘[resistance] to the concept o f  id eo lo g y ’, 
due to his relativism  (Fairclough, 1992: 60).
18 From a R elevance Theoretical perspective, Zegarac observes in ideological statem ents the 
‘superseding o f  linguistic m eaning by social function’ (2003: 161).
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defined differently to Chilton’s notion o f presumptions (2004: 64-65 -  see 3.4.3), 
namely, as ‘presupposed beliefs that are in fact ideological assumptions and not 
knowledge’ (van Dijk, 2005: 88). This is potentially contradicting van D ijk’s earlier 
stance (e.g. 2003), which moves away from the (philosophical) definition of 
knowledge as ‘justified true beliefs’ and points out that ‘knowledge’ is defined as such 
by the epistemic criteria o f each community, and that one group’s ‘knowledge’ is 
another group’s ‘ideology/opinion’ (van Dijk, 1998; 2003). However, with his 
definition o f ‘presum ption’ van Dijk implicitly claims that ideological assumptions 
cannot be knowledge. And he claims that they are not knowledge because they are not 
‘certified knowledge o f the community’ (2005: 88). He ignores the fact that ‘certified 
knowledge o f the community’ can be both false and ideological, as well as that 
ideological beliefs can also be true -  such as ‘women have equal intellectual 
capacities as m en’. 19 O f course, I can only say that this belief is true based on 
satisfaction o f certain epistemic criteria o f some communities I belong to (e.g. 
scientific evidence). It is still an ideological belief though, because it is contested, 
contestable, and related to social group interests, inequality and potential conflict. 
Also, according to van Dijk, racist beliefs are not ‘true’, but ‘presented as true’, and 
they are not true because they do not satisfy the epistemic criteria and consensus o f 
our community/society. Van Dijk here also ignores that no community or society is 
homogeneous, and some of the communities/social groups he belongs to would not 
consider racist beliefs valid, but some others would.
Unfortunately the only criterion needed for something to count as true in a group is 
consensus, which may well be false/socially damaging. All ideological beliefs, true or
19 This is too broad a generalisation and w ould have to be qualified in various w ays before it is accepted  
as a ‘certified’ scientific statement, but for our purposes here w e can consider it the general conclusion  
em erging from a number o f  scientific statements.
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false, are shared by some sub-groups and contested by others within the same society 
or larger grouping. And most importantly, the epistemic criteria o f any society/group 
are defined more often than not by its elites (which could be scientific/intellectual 
communities, the media, powerful political figures, groups controlling sources of 
wealth etc.).20 If certain elite members happen to be racist, it is more likely that other 
elite non-elite members will accept such beliefs, than if racist beliefs are held and 
expressed by marginal groups. Hegemonically established racist beliefs can be 
‘certified knowledge’ within a community, and accepted as such by all members of 
the community, and it only takes an outside/distanced perspective to point out 
alternative options/systems of belief. If the elites o f a community happen to believe 
that racism is unfounded, (and anti-racism is ‘certified knowledge’ in their 
communities), racism is wrong but not just because these elites/epistemic criteria say 
so. (cf. Sayer (e.g. 2009) on critique judging ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ based on human 
suffering and wellbeing; also Fairclough (1995a: 18) on claims o f truth or falsity and 
analysis o f  ideology.
For a critical analysis, then, we may want to examine the kind o f systems of beliefs 
underlying texts, whether these systems have the status o f knowledge within an 
epistemic community, and what it is that contributes to consensus constructing such 
knowledge. The latter may be extra-textual factors, from coercion to institutional and 
social norms, as well as beliefs manifested in texts other than the texts under analysis. 
These are all factors to be taken into account, to the extent that we can identify them. 
We further need to consider how they are articulated in a certain text, and the potential 
cognitive effects the text may have on the recipients. Cognitive linguistics can provide 
methodological tools for such an analysis, or at least can be useful in helping us
20 Ironically, even an oppressed group may have (and usually has) internal hierarchy. Such a group may 
not have the pow er to define ‘kn ow led ge’, but its ideology w ill be defined based on its own elites.
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develop such tools. The concept o f mental models (frames/schemata) has been shown 
to be useful in analysing referential strategies, i.e. systematic ways o f representing 
groups from particular ideological perspectives (Hart, 2010). Frames will be a central 
category in my analysis as well (Chapter 7). Below I provide a review o f the literature 
on mental models and explain how these terms will be used in the rest o f the thesis.
2.5 Mental models
2.5.1 Frames -  definitions and related terms
In the field o f Cognitive Linguistics the term ‘frame’ initially was employed to in 
order to account for the meaning o f words, providing an alternative to ‘checklist’ 
linguistic theories o f meaning (compositional semantics). That is, instead o f having a 
list o f properties or semantic features which constitute the meaning o f a word, a word 
can only be understood in terms o f its ‘frame’, where frame is defined as ‘any system 
o f linguistic choices ... that can get associated with prototypical instances of scenes’ 
(Fillmore 1975: 124, cited in Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 209, see also Tannen, 
1993b: 20).21 A much-cited example of such a frame would be that o f the word ‘buy’, 
which, according to Fillmore, would prototypically involve a buyer, a seller, certain 
goods and money -  this frame would also apply to verbs like ‘sell’, ‘cost’ or ‘charge’, 
which would refer to the same frame but from a different perspective (Ungerer and 
Schmid, 1996: 206-207). In any actual sentence, when the word ‘buy’ is used, the 
action o f buying and the agent (buyer) is foregrounded or ‘profiled’, while the rest of
21 ‘S cen e ’ here roughly corresponds to what Ungerer and Schm id call ‘situation’ (1996: 46, 209), 
nam ely an event taking place in the ‘real w orld’ (as opposed to the term ‘context’ or ‘context m odel’, 
which, according to Ungerer and Schm id, and van Dijk (2 0 0 lb: 18), is a mental representation o f  a 
situation).
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the elements (‘m oney’, ‘seller’ or ‘price’, for instance) are in the background and 
constitute the ‘base’ (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 15).
Fillm ore’s characterisation o f ‘fram e’ later shifts towards a more broadly cognitive, 
less language-oriented one, where frames are viewed as ‘specific unified frameworks 
o f knowledge, or coherent schematizations o f experience’ (1985: 223). There is also 
an explicit link with the phenomenon of presupposition, as frames are ‘cognitive 
structures ... knowledge o f which is presupposed for the concepts encoded by words’ 
(Fillmore and Atkins, 1992: 75). This bears great similarities to Ungerer and Schmid’s 
(1996: 209) discussion o f the term ‘cognitive m odel’ as the total o f ‘stored cognitive 
representations that belong to a certain field’. This is a broad definition, subsuming 
different kinds o f cognitive models, such as ‘frame’ and ‘script’ (1992: 211). In 
Tannen’s discussion o f ‘fram es’ and related terms (1993b; 1993a) it becomes quite 
apparent that the term is used differently across disciplines, and also that there is 
overlap between what some call a ‘frame’ and what others may call a ‘schema’ or 
‘script’.
At around the same time as Fillmore, the sociologist Goffman (1974, 1981, cited in 
Wodak, 1996: 22) defines frames as follows: a frame is ‘the definition which 
participants give to their current social activity -  to what is going on, what the 
situation is like, and to the roles that the interactants adopt within it’ (Wodak, 1996:
22). Tannen (1993a: 4) observes that ‘Gumperz’s notion o f speech activity is ... a 
type o f fram e’ (referring to Gumperz, 1982). Goffman and Gumperz were not 
necessarily concerned with cognition, but participants’ ‘definitions’ o f speech 
situations would correspond to ‘context m odels’ as ‘participants’ constructs of 
communicative situations’ (van Dijk, 2006: 159; 2008).
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M insky’s definition o f ‘fram e’ is broader (Minsky, 1975, cited in Tannen, 1993b: 19), 
including event sequences as well as expectations about objects and settings (Tannen, 
1993b: 19). Schank and Abelson have proposed the term ‘script’ as one kind of frame, 
specifically referring to mental representations involving sequences o f events (Schank 
and Abelson, 1975, cited in Tannen, 1993b: 17), whereas knowledge related to a 
specific entity is often named ‘schema’ (see discussion in Tannen, 1993b: 16-17). 
Tannen herself prefers to use the term ‘frame’ to define for a mental definition (by the 
participants) o f a communicative situation (following Goffman, 1974), and ‘schem a’ 
to refer to knowledge about entities like, e.g. illness (Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 59- 
61).
Thus, the term ‘fram e’ for some may mean a specific kind o f cognitive model, along 
with other kinds, whereas for others it is synonymous with ‘cognitive m odel’ as an 
umbrella term including ‘scripts’, ‘frames as models o f communicative situations/ 
context m odels’ and ‘schem ata’. I think it is useful to distinguish between ‘schemata’, 
for more or less static ‘ideal, abstract or prototypical’ representations o f the structures 
o f objects, events, people, groups, stories or social structures (that is, we can have a 
schema for the structure of anything, abstract or concrete), and ‘scripts’, which 
dynamically represent the ‘stetting, time, location and a sequence o f events and 
actions and the typical or optional [participants]’ which will constitute the 
representation o f the stereotypical events or rituals o f a culture (van Dijk, 1998: 57-58; 
2003: 92). Yet for my purposes in the thesis I will consider ‘mental model’ as a 
general term for all internal (cognitive and affective) representations, while I will most 
often be using the term ‘frame’ in alliance with Fillmore’s Frame Semantics. I will 
further use the term ‘fram ing’ for the online activation o f a specific frame in relation
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to a specific linguistic expression/concept, indicating simultaneously the adoption o f a 
particular point o f view.
2.5.2 Personal and social cognitive representations
As Ungerer and Schmid observe, the knowledge, or mental representations an 
individual may have about ‘a field’, will often be formed based on cultural 
experiences and are shared by the groups o f a culture (or group), in which case they 
would be called ‘cultural m odels’ -  they point out that both the terms ‘cognitive 
m odels’ and ‘cultural models’ refer to the same kind o f entities, only placing the 
emphasis on different aspects o f these entities (1996: 50 -  for ‘cultural m odels’ see 
also Quinn, 1996). Others appropriately have employed the term ‘cultural cognitive 
m odels’ in order to account for both the cognitive/ psychological and the shared/ 
cultural aspect o f these representations (e.g. Morgan, 2001: 78).
Van Dijk makes a distinction between individual and shared mental representations or 
knowledge - the term ‘mental m odels’ refers to the mental representations each person 
has, and ‘social representations’ to the mental models that are shared among members 
o f a social group or culture (van Dijk, 1994; 1998; 2003). Mental models can be more 
or less permanent structures in the long-term memory, or on-line models created on 
the spot; for instance, one can create an on-line ‘event model’ while witnessing or 
experiencing an event, but this model can later be stored in long-term memory as one 
remembers the event (van Dijk, 1998; 2001b).22 For the term ‘social representations’
22 A s discussed above, i f  the event is frequently occurring in a g iven culture and involves sim ilar 
participants, settings, sequences o f  events etc., the co llective  representation o f  such a stereotyped event 
w ill be a script, as opposed to a personal ‘event m odel’ (van Dijk, 1993: 114; 2003: 92).
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van Dijk draws mainly on the work o f the social psychologist Moscovici (1984 — see 
also other contributions in Farr and Moscovici, 1984).
Something to be borne in mind in the discussion o f all (kinds of) cognitive 
representations is that their descriptions ‘necessarily involve a considerable degree of 
idealisation’, since psychological states are private and individual experiences 
(Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 49-50). Not only can one’s description o f a cognitive 
model never be complete (as we never have full access to any subject’s cognition), but 
cognitive models are actually open-ended, as there is no fixed limit to the amount o f 
representations that belong to a ‘certain field’. Hence any description o f a cognitive 
model is ‘never exhaustive, but always highly selective’ (ibid: 48).
In order to discuss social representations one has to move to yet another level of 
abstraction -  namely ‘filter out’, so to speak, elements o f the mental models of 
individuals deriving from purely personal experience. Thus, every individual may 
have a ‘personalised version’ o f a social representation, but the social representation 
itself will refer to the elements that do not vary across individuals who are members of 
the same culture, or the same social group within a culture (van Dijk, 1998: 30).
2.5.3 Stereotypes
The concept o f ‘stereotype’ emerges often in critical research -  it refers at the same 
time to the cognitive (‘pictures in our heads’, Lippmann, 1922/1950), and the social 
(but also affect -  Quasthoff, 1973: 28; 1989). In the light o f more recent work on 
cognition, the question arises whether a ‘stereotype’ is a different kind o f mental 
entity to all other shared mental representations (schemata, Idealised Cognitive
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Models, prototypes, etc.)23 -  and, by extension, what consequences this may have on 
social life. Socially-oriented (including social- psychological) accounts focus mainly 
on the function o f stereotypes (as the basis or rationalisation o f discrimination) and the 
reasons for their perpetuation (Quasthoff, 1978; van Dijk, 1990; Brehm and Kassin, 
1996: 122). However, I believe that for a sufficient understanding o f stereotypes and, 
ultimately, for dealing with stereotypical discriminatory thinking in society, we need 
to focus also on the question o f what kind  o f mental entity a stereotype is.
The (social psychology) textbook definition o f ‘stereotype’ is ‘a belief that associates 
a whole group o f people with certain traits’ (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 122). Chilton 
(2004: 38) puts it as follows: ‘a cognitive construct concerning the properties o f a
94social category’. The above definitions seem at first glance unsatisfactory, because 
they appear neutral. Surely, as we have mental models o f categories o f objects, events 
etc., we also have models o f categories o f people. However, in that case, why do we 
use the negatively loaded term ‘stereotype’ instead o f the neutral ‘group model’? Van 
Dijk also considers stereotypes as social (i.e. shared mental) representations of groups 
o f people (‘group m odels’); although in most o f his work he does not use, or define 
explicitly, the term, he seems to define a ‘stereotype’ as a biased  (or prejudiced) 
shared group model representing a suppressed and/or minority group, held by a 
dominant majority group (1990, esp. 169 f.).
There are two problems with van Dijk’s view. First, it seems to distinguish stereotypes 
from other mental models based on whom they are held by (majority dominant 
groups); that is, oppressed minorities have mental models and dominant majorities
23 The terms ‘stereotype’ and ‘stereotypical’ are often used in discussing prototype research such as this 
o f  Labov (1 9 7 3 ), although Labov h im se lf does not use the terms (see  e.g . M cCarthy, 1990: 46).
24 Chilton does not define ‘social category’ here, but in any case w ith ‘stereotypes’ he refers to 
conceptual constructs about groups o f  people, not objective socio logical variables o f  these groups (pers. 
com m . 2010).
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have stereotypes. This is at odds with van D ijk’s own theory o f ideology, according to 
which ideologies can be held both by dominant and subordinate groups (1998). Based 
on this, there is no reason why minority groups should not have stereotypical 
representations o f majorities.25 Moreover, this seems to define stereotypes based on 
external factors (who has the beliefs), rather than what kind o f beliefs they are, which 
points again towards the function rather than the ‘nature’ or ontological status of
7 A
stereotypes. The second problem has to do with the terms ‘biased’ and ‘prejudiced’. 
These terms seem on the one hand to suggest that these models are o f a different kind 
to other mental models (i.e. biased vs. non-biased), and on the other to indicate why 
stereotypes are bad and harmful (because they are wrong). However, as I will discuss 
below, the human conceptual system is inherently biased anyway, and all 
categorisation is based on generalisations drawn from perception (which is not 
objective to begin with).
A brief look at the main characteristics o f stereotypes would include the following
7 7points, most o f which are common among all sorts o f mental models:
Stereotypes are mental representations (of groups o f people).
- They are elliptical generalisations - elliptical in that they do not contain much 
or very detailed information about the groups represented, and generalisations 
in that the information they contain is taken to apply to all (or most) members 
o f a group.
They are related to categorisation, classifying people into categories.
They structure our view of reality and our expectations and they are used as a 
basis for reasoning.
25 Social psychological research indicates that, although it is more likely that a minority group will be 
stereotyped, the reverse is also possible, and indeed happens (see  Brehm and K assin, 1996: Ch. 4).
26 The sam e seem s to apply to C hilton’s definition in relation to the term ‘social category’, since it 
appears that a ‘so c ia l’ category is defined by external factors (e.g. incom e, ethnic origin, social status), 
but this, in itself, merits further discussion.
27 Here I will favour the term ‘m ental’ over ‘cogn itive’ in that ‘m ental’ more clearly includes aspects 
not only o f  cognition , but also affect (Chilton, personal com m unication, 2006).
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They contain evaluative and affective elements, as well as factual.
Most o f the characteristics o f stereotypical mental models (stereotypes) are exactly the
same as the characteristics o f any other mental model. All mental models are elliptical
(cf. Ungerer and Schmidt, 1996; Lakoff, 1987), in that it is not possible to be aware
of, let alone store in memory, all the properties o f any category. In fact, for reasons of
cognitive economy, we store only the most salient aspects o f a category, i.e. the ones
more prominent in our interaction with members o f the category, or the ones more
often encountered through direct experience or discourse about the category. Some
social psychological research seeking to explain stereotyping has been in fact dealing
with priming, salience or other cognitive effects when people encounter minority
categories in objects, or (pairings of) words (see Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 125 f. on
‘illusory correlations’, esp. Chapman, 1967; McConnell, Sherman and Hamilton,
1994; and Hamilton and Rose, 1980).
As our human system of perception is limited, and therefore by definition biased (see 
Das-Smaal, 1990), categorisation itself does not rely on natural or clear cut 
distinctions in the world, but distinctions made based on our perception o f and 
interaction with the world. By structuring our expectations based on our 
knowledge/mental representation o f the world, we are saving ourselves the effort of 
treating any object, person or situation as a ‘one-off instance, and having to process 
everything about the situation from scratch before we are able to deal with it. Clearly, 
this would be too time consuming and probably practically impossible.
Finally, it does appear that stereotyping is more likely to occur in relation to groups 
one does not have much contact with or knowledge o f (van Dijk, 1998). This is quite 
well established in social psychological research, and explained again in terms of 
‘illusions’, heuristics or exaggerations o f our perceptual system making judgements
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about categories when there is very little information available, while closer 
acquaintance between groups reduces stereotyping (see Quattrone and Jones, 1980; 
Quattrone, 1986; Linville, Fischer and Salovey, 1989). However, there can be cases 
where stereotyping involves groups with which one has much contact, or about which 
one has quite detailed knowledge. Gender is perhaps the most obvious category where 
members o f each group co-exist and interact daily most o f the time (Cameron, 1992: 
58), while orientalism, for example, is based on acquiring quite detailed knowledge of 
an ‘other’ group, with which one does not directly interact, while still adding this 
knowledge on to a stereotyped model.
In the literature it is often emphasised that the problem of stereotypes is that they are 
inaccurate, or that they constitute overgeneralisations (see Quasthoff, 1989: 182). In 
terms o f accuracy, a stereotype may have a factual basis, whereby real differences 
among groups ‘contribute to the birth o f perceived [i.e. not real] differences’ (Brehm 
and Kassin, 1996: 122), an observation very often made in relation to gender (Brehm 
and Kassin, 1996: 138 ff.; see also Eckert and M cConnell-Ginet, 2003: 10). To an 
extent, the content o f stereotypes relies on misinterpretation o f the reason of 
differences -  e.g. white people perceiving black people as inferior due to the history o f 
black slavery in the U.S. (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 122), during which black people 
were indeed inferior in society, but not due to any biological reasons, but due to being 
forced in this position.28 Moreover, accuracy is straight away compromised through 
overgeneralisation. Every generalisation is potentially inaccurate, since it gives rise to 
general statements based on induction, and then it is used for deductive reasoning. 
Any claim ‘all X are Y ’ cannot be definitely true unless indeed all members of
28 A lthough it seem s far-fetched to claim that slavery is responsible for contemporary racist stereotypes, 
there may be some remnant beliefs transmitted through discourse, which is indicative o f  the importance 
o f  the role o f  discourse in perpetuating stereotypes (see van Dijk, 1994).
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category X have been examined and found to be Y. Moreover, finding an exception 
does not necessarily modify the mental model/stereotype, as people retain the 
generalisation, but treat the ‘exceptional’ individual as just that -  an exception 
(Quasthoff, 1973, 1987, 1989: 188; Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 128 f.). This is, 
however, the case with all mental representations, as they are based on generalisation 
o f limited experience, and also they define our expectations and influence the way we 
store mentally new experiences (Das-Smaal, 1990) -  cases which do not match our 
expectations will be classified as ‘atypical’ (Lakoff, 1987). For example, we can all 
say with some confidence that all dogs have four legs, and that any three-legged dog is 
an exception due to an accident or some medical reason, without having experience o f 
all dogs on the planet. Quasthoff suggests that it is a matter o f degree, i.e., that 
stereotypes are less flexible than non-stereotypical mental representations (1989: 189).
Quasthoff (1989) makes a distinction between harmful and harmless stereotypes based 
on the content o f the models. Namely, she considers generalisations such as ‘all 
Italians are good singers’ as positive, and not harmful stereotypes, whereas identifying 
groups o f people as criminals etc. is negative. This is not necessarily a valid 
distinction, in that positive generalisations are also problematic -  consider ‘all blacks 
are good athletes’; ‘all women are naturally good carers’. The problem here is not just 
that stereotypical mental models are abstract and elliptical, but that they are 
metonymic (Lakoff, 1987: 91; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 56-58), roughly speaking 
taking ‘part for the whole’. That is, emphasising one (real or imaginary, widespread or 
rare) aspect o f a group downplays all other human aspects o f the group and the 
individuals belonging to it. So one difference between stereotypical and non- 
stereotypical knowledge about a group is that stereotypical knowledge is not only
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incomplete, but also one-sided/ biased in that it only concerns one aspect o f the group 
and its members.
Another crucial difference is that stereotypical knowledge is always, directly or 
indirectly, evaluative. Directly evaluative knowledge includes clearly positive or 
negative properties, expressed in language either through evaluative adjectives 
(‘good/bad’), or expressions indicating a clearly negatively evaluated property 
(criminals, benefit-scroungers, etc.). Indirectly evaluative knowledge can be expressed 
in neutral expressions (and as factual knowledge), which however indicate negatively 
evaluated properties in a certain context (e.g. people in group X eat with their hands, 
sitting on the floor). Even apparently positive evaluations, such as ‘good carers’, is 
indirectly negative in contexts where caring is not valued as an activity (see Cameron, 
1992: 5).
The points made in the last paragraph relate closely to the affective aspect of 
stereotypes, further linked to the Us/Them distinction which serves as their basis 
(originally traced back to Sumner, 1906, cited in Quasthoff, 1989: 187). That is to say, 
one may have very strong positive or negative feelings towards people o f a certain 
ethnic or socioeconomic background, in a way that we don’t have strong feelings 
towards chairs, tables, trains or other entities in the world.29 Thus, although ‘grouping 
humans is much like grouping objects, there is a key difference. When it comes to 
social categorization, perceivers themselves are members or non-members o f the 
categories they employ.’ (Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 123). This key difference is not 
elaborated on very much by Brehm and Kassin (ibid.), but ultimately it accounts for
29 Anim als are an interesting in-between case, but I would think that strong positive feelings arise from  
personification/anthropom orphism  o f  anim als, and strong negative feelings from objectification.
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all the differences (whether qualitative or a matter o f degree) between stereotypes and 
other kinds o f mental models.
Consequently, I would define social stereotypes primarily as being about (groups or 
categories) o f people, with a strong evaluative element, which follows from the sense 
o f ‘s e l f , self-evaluation or personal and social identity o f the individual holding these 
beliefs. Thus, the determining feature for something being a stereotype is not just 
being about people (in theory at least we have mental models o f groups that are not 
necessarily stereotypical), but is related also to the identity o f the ‘stereotyped 
(aspects o f which could possibly be explored from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
which is beyond the scope o f the thesis, but see Quasthoff, 1989). The stereotyper’s 
identity in turn is determined by social and material conditions. As a psychological 
phenomenon, stereotype is very closely linked to affect (also beyond the scope o f the 
thesis, but definitely worth more consideration). The fact that stereotypes are often 
created when there is limited knowledge o f the stereotyped group, and that perceptual 
illusions lead us to overgeneralise or exaggerate when we encounter a very small 
number o f members o f a category, contributes to the creation and perpetuation of 
stereotypes. But these factors mainly build on and accentuate aspects o f personal and 
social/group identity which constitute fertile ground for such mis-perceptions.
To sum up, stereotype emergence is based on the same perception and categorisation 
principles the human cognitive system uses for all sorts o f categorisation. What is 
context-specific is the content of stereotypes (van Dijk, 1990: 178). To a certain 
extent, it is irrelevant whether the (factual) content o f stereotypes is ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’, or whether it is based on (over)generalised true facts or fiction, because of 
the function o f stereotypes. What is most relevant, however, is that the content of 
stereotypes also involves very strong evaluative and affective aspects. Along the same
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lines, van Dijk (1998) points out that ideologies, as belief systems, rely largely on 
attitudes/evaluation. Thus, accepting that mentally constructing and using categories is 
biased anyway, we can define bias as preferring one way of categorisation and 
category representation over other possible ways, and ‘[d irecting  attention towards 
certain features and away from others’ (Das-Smaal, 1990: 351). A (biased) 
stereotypical mental model is constituted as such (stereotypical) not necessarily in 
relation to which characteristics are preferred (and paid attention to), since, as we saw, 
stereotypical characteristics are not necessarily negative, but because o f the high 
proportion o f evaluation attached to the factual elements o f the model. Evaluation 
itself is, o f course, related to socio-cultural context and group membership, ultimately 
related to group interests. Ultimately, however, the term ‘social’ does not include only 
material parameters, but also the aspect o f relationships and emotions among (groups 
of) people, and this is why it cannot be treated as any other case o f categorisation. 
Namely, the fact that the object o f stereotypes is not objects but people is not, as I 
have assumed, an external difference, but the determining difference between 
stereotypes and other types o f mental models, because it involves a difference in the 
kind o f mental representation (factual vs. evaluative), which is, o f course, a matter of 
degree. In that sense there are degrees to how stereotypical the mental representation 
of a group is. The more evaluation and less factual information, the more 
stereotypical; less evaluation and more factual information mean the representation is 
less stereotypical. Inaccurate factual information with no evaluation is just wrong, but 
I would not call such a model a ‘stereotype’ unless there was evaluation attached to it. 
Finally, in this thesis by ‘stereotypes’ I refer to mental models (not their linguistic 
manifestation, cf. Quasthoff, 1989).
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In terms o f function, in the case o f dominant groups (majorities or minorities), 
stereotypes serve to affirm in-group superiority and perpetuate inequalities. In the case 
o f dominated groups, dominant stereotypes can function hegemonically as negative 
self-representation, again perpetuating inequalities (thus, dominant stereotypes can 
also involve the element o f positive other-evaluation, when the ‘other’ is the dominant 
group). In practice, dominated groups can also share non-dominant stereotypes about 
the dominant group(s), and this can temporarily contribute positively towards the 
liberation o f a dominated group. However, in the long term, there can be no peaceful 
co-existence among groups unless other-group representations come to include at least 
a reduced element o f evaluation (since complete neutrality is impossible) -  i.e., some 
de-stereotyping. The case o f gender stereotyping is a good example to demonstrate 
this: (most) men may share a negative representation o f women (although women are 
not a minority), but women may also share this negative representation o f themselves, 
and accept men as superior in some (most, or most important) aspects. This includes 
negative self-representation for women. On the other hand, women stereotyping men 
negatively (in a ‘war o f the sexes’) might have been useful in some cases, but overall 
it does not necessarily contribute to gender equality.
Quasthoff (1989), asks whether we should view stereotypes as something good, 
because they are natural, or as something bad, because o f their role in discriminatory 
attitudes and practices. In my view, something being natural does not necessarily 
mean it is good. Death is natural, but it is very rarely seen as something good and 
desirable. I would say that having mental representations o f groups or categories of 
people in itself is (natural and) useful, helping us most o f the times interact efficiently 
with groups we are not very familiar with. However, stereotyping, i.e. absolute
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evaluative judgem ents about groups o f people, albeit also natural, and potentially 
helpful, but obviously gives rise to more harmful effects on a larger scale.
It would be more significant to ask, does the fact that stereotypes arise from universal 
human cognitive properties make them inevitable? Does this constitute critical 
analysis and efforts to combat social inequalities pointless? On the issue o f avoiding 
(or deconstructing) stereotypes, one needs again to look at research in social 
psychology -  it is not sufficient to increase contact or information among groups.30 
Rather, this contact should be gearing people towards co-operatively achieved goals 
(for details, see Brehm and Kassin, 1996: 130). Incidentally, this at the same time 
points again towards the importance o f the role o f affect, and indicates the plausibility 
o f Marxist analyses o f sexism and racism, as a competitive economic (and social) 
system (i.e. capitalism) does seem, also from a psychological perspective, to privilege 
stereotyping and discrimination.
As for the second question, i.e. the role o f critical analysis in relation to natural mental 
processes, the answer is already pointed at by Chilton (2005). Social psychology is 
descriptive, showing us what people do with stereotypes. Basic cognitive 
psychological principles are explanatory in providing the principles in the human 
mind which cause stereotyping, also mentioned by social psychology: attention, 
cognitive effort, learning, memory, goals. A sociological account needs to account for 
the context in which these socio-cognitive mechanisms are put in use and/or are 
exploited. That is to say, if we all have these abilities and dis-abilities, why is it that 
some people have certain stereotypes, and others have different stereotypes? Why, and 
how (under what social conditions), do people fight against stereotypes, and why and 
how do they fail or succeed? A (critical) discourse analytical account needs to account
30 Although it certainly helps (L inville et al., 1989).
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for the role o f discourse in these socio-political and economic conditions which create 
inequalities, as well as the role o f discourse in emancipatory/egalitarian action. Also, 
the role o f discourse in relation to the management/manipulation o f audiences’ (group 
m em bers’) cognitive resources, and, finally, the elements o f discourse which betray 
certain beliefs/ideologies not directly visible.
2.6 Gender and discourse
2.6.1 Gender, discourse and social representations
The distinction between sex as a biological category and gender as ‘the psychological, 
social and cultural differences between males and fem ales’ (Giddens, 1989; 158, 
emphasis in original) has been useful to feminist thinking since the 60’s in answering 
arguments o f biological essentialism prescriptively telling men and women how to 
behave and justifying unequal treatment o f women as ‘natural’ (Weatherall, 2002: 81; 
Sunderland, 2004: 14). However, one can see from Giddens’ definition that gender 
remains linked to sex in certain ways - Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003: 10) 
observe that ‘gender builds on biological sex, it exaggerates biological difference and, 
indeed, it carries biological difference into domains in which it is completely 
irrelevant’ (for further discussion on the conceptualisation of the relation between 
‘sex’ and ‘gender’ see Mathieu, 1989; Wodak, 1997a and Cameron, 1997).
Postmodern feminist thinking has also argued that even ‘sex’ as a biological category 
is socially constructed -  this is in line with M oscovici’s argument that we only have 
access to the ‘real world’ through our social representations (1984: 5-6, 36-37). There 
is further discussion on how conceptions o f what ‘sex’ is change over time, and on
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how these have material effects on the bodies o f individuals in Weatherall (2002: 81 
ff.), Wodak (1997a) and Cameron (1997), and also, importantly, in the work on 
biology by Anne Fausto-Sterling (e.g. 1992; 2000). Therefore, Weatherall argues that 
‘gender’ should be seen as primary, as it constructs our conceptualisations o f sex and 
biology too (2002: 81).
With the ‘discursive turn’ in the social sciences, starting in the 80’s with works like 
Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley (1988) and Potter and 
Wetherell (1987), emphasis is placed on discourse constructing identities and social 
relations, and not simply reflecting them (see Weatherall, 2002: Ch. 4 for a review). 
This is valuable in avoiding making essentialist assumptions o f people and groups 
simply having certain fixed and inevitable characteristics which are reflected in the 
way they use language (or the way language is used about them). However, other 
feminist linguists observe also that discourse is ‘language in a social context, shaped 
by discursive and socio-cultural practices’ (Litosseliti, 2006: 1; also Ch. 3). Talbot 
(1998: Ch. 8) aligns herself with CDA in considering discourse both constituted by 
and constitutive o f social relations and identities, in a dialectic relationship (cf. 
Fairclough, 1992: 60; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258; Titscher et al., 2000: 146).
As discussed above, van Dijk also puts emphasis on social cognition as the interface 
between discourse and society and their effects on each other, a dimension 
downplayed by the discursive psychological approach -  Wetherell, Stiven and Potter 
point out that although they are interested in ‘systems of belief or thought’ which 
‘have obvious affinities with M oscovici’s (1984) concept o f ‘social representations” , 
they consider the view of those systems being constituted linguistically (and not 
cognitively) as ‘an analytically more productive option’ (1987: 60-61). For me, there 
is no contradiction in assuming that social representations are discursively constructed
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but are cognitive entities. Indeed, the way people draw on their social representations 
in discourse is influenced by the immediate situation, but these representations have to 
have a more stable presence in people’s minds for people to draw on them and ‘share’ 
them (van Dijk, 1998: 44-45).
2.6.2 Feminist linguistics and CDA
Discursive psychology has researched discourse and gender quite extensively; CDA 
less so, although Wodak (1997a) points out the similarities between CDA and feminist 
linguistics. The labelling suggests that ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ should be 
broader, encompassing feminist linguistics, but in practice researchers aligning 
themselves primarily with the CDA paradigm rarely conduct feminist research, with 
Wodak the most notable exception (1997b; 2003; 2005; Kothoff and Wodak, 1997). 
Other researchers in gender and language aligning themselves more or less with CDA 
are Talbot (1995; 1998), Lazar (2005), Kosetzi (2007; 2010; Kosetzi and Polyzou, 
2009) and perhaps Koller (2004), while Kaur (2007) argues for synergy o f the 
poststructuralist philosophical approach o f Judith Butler and strands o f CDA.
Overall feminist linguists may not explicitly align themselves with a particular 
paradigm (such as CDA), but rather eclectically point at the commonalities o f all 
critical approaches to analysing discourse, focussing perhaps more on feminist 
approaches. Thus, Litosseliti emphasises the value o f CDA for feminist discourse 
analysis (2002; 2006: 3; 54f.) at the same time incorporating insights from more 
poststructuralist perspectives. Also Sunderland (2004) and contributions to Litosseliti 
and Sunderland (2002) do draw on CDA, but not exclusively. Along the same lines,
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Baxter proposes Feminist Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis as complementary to, 
and not competing with CDA (2003: Ch. 2).
Overall, ‘fem inist’ and ‘CDA’ ways o f discourse analysis and principles do overlap 
significantly in their critique o f inequality, their political agendas and their scrutiny o f 
discourse in order to reveal power management, manipulation, maintenance and 
contestation o f dominance. Differences are to be seen among scholars from either o f 
these fields, as both ‘CDA’ and ‘fem inist’ scholars may align themselves to different 
degrees with poststructuralist or humanist principles, for example. The emphasis on 
gender also varies from scholar to scholar rather than according to different theoretical 
or methodological principles (and conversely, feminist scholars, especially more 
recently, take into account race, ethnicity, class and other social parametres 
traditionally studied within CDA, see Mills, 2008). These differences aside, it is hard 
to conceive o f any social critique o f inequality that allows for gender inequality, or to 
conceive o f feminism without social critique. Therefore, in theory at least, there 
should be no contradiction between CDA and feminist linguistics.
A few words o f critical reflection o f my own position as a researcher are in order at 
this point perhaps. In this chapter I have distanced m yself from certain 
poststructuralist epistemological positions in relation to cognition, while in the 
following chapters I critique specific theoretical and methodological aspects o f CDA 
in relation to presupposition. In that sense, as a feminist scholar, I acknowledge the 
benefits o f various approaches, while as a cognitive linguist I orient myself to the 
one(s) that I find more viable epistemologically. In the thesis I often use the term 
‘critical discourse analysis’ without capitalising the initials, in order to include all 
critical theoretical and methodological approaches to language rather than the 
particular group o f scholars and approaches known as ‘CD A’. I must also recognise,
62
however, that, a certain scepticism notwithstanding, it is within CDA that interest in 
cognition has emerged, and interest in cognition constitutes a central part o f this 
thesis. To my knowledge there is no scholar as o f yet self-identifying as ‘feminist 
cognitive linguist’ (bar myself), while for example Hart, Koller and Sarazin would 
probably identify themselves as ‘cognitive critical linguists’.
Having examined the overlap o f feminist and CDA approaches, I will now move on to 
the more contentious relation between gender and cognition, or, rather, between a 
feminist and a cognitive approach to language and discourse.
2.6.3 Gender, cognition and critical discourse analysis
Mentioning ‘gender’ and ‘cognition’ in the same sentence is very likely to bring to 
mind essentialist biological assumptions about innate differences in cognition, affect 
and brain structure between men and women, especially as this view is recently 
gaining ground also in academic circles (see Cameron, 2009). Clearly this thesis does 
not set out to address this debate, especially as Cameron (2009) has already done so 
more than sufficiently. There is perhaps one more specific point that I need to clarify 
further before proceeding with my theoretical position on gender and cognition. One 
major point o f criticism of the biological account o f ‘gender differences’ is that it ‘by 
implication treats all kinds of linguistic behaviour as the natural expression of 
cognitive traits embodied (or ‘embrained’) in individuals; the socio-cultural one treats 
behaviour as the outcome of calculations and choices which, though ultimately made 
by individual language-users, arise within and are affected by a larger social context’ 
(Cameron, 2009: 185). Now I have already claimed that studying language is studying 
cognition in 2.2, but there are two points of clarification here. The first is the point I
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have already made about cognition being a universal human trait, a claim less 
contentious than and much different to claiming that different groups o f people have 
different cognitive abilities. Second, by focusing on conceptualisation we examine 
representations in cognition rather than cognitive abilities or traits.
In light o f my discussion in this chapter on society, discourse and cognition, I would 
define ‘gender’ as a ‘mental representation’, or, more specifically, an element o f the 
mental representations o f gendered categories (such as ‘m an’, ‘wom an’, ‘boy’, ‘girl’) 
and sub-categories (such as ‘housewife’, ‘mother’, ‘bachelor’ etc.). Gender ideologies 
are systems o f beliefs in which gendered mental models emerge and o f which these 
models become part -  thus, gender ideologies and models are mutually constitutive, 
but with ideologies forming the broader basis.
Biological configurations o f elements o f ‘sex’ do exist (chromosomal, hormonal and 
anatomical), but ‘sex’ as a label refers to the mental representation o f categories 
whose boundaries are culturally defined (and biologically not always clear-cut). 
Gender, and knowledge thereof, is ideological (although on different levels and in 
different ways and degrees), due to social context placing prominence on sex, and 
justifying and creating further inequalities based on sex. Thus, in most contexts, 
knowledge about ‘sex’ is also ideological, but not always, as in ‘knowledge about 
ovarian cancer’. Indeed, if ‘sex’ was not made relevant in all sorts o f irrelevant 
contexts, its mental representation would not be ideological. What is or is not relevant 
to biological sex is o f course debatable and varies across contexts, and much that is 
considered relevant in folk theories o f sex has often been shown not to be the case 
under examination o f scientific evidence, such as the beliefs Cameron (2009) has 
shown to be unsubstantiated.
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Gender identity as an ‘illusion’, as Butler puts it (1990: xxii), is also a mental 
representation, namely, self-representation (since identity constitutes the mental 
representation we have o f ourselves, and gender identity includes the aspects o f 
ourselves that are defined by/related to gender conceptualisations). Gendered self- and 
other-representations in cognition and discourse are to a certain extent both stable and 
fluid, in that they are changeable and indeed changing, but this change may take time 
and cannot necessarily be triggered at will. These two aspects (stability and fluidity) 
can be captured by the distinction between mental models stored in long-term memory 
and on-line models occurring in context -  in the case o f discourse, in the course o f an 
interaction. On-line model (and identity) construction can be understood under the 
term ‘construal’, while ‘construction’ may be the result o f complex processes o f re­
iteration, memory and affective factors, which are overall beyond the scope o f this 
thesis.
Thus, instead o f  ‘gendered discourses’ I will be talking about beliefs about gender, 
and for me negotiation o f ‘discourses’ in discourse involves drawing selectively on 
pre-existing, socially shared beliefs.31 Thus every text involves ‘monitoring’ and 
guessing, on behalf o f the producer, about what the audience already knows, as well 
as what will make the text appealing to the target audience. In text production choice 
is o f course important -  i.e. what beliefs will be expressed, and which not, which 
determines the content o f the text. The combination o f various beliefs and the 
evaluation/attitude expressed is also important. In cognitive linguistic terms, we might 
be interested in what knowledge is activated/introduced, whether it is contested, how
31 In the course o f  a dialogue an interlocutor can o f  course change her or his mind, in which case they 
m ay express a b e lie f  that did not ‘pre-exist’ the interaction, or, more precisely, that was not shared by 
that particular individual. In planned written discourse, such as I analyse here, all beliefs expressed pre­
exist at least the final version o f  the written text.
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it is framed/evaluated through lexical choice, and what salience is afforded to each 
belief through fore- or back-grounding.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have broadly presented the theory o f language I adopt, and argued for 
taking cognition into account for critical discourse research. I have elaborated on the 
concept o f frames as a crucial unit for critical cognitive analysis on which I draw for 
my own analysis (Chapter 7). I have further discussed stereotypes as a kind o f frames 
which are particularly influenced by ideology and may circumvent reason via affect. 
Based on the above, I see gender as a socio-cognitive and affective construct, brought 
about by discursive (i.e. semiotic) practices and perpetuated due to maintaining 
gendered mental representations, which are often stereotypical.
In the following chapter (Chapter 3) I will move to discussing presupposition, and 
demonstrate that most definitions o f presupposition in critical discourse analysis draw 
on a different theory o f language, namely Truth Conditional Semantics (henceforth 
TC Semantics). Other theories are more inclined towards a cognitive approach, but so 
far have not been detailed or systematic enough for their analyses to be transparent 
and replicable. I will therefore argue in Chapter 4 that it is necessary to operationalise 
a fine-grained linguistic analysis in general, and for presupposition analyses in 
particular. In Chapter 4 I will further elaborate on a cognitive theory o f language 
specifically as it relates to presupposition and I will suggest a model that will 
hopefully be more helpful in identifying what ideologies the authors o f my data draw 
on, and making explicit what linguistic devices allow them to present certain gendered 
beliefs as incontestable.
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Chapter 3: Presupposition - A review
3.1. Introduction
In studying background knowledge (including ideological knowledge) and the ways it 
may surface in discourse, the notion o f ‘presupposition’ often appears as a relevant 
parameter to look at, for a number of reasons. First, as van Dijk (2003) points out, 
what is shared knowledge (and, consequently, accepted as common ground) is 
normally not asserted but presupposed. Therefore, this gives us a lead for ideological 
representations which have become naturalised and commonly accepted. Second, it 
has been claimed that the usage o f ‘presupposition’ by a speaker makes it more 
difficult for their interlocutor to contradict the presupposed proposition (Borutti, 1984; 
Harris, 1995), thus reinforcing the status o f the proposition as ‘common sense’, again 
significant in the case o f ideological propositions. From the above two claims it 
follows that finding ‘presuppositions’ in a text helps us identify what ideological 
representations underlie a text, but also how the language o f the text contributes to 
these representations being maintained and reinforced rather than contested or at least 
reflected upon.
I have been using the word ‘presupposition’ in quotation marks because the term has 
been used for a range o f phenomena or entities far from homogeneous -  despite the 
appeal o f using ‘presupposition’ as a methodological tool towards uncovering 
ideology, a careful delineation o f the term is necessary to avoid ending up with more 
methodological problems than solutions.
In this chapter I claim that one o f the problems faced by early pragmaticians aiming to
provide accounts o f the phenomenon of presupposition was that they were still using
logical and/or truth conditional approaches to language as a starting point, which were
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in conflict with the agenda o f pragmatics as examining meaning in relation to speakers 
and/or context. I further claim that within Critical Discourse Analysis some scholars 
adopt the same Truth Conditional Definition in contrast to the allegiance o f CDA to 
entirely different schools o f epistemology (from Austin and Wittgenstein to Habermas 
and Marx, to mention some o f the most prominent influences). The Truth Conditional 
approach to meaning is in direct conflict with critical theories o f language as an entity 
shaped by and shaping society and social action.32 On the other hand some CDA 
scholars do not adopt a truth conditional approach, while in some cases presupposition 
analyses are not clear as to epistemology, theory and methodology.
I will begin with a discussion of approaches towards ‘presupposition’ in the literature, 
giving a background o f the definition o f the term in Truth Conditional Semantics, and 
problems arising from it within Truth Conditional Semantics that may have theoretical 
and methodological relevance for (critical) discourse analysis. I further discuss 
pragmatic and cognitive linguistic approaches, which provide some answers but need 
to be carried further in order to be applied to the particular task o f analysing discourse. 
Finally, I look at recent examples o f critical analyses o f discourse, and the approaches 
to presupposition they have taken.
3.2. Presupposition in Truth Conditional Semantics
In Truth Conditional Semantics, a presupposition is a proposition that does not get
negated when the sentence in which it occurs gets negated. That is, a presupposition is
a proposition which is constant under negation, as in the following examples:
321 also need to point out that critically exam ining deception, manipulation and otherwise untruthful 
linguistic behaviour, w hich are central concerns o f  critical discourse analysis am ong other fields, 
should be separated from accounts o f  actual linguistic meaning depending on the philosophical concept 
o f ‘truth conditions’.
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Referring expressions: Kepler died in misery (Frege, 1892/1952: 71)
Kepler did not die in misery
Presupposition: Kepler exists 
Temporal clauses:
After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and
Austria quarrelled (Frege, 1892/1952: 71).
After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and
Austria did not quarrel.
Presupposition: Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark. 
Change-of-state verbs:
Bertrand has stopped beating his wife. (Sellars, 1954, cited in Levinson,
1983: 174).
Bertrand has not stopped beating his wife.
Presupposition: Bertrand had been beating his wife.
Referring expressions (triggering existential presuppositions, namely the 
presupposition that the referent exists), temporal clauses, factive verbs, change-of- 
state verbs, and other expressions (see Levinson, 1983: 181-184, for an extensive list) 
are termed presupposition triggers, which we could define as expressions introducing 
information that is not negated/refuted when the sentence in which it occurs is negated 
(I will revisit this definition later on).
The initial discussion, which later developed in the discussion of the 
phenomenon ‘presupposition’, began with Frege separating sense/meaning (Sinn) and 
reference/denotation (Bedeutung), and observing that a referring expression may have 
meaning but no referent (such as possibly ‘Odysseus’) or that two expressions may 
have the same referent but a different meaning, such as ‘the morning star’ and ‘the 
evening star’, or ‘Aristotle’ and ‘the teacher o f Alexander the Great’ (Frege, 
1892/1948: 210-211, 215). He then proceeds to comment that, apart from what we 
might call referring expressions, sentences and clauses can also ‘refer’, and in that 
case the reference is the state o f affairs in the world that corresponds to the
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proposition (or ‘thought’, Gedanke) expressed by the sentence. The proposition then is 
the meaning/sense o f the sentence, and the corresponding state o f affairs is the 
referent.
From Frege’s discussion, and from Russell’s response (1905), which I will 
discuss below, it becomes apparent that problems with the phenomenon not yet 
termed presupposition are related to how we define ‘meaning’, and what constitutes 
‘meaningful language’ (an issue I will discuss in Chapter 4). For Frege, expressions 
and clauses with no referent have meaning but constitute ‘problematic language’. 
Reference here is important because and insofar as we are concerned with truth value. 
Frege points out that we are not always concerned with truth value, as in the case o f 
poetry/fiction. ‘It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the 
sense to the referent’ (1948: 216), and we strive for truth because recognising the 
meaning alone ‘yields no knowledge’ (ibid.:217).
Frege suggests that ‘[a] logically complete language... should satisfy the 
conditions, that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out 
o f signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object and that no new sign shall 
be introduced as a proper name without having a referent assured’ (ibid.: 222). That is, 
in a ‘logically complete’ language presuppositions must always be satisfied.
When it comes to subordinate clauses such as ‘after Schleswig-Holstein was 
separated from Denmark’, Frege remarks that a Hearer who does not know or believe 
this to be the case will either take the truth value o f the whole sentence to be 
indeterminate, or will take the whole sentence as false (224). Interestingly [unlike 
Russell] Frege does not explicitly comment on what happens when a temporal clause 
is actually false, but from his commentary on the uncertain existence of Odysseus we 
might conclude that he considers this as one of the cases where a sentence has 
meaning but no reference.
Presupposition triggers pose problems for logic and Truth Conditional 
Semantics because they create issues for representing the propositional content of a 
sentence in a logical formula, and for determining a sentence’s ‘truth value’. There are 
two related reasons for this: First, for TC Semantics, a sentence is true if and only if 
the state o f affairs it represents corresponds to a state o f affairs in the world -  if what 
the sentence represents is not the case, then the sentence is false and the negation of
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this sentence is true. The fact that a part o f the sentence holds for both a sentence and 
its negation is thus problematic (to use Frege’s words, not occurring in an ideal, 
‘logically constructed language’).
Second, if we are to not separate ‘sense’ from ‘reference’, and consider the 
truth values o f a sentence the meaning o f a sentence, then the meaning o f the sentence 
is directly related to the state o f affairs in the world it represents. In that sense, ‘in 
order for an assertion... or a sentence to be either true or false [i.e. to have truth value 
and therefore meaning], its presuppositions must be true or satisfied’ (Levinson, 1983: 
170). If this is not the case, one is faced with the philosophical problem of explaining 
why linguistic expressions which contain presuppositions are not meaningless 
(Russell, 1905:484).
Russell (1905) proposes that referring expressions have no ‘m eaning’, and 
sometimes have a referent. According to Russell, referring expressions are to be turned 
into clauses as in ‘there is a X ’, and all clauses with reference to the real world are 
true, while if they have no referent/corresponding state of affairs in the world, they are 
false. Thus the only linguistic unit that can have truth value and hence meaning is the 
clause (in the indicative), and any presupposing expressions are to be developed into 
clauses before they are assessed for truth value.
Therefore, a sentence such as ‘the King o f France is bald’ is true if there is a 
King o f France, and false if there is not (i.e. it is not nonsensical). The negation of the 
sentence, namely, ‘the King o f France is not bald’, would then be true if there is a 
King o f France who is not bald, false if there is a King o f France who is bald, and also 
false if there is no King o f France.
Russell’s approach has been criticised on the grounds that it is counter­
intuitive and that it suggests an ‘unnatural’ way of processing an utterance and 
assigning truth value to it (Saeed, 2003: 105; see also Strawson, 1950: 330). 
Presumably, we would not treat and process every presupposing statement as a series 
o f assertions (in this case, ‘there is a King o f France’ and ‘the King o f France is 
bald’), nor would we claim, when the first (i.e. the presupposed) ‘assertion’ does not 
hold, that the statement is simply false. In natural language, we would either assign 
the presupposing statement to an alternative world (e.g., to the past, or to a fictional
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world — or to a ‘possible world’ -  Stalnaker, 1976), or would resolve the 
presupposition ‘pragmatically’ (Strawson, 1950; 1952- s e e  also 3.1 below).
From a pragmatic perspective we would still need to define a presupposition as 
a non-defeasible proposition (‘constant under negation’), and we would need to 
identify the presupposition triggers resulting in non-defeasibility.
‘Constancy under negation’ has been shown early on to be a problematic 
concept -  even the most typical cases o f what we might call ‘presupposition triggers’ 
turn out to be possible to be negated, after all. Such an example, including a temporal 
clause, would be (Levinson, 1983: 204):
- Sue cried before she finished her thesis.
- Sue died before she finished her thesis.
Levinson (1983: 194-195) discusses cases where a presupposition can be denied e.g. 
‘Sue didn’t cry after finishing her thesis, because in fact she never finished it’ or 
‘suspended’ (Horn, 1972), as in ‘Sue didn’t cry after finishing her thesis, if, in fact, 
she ever did [finish her thesis]’.
Such (and other) problems reasonably lead one to assume that presupposition cannot 
be treated as a semantic phenomenon, but as a pragmatic one. To quote Levinson,
semantic theories o f presupposition are not viable for the simple reason that 
semantics is concerned with the specification o f invariant stable meanings that 
can be associated with expressions. Presuppositions are not invariant and they are 
not stable, and they do not belong in any orderly semantics (1983: 204).
Levinson defines ‘presuppositions’ as ‘certain pragmatic inferences or assumptions 
that seem at least to be built into linguistic expressions and which can be isolated 
using specific linguistic tests’ (Levinson, 1983: 167, my emphasis). Thus, even in 
Levinson’s pragmatic approach, ‘presupposition’ does not mean any ‘previous 
assumption/supposition’ or ‘presumption’, and is only used for specific linguistic 
expressions (presupposition triggers).
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Saeed also makes the distinction between a semantic and pragmatic approach, 
whereby semantics deals with phenomena unaffected by context or co-text (such as 
entailment), whereas a pragmatic approach takes into account co-text and situational 
context, including the participants’ intentions and background knowledge (2003: 102, 
109).
By locating ‘presupposition’ in pragmatics, however, we are still left with the task of 
defining what presupposition is, how we define it, and how we study it (and why). 
Pragmatic approaches account for the phenomenon of ‘constancy under negation’ by 
discussing in more detail the concept of negation. In the following section I discuss 
some pragmatic as well as cognitive approaches to presupposition, demonstrating how 
they resolve or render irrelevant problems raised by a formal, logical approach to 
language. I argue that approaching presupposition phenomena from a cognitive and 
pragmatic is much more productive. Nevertheless, in some cases pragmatic 
approaches seem to implicitly adopt a Truth Conditional approach, for example by 
apparently making assigning truth value an indispensable step of ‘meaning m aking’. 
This becomes even more problematic in applications in discourse analysis, where it 
may lead to unjustifiably strong claims about the inability to refute pieces o f discourse 
containing presuppositions. It is perhaps worth noting that Frege’s point is exactly that 
it is possible to ‘make sense’ when truth or falsity are not determined.
3.3. Pragmatic and cognitive accounts of presupposition
3.3.1 Truth value vs. appropriacy and background knowledge
Strawson has already pointed out that we cannot talk about the Truth Values of 
sentences in abstract, but only the truth or falsity o f statements uttered in context 
(Strawson, 1950). So context is a crucial element which determines whether a
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presupposition holds (is true or not), and, if not, whether it will be questioned, negated 
or end up in lack o f comprehension. Saeed (2003: 105) points out that when a 
presupposed statement does not hold, we can speak o f presupposition fa ilure, which 
would normally be resolved in context by the Hearer signalling the failure: if I say ‘X 
is coming to join us’, and the Hearer does not know of the existence o f X, the Hearer 
will ask ‘who is X ?’. Alternatively, the Hearer will not question the Speaker’s 
presupposition, but will accommodate ( ‘tacitly acquiesce’, Lewis, 1979: 172), i.e. 
assume the truth o f the statement ‘there is an individual X ’, which then becomes part 
o f shared knowledge between Speaker and Hearer without being explicitly asserted.
Thus, a presupposition can have the same function as an assertion, in that it can be 
used to introduce new knowledge, which is encoded in the presupposed proposition 
(Gazdar, 1979: 105-106; Karttunen, 1974/1991; Abbott, 2000). When a presupposed 
proposition is indeed shared knowledge, it refers to entities or states o f affairs already 
known to all participants and therefore there is no need to explicitly assert it, or to 
question it. When the information is not shared knowledge, but it is uncontroversial 
and to a certain degree expected, again it will not be questioned due to consistency 
with the context/ our expectations (Gazdar, 1979: 105-106; also Stalnaker, 1973; 
1974/1991): ‘I’m sorry I’m late, my car broke down’ is acceptable even if the Hearers 
do not know whether I own a car, because it is reasonable to assume this in a given 
context (Levinson, 1983: 205, points out that saying ‘my fire-engine broke down’ 
would not be equally acceptable - we wouldn’t expect that someone would own a fire- 
engine or use it for transport). Whether something is controversial or not depends also 
on the purpose o f the interaction and the individual participants - the Hearer may not 
ask about an unknown referent because s/he is not interested, or does not care if it
33 Interestingly this is intuitively in line with R u ssell’s approach, specifically , with the claim  that a 
presupposition is an assertion included in the m eaning o f  the sentence.
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exists or not (Al-Raheb, 2005). Thus, we may say that a presupposition will not get 
contested or questioned, unless there is a reason to do so (cf. Sadock, quoted in 
Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 480).
In the paragraphs above I have already linked presupposition to context, and context 
to shared knowledge. Indeed, cognitively speaking, our physical context, perceived 
through our senses, as well as non-physical properties o f the situational context 
(knowledge and evaluation o f the participants and the situation, communicative 
purpose/genre, etc.) are represented in our minds in context models (Ungerer and 
Schmid, 1996: 45-47; van Dijk, 2006: 159). Thus, participants operating in the same 
situational context may form their individual context models, depending on how they 
differently perceive, interpret and evaluate the situation, as well as what is more 
salient/notable/of interest to them, but large parts o f their context models will overlap, 
or come to overlap in the course o f their interaction, constituting thus shared 
knowledge.
Stalnaker has early on pointed out the interconnection among context, knowledge and 
presupposition (1973; 1974/1991). According to Stalnaker, ‘the presupposition 
relation... must be explained partly in terms o f facts about the users o f sentences: their 
beliefs, intentions and expectations’ (1973: 447). Thus, presuppositions are the 
background assumptions (beliefs, intentions and expectations) shared by the speakers 
(‘presumed common knowledge’), not explicitly mentioned (or not at all), which 
‘define’ the context (ibid.; also 1974/1991: 474).34 New information introduced during 
the interaction by one o f the participants may be presupposed after its introduction, as 
it becomes part o f the ‘common knowledge’ (at least until it is ‘denied, challenged,
34 Stalnaker brings as an exam ple the case o f  ‘suppressed prem isses in an enthym em atic argum ent’ 
(1973: 447 , cf. topoi, Reisigl and W odak, 2001).
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retracted or forgotten’ Stalnaker, 1973: 455) and the context (with every new piece o f 
information, the context ‘shifts’; Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 476).
Apart from the immediate online conceptualisation o f the situational context (and the 
co-text, as part o f the context), participants in an interaction may presuppose 
knowledge related to the broader cultural and social context in which their exchange 
takes place. In Stalnaker’s example (1973: 449), in discussing the 1972 U.S. 
presidential election, when saying ‘I think McGovern is going to w in’, a speaker 
presupposes that Nixon is also running for president (although this background 
assumption does not surface in the discourse at all).
By acknowledging the interdependence o f presupposition and background knowledge, 
as Stalnaker advocates, we are moving away from viewing presupposition in terms o f 
truth value and direct relations o f propositions to an external, objective reality, and 
place the focus on the context and beliefs that are shared, or presumed to be shared, by 
the participants in an interaction. That is, to be pragmatically appropriate, a 
presupposed belief has to be shared and/or in accordance with the participants’ other 
beliefs about the (socio-linguistic) conventions o f interaction o f the genre and 
situational context they find themselves in, as well as about the topic under discussion 
(including associations with other, related topics, forming the cluster o f beliefs we 
may call ‘knowledge’ or ‘ideology’). Thus, the issue o f ‘truth’ does not arise, except 
as commonly accepted by most possible interlocutors in any given context -  and, 
when it comes to ideology, ideological beliefs by definition will be shared by certain 
(groups of) people and contested by others.
I align m yself with Stalnaker’s view of presupposition as background/unstated 
knowledge, an approach also adopted with van Dijk more recently. I argue that this
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approach can be further refined to acknowledge different types o f presupposition, and 
make a contribution to this direction when proposing a categorisation in Chapter 4. In 
the below I discuss how cognitive linguistics can contribute to the endeavour o f 
identifying, explaining and categorising presuppositions.
3.3.2. Presupposition and cognition -  Insights from presupposition 
negation
In this section I discuss how we can explain cognitively the phenomena that have 
traditionally been analysed as ‘presupposition’, as well as the ‘negation o f 
presupposition’, based on Cognitive Linguistics literature. Marmaridou has provided a 
comprehensive account o f the phenomena (2000) -  here I focus on the most relevant 
points to my cognitive approach to presupposition.
Looking at how we can explain presupposition negation gives us some valuable 
insights into the phenomenon termed ‘presupposition’. As mentioned above, Russell’s 
analysis o f presupposition (1905) has been criticised as counter-intuitive. One o f the 
problems has been that, if we interpret ‘the King o f France is bald’ as false, because 
there is no King o f France, ‘the King o f France is not bald’ is false both in situations 
where there is no King o f France, and when there is a King o f France who is not bald. 
It follows that ‘not’ (or equivalent negation markers) is ambiguous, negating either the 
existence o f the (existentially presupposed) King o f France, or his baldness (cf. 
Marmaridou, 2000: 139). Apart from being counter-intuitive (the word ‘not’ having 
‘two meanings’), this is problematic for seeing the word ‘not’ as the equivalent o f the 
logical operator for negation, as logical operators should have one and only one 
‘meaning’ and cannot be ambiguous. Alternatively, one would have to come up with
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two different logical operators o f negation, one just for the negation of 
presuppositions, which is ‘theoretically undesirable’ (ibid.).
One way out o f this is to consider only one negation operator, which however can 
have different pragmatic functions. Horn has suggested that negation can be seen as 
pragmatically  ambiguous, that is, the original single meaning o f the negation operator 
can be extended for cases like ‘metalinguistic negation’, as in
I didn’t manage to trap two moongeese -  I managed to trap two moongooses (1985: 
122; 1988: 126, cited in Marmaridou, 2000: 139).
Metalinguistic negation, then, is a matter o f scope. Rather than rejecting the total o f a 
speaker’s utterance, the interlocutor (in correcting), or the speaker herself (in self- 
correcting) is rejecting one part o f the utterance (in the example above, the 
grammatical realisation o f a concept). The same holds for negating presupposition -  
one can negate that the King o f France is bald, or one can negate the existence o f the 
King o f  France. This has been observed by Horn and Burton-Roberts (see Carston, 
1996), however it needs to be noted that Burton-Roberts sees presupposition as a 
semantic phenomenon, and thus presupposition negation (as well as metalinguistic 
negation) as a logical contradiction which pragmatically results in re-processing an 
utterance in order to make sense.
Carston (1996) makes a convincing case about why metalinguistic negation and
presupposition negation do not necessarily involve logical contradiction, and links
both to the metarepresentational, ‘echoic’ property o f language. That is, through a
presupposition negation such as ‘I don't regret telling her my secrets; I haven't told her
anything’ the second clause ‘echoes’ and refutes only one part o f the first clause,
namely ‘telling her my secrets’. However, Carston views language as a representation
of the world, and not as a representation o f beliefs. As a result, she still maintains a
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distinction between two types o f negation, ‘descriptive’ and ‘metarepresentationaP - 
the ‘descriptive’ use serves for determining the Truth Conditions o f an utterance, and 
the metarepresentational echoes and refutes parts o f previous utterances (ibid.).
Whereas in communication we often try to determine the truth or falsity o f what is 
being communicated, this judgem ent is by no means essential or necessary in 
determining meaning and reaching understanding. We can perfectly well understand 
the sentence ‘the King o f France is bald’, whether we know there is no King of 
France, or we think that there is one, or even if we do not know whether France has a 
King or not. Efforts to move away from the semantic understanding o f presupposition, 
already from Levinson and Fillmore, and even Stalnaker, have been hindered by the 
effort to preserve ‘Truth Value determination’ as a part o f semantics, pragmatics or 
both. Below, I discuss the Cognitive Linguistics take on presupposition, taking into 
account that the relationship between language and reality is not direct, but mediated 
by cognition. It then becomes apparent that all cases o f negation involve negating one 
part o f a mental representation (which may be expressed linguistically) -  whether this 
part is a phonological characteristic, a part o f (a belief expressed by) an utterance or a 
belief/proposition expressed by a sentence, is a matter o f scope, but also a matter of 
framing.
3.3.3 Presupposition and cognition -  Framing and mental spaces
As we saw, both what has been called presupposition negation and what has been 
called metalinguistic negation involve negating a part o f a previous utterance, which 
we can elaborate into negating a part o f the mental representation evoked by the 
previous utterance. Based on Fillmore’s Frame Semantics (see 2.5.1), Marmaridou 
points out that ‘a single situation can be framed in different w ays... For example, a
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person may be described as ‘stingy’ or ‘thrifty”  (2000: 143). The very same way of 
handling money, by the same person, can be understood within a mental 
representation (frame) including the value ‘Spending as little money as possible is not 
good’ (‘stingy’), or another, including the value ‘Spending as little money as possible 
is good’ (‘thrifty’). In an expression like ‘Mary is stingy’, a speaker says ‘in one 
breath something that could be challenged in two different w ays’ (Stalnaker, 
1974/1991: 476) -  one could say ‘Mary is not stingy -  she is really generous’, or 
‘Mary is not stingy -  she is just thrifty’. In the former negative sentence, the framing 
o f ‘trying to spend as little as possible’ as a negative attribute is accepted, but it is 
refuted that Mary does indeed follow this practice. In the latter, it is not accepted that 
all cases o f ‘spending as little as possible’ are negative -  some cases (presumably the 
most extreme) can be negative, but in other cases it can be positive (thrift), and it is in 
this category Mary is classified into -  this is ‘cross-frame negation’, in the sense that it 
rejects one framing of a situation in favour o f another. Fillmore argues that
the intuitions about presuppositions and the so-called ‘negation test’ hold under 
the ‘norm al’ or ‘within fram e’ sense o f negation and that apparent 
counterexamples are instances o f... non-truthconditional negation, which [he 
equates] with instances o f cross-frame negation (1985: 244).
Thus, looking at both metalinguistic and presupposition negation, ‘scope’ refers to 
whether it is the total or part of the content of an utterance that is being negated 
(presuppositions surviving or not depending on scope), but, unlike in Russell’s 
account, we do not consider all parts as ‘equal’ -  the presupposed elements may 
belong to a broader ‘frame’ encompassing the asserted elements, in which case 
refuting the presupposed elements requires a frame shift, or asserted elements may be 
parts o f different mental spaces, again on a higher level hierarchically.
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Cross-frame and meta-linguistic negation have definitely been shown to be possible in 
both discourse and cognition. In order to explain why cross-frame negation is 
conceptually troublesome we might want to attribute it to disruption o f the ‘conceptual 
unity o f dom ain’ (Croft, 2003). According to Croft (based on Langacker, 1987) the 
meaning o f words ‘appears to be determined by the interpretation o f the whole 
construction in which they are found. Much of this is determined by the domain in 
which the words are to be interpreted’ (2003: 161), and the ‘meaning o f the whole’, 
i.e. the domain in which the ‘whole’ is to be interpreted, determines the meaning of 
the ‘parts’ (2003: 162). The scope of what the ‘whole’ might be can vary o f course -  
for example we can imagine how our interpretation o f a text may be influenced by our 
knowledge o f its genre, producers, and/or context o f production, as well as our 
interpretation o f specific parts o f the text following from our holistic assessment o f the 
text. However, also with a narrower scope (and perhaps a narrower definition of the 
concept o f ‘dom ain’) ,35 Croft argues that ‘all o f the elements in a syntactic unit must 
be interpreted in a single domain’ (ibid.) -  if not, we might interpret some of the 
elements as metaphoric or metonymic, or, I would argue, we may proceed cognitively 
to frame or domain shifting.
The issue o f presupposition negation in cases such as ‘The King o f France is not bald, 
because in fact there isn’t such an individual’ or ‘Mary will not regret doing a PhD in 
linguistics, because she didn’t do the PhD after all’ is only one o f the cases that fall 
under the category o f the ‘projection problem’ in presupposition. The projection 
problem refers to the fact that although the presupposition ‘there is a King o f France’ 
is preserved in the simple sentence ‘The King o f France is not bald’, it is not
35 For our purposes w e could define ‘dom ain’ as a field , akin to ‘sem antic f ie ld ’, but em phasising that 
sem antic dom ains are related to experiential dom ains, and bearing in mind that they have a hierarchical 
structure, i.e., em bedded within a domain can be sub-dom ains, or mental m odels.
preserved in the complex sentence ‘The King o f France is not bald, because in fact 
there isn’t such an individual’. To bring another example, consider:
Mary will regret doing a PhD in linguistics.
If Mary does a PhD in linguistics, she will regret doing it.
In the first sentence it is presupposed that Mary is doing, will do or has done a PhD in 
linguistics, and asserted that at some point in the future she will regret it. In the second 
sentence, the presupposition (triggered by ‘regret’), does not remain (Mary may not do 
a PhD in linguistics). In general, the projection problem refers to the issue of 
presuppositions o f sentences, which remain constant if the sentence is simply negated, 
not remaining constant when a simple sentence becomes a part o f a complex or 
compound sentence (for a more detailed account o f the projection problem see 
Marmaridou, 2000: 127-132). In this section I will discuss how we can account for it 
from a cognitive perspective, bringing in the notion o f ‘mental spaces’ as imaginary 
worlds we construct online as we process discourse (Fauconnier, 1985; 1994; 1997; 
Marmaridou, 2000).
I will argue that’ cross-mental space negation’ is similar to cross-frame negation, but 
with a broader scope. We could define a mental space as a mental representation 
constructed online. Admittedly there is much work to be done in this area, as mental 
representations constructed online can be minimal units evoked by a referring 
expression to the whole o f what van Dijk calls ‘discourse schem a’ (1998). This is a 
matter o f scope and taxonomy which are beyond the scope o f my thesis. For my 
purposes here I will consider the mental spaces corresponding to epistemic worlds 
built in discourse on the sentence level. Mental Space builders for this could be 
conjunctions/connectives, aspect (in Greek), and the expressions traditionally
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classified as ‘presupposition triggers’. When there is no space builder, it is assumed 
that the discourse evokes representation within the last mental space constructed.
Mental spaces can account for the fact that presuppositions are triggered by 
expressions introducing subordinate clauses (such as ‘He forgot that the class starts at 
9 ’ -  presupposes the class starts at 9), infinitive clauses (such as ‘I managed to do x ’ - 
presupposes I tried), or gerund clauses (‘I have stopped beating my husband’ 
presupposes I have been beating my husband) 36, whereas other expressions with 
exactly the same syntactic structure do not (such as ‘He said that the class starts at 9 ’ -  
it may or may not be true that the class starts at 9). This has been extensively 
discussed in the work o f Lauri Karttunen (e.g. 1973), among others. Marmaridou 
observes that, although Karttunen and others have been describing, but not explaining 
the projection problem, cognitive accounts o f ‘mental spaces’ or ‘imaginary worlds’ 
also explain why it is that in some complex or compound sentences the truth value of 
presuppositions is maintained, whereas in others it is undetermined (2000: 153).
In a nutshell, mental spaces as imaginary worlds are created by ‘space building’ 
expressions, and worlds can be embedded in other, hierarchically higher worlds. Thus, 
‘It is raining’ pertains to the real world (as perceived by individuals in their temporal 
and spatial context), whereas ‘believes’ in ‘Ann believes that it is raining’ builds the 
mental space or ‘world’ or Ann’s beliefs. ‘It is raining’ is the case in the world of 
Ann’s beliefs, but may or may not be the case in the real world. The same holds for 
reference to situations in a world including presuppositions. For example, in the 
sentence ‘Ann believes that it will not stop raining until tomorrow’, ‘stop’ seems to 
trigger the presupposition that ‘it is raining now’, but if interlocutors know that it is
36 In Greek, all the above verbs can introduce subordinate clauses in the subjunctive form, or take a 
noun as an object com plem ent.
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not raining then this presupposition holds only in the world o f A nn’s beliefs, but not in 
the real world (or, at least, not in the world o f the interlocutors’ beliefs). This account 
includes also the cases o f framing discussed in the previous section, i.e. ‘Mary is 
stingy’ holds in a ‘world’ (system of beliefs) where M ary’s behaviour is not 
conforming with the norms and expectations o f managing money, but not in a ‘world’ 
where the same behaviour corresponds to what would be positively perceived and 
described as ‘thrifty’, and is socially desirable. But both these worlds are part o f a 
reality world where Mary is trying not to spend a lot o f money. However, in ‘Mary is 
not stingy, she is really generous’, we are not talking about a reality where Mary is 
tight with money, which is differently evaluated in different sub-worlds/systems of 
belief within this reality. The negation is applied to the superordinate, ‘real world’ 
mental space, where ‘Mary is stingy/thrifty/tight with money [and other synonyms for 
the same behaviour]’ is not the case.
Marmaridou discusses the Mental Space Theory as an explanation for the problems 
encountered by TC Semantics in assigning truth value to sentences, linking 
presupposition to specific linguistic triggers, and making generalisations on the 
phenomenon of presupposition (cf. Fauconnier, 1985). However, if truth conditions 
are more o f a philosophical issue than an issue o f meaning-making, why would we be 
so concerned about the determination o f truth value even in cognitive semantics or 
pragmatics? The reason is related to the communicative function of the texts and 
interactions we may be interested in studying. In the narration o f a traditional fairy 
tale, hearers understand what is being said and also are perfectly aware that the 
narration applies to a fictional world (but are still able to assign representations to the 
superordinate fairy tale world and the subordinate worlds o f the beliefs o f characters 
etc.). In non-fictional genres, however, there is the implicit or explicit claim on behalf
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of the speakers/narrators/text producers that their utterances represent aspects o f the 
real world. There is then an issue o f whether speakers, by representing certain states of 
affairs as true through devices that make negation more difficult, can impose their 
own ideologies/group knowledge on other groups, or at least influence their audience 
making it more willing to accept certain beliefs as true at their expense, or at the 
expense o f third parties/ groups that are being discriminated against. In the following 
section, I discuss the issue o f negating/questioning presupposition in interaction, and 
how it may or may not be useful to adopt a notion o f presupposition for analysing the 
manifestation o f ideological beliefs in texts.
3.4. Analysing presupposition in discourse
3.4.1 Questioning/ refuting presupposition in discourse -  cognitive and 
social constraints
Marmaridou points out that cross-frame negation involves ‘[bringing] out some kind
o f disagreement between interlocutors which is based on presupposed rather than
asserted m aterial’ (2000: 146), which is more difficult than disagreeing on asserted
material. Fauconnier suggests that presuppositions ‘make the hearer feel they are
already somehow given and therefore difficult to question or refute’ (Fauconnier,
1985: 108). This may be resulting from the fact that ‘[to] presuppose a proposition
consists o f being committed to that proposition while not countenancing the
possibility that it may be false’ (Burton-Roberts, 1989a: 26, cited in Marmaridou,
2000: 134), whereas to assert a proposition allows considering the possibility that it
may be false. Thus, Burton-Roberts proposes that ‘the distinction between assertion
and presupposition can be pre-theoretically characterized in terms of a distinction in
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degree and/or kind o f comm itm ent’ on behalf o f the speaker (Burton-Roberts, 1989b: 
452-453, cited in Marmaridou, 2000: 135) -  in Stalnaker’s terms, presupposition 
expresses a ‘propositional attitude’ on behalf o f the speaker towards what is being 
expressed but not asserted (1973: 448).
Sbisa proposes seeing presuppositions ‘not as shared assumptions, but as assumptions 
which ought to be shared’, attributing thus to presuppositions a ‘normative feature’ 
(1999: 501). Questioning a presupposition is ‘laborious, because it involves a change 
o f topic from what was explicitly at issue to what was merely presupposed, as well as 
being risky, because it amounts to openly challenging the entitlement o f the utterances 
he or she has issued’ (ibid.: 502). This is in line with Strawson’s point that the 
question doesn’t even arise (1950: 12, in Sbisa, 1999: 502).
So we have two factors here: the amount o f work needed to question a presupposition, 
which can be seen in terms o f ‘processing effort’ or ‘cognitive effort’ in Relevance 
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; 1995). It is worth the effort if the expected results 
overcome the costs -  this can be seen in terms o f benefits in understanding (it may 
cost more cognitive effort not to ask about something which is presupposed, as many 
students may have felt when attending a lecture presupposing knowledge they do not 
have), but also in terms o f extra-linguistic costs and benefits in relation to what one is 
trying to achieve through an interaction. So challenging an interlocutor, as Sbisa 
notes, can be costly.
This is particularly clear when taking into account the power relations among 
interlocutors. Harris (1995), examining data from a magistrate/defendant and 
police/suspect interactions, claims that presuppositions are difficult to challenge based 
on the fact that the defendants/subjects in her data do not challenge the
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presuppositions in the questions o f the magistrate or police. Although they do in fact 
have a vested interest in challenging their interlocutors’ presuppositions, in terms of 
power they are subordinate. It seems that at least in such cases there is nothing in the 
linguistic structure o f the expressions used ( ‘presupposition triggers’) that cognitively 
prevents addressees from questioning presuppositions (see discussion in 3.1). One 
could argue that, pragmatically, the discursive and social conventions related to 
presupposing expressions make it socially unacceptable to challenge presuppositions, 
especially for people in powerless/less powerful positions. Generic conventions 
should also be noted, as the structure of court interaction involves certain discursive 
roles for the participants. As Borutti observes
Presupposition... is analysable as a strategy which transforms the addressee’s 
possibility o f speaking -  although this change is n o t o f  a  c a u sa l na ture (such as: 
in flu en cing  the h e a r e r ’s  opin ions, vo lition s, in terests  etc.). Rather, the change 
concerns the hearer’s right o f speaking. The strategic value o f presupposition in a 
discourse is that the utterer implicitly imposes a particular thematic -  pragmatic 
organization o f discourse. Such an organization is, precisely for this reason, more 
difficult to challenge (1984: 442, my emphasis).
One cannot help but wonder, however, if it is not also (maybe equally?) difficult for a 
powerless participant in an interaction (highly structured or otherwise) to challenge 
the powerful interlocutors’ assertions. Therefore, in any analysis it may be worth 
considering whether it is primarily cognitive, social-interactional or social-structural 
factors influencing ‘defeasibility’ (or a combination o f these).
When it comes to cross-mental space negation, Fauconnier’s account (1985) explains 
why statements in relation to any world subordinate to one person’s ‘belief world’ are 
o f indeterminate truth value in the real world, and we can only be certain they are true
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fo r  this person. Consider M armaridou’s brief discussion on the following example, 
and the contextual factors involved (2000: 158-159):
The Prime Minister said that he didn’t know about telephones being tapped.
We can identify three mental spaces:
S(l): the space o f the Prime M inister’s knowledge (built by ‘know ’)
S(2): the space o f the Prime M inister’s sayings (built by ‘say’)
R: the real world space 
Presupposition (P): Telephones were being tapped.
The presupposition (P) is not satisfied in S (l) -  that is, it is not True in the mental 
space o f the Prime M inister’s knowledge (it is either false or undetermined). 
Therefore, it cannot be inherited by S(2). However, S(2) is built by the word ‘say’. 
Someone saying that the Prime Minister said  he didn’t know about telephones being 
tapped means that the truth o f the claim ‘the Prime Minister didn’t know about 
telephones being tapped’ is also undetermined (the Prime Minister may be lying). 
There are two states of affairs to be judged in terms o f truth value here -  whether 
telephones were being tapped and, if yes, whether the Prime Minister knows about it. 
Members o f the audience who, ‘for independent reasons’ know, or believe they know, 
that the Prime Minister has no knowledge o f phones being tapped, will also believe it 
even if it is introduced by the reporting verb-space-builder ‘say’ (Marmaridou, 2000: 
159). However, a journalist reporting the Prime M inister’s words cannot be held 
responsible if the Prime Minister was lying and it turns out he knew about the tapping 
o f phones, since s/he was only reporting on the world o f the Prime M inister’s sayings 
S(2), and not necessarily on the real world. Marmaridou observes that this allows
speakers to create beliefs in speakers’ minds, without being held responsible if these
beliefs turn out to be unsustainable (2000: 159). I would be more interested, however,
in the ‘independent reasons’ that might entice a speaker to deem something as ‘true’ in 
the real world or not. To begin with, let us not forget that the ‘real world’ is yet 
another ‘mental space’. In many cases, we are not able to verify through our senses 
states o f affairs represented as belonging to the ‘real world’ (say, assertions in simple 
sentences, as when we have the sentence ‘Telephones were being tapped.’), either 
because they refer to a different temporal or spatial point from the one we are in, or 
because they represent abstract states and actions we have no access to (as in, ‘the 
Prime Minister does not know x ’ -  we don’t know if this is true in the superordinate, 
real world, because we have no access to the Prime M inister’s mind. We may know 
this is true in the world S(2), ‘he said he doesn’t know x ’, because we have heard him 
say it, for example). The question o f whether a hearer will deem what the Prime 
Minister said to be true has to do with whether the hearer considers that the Prime 
Minister is an honest person, and that s/he has no evidence countering the Prime 
M inister’s statement, or proving that he is not telling the truth in this case, or this 
evidence is not sufficient. Clearly, then, the hearers bring in other beliefs/information 
about the context o f the utterance, the speaker(s) and the real world in general in order 
to assign truth value (or not). Thus, the use o f reporting verbs may indicate an 
unwillingness of the reporting speaker to commit to the truth o f the reported 
representations; it may indeed indicate distancing from and doubt about a person’s 
words (‘Did James lock the door when he left?’ ‘He says he did’), or, on the contrary, 
it may provide a reason why we should accept the reported representations as true, as 
in all arguments ad verecundiam  (appeals to authority). Thus, although from a 
formalist/semantic perspective the verb ‘say’ does not guarantee the truth or falsity of 
the representations within the mental space it builds, the hearers’ beliefs and reasoning
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about various aspects o f the context will determine whether to accept the represented 
state o f affairs as true or not.
There are a number o f issues arising from this and the previous sections. One o f them 
is the issue o f to what extent the classical examples o f presuppositions are more 
difficult to negate due to different cognitive processing or due to social norms about 
what parts o f our interlocutors’ utterances we are allowed to question -  where power 
as well as specific generic conventions play a role. The other important issues are, 
given the insights from cognitive linguistic approaches to presupposition, whether we 
should re-define the notion o f presupposition, how we can identify and analyse 
presuppositions based on our new definition, whether this new definition also predicts 
the difficulty o f defeasibility observed in the classical examples and what implications 
this has for the manifestation o f ideology in discourse and its effects.
It has often been observed (Stalnaker, 1974/1991: 475; Sbisa 1999) that 
‘understanding’ the presupposition is necessary for making meaning of the discourse. 
Based on this, I regard presupposition as ‘prerequisite for m eaning’. This is not to 
suggest that if a presupposition/presupposed assumption is not true, then the sentence 
has no meaning. Rather, that in order to achieve ordinary ‘understanding’ o f the 
meaning o f a stretch o f discourse, it is necessary to access the presupposed material 
from our stored background knowledge. In a theory o f language where each single 
lexical item constitutes part of a frame, and profiles one aspect o f the frame, at least 
some other elements o f the frame need to be triggered for comprehension on the frame 
level. It is in that sense that it is impossible for an outsider to understand what Jorg 
Heider means by ‘East Coast’ (and not only because o f the inability to assign 
reference to the name) -  although in this case activated knowledge on the discourse 
level would include accessing ideological stereotypical assumptions about Jews and
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the US. As we go up the levels, the scope o f presupposition and consequently the type 
o f ‘m eaning’ co-constructed between text and recipient differs. One might then argue 
that on a narrow level we can still understand the lexical items ‘East’ and ‘Coast’ in 
this example, and therefore we don’t consider them nonsensical. The higher the level, 
therefore, and the broader the scope, the more pragmatic and context oriented the type 
o f meaning constructed becomes.
In addition, ‘presupposed’ is knowledge that is required in order to access and 
construct meaning, and knowledge that is taken to be or made relevant by the text 
producer. That is, the text producer not only has the knowledge underlying the surface 
o f the discourse they produce, but also has awareness and expectations in relation to 
whether and to what extend various audiences have access to the relevant knowledge 
too. For meaning-making this means that the audience may not necessarily agree with 
the presupposed assumptions, but that they are able to decode them and understand 
them. Thus, my definition of presupposition does not require necessarily that 
presuppositions be mutually accepted (this is related to the social aspects of 
presupposition and presupposition questioning), but that they should be mutually 
accessible.
The question o f making meaning and persuasion/acceptance has always been 
important for the critical study o f language. If, in any given interaction, we construct a 
discourse model, which includes a representation o f the contents o f the discourse 
produced by our interlocutor(s) (van Dijk, 1998; 2001b), this is first and foremost a 
meta-representation. That is, we form a mental model o f ‘what has been said’. 
Drawing on other knowledge about the speaker and the context, we normally tend to 
assume that our interlocutor is truthful, i.e. believes that what s/he says is true (or we 
may detect dishonesty -  cf. Chilton, 2005). Nevertheless, we may still have issues
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with the representation o f reality constructed by the speaker, or blatantly disagree with 
every single word. The issue is to what extent discourse persuades (and possibly 
deceives) by using our meaning-making mechanism as a tool for persuasion, i.e. by 
exploiting the default processes o f attention and inferencing in order to lead to a 
specific understanding, desirable to the speaker/discourse producer.37
Stalnaker (1974/1991) points out that we often behave as i f  certain information is 
shared even if we mention/hear it for the first time, and Sbisa (1999) suggests that 
‘presupposition’ is not information which is shared, but information which ought to be 
shared. Stalnaker however does not claim that presupposition defined this way has a 
persuasive function -  we may behave as i f  we know, or even agree with something, 
but not come to the point of agreeing with it. Sbisa is right to point out the normative 
function o f discourse, but does not elaborate so much on the issue of cognitive vs. 
social/pragmatic difficulty in refuting ‘presupposition’.
A potential explanation for the normative/persuasive power o f presupposition is that 
the issue o f how the world is and how the world ought to be are very often conflated 
in discourse (and consequently potentially in cognition). A good example is the 
constant, ostensibly purely descriptive representation o f gender -  e.g. in an issue of 
the Greek m en’s lifestyle magazine Nitro, pages o f text are devoted to how ‘real m en’ 
are. Implicitly, this is also prescriptive -  if by definition ‘real m en’ are this way, 
anybody who is different is not a ‘real m an’ (Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2005). 
Incidentally, this is one important reason to examine textual representation o f reality, 
even if it appears to be a merely descriptive endeavour. According to how factive 
descriptions in texts are framed or used, they can provide a representation o f reality to 
be prescribed or criticised. It is always, however, a matter o f framing. Likewise the
37 Thanks to Steve O swald for interesting discussions on this.
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distinction between ‘given’ and contestable information. As pointed out above, both 
new and old information can be represented as ‘given’ and not open to contestation. 
As for old information, and whether this can be either ‘given’ or ‘contestable’, we 
need to take into account the status o f ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ as mental 
representations. That is, a proposition representing a state o f affairs in the world (a 
belief) may be widely present in the discourse o f a community, thus shared and 
‘known’, but may be evaluated as true by some people, as false by others, and as 
undetermined for others (cf. van Dijk’s (2003) point that some beliefs may be 
considered ‘knowledge’ or ‘mere opinions’ based on who evaluates them). This 
involves a meta-representational element accompanying the mental representations, 
i.e. ‘I know that group x believes y, but I think y is not true’. In discourse we can 
distinguish among representations which are presupposed to be true (presupposed to 
be the case, ‘given’, whether new or old/shared information), presupposed to be 
known/shared (old information but not necessarily accepted as true by everyone), and 
o f course both, i.e. presupposed to be the case and  shared by everyone, or at least 
everyone participating in an interaction and the social groups/communities o f the
* • 38participants.
3.4.2 Recent critical analyses of presupposition in discourse
Despite van Dijk’s seemingly very broad definition o f presupposition as ‘everything 
which is not asserted’ (‘presupposed material’, in M armaridou’s terms, cf. also 
Grundy, 1995: Ch. 6), and Sbisa’s (1999) comment in passing that we can analyse
38 Bekalu also m akes the distinction between what has to be presupposed/ assum ed to be known for the 
discourse to make sense, and what is taken for granted, w hich he calls ‘discourse presuppositions’ 
(2006: 152).
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‘linguistically m arked’ presuppositions (which she does), and ‘linguistically 
unm arked’ presuppositions (which she does not do), analysing presupposition in 
discourse remains for the most part restricted to the truth conditional definition o f 
presupposition even when the analysts purportedly do not subscribe to the objectivist, 
formalist understanding o f language which gave birth to the discussion of 
‘presupposition’ as a phenomenon in the first place. Moreover, none o f these 
approaches seem to subscribe to a cognitive explanation o f presupposition taking into 
account mental representation, such as the frame- and mental space-based approaches 
presented above. Below I review some recent literature specifically from critical 
discourse analytical approaches taking different perspectives on presupposition and 
knowledge.
Chilton reserves the term ‘presupposition’ for the cases traditionally identified as such 
in the literature, also making the observations that presupposition triggers serve for a 
more convenient or succinct ‘packaging’ o f information, which may either be known 
or accommodated, and therefore cognitively and socially difficult and ‘inconvenient’ 
to question/refute (2004: 63-64). Wodak also follows the truth-conditional definition 
of presupposition (2007: 213), focussing on existential presuppositions in her analysis. 
For the analysis o f gender ideologies in discourse, Christie (2000, 24-25; 88ff.) Talbot 
(2010: Ch. 7) and Magalhaes (1995) explicitly subscribe to the truth-conditional 
approach.
For background knowledge (what Sbisa calls ‘linguistically unmarked’ 
presuppositions) Chilton seems to employ the term presumptions (2004: 64-65; see 
also analysis in 2004: 78-79, for example). Wodak uses the term allusions for all 
(other) expressions in the discourse that evoke (rather than explicitly assert) 
background, shared and commonly accepted knowledge (2007: 212), and mentions
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topoi as a kind o f shared knowledge often evoked through allusions in her data for 
argumentation purposes (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).
It appears that, for both Chilton and Wodak, presuppositions may rely on shared and 
commonly accepted knowledge, but are more interesting for critical analysis when 
they present new knowledge as old/given. ‘Presumptions’ can also have this function, 
when it comes to principles of discourse, for instance, as in the case o f a speaker who 
performs a speech act, whereby ‘presuming’ that s/he is authorised to perform the 
speech act felicitously (which may be ‘new information’ for the addressee). On the 
contrary, allusions only ‘work’ when the knowledge is already shared, and allusions 
have more to do with content rather than principles. In this case, then, as it also 
becomes apparent from W odak’s critical analysis, knowledge o f the presupposed 
representations (including presupposed topoi, 2007: 217) is necessary for
understanding aspects of the discourse, but it is not necessary that the recipient will 
agree with the presupposed representations. In this case, Wodak disagrees with the 
anti-Semitic representations alluded to, but points out that knowledge of these 
representations is necessary for the audience to understand (and only subsequently be 
persuaded by) Jorg Heider’s discourse.
The analyses and/or examples by Talbot (2010), Magalhaes (1995) and Christie 
(2000) indicate that the concern here is not so much whether the addressee already 
shares the presupposed beliefs -  in fact the beliefs in question are likely to be already 
shared by (at least the intended) text consumers, such as the belief that teenage girls 
are romantically interested in teenage boys (Talbot, 2010: 123) or the stereotype that 
women gossip (Christie, 2000: 90-91). The issue is rather that these ‘common sense’ 
ideological beliefs are reinforced, presented as ‘normal’ and incontestable (and thus
95
also normative), and become even harder to challenge and change, both short-term in 
interaction and long-term in social cognition.
One possible reason for the resilience o f the use o f traditionally defined 
‘presupposition’ may be the power o f tradition. Early scholars presenting slightly 
different takes to the traditional, truth-conditional one, such as Austin, Stalnaker, and 
Fillmore, have been trying to find a common ground between their approaches and the 
prevalent formalist paradigm as the then new fields o f pragmatics and cognitive 
linguistics were being established. Relevance Theory also seems to feel obliged to 
account for Truth Conditions as part o f meaning, rather than as part o f an underlying 
pragmatic principle. That is, the relevance theoretical approach includes making 
judgements on truth or falsity in the account o f how interlocutors process and 
understand language, rather than viewing it as a default underlying assumption that 
every speaker is truthful unless there is evidence to the contrary - an assumption that 
may or may not hold, or which may be suspended in some contexts such as in the 
courtroom (for more discussion see Chilton, 1987).
On the other hand, it remains the case that there is something about certain 
expressions that makes them noticeable as some kind o f special phenomenon - to 
quote Kripke, ‘to some degree Justice Stewart’s comment about pornography holds 
here: we all recognize it when we see it, even if we can’t say exactly what it is’ (2009: 
367). However, when attempting to define presupposition triggers it is still 
problematic to separate them from other, ‘ordinary’ linguistic expressions, for 
example as ‘expressions introducing propositions that can only be negated by cross­
frame negation’, given that cross-frame negation (including metalinguistic negation) 
can occur practically for any lexical item, since, as discussed in Chapter 4, every 
lexical item or longer linguistic expression carries with it unexpressed meanings
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(which can only be negated if these -  presupposed- meanings are brought to the 
foreground).
In this chapter I have argued that what have traditionally been called ‘presupposition 
triggers’ are ‘mental space builders’ (Fauconnier, 1985/1994), and that the 
propositions they introduce constitute the most prototypical sub-category o f a broader 
‘presupposition’ category. This places emphasis on the semantic aspect o f these 
expressions particularly in assigning epistemic status, while acknowledging that 
recognising a ‘mental space’ (or epistemic world/level) involves taking into account 
syntax/co-text, context and the interlocutors’ ‘world knowledge’, none o f which poses 
a problem for a pragmatic cognitive approach (while all o f which do potentially pose 
problems for logical formal approaches).
Classifying ‘sentence-level’ presuppositions introduced by presupposition triggers as 
‘prototypical’ acknowledges that there is no clear dividing line between 
‘presupposition triggers’ and other linguistic expressions triggering background 
knowledge, but still assigns them some special status, which, I argue, is the case due 
to the status o f clauses as expressing ‘complete thoughts/propositions’ (see 4.4 for 
further details on this).
Whether we consider sentence-level presupposition as only one type o f presupposition 
(albeit the most prototypical one), or we reserve the term ‘presupposition’ for this type 
only, we would still need to account for other types o f (presumed, not directly 
defeasible) ‘background knowledge’-  a category ‘indicators of background 
knowledge’ would be too nebulous for systematic linguistic analysis, as are the 
categories ‘presumption’ or ‘allusion’, which could, in principle, include every 
expression indicating, alluding to or triggering any amount or type o f background
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knowledge. Moreover, according to W odak’s definition o f ‘allusion’, every 
presupposition which is not informative can be an allusion, at least in theory (in that it 
will be based on shared knowledge, which some people may not have and thus not 
comprehend the text). Chilton’s ‘presumptions’ could also include what Wodak calls 
allusions plus pragmatic competence and any other ‘presumed’ knowledge (Chilton, 
personal communication, 2008), which would therefore also include ‘presuppositions’ 
when the ‘presupposed propositions’ are already known to all participants.39 Given 
that what is known to the participants cannot always be determined with certainty, and 
also it will change according to the participants (e.g. in media texts it will vary 
according to recipient), we have no way o f telling a ‘presupposition’ from a 
‘presumption’ or ‘allusion’ apart from the presence or not o f ‘presupposition triggers’.
On the other hand, van Dijk (2003; 2005) and Bekalu (2006) define ‘presupposition’ 
solely as ‘background, presumably shared, knowledge’ which is not asserted, 
irrespective of ‘presupposition triggers’. Van Dijk (2005) elaborates on what kind of 
knowledge would be presupposed in what kind o f communicative situations. He 
discusses how in any interaction participants monitor each other’s already existing 
knowledge, and determine what they should assert, and in what manner, taking into 
account the perceived shared knowledge as well as other contextual considerations 
(politeness, appropriacy, genre/purpose o f interaction, interests of self, interests of 
interlocutors etc.). In this approach, some beliefs not stated, directly or indirectly, in 
the discourse, are presupposed (e.g. that Egypt is a country), whereas indirectly 
surfacing propositions can be ‘reminded’ to the recipients who may have forgotten 
them from previous discourse, or ‘obliquely asserted’ for recipients who never knew 
them in the first place (2005: 91, 94). It seems that these are the cases where it is not
39 Later on Chilton lim its the concept o f  presumptions to shared moral ‘values that are taken for granted’ 
(2011: 777).
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assumed that this knowledge is shared, but the ‘rem inded’ facts are taken for 
granted/true. Van Dijk also touches upon the problem that in some cases shared 
knowledge may nevertheless be asserted, or that certain information may not be part 
o f the discourse not because it is shared knowledge but because it is backgrounded 
(‘underemphasized’) or hidden (2005: 95). I would link his discussion o f the latter to 
the issue o f framing, namely, the question o f what information is presupposed and 
communicated as part o f the frame of a word used, as opposed to information which is 
not communicated because it is not explicitly stated but also not part of the 
frames/mental representations evoked.
Since van Dijk, as well as Bekalu, is concerned primarily with knowledge (or lack 
thereof) on behalf o f the audience, they can speak of presupposition, as indicated 
through linguistic expressions, as presupposed knowledge because it has been 
explicitly stated at some other part o f the text, or as mental models that are never fully 
described in the text but are supposed to be part o f the audience’s pre-existing 
knowledge, evoked by (explicit descriptions of) facts in the text. However, this can 
appear methodologically problematic and/or unsystematic. Consider one example (a 
headline) from Bekalu’s analysis:
M inistry calls for active public participation in exposing anti-peace group in 
Gambella.
According to Bekalu (2006: 158),
[i]f we begin with the headline, it presupposes that in Gambella (a name o f a 
place likely to be construed as such by the reader by the linguistic clue of 
capitalization) there had been an ‘anti-peace group’ that should be exposed, and 
this in turn presupposes that there was a clash o f some kind in the place 
mentioned, Gambella.
99
Most, if not all, analyses o f presupposition would agree that the existence o f an anti­
peace group in Gambella is presupposed/ presented as given (existential 
presupposition through the definite referring expression). I would argue that it is also 
presupposed that there is, or is planned to be, and ‘exposing’ o f this group (not 
necessarily that there ‘should be’).40 ‘Exposing’ also presupposed that the group is 
somehow ‘hidden’, although this is not part of Bekalu’s analysis. Moving on to the 
assumption that there was a clash in Gambella -  this is where ‘presupposed’ comes to 
mean ‘requires the reader to draw on other mental models/resources than the text 
alone’. The expression ‘anti-peace group’ alone does not automatically mean there 
was a ‘clash’, since there are other things an anti-peace group can be involved in that 
may need ‘exposing’, such as threats, symbolic violence acts, etc. Bekalu knows that 
in this case there was a clash involved because o f his knowledge o f the context, and 
his point is exactly that it is ‘unfair’ to expect the audience to understand certain 
elements that are ‘presupposed’ (absent) because they do not have enough evidence to 
infer them, and thus they cannot fully comprehend the text (this is the same as 
W odak’s point about ‘allusions’, reversed. Indeed, in both cases, a hearer who does 
not have the necessary background knowledge alluded to will not fully understand the 
text, or will have a different understanding).
Other cases o f slippage between the ‘traditional’, truth-conditional and a broad 
‘background knowledge’ approach to presupposition include Mills (2008) and 
Magalhaes (1995) in the study of language and sexism. M ills’ (2008: 146) re-analysis 
o f Christie’s example ‘So, have you women finished gossiping?’ (2000: 90-91) 
suggests it presupposes not only that the addressees had been gossiping (truth-
40 This could be one o f  the cases one could analyse as ‘backgrounding’ or ‘m ystification’ -  probably 
readers can infer that the M inistry w ill do the ‘exp osin g’, and is asking for co-operation from the public, 
but the abstract, non-basic level noun or verb ‘exposing /expose’ does not make it clear what actions this 
involves (see  O ’Halloran, 2003).
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conditional), but also that ‘women’s talk is trivial, that women engage in gossiping 
more than men, that two women talking together can be assumed to be gossiping’ 
(2008: 146) assumptions which are definitely widely held stereotypes about women 
but not derived merely by performing a ‘negation test’ on the sentence. Magalhaes 
(1995) presents a formal, Truth Conditional theoretical approach, but in her analysis 
she also comments about a male character: ‘Rubinho's speech presupposes his former 
and current power over Tina [his girlfriend] ’(1995: 189). ‘Presupposition o f power’ is 
not, strictly speaking, truth-conditional, and does not emerge from ‘presupposition 
triggers’.
It seems that, as Sbisa has pointed out, the terminological confusion and appearance of 
methodological lack o f systematicity emerges from the different uses o f the term 
‘presuppose’. Is presupposed material automatically inferred, and therefore difficult to 
reflect on consciously and refute, or ‘not stated, but required’, in which case it may 
not be inferred, leading to impaired or insufficient understanding for some recipients? 
There is an element o f contradiction when van Dijk says that certain ‘knowledge can 
be presupposed because it is irrelevant or can be inferred by the recipients themselves’ 
(2005: 76) -  surely, if this knowledge is not mentioned because it is irrelevant, it is not 
meant to be inferred, whereas if it is relevant and can be inferred it will not be asserted 
for reasons o f economy. Bekalu speaks of ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ presuppositions -  fair 
ones are the ones that will be readily inferred by the audience, which should include 
all the ‘linguistically marked’ ones (the issue o f strategic imposition o f these 
automatic inferences as incontestable facts is not the concern o f Bekalu’s analysis), 
unfair ones are the ones which require background knowledge the audience may not 
have. In the following Chapter (Chapter 4) I provide an account o f the factors related
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to issues o f both processing and accepting (or not) underlying presupposed meanings, 
and present a cognitively informed broad definition o f presupposition.
3.5. Conclusion
From the above review of classical and more recent account o f presupposition, there 
are a few concluding remarks pertinent to the thesis. First and foremost, truth 
conditional logical approaches to meaning are ontologically and epistemologically 
incompatible with critical analyses o f discourse, and o f functionalist/performative 
approaches to language in general (see Robinson, 2006, esp. Ch. 2, for a brilliant 
discussion on the two main strands o f approaches to language). The explanation of 
presupposition as ‘socially costly to challenge’ fits the critical approach and often 
emancipatory agenda o f feminist and other critical approaches to linguistics, with 
Harris (1995) providing perhaps the most relevant account in this respect. However 
focussing on this seems more apt for analysing dialogic exchanges, where participants 
are by virtue o f the genre and mode o f communication allowed and/or at times obliged 
to respond to an interlocutor’s utterances. It is harder to account for social cost when 
analysing unidirectional texts, such as newspaper or magazine texts, lectures or 
speeches.
I argue that cognitive aspects of discourse processing must be taken into account for a 
more satisfactory and comprehensive account o f presupposition, presupposition 
processing and ideology. This should include also the psychological/affective factor of 
acknowledging authority and power -  personal, professional, institutional or other, as 
well as issues o f perception and salience, pre-existing shared knowledge etc. The latter 
can actually account for presupposition acceptance in the case where there is no
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significant power imbalance among interlocutors, whereas there is naturalisation and 
reinforcement o f ideologically dubious beliefs.
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Chapter 4: Toward a Theory of Presupposition for Discourse 
Analysis: Social Cognition and Knowledge Management
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I would like to outline my proposed definition for ‘presupposition’ as a 
category with radial structure, encompassing more or less prototypical cases related to 
each other with ‘family resemblances’. I will further discuss both prototypical and less 
prototypical cases, considering how the various characteristics and functions attributed 
to ‘presupposition’ in the literature can occur in these categories.
Finally I will propose a theoretical and methodological distinction of five levels of 
analysis, relating these to the definition. I argue that taking into account functions and 
levels of discourse, and stating explicitly in our analysis which o f these we are 
addressing, contributes to more clarity and reliability in the analysis, and, from a 
critical perspective, it allows us to reflect more on how and why certain beliefs are, or 
are more likely to, be taken for granted in certain contexts.
My working definition o f presupposition, on which I will elaborate in this chapter, is 
the following:
Presupposition is a proposition/belief, concept or system o f beliefs forming 
the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse. Prototypically, 
presupposition is the proposition forming the ground which surfaces in the 
discourse on sentence level and is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality 
Space o f the participants in the interaction.
Before I provide the elaboration and explanation o f the definition itself, I will first 
present the theoretical considerations that led me to this definition, namely, the
104
understanding o f concepts o f ‘meaning’ and the properties o f  the phenomenon of 
presupposition vs. ‘non-presupposition’.
4.2 Meaning: Presupposing vs. Evoking
It seems to me that one o f the reasons for the theoretical and methodological 
discrepancies across different approaches, even within functionalist paradigms of 
discourse analysis, is the different understandings o f the concept of ‘meaning’. 
Traditional TC accounts speak o f denoting, entailing, presupposing, and implicating, 
whereby ‘denoting’ belongs to the study o f the field o f semantics and stands for a 
direct relationship between the language and the world, in M orris’ classical definition 
(1938). The concept o f ‘denoting’ and in some cases also that o f ‘entailing’ could be 
replaced in Cognitive Linguistics by that o f ‘evoking’ frames or knowledge structures 
in general.
I have already discussed in Chapter 2 that the relationship between language and the 
world is mediated by cognition, which has various implications not only for the study 
of social cognition, ideology and knowledge, but also for the study o f ‘meaning’. Not 
only do linguistic expressions correspond to mental representations, as opposed to 
entities in the world, but also this correspondence is not a simple word-to-concept 
correspondence. Lehrer and Kittay (1992) observe that knowledge o f the meaning o f a 
word is not just a self-contained lexical entry in the mind, to be defined by a closed 
list o f semantic features. It is notable that even though frames can be defined as 
clusters o f concepts, they cannot be defined as ‘closed’. O ’Halloran (2003: 62), based 
on Quine (1953), argues that we see sentences not as discrete representations of 
reality but as cues o f background knowledge. O ’Halloran (2003: 63) also quotes a
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particularly telling extract from Slobin (1982: 131-132), which I would like to 
reproduce here:
A sentence is not a verbal snapshot or movie o f an event. In framing an 
utterance, you have to abstract away from everything you know, or can 
picture, about a situation, and present a schematic version which conveys the 
essentials. In terms o f grammatical marking, there is not enough time in the 
speech situation for any language to allow for the marking o f everything 
which could possibly be significant to the message. Probably there is not 
enough interest, either. Language evokes ideas, it does not represent them. 
Linguistic expression is thus not a natural map o f consciousness or thought. It 
is a highly selective and conventionally schematic map. At the heart o f 
language use is the tacit assumption that most o f the message can be left 
unsaid, because o f mutual understanding (and probably also mutual 
impatience). The subset o f semantic notions which is formally marked in a 
particular language serves more to guide the listener to the appropriate 
segments and categories of analysis than to fully represent the underlying 
notions.
What I would like to emphasise in particular here is that not only language does not 
represent the world, but that it also does not represent concepts and ideas -  it evokes 
them.
First I would like to discuss the implications this has for the definition of ‘meaning’, 
then move on to the implications for ‘presupposition as shared knowledge’, and 
finally ‘presupposition as incontestable knowledge’.
In semantic and pragmatic research, we generally tend to think o f two ‘kinds’ or levels 
o f meaning. Meaning (1), semantic meaning, which is necessary for language 
comprehension. This is perceived as relatively stable and relatively conventionalised
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as a default, i.e., more or less independent o f context. Meaning (1) is fossilised enough 
to be encoded in dictionaries, and would be what I mentioned above as ‘denotation’. 
In everyday meta-linguistic commentary people may explain to children or non-native 
speakers o f a language what a word ‘m eans’ in that sense, and this is normally 
perceived as, if not easy, at least perfectly plausible. Meaning (2) is much broader -  it 
can include what we may call ‘connotations’ or associative meanings, but also 
personal associations (‘what this means to m e’), and it has a broader scope. In that 
sense we can link the use even o f isolated lexical items (such as ‘slut’ or ‘nigger’, for 
example) to whole systems o f beliefs and socio-historical circumstances.41 This kind 
o f meaning is more elusive and much more controversial.
However, as we have seen, from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective we cannot speak 
o f meaning (1) as ‘closed’ and self-contained. Linguistic (and particularly, but not 
exclusively, semantic) knowledge is associated with ‘world knowledge’, and clusters 
o f this knowledge (frames or mental models) are linked to each other, forming the 
complex network o f all knowledge an individual has (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 30). 
Thus, the ‘meaning o f a word’ acts as an access node into the knowledge network:
The entity designated by a symbolic unit can therefore be thought o f as a point of 
access to a network. The semantic value o f a symbolic unit is given by the open- 
ended set or relations... in which the access node participates. Each o f these 
relations is a cognitive routine, and because they share at least one component the 
activation o f the routine facilitates (but does not always necessitate) the activation 
o f another. (Langacker, 1987: 163, emphasis in original)
41 See also Hart’s (2010) analysis o f ‘referential strategies’ realised through evoking certain frames in 
immigration discourse. Fairclough also observes that even one word can serve as a textual ‘cu e ’ to a 
discourse/ideology (1989: 24).
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Therefore, it is impossible at any given time to give a precise and definite ‘meaning’ 
o f a word (or a text, for that matter). Further, ‘meaning’ would then have to be 
equated with everything symbolised by the physical aspect o f language, i.e. everything 
but the actual strings o f sounds or marks on a page (or computer screen). One o f the 
crucial questions for determining ‘m eaning’ then is, if all knowledge is interconnected, 
how much of this knowledge is activated with every linguistic unit uttered for 
communication to be possible. Given time and memory constraints, a hearer has to 
process every unit uttered at a very high speed as the speaker continues speaking. 
Possibly with reading one would have the time to stop and retrieve more knowledge, 
but this also depends on the kind of reading (skimming, scanning for information, 
reading for pleasure, close reading, studying or reading with the purpose o f 
conducting textual analysis). Moreover, we may still not want to do away with the 
‘meaning (1)’ and ‘meaning (2)’ distinction altogether, but rather recognise that there 
is no clear and fixed dividing line between the two.
A way to look at meaning levels from a cognitive linguistic perspective is to take into 
account the issue o f scope. A narrow scope, termed scope o f  predication  (Langacker, 
1987: 119) or immediate scope (Langacker, 1999: 49), seems to include the minimal 
amount of background knowledge (part o f a frame) necessary to make meaning, 
which we then we could argue would be ‘meaning (1)’. Langacker illustrates this 
through the example o f body parts; ‘[t]he body as a whole functions as the immediate 
scope o f predication for such terms as head, arm, leg, and torso, since their position 
within the overall configuration o f the body constitutes an essential part o f their 
meaning’ (1987: 119), while for hand  the immediate scope o f predication is arm, and
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for finger  it is hand. Croft and Cruse schematise the scope o f predication for each item 
as follows:42
Knuckle> finger> hand> arm> body (2004: 23)
From the above we can also see that for knuckle the concept o f body lies outside the 
immediate scope o f predication, but is part o f a broader scope, which we can term 
maximal scope (Langacker, 1999: 49) or domain structure (see also Croft, 2003).
Based on this, we can at least identify a minimal narrow scope for each concept, but 
we still cannot determine with certainty and how much of the broader scope o f a 
concept will be activated through discourse comprehension. We can, however, say 
quite safely that due to processing constraints the narrower the scope, the more readily 
available the material evoked (see Croft and Cruse, 2004: 50; also O ’Halloran, 2003).
Our theorisation o f meaning and background knowledge is important for our 
understanding o f presupposition, a link I will elaborate on in the following section.
4.3 Background knowledge and presupposition
The relevance o f the previous section to presupposition in particular lies in that, if we 
define presupposition as shared knowledge, or even as shared knowledge necessary 
for understanding discourse, we end up almost equating ‘presupposition’ with 
‘m eaning’, excluding perhaps inferences made by a recipient o f discourse which are 
very closely related to unique personal experiences. However, all accounts o f 
presupposition, despite their contradictions, agree that ‘presupposition’ is not just any 
kind o f meaning, but one that has certain special properties. If, however, all meaning
42 See also Croft and Cruse’s exam ple o f  the concept o f  the le tte r ‘T ’ and its domain matrix (2004: 26).
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is evoked, we would have to consider different categories o f meaning than just 
‘meaning (1)’ and ‘meaning (2)’. Van Dijk (2005), for example, distinguishes between 
‘asserting’, ‘reminding’ and ‘presupposing’ to label communicating different types of 
meaning -  in this case it is crucial to define both ‘presupposing’ and ‘asserting’.
Let us consider (part of) my working definition o f presupposition, reiterated here for 
convenience:
Presupposition is a proposition/belief, concept or system o f  beliefs forming the 
ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse.
‘Forming the ground’ involves the following:
first, whatever it is we call ‘presupposition’ is not foregrounded 
second, ‘presupposition’ is, however, accessed/activated
it is accessed by virtue o f being a part of knowledge activated/evoked in discourse 
processing through linguistic cues, and necessary for achieving at least 
m eaning(l)
It is in that sense that Fillmore and Atkins suggest that the contents o f frames are 
presupposed by the lexical items which evoke the frames (1992: 75), and Croft and 
Cruse observe that ‘in the scope o f predication, the domains immediately presupposed 
by a profiled concept are accessible in a way that more indirectly presupposed 
domains are not’ (2004: 50).
As we have seen, however, there is an element of presupposition which is said to 
make the presupposed material (concept, belief or system of beliefs) ‘incontestable’ - 
and it is in this sense that Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), for example, distinguish 
between ‘evoking’ and ‘presupposing’. In my framework this distinction would 
signify the difference between information ‘presupposed because known’ and
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information ‘presupposed as given/incontestable’. Yet it should be noted that an item 
of information can be at the same time (assumed to be) known and (presented as) 
incontestable -  in that sense, if we were to use Dancygier and Sweetse’s terms, we 
could say that it is possible to evoke and presuppose at the same time.
For the study o f knowledge management (cf. van Dijk, 2005) I would argue that it is 
perhaps necessary to consider these aspects (degree o f ‘sharedness’, degree of 
‘backgrounding’ and degree of ‘incontestability’), in order to avoid, for example, 
equating ‘what is not asserted because it is irrelevant’ and ‘what is not asserted 
because it is known’. Let us consider these distinctions one by one:
4.3.1 Known vs. Unknown
a. Beliefs not asserted because they are shared/already known
Much knowledge in discourse is presupposed in that sense -  the most obvious 
example would be the aforementioned ‘meaning o f words’. Normally speakers do not 
explain the meaning o f every single word they use, as every competent speaker o f the 
language they use will already know it. That is, every interlocutor will have 
knowledge o f at least some part o f the frame associated with the item in question, 
which draws on ‘world knowledge’ (see Fillmore, 1985; Fillmore and Atkins, 1992; 
also discussion above). Allusions to stereotypes would be included in this category -  
these do not need to be spelt out, but everyone who is aware o f the stereotype 
(whether ‘sharing’ it in agreement or not) would be able to access the speaker’s 
intended meaning. Anyone unfamiliar with the stereotype will not be able to fully 
‘understand’ the allusion in that sense (see Wodak, 2007, for an example).
O ’Halloran (2003) looks at the issue of mystification as it has been discussed in the 
CDA and critical linguistics literature. He focuses on the problem of whether by using
a noun phrase instead o f a full clause (a process sometimes called ‘nominalisation’ in 
the literature) the text producers withhold information from the receivers and thus lead 
them not to attribute responsibility to actors, for instance. On the other hand, he brings 
in examples where not mentioning some information is taken as a sign that this 
information is actually accepted by the ‘ideal reader’ as given (Fairclough, 2001: 44- 
45, commentary in O ’Halloran, 2003: 27 ff.). O ’Halloran concludes that in some cases 
o f noun usage, some information is not withheld, because it is part o f the frame 
automatically triggered by the word. By the above definition o f presupposition, this 
would be presupposed. However, it would not ‘be mystified’ or ‘escape our attention’. 
Moreover, in a sentence such as ‘Demonstrators have been shot’, which has been 
analysed as mystifying the agent through the use o f the passive, the agent is not 
presupposed if s/he is not known. However, the immediately previous sentence states 
that the police interfered with the demonstration, and because it is right before the 
passivised sentence, the readers (even ones reading quickly and uncritically) are very 
likely to infer that it was the police who did the shooting (O ’ Halloran, 2003: 123-124). 
In this case, knowledge that the police did the shooting is presupposed in that the 
author has stated it in the preceding co-text and proceeds knowing that the audience 
has this knowledge.
b. Beliefs represented as known and shared
Often beliefs may be asserted, but not because they are new. Such beliefs may be
prefaced with ‘As we all know,...’, or ‘O f course,...’ (as concessions). Or they may be
presented as unqualified statements at the beginning o f a written or spoken text, with
the aim of ‘setting the scene’, indicating what the text is about, before moving on to
contribute new information. These beliefs are backgrounded in the sense that they are
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not the focus o f the text, they are not the issue under debate, and, in that sense, they 
function as introductions rather than the ‘topic’ o f the text per se (see van Dijk, 2000: 
60). Beliefs introduced through presupposition, narrowly understood, fall under this 
category: ‘When I finish my degree, I will take a year o f f  presupposes 1 will finish 
my degree, and that my interlocutor knows or expects this (setting), and introduces the 
new information that I will take a year off.43
There is also the possibility that a belief (or set o f beliefs) may be known and shared, 
but still asserted and emphasised (not backgrounded) for other reasons. Van Dijk’s 
(2003; 2000: 61) point that we have to look at what is ‘not said’ in order to find the 
‘commonsensical’ (presupposed, naturalised and accepted in the community or 
communities involved in an interaction) is contradicted by the fact that for some 
strategic purposes we may elaborate and say a lot about known things. For example, in 
representing in- and out-groups (members o f one’s social group vs. other social 
groups) positive self-representation and negative other-representation are more 
detailed, and negative self-representation and positive other-representation less 
detailed, if provided at all (van Dijk, 2000: 63). Positive information about one’s own 
group (and negative information about other groups) is not necessarily unknown, but 
it will be repeatedly and elaborately provided for persuasive purposes. For example, in 
the parliamentary discourse examined by van Dijk (ibid.) the in-group (politicians and 
citizens of a country accepting immigration) is represented as civilised, hospitable, 
tolerant etc., while the out-group (immigrants) is presented as unrefined, 
untrustworthy, threatening etc. These beliefs are not new in that they circulate very 
widely in media, political and everyday discourse o f the countries researched. This is
43 This is com m only accepted as presupposition even when w e have no means o f  checking whether the 
know ledge is shared or not, thus the classification o f  this exam ple as ‘presupposition’ is based so le ly  on 
the basis that it is presented as incontestable.
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just one case where shared knowledge does not surface in the discourse as 
‘presupposition’ but as assertions as well, and detailed ones no less. And negative 
self-representations/ positive other-representations will be absent, vague and short not 
because they are known and do not need to be asserted/ elaborated on, but because the 
speakers’ intentions are for them to remain unknown/ neglected.
c. Beliefs asserted because they are new to the recipient
Assertions rarely have the aim to just provide new information. There are, however, 
some cases in which they do, most notably news discourse and ‘initiation’ or 
educational discourse (van Dijk, 1998). In this case it is interesting to think o f the 
selection process: What news story is chosen over others? What knowledge is deemed 
necessary to be explicitly taught to children and new members o f communities? In this 
case the ideological function does not lie in the backgrounding, but in the 
foregrounding o f this unquestionably new for the recipients information, at the 
expense o f other knowledge, which is not simply backgrounded but not mentioned at 
all. These new assertions still occur within a setting provided, implicitly or explicitly 
by the co-text, as we can see from the example in the paragraph above. Moreover, 
these need to be distinguished from beliefs that are asserted in order to provide the 
setting (again, see above), as reminders (see next paragraph), or from beliefs that are 
asserted because, although known, they are under question or under attack.44
44 ‘A sserted’ could be understood as the ‘profile’/ ’figure’ o f  frames on lexical level, or an indicative  
clause on sentence level, for exam ple.
d. Beliefs represented as new
Often, and most probably in most cases where the audience is more than one person 
and unknown to the speaker (including overhearers), it is impossible for a speaker to 
know whether the beliefs she or he is drawing on are already familiar to the audience 
(let alone whether they agree with them). Breaking news can be assumed to be new to 
all o f the audience, and it is quite safe to guess that most schoolchildren do not already 
know the Pythagorean theorem. Turning to a genre like advice texts o f lifestyle 
magazines, however, it is impossible to know how many o f these beliefs are already 
held by or known to the readers. A new reader might encounter much unknown 
information about grooming, beliefs about gendered behaviour, and the like. A reader 
who has already read some of these texts (even if not a regular reader) might have 
encountered these beliefs before. Also, with the exception o f the youngest members of 
the community, most adults will have encountered these beliefs about gender and 
appearance in other genres, even if they have never read a lifestyle magazine in their 
lives. Magazines will still present this knowledge as new, sometimes allowing for the 
possibility of some readers’ already having this knowledge (with rhetorical questions 
such as ‘Did you know...?’). They thus present the ‘new knowledge’ to ‘novices’ 
while at the same time reinforcing or reminding the ‘old’ knowledge to the more 
experienced readers (see also van Dijk, 2005). Presenting knowledge as new always 
runs the risk o f sounding patronising (assuming ignorance), and devices like the 
aforementioned rhetorical question allow the readers to perceive themselves as 
knowledgeable (knowing more than other readers) rather than patronised.
115
e. Beliefs that are not known and not asserted
Such beliefs may be simply irrelevant to a topic -  even if I assume that you do not 
know the Pythagorean theorem, I do not consider it relevant to (re)iterate it here. In 
the cases when certain new beliefs may be considered to be relevant, however, there 
are issues related to ‘information selection’ -  some facts may not be mentioned 
because the hearers knowing them is against the interests o f the speaker, or some 
topics or beliefs may be taboo. Or, as in the case o f allusions, allowing some relevant 
aspects o f meaning to remain unasserted (implicit) may be a method o f ‘audience 
selection’, where the target audience ‘gets it’ and the rest remain in the dark (Wodak, 
2007; also Bekalu, 2006, on ‘unfair presuppositions’).
4.3.2 Degree o f  certainty/’definiteness’
a. Beliefs represented as 'given/unquestionable'
Introducing knowledge through certain ‘presupposition triggers’ contributes to them 
not being ‘open to questioning’. Categorical modality (i.e., a categorical assertion 
without modification, which usually indicates factuality or certainty -  see Fairclough, 
1992: 158-159), epistemic modality o f high certainty, deontic modality indicating 
strong obligation and certain kinds of evidentiality (e.g. citing a very authoritative and 
trustworthy source) also contribute to a belief being presented as ‘unquestionable’. 
The difference here is that presupposition triggers function as backgrounding devices, 
while modality and evidentiality can have a foregrounding function. However, the 
presence o f presupposition triggers may be combined with drawing on the authority of 
a speaker, or the authority of a quoted source, in presenting knowledge as even more 
definitive and unquestionable (as this is a continuum of various degrees of definitive­
ness). ‘Informative presupposition’ is a case where new but incontestable information 
is introduced through ‘presupposition triggers’ (Abbott, 2000). Karttunen (1974/1991: 
411) observes that through the sentence ‘We regret that children cannot accompany 
their parents to commencement exercises.’ the audience is actually informed that 
children cannot accompany their parents (as well as that the source o f this information 
claims to be sorry about this. In Sbisa’s example ‘The anti-cancer treatment invented 
by Luigi Di Bella, the professor from Modena, scores another amazing goal in its own 
favour.’ (1999: 496),45 the reader might not previously know that Luigi Di Bella has 
invented an anti-cancer treatment. Lewis (1979) comments on referring to ‘the cat’ 
when there is a cat in the room, even though the existence o f the cat has not been 
previously asserted.
In Lewis’ example it is most reasonable to assume that the existence o f the cat has 
been perceived by all interlocutors in the room, and thus ‘the cat’ is part of the 
common physical context and also part o f the common context model (shared 
knowledge). In Karttunen’s example, the purpose o f the announcement is exactly to 
inform those who do not know that children are not allowed. However, some of the 
addressees may already know that from other sources. The same holds for Sbisa’s 
example -  readers may or may not know/believe that Luigi Di Bella has invented an 
anti-cancer treatment, or that this treatment has already had some success (‘scored a 
goal’, and now scores ‘another’). For some cases, it does not matter. In Karttunen’s 
example, the purpose is to make sure people do not bring their children along, whether 
they knew this information in advance or not. What matters is the directive speech act 
and whether it will be followed. In this case, ‘we regret that’ as a ‘presupposition 
trigger’ seems to function rather as a politeness/formality device. Vice versa, in Lewis’
45 'La terapia anticancro ideata dal professore m odenese Luigi Di B ella  segna un altro clam oroso punto 
a favore’.
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example, if by any chance participants have not perceived the presence o f a cat in the 
room, they will look around them for a cat before they challenge the presupposition. 
What matters is that the act of ‘referring to the cat in the room ’ is achieved 
successfully so that the hearers know what the speaker is talking about. In Lewis’ case, 
using a referring expression without asserting the existence o f the referent functions as 
a ‘shortcut’ (Karttunen, 1974: 191) or more economical ‘packaging’ (Saeed, 2003: 
104).
Choosing to foreground or background ‘incontestability’ does depend on principles of 
economy, but foregrounding has the function of making explicit the certainty, 
obligation or authority underlying this incontestability, something to be determined by 
the dynamics o f the interaction - does the speaker wish to assert authority? Reassure 
or save face for the hearer? Patronise or mock the hearer? What is more at stake, 
economy (packaging ‘given’ beliefs briefly and implicitly through presupposition) or 
explicit assertion of incontestablity?
b. Knowledge 'open to contestation'
There are two reasons a speaker might want to introduce beliefs as open to 
contestation. One is that one may be genuinely unable to assert certain beliefs with 
certainty, or one may acknowledge that disagreement is a valid option. Such an 
acknowledgment o f limitations may, o f course, be strategic, as in the case o f news 
discourse trying to avoid charges of inaccuracy, or academic discourse avoiding 
overgeneralisations. Epistemic modality o f not-so-high certainty is one o f the devices 
used for these purposes, but it seems to me that here the focus o f attention is meant to 
be the proposition itself, and the mitigation serves as a marginal disclaimer. Some
kinds o f evidentiality can have similar functions (e.g. ‘...or so I’ve heard’). The second 
reason o f presenting beliefs as open to contestation is to simply go on and contest 
them. In this case more emphasis would be placed on the modality or weakness o f the 
evidence or quoted source, and we may have a contrast following in the co-text (‘It is 
possible  that he is telling the truth, but I find it very unlikely’, ‘77ze opposition want us 
to believe that..., when in fact...’).
4.3.3 Degree of emphasis/focus
a. Knowledge not mentioned, or backgrounded and not processed
Practically all discourse analytical (and most pragmatic) approaches associate 
presupposition phenomena with backgrounding. Taking something for granted, and 
not questioning it, then, stems from the fact that the presupposed elements are 
backgrounded; salient propositions are noticed, and therefore open to question. In 
order for beliefs to be (readily) accepted, however, they have to be at least 
communicated, i.e., the hearer must have some mental representation o f them by the 
end o f the interaction.
However, there are beliefs (and corresponding facts, when it comes to factual beliefs) 
which the speaker intends the hearer to miss. Indeed, this is perhaps the most crucial 
defining feature of manipulation -  deflecting attention from beliefs (or contextual 
assumptions, in Relevance Theoretical terms) which are relevant for the hearer, but 
contrary to the effect the speaker wants to achieve (see Maillat and Oswald, 2009; 
Oswald, 2010; see also O ’Halloran, 2003, on ‘mystification’). This is information 
withheld from discourse receivers and not presupposed -  it is expected that audiences 
have no knowledge o f the information withheld. In this case, hearers still arrive at
some meaning o f what is being said. If this co-occurs with representations o f the 
speakers as reliable sources, and no other representation of the world as different from 
what the speakers represent it to be, hearers will accept them as not only truthful but 
also true. In order to be able to identify such non-communicated but (potentially) 
relevant beliefs, the analyst would have to have this information from another source 
(other texts and/or belief systems, not present in the text).
Concepts and propositions may also be present in the text, but backgrounded 
deliberately so as to be missed, with the most obvious example the obligatory ‘small 
print’, which has to be present in the text for some reason (e.g. advertising regulations 
or other legal requirements), but can only be processed with some effort which may or 
may not be made by the audience.
Both o f the above kinds o f propositions (completely missing or backgrounded) cannot 
be said to constitute ‘presuppositions’ just because they are not salient. Likewise, 
information not mentioned because they are simply irrelevant are not presuppositions, 
whether they are shared knowledge between speaker and addressee or not.
A special case would be what Bekalu calls ‘unfair presuppositions’ (2006). In the 
above sense, ‘unfair presuppositions’ are not presuppositions at all, but merely 
backgrounded contextual assumptions. This, however, would mean that
- For the speakers already having these beliefs/knowledge, or accessing them 
through close reading, such as the analyst, these are presuppositions and for 
the rest o f the audience these are not, or
- We have to have different terms for presupposed (assumed) knowledge which 
might or might not be activated and for presupposed knowledge that will 
definitely be activated, or
120
We have to assume that it is the speaker who presupposes, in which case 
presupposition is not merely the speaker’s knowledge, but it is the knowledge 
the speaker assumes the audience to have, and which is necessary for meaning- 
making.
This is perhaps the main problem with defining presupposition, which relies upon our 
definition o f ‘meaning’ and theorisation o f audience. For Truth Conditional 
approaches, meaning resides in the language itself, and it is sentences who 
‘presuppose’, which makes it impossible to speak of presupposition above the 
sentence level. Assuming that ‘meaning’ is co-constructed jointly by speakers and 
hearers, and relies as much on linguistic as on encyclopaedic knowledge means that 
each text has a ‘meaning potential’ encompassing at least a range o f ‘meanings’. This 
is where scope and focus are significant -  there is a certain amount o f ‘meaning 
potential’ which will be realised even with an audience who has relatively limited 
‘world knowledge’ (i.e. no specialist or professional knowledge), and who makes the 
minimum effort to process a text (e.g. is distracted, reads fast etc.). This will be more 
visibly accessible to the discourse analyst as well (O’Halloran, 2003), and would be 
categorised under ‘backgrounded and processed knowledge’, see below. Thus, 
according to van Dijk (2005), sentence level presuppositions are not ‘presupposed’, 
but ‘obliquely asserted’.
As discussed in 3.4.1 the critical cognitive approach I follow view presuppositions as 
‘prerequisites for meaning’; accessing presuppositions is necessary for meaning 
making. I would also like to emphasise the necessity to take into account ‘what means 
what to w hom ’, and under what conditions. Thus, ‘the King o f France is bald’ has 
meaning in the lexico-grammatical sense for all English speakers, but on the discourse
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level, in the current socio-political context and presuming the genre o f the text is not 
fictional, it does not ‘make sense’.
b. Knowledge backgrounded and processed
Generally all pragmatic approaches to presupposition, from Levinson to van Dijk, 
assign ‘backgrounded-ness’ as a core feature o f presupposition, which is essential for 
distinguishing it from propositions which are not defeasible due to social-contextual 
rather than cognitive factors (see above). I argue that sentence-level presupposition is 
one form of windowing of attention (Talmy, 2010; 2007), a figure-ground distinction 
(Marmaridou, 2000: 124. 147; see also Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Wilson and Sperber, 
1979).
This is also the aspect o f presupposition o f most interest to critical discourse analysis.
Both for discourse comprehension purposes, and for persuasion purposes, the belief
introduced through presupposition has to be triggered, in order for the utterance to
make sense, while at the same time it must not be the focus o f attention and debate,
the topic, ‘what is really the problem here’ (van Dijk, 2000: 60). Van Dijk (2000: 61)
suggests that these implicit representations would not form part o f the audience’s
discourse model (memory of the discourse they have been exposed to) -  I would argue
that, in the case o f presuppositions, they would, as they surface in the discourse as
‘setting’ or background {ground), against which concepts in the discourse are profiled
(as figures) (Levinson, 1983: 180). Cognitively, then, ‘presupposition triggers’ on
sentence level set up mental spaces within which the rest o f the proposition (in the
main clause) is interpreted. Saeed (2003: 103-104) thus suggests that propositions
expressed through noun phrases (e.g. nominalisations) are backgrounded in relation to
the main verb. The same could be said with the rest of the presupposition triggers,
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namely, that subordinate clauses receive less attention than main clauses (see Talmy, 
2007). Backgrounding is thus always a relative notion -  something is foregrounded at 
the expense o f and in relation to something else (backgrounded), which however 
belongs to the default mental representation/knowledge associated with a concept or 
topic.
c. Foregrounded knowledge
Foregrounding in discourse can take different forms, overall related to perceptual 
salience. An early theorisation o f perceptual salience and its cognitive effects in 
discourse was Mukarovsky (1970, cited in Semino and Culpeper, 2002: ix), 
empirically investigated by van Peer (1986). From a Cognitive Linguistics 
perspective, due to iconicity of language, devoting more space/time on an expressed 
concept or belief (elaboration) increases its salience (see Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 
252). Perceptual salience is also increased by larger, bold or italicised print in writing, 
and higher pitch and/or volume in speaking (emphasis). An element can be 
foregrounded also by being placed in initial or final position (or before and after a 
long pause), or by repetition (cf. ‘parallelism’, Leech and Short, 2007). Interestingly, 
foregrounding can also be achieved by deviation (ibid.), linguistic, graphological or 
other, that is, by departing from expectations. In that sense, an expression introduced 
through a presupposition trigger, which would normally be taken as backgrounded, 
may be foregrounded if an assertion (and/or more elaboration) is expected.46 To 
provide an example, if I apologise for my delay to new acquaintances due to problems 
with my car, the presupposition that I have a car will be accepted because it does not 
violate expectations in any way (which often accounts for the processing of
46 This could be taken as flouting the Gricean maxim o f  quantity, by providing less information than 
required/expected.
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informative presupposition, see Gazdar, 1979: 105 on expectations), and hearers have 
neither reason nor vested interest in questioning it. However, if my friends know 
perfectly well that I do not have a car, and I say ‘Sorry I’m late, I had some problems 
with my car’, instead of focussing on my delay they will probably focus on the new 
information o f my owning a car. I may even choose to introduce the news o f buying a 
car this (deviant) way in order to create a stronger impression.
On the other hand, when backgrounded propositions and concepts do not blatantly 
violate expectations, less effort will be invested in processing them -  Culpeper (2002: 
270) observes that ‘more attention and effort is focused on foregrounded elements, in 
an attempt to rationalize their abnormality’ and that ‘foregrounded elements are not 
only psychologically more striking but are also regarded as more important’, based on 
the work of Leech and Short (e.g. 1981: 29; 2007) and van Peer (1986). Thus, the 
claim that ‘presuppositions’ are more backgrounded and therefore difficult to contest 
on cognitive grounds does indeed hold, other things being equal. An analysis aiming 
to analyse the ideological underpinnings, aims or effects o f a text should take into 
account also co-textual and contextual factors, including the degree to which a 
presupposition may still be processed carefully and contested (when foregrounded 
through other means, such as violation of expectations).
4.3.4. Conclusion
Beliefs represented in discourse can combine two or more o f the above properties. 
New knowledge can be presented as given, shared knowledge can be presented as 
given, shared knowledge can be presented as contestable, and so on. In order to 
determine whether certain knowledge can be reasonably assumed to be shared the 
analyst can draw on her own knowledge o f the context (socio-political and discursive),
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evidence within the text itself (prior asserted beliefs can be assumed to be known at 
any point later in the text), and triangulation by independently assessing the 
knowledge o f at least some members of the audience through, for example, focus 
groups, interviews or questionnaires.
4.4 (Re)defining presupposition
In this section I would like to continue looking at my proposed working definition of 
presupposition in some detail, repeated here for convenience:
Presupposition is a proposition/belief, concept or system o f beliefs forming the 
ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse. Prototypically, presupposition is 
the/a proposition forming the ground which surfaces in the discourse on sentence 
level and is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality Space o f the participants in the 
interaction.
‘a proposition/belief, concept or system o f beliefs’: This relates to the issue o f scope -  
I do not necessarily consider ‘a presupposition’ to be a single proposition. This is in 
line with many critical scholars on ideological presuppositions, and it is also related to 
methodological issues o f identifying presupposition triggers, as this in fact broadens 
the definition as to what a presupposition might be (as opposed to the TC definition).
‘forming the ground in a figure-ground distinction in discourse’: This is also not new
by any means, as it has been observed very early on that presupposition forms the
ground rather than the figure (see e.g. Levinson, 1983: 180; Sperber and Wilson, 1995:
215). What is more interesting and ultimately important methodologically is to
identify ‘a figure-ground distinction in discourse’: Based on my discussion on
meaning above, every single instance o f language use involves a figure-ground
distinction, with the ground being everything evoked, and the figure an aspect that is
12 5
made most salient; by uttering ‘finger’ I evoke ‘hand’ (ground), but ‘finger’ is made 
salient (figure).
‘is attributed to the mutually accepted Reality Space o f the participants in the 
interaction’: This is a cognitive explanation from the perspective o f the theory of 
Mental Spaces for what has been repeatedly observed to be the other crucial defining 
characteristic o f presupposition -  presenting something as taken for granted and 
incontestable.
‘Taking something for granted’ indicates not only epistemic but also potentially 
deontic stance. Presupposition is therefore not necessarily shared knowledge, but 
definitely som ebody’s ‘knowledge’, and by being presented and understood by 
participants as ‘knowledge’/ ‘reality’, it is further presented and often also perceived as 
incontestable. ‘Knowledge’ is here in quotation marks because in this thesis I do not 
define knowledge as necessarily corresponding to an external independent reality, 
whereas in lay definitions (and some philosophical definitions) ‘knowledge’ entails 
‘truth’. Likewise ‘reality’, or the Reality Space, is what is understood by the discourse 
participants to be the real world. This has also been termed the Base Space 
(Fauconnier, 1985; 1994), which overall 1 think is descriptively more accurate in that 
it can be used more transparently to describe a mutually manifest fictional reality (e.g. 
what two characters in a novel perceive as reality in the text world). In the thesis I 
will be using the two terms interchangeably.
‘Prototypically, presupposition is the/a proposition forming the ground which surfaces 
in the discourse on sentence level’:
There are three aspects to consider here:
• I define presupposition prototypical ly as a proposition.
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• I define presupposition prototypically as a proposition which surfaces in the 
discourse.
• I define presupposition prototypically as being located on sentence level.
So far in my definition I have advocated the not particularly new ideas that 
presupposition is ground rather than figure, and that it is incontestable knowledge 
(taken for granted), but that it does not have to be shared knowledge (and this is why 
we can have informative presupposition). I would like to explore more the issue of 
prototypicality, and consider why it is at the sentence level that this phenomenon 
seems to manifest itself prototypically, and also discuss a bit more why I would 
nevertheless call some other more controversial instances ‘non-prototypical 
presuppositions’ rather than not presuppositions at all.
To begin with, prototype effects occur in categories with radial structure, which 
include ‘good’ and ‘not-so-good’ exemplars o f category members (rather than 
consisting o f equally ‘good’ members). (I discuss prototypicality also in Chapter 5). 
This means that there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for category 
membership. Rather, a set o f features characterise the category, but not all members 
will display all features. Prototypical members will display more features than non- 
prototypical members, but even prototypes may not display absolutely all features of 
the category. In the category ‘presupposition’ these features are:
- Forming the ground in a figure/ground distinction 
Being presented as incontestable





I have already argued that the latter (being shared) is not a necessary condition for an 
expression triggering a presupposition. The fact, however, that it is a common feature 
o f presuppositions may be precisely why presupposed knowledge is seen as 
knowledge which ‘ought to be shared’. I will further discuss below also the question 
o f why I consider a presupposition to be prototypically, but not necessarily, a 
proposition.
Based on the features above, we still need to consider how it is that sentence level 
cases o f presupposition are more prototypical? To me it seems that this is related to 
the importance o f the clause as a unit o f analysis, with a ‘sentence’ comprising o f one 
or more clauses. ‘Clause’ is taken as a particularly important unit o f analysis in 
functional approaches to language (Dik, 1997a, 1997b), possibly because it is seen as 
the smallest possible unit conveying a speech act (see Dik, 1997a: 55; Dik, 1997b: 
92).47 In turn, the speech act has been characterised as the minimal linguistic unit 
which performs some action (van Leeuwen, 1993: 195). Traditionally the importance 
o f the clause as a unit of analysis comes perhaps from the Aristotelian ‘equation o f the 
verb with the core o f a proposition’ (Pawley, 2011: 22), and further the importance of 
the verb in defining the clause. Further, it has been argued that speakers ‘typically 
introduce one new idea per clause’ (Pawley, 2011: 39, citing further Chafe, 1987, 
1994; Givon, 1984 and Du Bois, 1987), and it seems that it is generally accepted that a 
clause is the minimal unit representing an ‘event’ (e.g. in Bohnemeyer and Pederson, 
2011). Now a sentence can be either a clause, or a combination o f clauses connected 
more closely than clauses simply co-occuring in a text. The sentence as a unit of
47 Cf. ‘the characteristic grammatical form o f  the illocutionary act [speech act] is the com plete sentence’ 
(Searle,1969: 16).
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analysis may be more contentious than ‘the clause’, but I choose to employ it here 
because although we cannot have a sentence which is smaller than a clause (so in 
some cases the terms actually refer to the same thing), ‘sentence’ also includes a set of 
clauses combined in such a way that they create a figure-ground distinction. It is still 
the clause that would be classified as ‘ground’ or ‘figure’, but it is only from 
examining the clauses around it that we can tell.
Another factor contributing to the sentence level as a prototypical level is the issue of 
scope. As I have discussed above, narrow scope knowledge is ‘immediately 
presupposed’ and wider scope elements are more indirectly presupposed. O ’Halloran 
(2003) argues extensively that certain inferences are automatically made, and hence 
accessible even when a reader reads quickly and inattentively. Based on his discussion 
I would conclude that these inferences concern elements that constitute the narrow 
scope knowledge activated by any given expression.
Therefore, a more prototypical presupposition would belong to the narrow scope 
knowledge activated in the discourse. The best candidates for such a classification 
would be representations evoked by clauses, and certain elements o f frames. By 
containing pretty much all the necessary elements o f argument structure, knowledge 
activated immediately is sufficient for making sense o f the clause. The way it is linked 
to other clauses (as well as other factors such as its position in the text structure or 
modality) will tell us whether the clause forms the ground or figure, and whether it is 
represented as contestable or incontestable. Thus, clauses are most likely to display 
the characteristic o f ‘activated backgrounded knowledge’ which distinguishes 
presuppositions from ‘mystified (non-activated) knowledge.
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4.5 Levels of presupposition
Having looked at what I have defined as ‘prototypical presupposition’, I would like
now to move on to discuss each level, including less prototypical cases and provide a
methodological model for their identification. My claim is that the various
propositions and phenomena that have been identified in the literature as
‘presupposition’ can fit into the below categories. The purpose o f this categorisation is,
on the one hand, to provide a systematic methodological framework for analysing
presupposition in discourse, and on the other to acknowledge that, despite their
similarities, the various presupposition phenomena are indeed different to each other
and need to be theoretically accounted for accordingly. At the same time it is
necessary to acknowledge that these levels are not isolated from each other, but they
interact. Every categorisation runs the risk o f appearing more clear-cut than the reality
it attempts to represent.




discourse level and 
pragmatic competence level
On all levels except the sentence level the presupposition is not necessarily a (single)
proposition, but it nevertheless forms a ground which is necessary for making
meaning on the respective level. This ground can be manifested or not in the text, and
it can be already known by the hearer or established on the spot. Above the sentence it
is much more complex than at sentence level, while below the clause it never surfaces
in the text but is part of frames.
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Therefore, while advocating a broad view of presupposition the differences among the 
levels are also acknowledged. The aim of maintaining a multi-level categorisation is 
exactly to avoid the drawbacks of more general ‘background knowledge’ approaches 
to presupposition. Closer elaboration of phenomena that might be addressed in 
relation to each level would suggest that these are meant to be included in and 
examined through the prism of, rather than conflated with a broad concept of 
presupposition. Therefore, rather than simply labelling ‘presuppositions’ categories 
such as relevant world knowledge/ contextual assumptions, stereotypes, Felicity 
Conditions, politeness norms (as sometimes occurs in discourse analytical accounts -  
see 3.4.2) my categorisation acknowledges overlaps in categories while maintaining 
the difference among them. Thus, in analysing a command such as in Magalhaes 
(1995), where the boyfriend makes his girlfriend change clothes, I would still suggest 
that his command presupposes power over the woman, but it would be necessary to 
clarify that this is because on the pragmatic level ‘authority’ is one o f the presupposed 
Felicity Conditions o f the speech act of ‘commanding’.
4.5.1 Frame level
On the noun or verb phrase level ‘frames’ as discussed by Fillmore can be employed 
to represent activities, states of affairs and social actors (individuals or groups) in 
ideologically laden ways.
Consider the example ‘So, have you women finished gossiping?’ (Graddol and 
Swann, 1989: 166; Christie, 2000: 90 -  91). On the sentence level it is just 
presupposed that the addressees had been gossiping. However, as Christie also 
observes (ibid.), it is also significant that the activity is framed as ‘gossiping’, with all
the evaluative, stereotypical elements that this entails -  I would classify this as 
presupposition on the frame level. One would have to re-label/re-frame the activity in 
order to challenge these background assumptions, and that would be a case o f frame- 
shifting as discussed in Chapter 3: ‘We are not gossiping, we are talking!’.
A similar example is the advice from a Greek women’s lifestyle magazine ‘stop 
nagging about his performance’ (Polyzou, 2008). Here the female reader is not only 
advised to stop talking about her male partner’s sexual performance (which, it is 
assumed, she does, based on the sentence level presupposition), but any such talk is 
framed as ‘nagging’, carrying evaluative connotations hard to contest.
O f course both these examples are also instances of discourses/systems of belief in 
relation to men, women, and the relationships between men and women. So the 
‘discourse level’ does surface in the frames triggered in the discourse. However, it 
goes beyond just the cluster o f concepts constituting a frame. Therefore I would like 
to distinguish between frame and discourse level presuppositions based on scope -  
frame level presuppositions are narrow scope while discourse level presuppositions 
are broader scope. Due to both the concept o f ‘scope’ (which is graded) as a criterion 
o f categorisation, and the embeddedness of frames in discourses and o f discourses in 
the broader knowledge network, frame presuppositions are embedded in discourse 
presuppositions, but are more likely to be automatically inferred than discourse 
presuppositions.
Much research in Critical Discourse Analysis, then, in examining representations at a 
micro-linguistic level and linking those to broader systems of signification and belief 
(discourses) actually examines the frame level as a first stage o f analysis. Hart (2010) 
points out that Frame Semantics explains the operation o f referential and predicational
strategies in discourse as defined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). Similarly, the
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framework o f representation o f social actors by Theo van Leeuwen (1996) presents 
the analyst with a categorisation of different types o f framing o f social actors in 
discourse.
In examining lexical items in discourse and their relation to knowledge presupposed 
as part o f frames (Fillmore and Atkins, 1990: 75) I have also chosen to include 
metaphorical items, items I have termed as ‘vague’ because they limit understanding 
in some (ideologically biased) way, and items which can be seen as triggering 
affective rather than only factual mental representations.
M etaphor is one o f the ways in which framing occurs in discourse. According to the 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), ‘[t]he essence o f metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind o f thing in terms of another’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:5, 
italics in original). That is, we may for example conceptualise an abstract concept 
such as ‘tim e’ (the ‘target’ category) in terms o f a more concrete concept (the ‘source’ 
category), such as money or any other valuable material resource, which may be 
manifested in linguistic expressions such as ‘spending’, ‘investing’ or ‘wasting tim e’. 
This transfers cultural understandings and attitudes towards money to the way we 
reason and behave about time (see also Lakoff, 1993). In terms of underlying 
knowledge then it is the source category-related vocabulary which is always present in 
the text. The target category may be present (as in ‘wasting tim e’), or inferred from 
the co-text and context, or inferred because the metaphor is conventional, or through a 
combination o f context and conventionality. Yet the metaphor activates our 
knowledge o f the source category, which is more salient and at times may even 
override knowledge related to the target category. For example a war metaphor as in 
the ‘battle o f the sexes’ makes salient factual and evaluative beliefs about war, 
activating notions of aggression, desire to win at all costs and seeing the ‘opponent’
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with distrust and enmity, and obscures the fact that men and women do not necessarily 
always have conflicting interests, or, more generally, that problems can be solved 
through co-operation rather than aggression.48 Additionally, such a metaphor is 
ideologically informed, since the gender-related frames it activates include ideological 
(and normative) beliefs about men and women and are situated in the broader 
discourse o f ‘Battle o f the Sexes’ (Sunderland, 2004. On metaphor and ideology see 
also Semino, 2008: 32-34). In short, metaphorical framings, like non-metaphorical 
ones, trigger unstated presupposed knowledge, the accessing o f which contributes to 
meaning making and the negation or challenging of which would require cross-frame 
negation.
Vagueness often results in ‘mystification’ or obscuring understanding (on 
mystification see Wodak and Meyer, 2009a: 7; Wodak, 2008a: 298; also Fowler, 
Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979; Fowler and Kress, 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979; 
O ’Halloran, 2003; 2004). For the purposes of my analysis I will define vagueness as 
language which does not allow a recipient, or at least a non-ideal recipient, to either 
construct a schema of an event or situation, or to fill in the slots in the schema through 
inference, due to providing insufficient information. 49 For instance, using 
superordinate instead of basic level terms can lead to mystification (O ’Halloran, 
2003), because superordinate terms are too general. I would call this use of 
superordinate terms ‘vagueness’. My definition of vagueness bears similarities to that 
o f Cruse (2004: 49-50). Cruse discusses ‘ill-definedness’ as a characteristic of
48 Boers (1997) provides interesting experimental evidence on reasoning and problem -solving  
influenced by the metaphorical language in which the problem is framed.
49 Here I am using the term ‘schem a’ differently to ‘frame’ in that ‘fram e’ signifies default background 
know ledge, w hile schem a is a mental representation constructed online during discourse processing (cf.
van D ijk, 1998).
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vagueness, as in the phrase ‘middle age’. The phrases ‘jo b ’ and ‘critical m oment’, 
which I discuss later in this section, are also not very well defined in that sense.
Contrary to the above definition, Channell, in her seminal work on vagueness (1994) 
explicitly excludes ‘mystification’ as defined by Fowler and Kress (1979) from her 
definition, as well as ‘ill-definedness’. She includes ‘vague additives’ (such as 
‘around’ and ‘approximately’), words that are ‘always, and unabashedly vague’ (such 
as ‘whatsit’) and rounded-up numbers (Channel, 1994: 18-19). It seems, indeed, as 
Channel observes, that some degree o f imprecision and ‘ill-definedness’ is present in 
every lexical item, partly due to the internal radial structure of lexical categories 
(Rosch, 1973; Labov, 1973 -  see also 5.2), and partly due to the context-boundedness 
o f meaning of any language-in-use. In that sense, then, we would have to concede that 
all language is vague, which would then result in the term ‘vagueness’ not being very 
useful. However, Channel also observes that ‘[w]hat matters is that vague language is 
used appropriately’ (1994: 3), and that vagueness is so prevalent that it is not noticed 
until it is, or appears to be, used inappropriately (even deliberately so). She briefly 
reviews work suggesting that all language is inherently vague, but users seem to be 
able to choose the appropriate type and degree of vagueness for their purposes (Fodor, 
1977; Bolinger, 1965: 567; Lehrer, 1975).
This view then is not all that unhelpful for the purposes of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, since this type of critique of language aims to examine exactly how ‘normal’ 
features o f language maybe be used differently and exploited for ideological purposes. 
Thus, if we concede that all language (use) is vague to some extent, from a CDA 
perspective we might ask: is vagueness used appropriately here? For whose purposes
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is vagueness used (in)appropriately? Why is such an instance of vagueness considered 
(in)appropriate, and by whom (interlocutors? some or all o f them? other people 
influenced by the interaction? the analyst?) -  who defines appropriacy, o f vagueness 
among other things — institutions? social and cultural norms? Are there any strategic 
and/or hidden purposes for the use of vagueness in this instance?
Especially in relation to my presupposition model, vagueness and resulting 
mystification are relevant in that they involve knowledge which is not present in the 
discourse but also not inferred, and therefore not presupposed.50 Here we might again 
ask the question -  not inferred by whom? In my analysis I argue that some inferences 
in Status may not be made by the ‘uninitiated’ who then does not access the same 
‘amount o f meaning’ as an ‘initiated’ reader. I further argue that these unexpressed 
meanings are ideological, they would not be contested by an ‘initiated’ ideal reader, 
and they cannot be accessed and contested by a non-ideal reader unless the latter 
invests certain time and effort in accessing them.
Emotion also can short-circuit and override rational processing, so when both neutral 
factual and evaluative (or affect-inducing factual) beliefs are presented, it is more 
likely that the affective ones will attract more attention that the neutral ones, obscuring 
the latter. It is not impossible to infer or to speculate what the obscured beliefs may 
be, but they may be accessible only to certain readers who have sufficient 
knowledge/beliefs independent of the text, they would not be accessible through quick 
reading even to these readers (because they would require more cognitive effort), and,
50 M ystification can also occur through com plete absence -  for exam ple, fem ale condom s are not 
m entioned in any o f  the three articles.
136
even when inferred, it is more questionable whether these were indeed the 
communicative intentions of the text producers.
Thus my present analysis also includes what I have called here ‘emotional language’ 
or ‘emotional expressions’. It needs to be noted that by ‘emotional expressions’ I do 
not mean language expressing or influenced by emotions (for that, see contributions in 
Caffi and Janney, 1994), or the way emotion is conceptualised and labelled in 
different linguistic systems and cultures (as in, for example, in W ierzbicka’s work, 
1992; 1994; 1995). While this is not precluded, even in heavily edited texts such as 
media texts (after all, even professional authors and editors are human, and emotion 
may have played a role in what they have selected to write/change and how), this is 
not my focus here. Rather, as with other lexical choices, 1 attempt to consider the 
interpretation of language from a critical-cognitive perspective. Expressions that 
activate evaluative frames/mental models can trigger emotional reactions -  notably, in 
this case, emotions o f fear, worry etc. - and short-circuit reasoning. This is view is 
only recently being taken up in critical cognitive studies of discourse (Hart, 2010, 
based on Chilton, 2005), so the present analysis is only an exploratory and very 
rudimentary step in this direction.
4.5.2 Sentence level
Examining the figure-ground distinction on the sentence level is complicated, and
perhaps related to the numerous problems with presupposition negation. On the one
hand, the proposition surfacing in the sentence as presupposition is more salient than
the numerous entirely unexpressed underlying knowledge/beliefs o f Speaker and
Addressee in relation to the topic under discussion, the immediate context, world
knowledge, each other’s beliefs and so on. On the other hand, the main clause is often
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thought to be more salient than any subordinate ones. For the purposes o f this thesis 1 
focussed mainly on conjunctions, prepositional phrases and modality markers as 
Mental Space Builders. Due to space limitations I have not been able to include the 
whole analysis in the thesis. I chose to present the analysis of the main clauses, 
relative clauses (and some cases o f marked syntax in relation to main and relative 
clauses) and conditionals because these were the most prevalent categories in my data, 
and also because they represent a broad range of the characteristics discussed earlier 
in this chapter. I would nevertheless like to present an overview of my observations of 
the whole sentence level analysis in this section, and focus on my chosen sub­
categories in more detail in the analysis chapters 8 and 9.
When considering the pairing of form and function, all sentence types/speech act 
types involve background knowledge and expectations in some way. Declarative 
sentences performing assertions rest on the assumption that the information they 
present is new to the reader. Declarative sentences may, o f course, perform a range of 
other functions, which in some way anticipate and respond to readers’ expectations 
and reactions -  insofar as they present evidence for previous assertions, they (or rather 
their author) pre-suppose that evidence is needed; when they serve to legitimise a 
certain piece o f advice, it is because it is not immediately evident that the advice will 
be beneficial to the recipient, or doable, and so on, i.e. it needs to be explicitly stated 
how the Felicity Conditions of ‘advice’ are being met. I would categorise such 
functions as belonging to the Pragmatic Level of presupposition, and I will therefore 
not deal with it in this thesis in great detail. I will, however, consider some illustrative 
examples o f assertions, primarily in order to consider what kind o f information is not 
taken for granted in the texts I analyse here.
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Negations in declarative sentences pragmatically presuppose assertions — that is, they 
negate something that either has been stated before in the text, or is assumed to be the 
readers pre-existing thoughts, which are unexpectedly to be negated.
Relative clauses are formulated very similarly to declarative main clauses, yet in 
principle their function should depend on whether they are restrictive/defining or non- 
restrictive/non-defining. Defining relative clauses bring in information presumed to be 
known (or immediately perceivable) to the recipient in order to help them distinguish 
the referent among a number of other potential referents. Non-defining clauses may 
contain new information which is presumably less emphasised and not important 
enough to be granted its own main clause, yet important enough to be mentioned. It 
may be the case that these clauses contain reminders of known information, or present 
‘less surprising’, and therefore less controversial and less contestable information. I 
have included relative clauses in my analysis (Ch. 7) in order to look at what 
information is presented as new and what information is presented as shared in the 
data. Furthermore this allows me to consider a lower degree o f emphasis (in 
comparison to main clauses) in the presentation o f new information, while I have also 
found that it is not always possible to distinguish between defining and non-defining 
relative clauses, and therefore between presumably shared and presumably new but 
incontestable knowledge.
Relative clauses are also involved in clefts and cleft-like constructions, such as ‘it was 
John who ate the cake’ (see Levinson, 1983). Such constructions are manipulations of 
sentence structure to create varying effects of fore-and back-grounding, and indicate 
what information is new and noteworthy (in the above example, who the culprit is) 
and what information is shared and taken for granted (the cake was eaten). I have
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analysed such constructions together with other cases o f marked syntax in order to 
examine devices that manipulate emphasis/focus and therefore attention within the 
sentence.
Temporal expressions are not very frequent in the data. Although they have been one 
o f the central concerns of presupposition research, I will not discuss them here, mainly 
because o f lack of sufficient data for any kind of meaningful generalisation. Another 
central concern for presupposition research which I will not discuss in this thesis in 
detail is the heterogeneous category o f ‘^ / ‘-clauses’. The ‘taken-for-granted-ness’ o f 
these clauses relies largely on the expression introducing them, a phenomenon that has 
been observed in the literature with a range o f explanations presented. My analysis 
confirms Fauconnier’s theoretical model (1985), indicating that the introducing 
verb/expression sets up a mental space within which the ‘that-clause’ holds -  to what 
extent the clause holds in the ‘real world’ then will be determined by the epistemic 
status o f the mental space within which it occurs. With the exception o f Cosmopolitan, 
very few ‘that-clauses’ are present in my data. Moreover, many of the Cosmopolitan 
cases involve instances of speech and thought presentation. These are certainly of 
interest for the study o f epistemic status of propositions, as one of the functions of 
attributions is evidentiality, they lie, however, beyond the scope o f this thesis.
Expressions of causality and explanations are taken for granted simply by virtue of 
their function -  in order for them to function as causal attributions and explanations, 
the reader needs to accept their reality, otherwise they explain nothing. Contrast 
relations (adversative and concessive) also operate in subverting expectations -  here, 
instead o f a marker o f negation, we have a marker o f contrast (e.g. a conjunction) 
which simultaneously sets up a Reality mental space (what is claimed to actually be
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the case) and a presupposed Reader’s Beliefs mental space, which is claimed not to be 
the case against expectations.
Conditionals have been o f interest to the analysis of presupposition mainly in relation 
to the ‘projection problem’ — the ‘constant under denial’ presuppositions o f a simple 
assertion cease to be necessarily ‘undeniable’ when the assertion constitutes the 
second part (apodosis) o f a conditional construction (see 3.3.1). Fauconnier (1985) 
explains this as the assertion being contained within the hypothetical mental space set 
up by the conditional -  thus, the apodosis will only be satisfied insofar as the 
hypothesis is satisfied. Analysis of conditionals has allowed me to explore this further, 
applying the theory to data in the Greek language (the model has been extensively 
elaborated on and applied to English by Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005). It is 
interesting to consider potential ideological functions o f conditionals: even though by 
definition information contained in conditionals is not necessarily true or taken for 
granted, depending on the type of conditional, information can be presented as at least 
possible  and likely, or so unlikely as to be practically impossible. Conditionals thus 
indicate what would be conceivable and in line with currently shared knowledge and 
expectations, and what would be utterly unexpected and most definitely not true 
(counterfactual). Conditionals, as well as generic clauses introduced with ‘when’ set 
up hypothetical mental spaces.
In Chapter 8 I present my analysis of declarative main clauses, relative clauses and 
marked syntax, and in Chapter 9 I look at conditionals. If not otherwise specified, it is 
assumed that the mental space R (‘reality’ or ‘base space’) and the mental space o f the 
author’s perception of reality/beliefs, overlap, i.e. the author believes that what he/she 
they says is the reality, and (s)he believes that (s)he has knowledge of the reality.
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4.5.3 Text level
We can discuss presuppositions on the text level in terms o f knowledge and 
expectations which are presumed to be both shared and incontestable and arise from 
our perception o f the structure and type of the text we are dealing with. Like with 
sentence level presuppositions, content and form/structure are to be looked at in 
conjunction for such an analysis.
As an example I would like to discuss the presupposed knowledge o f the generic 
structure o f advice texts. Advice texts as a genre type typically consist o f a ‘problem ’ 
and a ‘solution’ part, and optionally may include elaboration parts, which provide 
further details but also justify/legitimise seeing something as a problem or accepting a 
suggestion as its solution (for further details, see Chapter 5 and Polyzou, 2008b; 
2008a).
In the text ‘Make his libido skyrocket!’ {Marie Claire, Feb 2006, pp. 157-158) the 
problem is set up in the first line of the lead-in paragraph: ‘Did you know that 23% of 
men prefer watching television to having sex?’ (Problem: 23% of men prefer watching 
television to having sex). In the first paragraph on the main body we have the 
elaboration o f the problem: ‘45% of women ... say that they would like more sex ...it 
gives us a sense o f affection and security ..., consequently if he is not in the mood, we 
get frustrated and feel that he is rejecting us.’ I presume that elaboration and 
legitimation are present in the text when they are deemed to be more necessary or 
appropriate by the text producer in advising the target audience. I would think that it is 
not self-evident that it is a problem for anyone to prefer watching TV to having sex,
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but more importantly it seems that it may not be self-evident for the target readers of 
Marie Claire that it is a problem that some men have this preference. Therefore the 
text proceeds by presenting two reasons why this is a problem: First because some 
women would like to have more sex, and second because, regardless o f how much sex 
women would like to have, it is claimed to be frustrating for women when their 
partners do not want to have sex with them. Notably on discourse level the whole text 
presupposes heterosexuality and sexual activity on behalf of all men and women.
On the contrary, on the piece on hair entitled ‘her hair’ {Marie Claire, Feb. 2006, p. 
77), why hair is a problem is not elaborated on. The text consists just of a lead in 
paragraph and just a bulleted list on what each hairstyle ‘means’ (please see Appendix 
1 for a scanned image o f the text). In terms o f background knowledge and femininity 
discourses in particular, it is already taken for granted that women consider their hair a 
problem. However, in terms of generic structure the readers will expect that the text 
will consist o f a ‘problem’ part and a ‘solution’ part. Every bullet point constitutes a 
solution. In terms of setting up the problem, though, I would argue that the assumption 
that ‘The way you do your hair reveals your personality’, as is stated in the lead-in 
paragraph, is also not necessarily a problem. For interpreting this as a problem we 
have an interplay of femininity ideologies, knowledge o f generic structure of advice 
texts which states that prototypically the problem comes first, the solutions follow’, 
and a broader knowledge o f the pragmatics of Speech Acts (see 4.5.5 below). On the 
latter I will briefly observe here that pragmatically one simply does not provide advice 
on something unless it is a problem in need of solution, or an area o f ignorance for the 
addressee in need o f illumination. Thus providing advice on something in itself 
implies that the ‘something’ is a problem.
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4.5.4. Discourse level
In Chapter 2 I have discussed the understanding o f ‘a discourse’ as ‘a way of seeing 
and understanding the world’ including ideologies, stereotypes and so on. I have also 
touched upon ‘discourse level’ presuppositions in the section addressing frame 
presuppositions above (section a - examples from Christie, 2000: 9 0 - 9 1  and Polyzou, 
2008b). Discourse level presuppositions would include what Wodak has called 
‘allusions’, as well as background knowledge drawn on, for example, for interpreting 
implicatures.
One might notice that what I call ‘discourse level presuppositions’ is what others 
might just call ‘discourses’, and that identifying either one or the other is fraught with 
methodological problems (but see Reisigl, 2007). First I would like to address the 
issue o f discourse identification, and then move on to the issue o f choice of 
terminology.
It is notoriously difficult to ‘systematically’ identify ‘a discourse’, and even more so 
to provide an account o f how that was done once the analysis is over. Sunderland 
likens ‘discourse spotting’ to bird watching (2004), whereby identifying a discourse 
has similarities to catching a glimpse of a (part of) a bird. In making their 
methodology explicit analysts may present lists o f parameters they checked in 
identifying (and indeed co-constructing) discourses (e.g. Koller, 2004; Kosetzi and 
Polyzou, 2009), but it is not the case that we can tell ‘a discourse is what you get when 
you analyse the metaphors’, or the adverbs, or whatever. I would argue that this is 
because a discourse is a broad system of meaning, part o f the ‘knowledge network’ 
(mentioned in 4.2) which therefore can be activated with any content word, but at the 
same time it is ‘broad scope’ and therefore ‘indirectly presupposed’.
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In short, a broad scope’ presupposition may or may not be accessed by all 
participants in the discourse, it may require more cognitive processing in order to be 
accessed, and exactly for this reason it is defeasible, as it is not present in the ‘surface’ 
o f the text. However, it may well be instantly accessed by an audience displaying 
characteristics o f the ‘ideal audience’ (possessing all necessary background 
knowledge to a satisfactory degree of salience), and/or by an audience that has been 
primed by previous linguistic or visual discourse or other perceptual stimuli, for 
example. I would say that the meaning accessed through accessing ‘discourse level 
presuppositions’ is what I have labelled ‘meaning(2)’ in 4.2 above. Moreover, if 
challenged, one would probably have to negate underlying ideological assumptions by 
a laborious process similar to ‘frame shifting’ or metalinguistic negation. Consider 
Graddol and Swann’s example ‘So, have you women finished gossiping?’ (1989: 166). 
If the addressees, or an overhearer of this question, were to challenge the utterer of 
this by saying ‘Do you mean that women always gossip?’, its negation would have to 
be something like ‘No, I don’t mean that women always gossip, [I mean] just that 
these two particular women gossip all the tim e’, for example. Or one could say ‘So, 
have you women finished gossiping? Not that women gossip all the time, o f course...’ 
which, like with presupposition negation, would require bringing an element o f the 
ground to the fore in order to negate it.
It is in that sense that I employ here the term ‘discourse (level) presuppositions', 
similarly to the way Bekalu (2006) defines the term. He suggests that discourse 
presuppositions are ‘the pieces of information that are taken for granted in a given 
discourse’ (2006: 152). Clearly then with this quote Bekalu does not equate ‘discourse' 
with underlying knowledge, but with actual language produced by a specific 
institution in a specific socio-historical context, while, for example, for Fairclough
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(1989. 24) a discourse (as a count noun) is not actually present ‘in’ the text but only 
leaves linguistic ‘traces’ on the text (or feathers, to pursue Sunderland’s metaphor). 
These two views are not mutually exclusive (Greek media discourse evokes 
femininity and masculinity discourses, for example). Moreover, if we consider that 
every single linguistic expression in order to be meaningful necessarily evokes at least 
a cluster o f concepts (narrow scope - frame), the question is not so much whether the 
discourse is ‘in’ the text or not, but rather to acknowledge that in interpreting texts 
readers draw on discourses/systems of beliefs/interpretive repertoires or however we 
might call them, and that the broader the scope o f these parts o f the knowledge 
networks the less we can rely on the text alone to identify them as analysts. By 
‘discourse presupposition’ I suppose one could avoid the proliferation o f the term 
‘discourse’ for a range of categories (Widdowson, 1995), at the same time 
emphasising that knowledge of this type still ‘forms the ground’ and is necessary for 
making meaning in interaction.
4.5.5 Pragmatic competence level
Pragmatic competence is presupposed knowledge on how discourse works, including, 
e.g. felicity conditions, politeness conventions and so on, i.e. presupposed pragmatic 
knowledge. By ‘presupposed pragmatic knowledge’ I mean that it is required  and 
expected to be there. It is knowledge of pragmatic principles needed to access the full 
(pragmatic) meaning of an utterance and/or interaction and principles assumed by the 
Speaker to be accessible to the Hearer (if the Speaker assumes these principles to not 
be accessible to the Hearer then they are deliberately producing something they aim 
the Hearer to not understand).
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We could see pragmatic competence as procedural rather than representational 
knowledge (see van Dijk, 2003) — knowledge on how things are done. We can 
nevertheless use our knowledge o f how things are done, or are to be done, in order to 
make assumptions about the world, which would then be representational knowledge.
I would like to demonstrate this with an example from our knowledge o f the Felicity 
Conditions o f Directive Speech Acts (see Austin, 1975: 14-15; 50-51 and Searle, 
1969). Regardless o f sub-type (command, advice, request), all directives have as a 
preparatory condition the assumption that the addressee would not go on and perform 
the requested act anyway (Searle 1969: 60 ff.) - otherwise the directive would be 
superfluous and perhaps received as patronising, impolite, or simply annoying).
Now when Greek Playboy advises its (presumably male) readers on how to please 
their (presumably female) partners (Feb. 2006, pp. 136-137), it includes a number of 
directives along the lines o f the ones cited here:
•  ‘ .. .show self-restraint’
•  ‘Don’t grope her loutishly’
•  ‘Don’t hurry’
From our knowledge about directives we can see that the text producers believe that 
the readers will not show self-restraint and so on (or, at least that they present 
themselves as believing that) and therefore positioning their readers accordingly (see 
Polyzou, 2010: 121 f. for further discussion; also Polyzou, 2008a: 118). Knowledge 
about how mass media work will make it clear for the reader that he is not addressed 
personally, the pronouns will make it clear for the female heterosexual reader that she 
is not addressed at all, and discourse level presuppositions, specifically ideologies 
about male and female (hetero)sexuality will make it clear both that it is not a lesbian 
reader who is addressed, and that the group of readers addressed is addressed in their
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capacity as straight m en’ (and not, say, in their capacity as marathon runners, 
business people or Greek citizens, all o f which may be true for some o f the readers but 
irrelevant).
Notably Austin calls Felicity Conditions ‘the presuppositions o f speech acts’ (1975: 
50-51), probably in order to suggest that if Felicity Conditions are not met the speech 
act ‘doesn’t make sense’. I think this insight is worth incorporating in a presupposition 
classification model, but being aware that it is a different kind o f shared knowledge 
put in use here. It seems that Magalhaes has a similar understanding in mind when she 
says that ‘Rubinho's [directive speech act] presupposes his former and current power 
over Tina [his girlfriend]’(1995: 189), as having authority over the addressee is one of 
the preparatory conditions o f orders and commands (Searle, 1969: 64-66).
The use o f terms such as ‘presupposition’ and ‘presupposing’ to talk about such 
pragmatic principles is not generally the prototypical use of the terms, but in fact it is 
not as deviant as it may appear. Frege’s (1892/1948) initial observations in relation to 
presupposition seem to point to pragmatic competence and principles o f discourse (at 
least in an ideal speech situation) rather than Truth Conditions as determinants of 
meaning. Frege says that ‘when we say ‘the moon’... we presuppose a referent’ (ibid.: 
214), and generally that ‘[if] anything is asserted there is always an obvious 
presupposition that [referring expressions] have referents’ (Frege, ibid.: 221). That is, 
Frege claims that ‘we’, as users o f language, engage in communication following the 
pragmatic assumption that referring expressions have (real world) referents. We might 
argue that this is not the case, or we might point to cases where this principle does not 
apply (e.g. when referring takes place within a Fictional World Mental Space).51 Yet,
51 Even though I have not pursued this further in this thesis, I would like to observe that based on the 
present d iscussion existential presuppositions should also belong to this level o f  analysis, as they are a
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this is not exactly the point here. What I argue is that pragmatic competence includes 
generalisation regarding the use o f language such as:
A referring expressions carries the assumption that it refers (to an entity)
A speech act carries the assumptions stated as its Felicity Conditions 
Indirectness (at least not very conventional indirectness) carries the 
assumption that there is a reason for it, rather than the assumption that the 
speaker does not intend to be understood (what, for example, Grice accounts 
for with the Co-operative Principle, 1975/2006)
What the above three have in common (the presupposition of reference, Felicity 
Conditions and the Co-operative Principle) is that they are ‘taken for granted’ 
principles, which are necessary in that, when not observed or recognised, we have 
some sort o f breakdown in communication. However, it should be noted that, as with 
the terms ‘pragmatic principles’ or ‘pragmatic competence’, ‘presupposed pragmatic 
knowledge’ (presupposition on the level of pragmatic competence) is not meant to 
replace the more specific terms and concepts (such as Felicity Conditions), but rather 
to acknowledge that
a. these refer to mentally represented ‘rules’ o f how discourse works, how we 
should speak and how we are to interpret what we hear/read
b. examining this type o f knowledge is useful for analysis o f underlying 
ideologies (even though in the literature sometimes it is called ‘presupposition’ 
and sometimes it is not), and
product o f  (and, in terms o f  discourse processing, an inference stem m ing from) the application o f  this 
pragmatic principle.
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c. presupposed pragmatic knowledge is in some ways distinct from general 
world knowledge’, and it is applicable in processing the representational 
meaning o f utterances in any level
The latter point suggests that the ‘pragmatic competence’ level has a special status in 
relation to the other levels of this framework. We might perhaps want to argue that, as 
it is not on a par with the other levels, this should not be included in the list at all but 
be considered separately as a meta-level.
4.6 'Ideologicity'
In Chapter 2 I mentioned a few times that not all linguistic expressions are necessarily 
ideological, or not to the same degree. In order to explain this I would like to link this 
the issue o f extra-textual context and to two points from this chapter: the levels of 
presupposition and the issue o f scope.
The Earth is flat’ is a belief which used to be considered true universally -  in that 
context, it was part of universal knowledge. It was only made ideological knowledge 
during the phase when believing or not believing this becomes a source of conflict (of 
interests, among other things) and/or persecution. Nowadays the belief that the Earth 
is flat is not epistemologically ratified by dominant scientific criteria (i.e. it is not 
knowledge), but as a rule an individual holding this belief would just be considered to 
be wrong. Therefore, as a whole this belief would not be defined as ideological 
nowadays. Overall, rather than speaking o f ‘something’ as being ‘an ideology’ or not,
I find it more precise to speak of knowledge/beliefs, which, depending on socio-
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historical context, may be ideological or not. ‘Ideology’ would then constitute a 
shorthand for a configuration of related ideological beliefs.
An implication of choosing the adjective ‘ideological’ over the noun ‘ideology’ the 
possibility o f a belief, or a statement of belief, being ‘more’ or ‘less ideological’ than 
another, displaying a degree of ‘ideologicity’, as it were. This is related to the well- 
founded criticism that CDA sees ideology as underlying all discourse, which is 
counter-intuitive if we consider utterances such as ‘What time is it?’, or ‘How big is a 
15 inch monitor?’ (Oswald, 2010: 179-180 f.).
I would say that socio-cultural norms, perceptions and knowledge underlie all 
discourse, which would determine e.g. politeness strategies, or the kind and amount of 
knowledge taken as shared -  in short, social cognition underlies all discourse. Socio- 
cognitive representations have the potential o f being, or becoming, ideological insofar 
as they constitute points o f difference among social groups. Yet this potential is only 
realised when these differences are utilised to establish, maintain or challenge interests 
o f social groups, as in the example ‘the Earth is flat’.
Finally, although it is hard to come up with a method of measuring linguistic 
expressions as ‘more’ or ‘less’ ideological, we can nevertheless consider that different 
expressions may be more or less observably ideological, or not. A similar concern is 
addressed by Swann (2002), who discusses what warrants we may have when 
analysing discourse as drawing on gender ideologies. In line with the model 
developed in this chapter I would define ideological presuppositions as all 
presuppositions corresponding to beliefs that can be said to be ideological based on 
group interests in the context in which they were uttered. Thus, there will be 
presuppositions in the data which are not ideological, or at least not related to gender
ideologies. From a methodological point of view, whereas ideology operates in 
discourse on more than one level, we can link these levels to the levels of 
presupposition proposed in this chapter (see also Polyzou, 2008b). Thus, a derogatory, 
sexist term for women, or a group o f women, would be sexist on the frame level, as 
the sexist meaning would be automatically activated by default upon the utterance of 
the word (with contextual factors adding potentially subversive meta-representations 
o f this meaning such as irony, citation or reclaiming o f a term for solidarity). On the 
other hand, ‘what time is it?’ would not be ideological by default. Yet o f course in 
context it could be used to generate all sorts o f ideological implicatures. To make up 
an example, this could be said angrily to a young woman returning home at a time 
deemed unsuitable for women to be out in a specific socio-cultural context. That 
would not be ideological on a frame, but on a discourse level, since for accessing the 
implicature it would be necessary to draw on ideological beliefs/discourses about 
‘wom en’s behaviour’. As with presupposition, it is easier for an analyst to identify 
textual elements which are ideological on the frame level, and it is easier to make a 
more convincing case about it. Nevertheless, by considering what is presupposed 
(taken for granted) for the production o f the discourse we analyse, we can find 
evidence for the more elusive discourse level ideological presuppositions.
4.7 Conclusion
The motivation for this categorisation of various phenomena, which have been at one
point or another been labelled ‘presupposition’, has been their similarities in many
aspects. All items in the above five levels concern presupposition as knowledge which
is taken for granted in interaction, it is not foregrounded, but it nevertheless needs to
be accessed or acquired on the spot for the interaction to proceed. Although they are
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taken for granted and therefore presented as if they are shared, there is always a 
possibility that the recipient will either not have the presupposed knowledge, or it will 
not be salient in their mind at that moment o f the interaction. In both cases through 
accommodation the recipient should infer or be reminded o f the presupposition.
There will be, however, different degrees to which it can be expected that presupposed 
knowledge will be shared or not. What I have termed frame presuppositions are 
narrow scope and can be presumed to be accessed by any competent speaker o f the 
language o f the interaction under analysis, since knowledge o f frames is necessary 
semantic knowledge (together with the world knowledge involved in the frames). On 
the other hand, sentence level presuppositions are expressed in clauses and are 
definitely presented as incontestable insofar as they are attributed to a commonly 
accepted Real World Mental Space. Shared-ness is here not so important as 
incontestability, since the propositions in question can be accommodated very easily 
(with small cognitive effort).
It is hard to draw a line between frame and discourse presuppositions, because it is 
hard to draw a line between frames and discourses/systems of belief, so for 
methodological purposes I will define discourse presuppositions as the broad scope 
backdrop o f knowledge against which the interpretation o f text takes place. Discourse 
and also text presuppositions are knowledge that does not surface in the text, but 
needs to be shared for understanding of meaning (2) to take place. These 
presuppositions generally taken as incontestable, and questioning, challenging 01 
refuting them involves the cognitive and social costs o f bringing backgrounded 
material to the foreground.
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Admittedly many of the examples mentioned in 4.4 and 4.5 could be and have been 
analysed perfectly well without the use of the term ‘presupposition’ at all. We could 
simply talk o f frames, felicity conditions, generic conventions, discourses and so on. 
The list is very diverse; however, as we have seen from this and the review in Chapter 
3, knowledge falling under any of these categories has at some point been called 
‘presupposition’, or ‘presupposed’. In context any of these analyses intuitively makes 
sense, and my aim is not to claim that any of these are inaccurate. In fact I find it 
rather unsurprising, since there is no clear dividing line between the truth conditional 
category ‘presupposition’ and any other type o f knowledge taken for granted in 
discourse -  already Fillmore has been suggesting categories that were controversial 
for logical approaches to meaning such as ‘verbs of judging’ (‘accuse’, ‘blame’ etc., 
Fillmore, 1971), which Levinson characterises as ‘not really presuppositional at all’ 
(1983: 182). It does still seem that sentence level presuppositions occupy some kind of 
special status occurring from the combination of the semantics o f ‘presupposition 
triggers’ as space-builders, something which we have to take into account also when 
looking at ‘non-presupposition-triggering’ space builders, and the actual mental space 
built.
Thus, what I am arguing for here is that when using the terms 
presuppose/presupposed/presupposition we need to be explicit as to the level to which 
we attribute the presupposed knowledge. Further, we need to have an argument about 
why, as analysts, we consider the presupposed material to be forming the ground, 
what is the profiled material, and what it is in the text that makes the presupposition 
incontestable/necessary, including whether it is necessary for accessing meaning (1) 
or meaning (2). Looking at Mental Spaces helps us determine what it is that forms the
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ground , as well as what the epistemic status o f the ground is (fictional, hypothetical, 
‘real’ etc.).
Moreover, I would like to point out that there are further cases, not identified as 
‘presuppositions’ in the literature and not exemplified above, that would constitute at 
least non-prototypical presuppositions. For example, ‘forming the ground’ and ‘being 
attributed to the Mental Space of reality’ also includes indicative clauses which do 
not perform the speech act of ‘asserting new information’; such cases would include 
‘setting the ground’ on text level, or concessions/first parts o f adversative relations on 
sentence level.
I would like to close with some final words on the issue o f evoking vs. presupposing. 
Two questions still need to be clarified: a. Is everything evoked presupposed? and b. is 
everything presupposed evoked? I can only provide tentative answers to these 
questions in light of the discussion in this chapter. In relation to a. I would answer 
both yes and no -  it depends on which level of meaning we are talking about. 
Everything automatically evoked/activated for narrow scope ‘meaning m aking’ 
(meaning (1)) is also presupposed, that is, taken for granted and forming the 
ground/frame of the profiled concept activated by a lexical item. In the case of 
ideologies and broader meaning systems/ discourses matters are not so clear cut, 
mainly because it is harder to identify what is evoked to begin with. Overall from 
sentence level and above syntactic and textual structure, phrasing, modality and other 
parameters need to be examined in order to make an informed interpretation as to 
whether a belief is taken for granted or not. In relation to b., what is presupposed may 
not be evoked in the case of ‘unfair presuppositions’. When there is a clash between 
presupposed and actually shared knowledge ‘evoking’ occurs through accommodation,
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or there is a misunderstanding, or insufficient understanding, with (a) recipient(s) not 




In this chapter I discuss the methodological choices made in the thesis in relation to 
selecting a set o f magazine titles to analyse, selecting a specific genre from the 
magazines, selecting a topic and finally beginning to apply the theoretical and 
methodological insights presented in Chapters 2-4. I begin by explaining how and 
why I conducted a questionnaire survey in order to identify prototypical m en’s and 
women’s Greek magazines. Firstly, I outline the concept of prototypicality as the ‘best 
example’ of a category according to the evaluations of community, and argue that 
replicating experiments in identifying ‘category norms’ can actually be used for 
identifying both what a community considers to be members o f a category, but also 
which category members are more prototypical than others.
I move on to explore the concept o f ‘genre’ and the difficulties in applying this to 
categorise different text types within the magazines. I review various approaches to 
genre across disciplines and conclude that, for text types not named as specific genres 
by the community o f their users, the criterion o f ‘community purpose’ or function 
performed by the texts can serve as a guiding principle in categorisation. I 
consequently chose to look at texts performing the function of ‘advice’, broadly 
speaking.
In order to make detailed analysis practicable, the data have been narrowed down to 
three texts of the ‘advice’ type, all dealing with the issue o f sexual health. Moreover, 
rather than applying the whole model outlined in Chapter 4, I focus on the first two 
levels, those o f frames and mental spaces (but for a full application see Polyzou, 
2008b; 2010; 2011 and 2012). Thus I provide the rationale for choosing the particular
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topic, and finally explain how I identified the frames and mental spaces in the texts 
and looked for patterns demonstrated underlying presupposed ideological beliefs.
5.2. Selecting prototypical magazines
In generating my dataset, my aim was to collect a range o f titles for detailed 
qualitative analysis o f selected texts. There are a number o f issues emerging in any 
such task, related to selecting the appropriate titles to analyse.
One o f them is the issue of ‘influence’ or ‘representativeness’ - clearly any social 
constructivist approach would choose to look at media and pop culture under the 
assumption that these have an influence on social cognition, ideologies and social 
practices o f the communities in which they circulate (more so on regular users). 
However, selecting the most influential one, or selecting a number o f titles 
representative o f the sort of influence exerted by lifestyle magazines in general, would 
have to be based either on detailed studies of the media in question, and surrounding 
practices, or on the analyst’s own research and/or speculation.
Until recently there has been no research whatsoever on Greek lifestyle magazines 
(see also Chapter 6) with the exception o f Hatzidaki (2011) and part o f Goutsos and 
Fragaki (2009) -  and none by the time of data selection and collection in 2006. 
Moreover, the work o f Hatzidaki, Goutsos and Fragaki is quantitative corpus-based 
analysis, and does not deal with reception, cultural implications and social context. It 
has been beyond the scope o f this thesis to engage in detailed analysis o f the 
emergence and consumption of lifestyle magazines as a genre in Greece (but see some
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discussion o f the broader contemporary social context in Chapter 6), and I can only 
make informed speculations as to the role or representativeness o f each title.
There is some information available online, which one could use to provide a rough 
idea about each magazine currently circulating in Greece, such as circulation numbers, 
readership, target audience etc. Although useful, this information is not necessarily 
helpful in selecting specific titles in a reliable and systematic way. First o f all, the 
availability of information is inconsistent across publications -  some include 
readership information, some do not. Also, often the information overlaps to the 
extent that it is no longer useful for making distinctions: virtually all magazines target 
an audience o f middle- or upper-middle class (with the exception o f Penthouse, 
targeting men ‘from the whole social spectrum’) .32 Circulation indicates to some 
extent the popularity of a publication, but not necessarily, as indicated by practices 
such as sharing magazines among friends (Hermes, 1995). Also, media texts may be 
consumed without necessarily being ‘popular’ or liked, as in the case o f reading 
magazines at a waiting room (but even in these cases ideological assumptions remain 
‘in circulation’). Finally, circulation does not tell us whether a magazine is 
(considered to be) a lifestyle magazine, or a men’s magazine, and so on -  some 
method of classification is still required.
At first glance at least the distinction between m en’s and women’s magazines appears 
quite clear-cut. Regardless of circulation and class affiliation o f target audience, 
magazines can be distinguished as targeting ‘men’ or ‘women’. Although looking at 
actual readership complicates matters (20% of men’s magazines readers in UK are
52 httn7/w w w  Hanhnp »r/index en.asp, last accessed January 2006. It should be noted that Penthouse is 
no longer present in the website, presumably because now it is being published by a different publisher 
(no further information available online).
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women — Benwell, 2003), magazines on their websites self-identify as m en’s and 
women s, either directly (information for advertisers) or indirectly (through the 
discourse o f their advertising, their cover pages etc.). However, there are cases such as 
the Greek magazine Nitro, which is listed as ‘general interest’ on the websites 
ClipNews Press Monitoring53 and Communication and Publicity Guide54, and claims 
to target ‘25-44 year olds’ independent of their sex55 (in contrast to, e.g., Esquire56)-, 
however, I would consider Nitro a men’s magazine, a hypothesis confirmed by two 
independently conducted prototypicality tests (see below). Therefore, despite the label 
under which it is marketed, for most members o f the community in which it circulates, 
Nitro is not only a m en’s magazine, but a prototypical one.
It seems, then, that there are a number of ways to interpret ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’ as 
terms to categorise magazines by: who they targeted, as what they are marketed, who 
actually reads them, and how the public perceives them whether they read them or not. 
The latter may be linked to the social cognition of at least a percentage o f ‘the public’, 
which, in this case, consists of the whole literate Greek speaking population of 
Greece, as lifestyle magazines are circulated on a national level. That is, people have 
expectations o f what kind o f topics, style, ideologies and attitudes and so on are to be 
found in a ‘men’s’ versus a ‘women’s’ magazine, related to what is considered 
appropriate for, or relevant to, men or women.
Therefore, rather than relying on my own initial perceptions of the content and 
attitudes of Greek lifestyle magazines prior to the analysis, I considered it more 
reliable to conduct a survey with the aim of finding out which magazines a sample of
53 http://w w w .clipnew s.gr/en/vi6w  site.asp?rncid—7& cid—32, last accessed 10/03/2010
54 h t t p : / / w w w . p n h l i c i t v - g u i d e .p r / i n d e x .D h p ? i d = 1 1 6 8 0 & c l i e n t  i d = 4 0 7 & f r o m = 6 2 1 , last accessed
^ h ttp V /w w w  im a k o .g r /en /activ ities/m agazin es/n itro .h tm l, last accessed 10/03/2010
56 h ttp ://w w w .iiT iak o .gr/en /activ ities/m agazin es/esq u ire .h tn il, last accessed  10/03/2010
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Greek men and women consider prototypical o f the categories ‘Greek m en’s lifestyle 
magazine and Greek women’s lifestyle magazine’. Below I briefly outline prototype 
theory, and how it relates to the questionnaire design, moving on to the discussion of 
the pilot and the main survey, and finally presenting my findings, which determined 
the data selection.
5.2.1 Prototype theory and category norms
Prototype theory in the cognitive sciences (cognitive psychology and cognitive 
linguistics) is based on the research of Eleanor Rosch (some of it published under her 
former name, Heider. See Heider, 1971; Heider, 1972; Rosch, 1973. See also Labov, 
1973). Contrary to the traditional (Aristotelian) approach to categorisation (followed, 
e.g., by formal semantics), Rosch showed that categories are not homogeneous groups 
o f concepts or entities assigned to the category by necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Rather, categories have an internal radial structure, with central members considered 
more prototypical, or best exemplars (Rosch, 1973: 114), and more marginal members 
less prototypical. ‘Borderline’ members could also be seen as members o f another 
category. Thus, there is no fixed set of properties all members o f a category should 
share, but rather they are connected through ‘family resemblances’ (Wittgenstein, 
1953), i.e. various combinations of sharing some features with some members of the 
category, and other features with other members. Importantly, categories and 
prototypes themselves are not stable, possessing a timeless and context-independent 
‘essence’; they are determined by the users of the category and the context (material, 
social and psychological) -  some even created on the spot (Barsalou, 1991). 
Therefore, what is a prototypical Greek men’s or women’s lifestyle magazine at any
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given time is only what is considered as such by Greek people who are familiar with 
the category at that time.
Rosch s experiments showed that people are capable o f judging prototypicality among 
a list o f items regardless o f their personal preferences, likes or dislikes (1973: 134). 
This is an important point for my research, since on the one hand lifestyle magazines 
are primarily related to pleasure and entertainment, and thus are subject to personal 
taste (but also critical or favourable judgements about their ideological orientation), 
and on the other hand, they carry a certain degree o f social stigma as ‘inferior’ forms 
o f entertainment, along with other products o f popular culture (see, e.g., Stevenson, 
Jackson and Brooks, 2003 on men’s reluctance to admit they are regular readers of 
m en’s lifestyle magazines).
One straightforward way of measuring prototypicality for members of a category is to
replicate one o f Rosch’s tests (1973: 130ff.), namely, to provide participants with a list
with the members o f each category, and ask them to rate them according to how good
examples of the category they are (giving 1 to the best example, 7 to the most
marginal example, and anything in between according to prototypicality). This method
has been used for a small scale research I conducted for selecting a prototypical m en's
lifestyle magazine for a previous project (Polyzou, 2004 -  see below for findings). For
my purposes I would need two categories: ‘Greek men’s lifestyle magazines’ and
‘Greek women’s lifestyle magazines’. However, in my 2004 research I pre-determined
the list of ‘Greek men’s lifestyle magazines’ based on a mixed list provided by a
Sunday newspaper (.Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 04/04/2004) and my own intuitions,
which restricted participants to a closed list of options, and also ignored more recent
publications that were not listed on the paper yet. Also, importantly, my own
judgements of including, e.g. Nitro as a ‘men’s lifestyle magazine’, were given
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precedence over the publisher’s own representation o f their publication as ‘general 
interest’.
Thus, I decided to design a free response questionnaire, asking participants to list titles 
o f magazines which belonged to the categories ‘Greek m en’s lifestyle magazines’ and 
‘Greek wom en’s lifestyle magazines’. Rosch herself (1973: 131) based her lists o f 
category members on findings from Battig and Montague’s research on category 
norms, which are part o f ‘research in organizational processes in free recall learning 
and memory’ (Battig and Montague, 1969: 1). Research on category norms provides 
participants with names of categories, asking them to list items they think belong to 
this category. The aim is to ‘find out what items or objects people commonly give as 
belonging to various categories or classes’ (1969: 2). Other conditions o f such 
experiments vary: sometimes participants are given a limited time period in which to 
compile their list for each category, sometimes not; sometimes participants are asked 
to write as many members of the category as they can, sometimes they are limited; 
sometimes the category name is written down for the participants, sometimes it is 
read/spoken aloud for them, and so on.
Rosch’s list for prototypicality experiments (1973) did not include all the responses 
Battig and Montague got for every given category. Instead, she selected some items 
that occurred more frequently (i.e. most people thought they were members of the 
category), some items that occurred very rarely (fewer people thought of them as 
members o f the category), and some in-between. Since she wanted members that 
‘might reasonably be expected to range from very good to peripheral members o f their 
categories’ (1973: 131), she chose members which appeared with considerably 
different frequencies in the Battig and Montague norms, which also represented what 
she ‘subjectively judged to be a wide spread on how focal the instances were to the
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category (ibid.). Rosch predicted that more focal (i.e. prototypical) members will 
appear more frequently in the category norms, and fewer focal members will appear 
more rarely. Indeed, ‘the mean rank of goodness o f example in the present task 
[prototypicality] and the item’s Battig and Montague frequency were highly 
correlated’ (Rosch, 1973: 132). Therefore, by asking participants to provide names of 
members o f the categories I was interested in, the ones given more frequently as 
responses would be more likely to be prototypical.
Moreover, another factor which appears to be o f significance in relation to 
prototypicality is the order in which the items given as response are listed. Generally, 
in category norms research, participants are asked to write down the items ‘in 
whatever order they happen to occur to [them]’ (Battig and Montague, 1969: 2). 
Evidence from Freedman and Loftus’s experiments (1971) suggests that, when faced 
with such a task, participants scan their mental representations of the category starting 
with the prototypical members and moving outwards (towards more marginal 
members), with which Rosch concurs (1973: 140). Generally it seems, then, that 
prototypical items come to mind faster than (i.e. before) less prototypical items, and 
would occur with higher frequency when one compiles a list.
Therefore, I distributed a questionnaire requesting participants to list items belonging 
to the categories ‘Greek men’s lifestyle magazines’ and ‘Greek women’s lifestyle 
magazines’. The ones occurring more frequently and higher up on the lists they 
provided would be the most prototypical ones, which I would choose to analyse.
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5.2.3 The questionnaire design and pilot
The questionnaire was written in Greek. It was preceded by a paragraph (also in 
Greek) thanking participants for their time, informing them that the questionnaire was 
part o f research for my PhD Thesis and reassuring them that their answers and any 
personal information they provided would remain anonymous and confidential. It was 
originally piloted on 6 Greek participants, 3 male and 3 female, aged 23-27.
An English translation of the task the participants had to complete would be:
‘Please list up to 5 women’s lifestyle magazines circulating in Greece’ and ‘Please list 
up to 5 m en’s lifestyle magazines circulating in Greece’.
Since I was only interested in the most prototypical titles, no more than 5 titles would 
be necessary, as presumably the 5 titles that would occur first would be the ones most 
prototypical for each individual. Moreover, ‘women’s lifestyle magazines’ and ‘m en’s 
lifestyle magazines’ are subordinate terms, sub-categories o f the category ‘lifestyle 
magazines’. ‘Lifestyle magazines’ in turn is subordinate to the basic level category 
‘magazines’, part o f the superordinate category ‘Kind o f Reading M aterials’, used as a 
category for Battig and Montague’s category norms (1973).57 Apart from general 
‘knowledge of the world’, some kind of expert knowledge is required for participants 
to name members for my categories, since knowledge o f subordinate categories 
involves more specialised knowledge than that of basic level terms. Moreover, my 
categories are closed and smaller, i.e. there is a certain number o f magazines 
circulating in Greece, which cannot be extended ad infinitum (whereas, for instance, 
the category ‘Kind o f Reading Material’ can be extended almost infinitely). Therefore,
I asked for ‘up to 5’ titles, taking into account the fact that some participants may not
57 For superordinate, basic level and subordinate terms, see Ungerer and Schm id (1996).
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know as many as 5 titles. The phrasing ‘circulating in Greece’ was chosen instead of 
‘Greek m agazines’, because many lifestyle magazines circulating in Greece are 
international titles (usually published in Greek, by Greek publishers, but sometimes 
including Greek translations of texts from the original, usually English-language, 
title).
One o f the implications o f this is that at least some participants might find the task 
more difficult and require more time to respond. In the pilot study this turned out to be 
indeed the case, thus I rephrased the instruction ‘Please take no more than 2 minutes 
to answer the below’ to ‘Try to answer within 2 minutes’. This encouraged 
participants to try to answer as fast as possible, without dwelling too long on their 
answers, but also meant that they could take longer than 2 minutes if necessary.
The pilot version ‘In filling out the following, please bear in mind that there are no 
right or wrong answers. I want to know whatyow think, in fact, what comes readily to 
your m ind’ was complemented with ‘Please write down the titles in the order in which 
they come to your mind’, as some participants in the pilot asked for clarifications in 
relation to the order in which they had to write down their answers.
Finally, in order to avoid priming effects, the two questions were not always presented 
in the same order; half of the questionnaires (60) were asking participants to list 




The questionnaires (hard and electronic copies) were distributed during my 2 w eeks’ 
long stay in Greece in the summer o f 2006, through snowballing. That is, I first 
approached friends and acquaintances asking them to fill in the questionnaires for me, 
and then I asked them to pass on some hard copies, or the electronic copy to their own 
friends and acquaintances. These questionnaires were either returned directly to me, or 
via the common acquaintance.
All participants were unpaid volunteers, and they were Greek having spent all or most 
o f their lives in Greece, to ensure that they would be familiar with the press circulating 
in Greece. They were aged 18-44, approximately the target age groups o f most 
lifestyle magazines, which means that, even if they were not lifestyle magazines’ 
readers, they were likely to have encountered advertising o f the magazines, or heard 
about the magazines in conversations with their peers.
115 questionnaires were returned, 60 from female participants and 55 from male 
participants. 60 o f the questionnaires were type A (33 by female and 27 by male 
participants), and 55 were type B (27 by female and 28 by male participants).
Table 1: Demographics o f participants
Female Male Total
A 33 27 60
B 27 28 55
Total 60 55 115
5.2.4 Q uestionnaire analysis and findings
The questionnaires were analysed with SPSS by Damon Berridge and Elizabeth 
Ackerley, (Centre for Applied Statistics, Lancaster University) to whom I am very
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grateful.58 Two factors were relevant for the analysis: the frequency with which each 
title was mentioned as a member of the related category, and the rank order, i.e. the 
order each title is mentioned in each list of 5 titles by each participant.
As I first step, for each category I constructed 5 lists o f titles, one for each rank 
(position in the list, from 1st to 5th), and the frequency each title for each rank.
This is, for example, the table with the men’s magazines’ titles occurring first on the 
list:
Table 2: M en’s magazines titles occurring on the first slot
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 3 2.6 2.6 2.6
4 Wheels 1 .9 .9 3.5
Anti 1 .9 .9 4.3
Esquire 6 5.2 5.2 9.6
FHM 3 2.6 2.6 12.2
Free 1 .9 .9 13.0
Magnum 1 .9 .9 13.9
Man 3 2.6 2.6 16.5
Max 5 4.3 4.3 20.9
Maxim 3 2.6 2.6 23.5
Men 21 18.3 18.3 41.7
Men's Health 15 13.0 13.0 54.8
Men's World 1 .9 .9 55.7
Money and Life 1 .9 .9 56.5
Nitro 21 18.3 18.3 74.8
Penthouse 1 .9 .9 75.7
Playboy 11 9.6 9.6 85.2
Status 16 13.9 13.9 99.1
unintelligible 1 .9 .9 100.0
Total 115 100.0 100.0
581 am also grateful to Aaron Hunsberger for his help.
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This is the list o f women’s magazines titles occurring in the first position:
Table 3: W om en’s magazines titles occurring on the first slot
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 2 1.7 1.7 1.7
Celebrity 1 .9 .9 2.6
Cosmopolitan 42 36.5 36.5 39.1
Diva 3 2.6 2.6 41.7
Dolce Vita 1 .9 .9 42.6
Egw 1 .9 .9 43.5
Elle 3 2.6 2.6 46.1
Glamour 4 3.5 3.5 49.6
Gynaika 6 5.2 5.2 54.8
Hello .9 .9 55.7
Katerina .9 .9 56.5
Life and Style 3.5 3.5 60.0
Lipstick .9 .9 60.9
Lucky .9 .9 61.7
Madame Figaro 16 13.9 13.9 75.7
Marie Claire 14 12.2 12.2 87.8
Nitro .9 .9 88.7
Pink Woman 1.7 1.7 90.4
Super Katerina .9 .9 91.3
Vogue 7.0 7.0 98.3
Votre Beaute .9 .9 99.1
Woman .9 .9 100.0
Total 115 100.0 100.0
From the tables it is clear that certain magazines were mentioned very frequently, 
while others only occasionally. Therefore, I grouped all titles mentioned less than 12 
times in total in one category, ‘others’ (12 times was a random ‘cut-off point’). I then 
ended up with the following lists (presented alphabetically):
Table 4: Magazines occurring 12 or more times in total






Gynaika M en's Health




An interesting observation when looking at all the titles listed by participants is that, 
even though women had no difficulty listing magazines addressed to men, and men 
magazines addressed to women, none of the participants listed magazines addressed to 
gay men or women. This indicates the marginalisation of homosexuality in Greece -  
participants had no trouble listing magazines addressed ‘not for them ’, so even if we 
assume that all participants self-identified as straight, this is no reason for them to 
ignore gay publications. The reason a publication was listed was because (a) the 
participants were aware of its existence and (b) it was considered ‘prototypical’. 
Which means that either participants were not even aware of gay publications, or they 
had classified them mentally as something other than ‘men’s/ women’s lifestyle 
magazines’. In my opinion this may also linked to the definition and prototypical 
instances o f the categories ‘man’ or ‘woman’. Ironically, a straight woman is more 
likely to be aware o f magazines addressing men, than o f magazines addressing gay 
women.
For the magazines listed, I calculated prototypicality by attributing a certain weight to 
each rank, 5 for the first position, 4 for the second, 3 for the third, 3 for the fourth, and 
1 for the fifth, and multiplying this by the frequency o f occurrences o f each title for 
each rank. Therefore, the prototypicality score for the magazine Nitro (nitroscore)
would be
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nitroscore = 5x21 + 4x9 + 3x15 + 2x4 + 1x2 = 196
because Nitro was mentioned 21 times in the first position, 9 times in the second, 15 
times in the third, and so on. Below are the scores o f each title in order of 
prototypicality (see column ‘Sum’):
Table 5: W om en’s magazines in order of prototypicality 
Descriptive Statistics
N Sum Mean Std. Deviation
cosmoscore 115 317.00 2.7565 2.15452
figaroscore 115 226.00 1.9652 2.03017
mariecscore 115 151.00 1.3130 1.91194
voguescore 115 111.00 .9652 1.71643
ellescore 115 101.00 .8783 1.54550
glamscore 115 55.00 .4783 1.30012
divascore 115 47.00 .4087 1.16901
gynaikascore 115 46.00 .4000 1.25516
Istylescore 115 35.00 .3043 1.10956
mirrors co re 115 28.00 .2435 .79020
Valid N (listwise) 115
Table 6: M en’s magazines in order of prototypicality 
Descriptive Statistics
N Sum Mean Std. Deviation
nitroscore 115 196 1.70 2.069
menscore 115 183 1.59 2.123
statusscore 115 166 1.44 2.040
playboyscore 115 154 1.34 1.863
mhscore 115 124 1.08 1.897
maxscore 115 95 .83 1.557
esqscore 115 78 .68 1.424
klikscore 115 41 .36 1.019
Valid N (listwise) 115
Therefore, the 3 most prototypical women’s lifestyle magazines were Cosmopolitan, 
Madame Figaro and Marie Claire, and the 3 most prototypical men’s lifestyle 
magazines were Nitro, Men and Status. However, Men stopped being published in
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November 2005, as is apparent from the magazine website,59 something participants 
might not have been aware o f yet. Thus, I collected Nitro, Status and Playboy, which 
was fourth in prototypicality. Incidentally, Nitro and Status were found to be 














found to be prototypical in Polyzou (2004)
In the above table, the closer the score is to 1, the higher the prototypicality.
I collected a random trimester for each title (February, March and April 2006), 
purchasing the hard copies, since most o f these magazines either do not have online 
versions at all (e.g. Madame Figaro), or have very little content available on their 
websites (e.g. Cosmopolitan at the time o f collecting the data had the editorial, some 
quizzes and the horoscopes).




The notion o f ‘communicative purpose’ as a primary criterion for genre identification 
and classification (Swales, 1990) has been criticised and shown to present the analyst 
with a number of challenges (Askehave, 1999). Similarly, scholars from Critical 
Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis speak of the ‘social activity’ linked to 
each genre (Fairclough, 1992; Kress, 1985/1989); they thus view communicative 
purpose from a more socially-oriented perspective and make the identification of the 
social activity taking place central to genre identification. At the same time, 
researchers aiming to provide guidelines for genre analysis place their focus on how to 
conduct the analysis of a corpus of texts of the same genre, rather than on the criteria 
used to compile the corpus -  genre identification has been broadly assumed to be 
accomplished solely on the basis of background knowledge o f or about the ‘speech 
community’ using the genre (Bhatia, 1993; Fairclough, 1992; Swales, 1990). I claim 
that, despite the problems they present, the notions of ‘communicative purpose’ and 
social activity are indeed primary for critical research, as they point us towards the 
ideological functions o f genres. Taking into account other parameters for genre 
identification provided by Swales (1990: 58), such as the participants, the content, the 
structure and the style o f the texts in my data, I propose that texts o f quite different 
structure and/or content can be classified as sub-genres of the same genre type (e.g. 
‘advice’), as these texts share a set of common generic characteristics (see Polyzou, 
2008a).
Initially I discuss the notion of ‘genre’ as a criterion for categorising texts for critical 
analysis. Despite its advantages, certain difficulties are presented with less
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conventionalised mediated texts - various kinds of texts in magazines do not always 
belong to clearly identified/identifiable genres. Then I move on to propose a way of 
facing these difficulties, by adopting categories broader than, but related to genre. I 
am making the theoretical suggestion of viewing texts as overarching speech acts, and 
suggest classifying texts in ‘speech act’ categories, further to be divided in ‘genre 
categories’ as a method of categorisation.
5.3.2 Approaching genre from a functional perspective
Currently, genre as a kind o f text is considered to be part o f every human social 
activity, and the functions and extra-textual conventional characteristics o f genres are 
taken into consideration. Swales’ (1990: 58) definition o f genre as
a class o f communicative events, the members o f which share some set 
o f communicative purposes... In addition to purpose, exemplars o f a 
genre exhibit various patterns of similarity in terms o f structure, style, 
content and intended audience
provides a useful starting point. One would assume that in order to identify the various
genres within the magazines, one would have to identify the shared (sets of)
communicative purposes, as well as the structure, style, content and intended audience
shared by the texts belonging to the same genre. Communicative purpose is privileged
as a criterion (Bhatia, 1993: 13; Swales, 1990: 58), at least for a functional approach
to discourse, although other elements may be assigned more importance depending on
the genre.
The approaches adopted by Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis in 
relation to genre are compatible with that o f Swales and Bhatia, putting more
174
emphasis on the additional dimension of social situation or social activity. Kress’s 
references to participants and to ‘functions, purposes and meanings’ (Kress, 
1985/1989: 19) are related to the notion o f ‘communicative purpose’. Critical 
Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis scholars also refer to form, again in line 
with the common perception that genres are ‘types’ or ‘kinds’ o f texts, with specific 
texts being the tokens o f these types (Kress, 1985/1989; Wodak, 2001: 66).
The emphasis for CDA lies in the connection o f genres to social situations or activities 
(Fairclough, 2001: 123; Fairclough, 1992: 51-52; 125; Kress, 1985/1989: 19; Wodak, 
2001: 66), a connection earlier identified and discussed by Bakhtin (1986: 60). That is, 
genre is bound to what we may call the ‘situational context’, which in itself is 
embedded in the broader historical and socio-political context (see Wodak, 2001: 67; 
Martin, 1992: Ch. 7). Kress suggests that ‘the characteristic features and structures of 
... situations, the purposes of the participants ... all have their effects on the form of 
the texts which are constructed in those situations’ (1985/1989: 19). Moreover, he 
points out that most social situations are conventionalised, to a certain extent, and that 
‘[t]he conventionalised forms o f occasions lead to conventionalised forms o f texts’, 
genres, which are ‘deriving from and encoding the functions, purposes and meanings 
o f the social occasions’ (ibid.). Fairclough also suggests that genre is ‘a relatively 
stable set of conventions that is associated with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified 
type o f activity’ (1992: 126). Thus, whereas we may not have access to the minds, 
intentions and purposes o f the participants in a communicative event, and we may not 
be able to read off effects from texts, genres as event schemata are abstractions o f how 
people use language conventionally, in order to achieve conventionally ratified (or 
even institutionalised) social purposes.
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In terms o f the methodology of genre identification, the link to specific conventional 
situations and what people are actually doing with discourse in these situations is in 
many cases valuable. However, there are still problems. Admittedly not all situations, 
or the language associated with them, are equally conventional (Fairclough, 1992: 70; 
Kress, 1985/1989: 19). Most importantly, practically all mediated texts (i.e. written or 
broadcast) are less bound by a ‘context o f situation’ including a specific setting (time, 
space) and specific participants. At the same time, by definition communication 
involves at least two parties (as pointed out in encoding-decoding models of 
communication since Shannon and Weaver, 1949; cf. also Hall, 1980) and thus a 
discursive event (or its communicative purpose) is not realised until the consumption 
o f the text. With written, recorded or mass media texts it is not always possible even 
to know who is consuming the texts, let alone where, when and how. O f course, some 
mediated texts, particularly written ones, are more closely linked to specific 
production, distribution and consumption practices, specific audiences and specific 
functions (or communicative purposes and effects). Such texts are academic genres 
like student essays, exam papers, academic journal articles etc., texts used in the areas 
o f law and politics (in the narrow sense) like laws and bills, and generally genres used 
in specific institutions and organizations such as job applications, or even the Bible.
When it comes to mass media texts, however, even ethnographic observation may not 
give us the full range of what people do with these texts, and audiences are much 
more fluid and flexible in their composition and practices. To link with the specific 
case of magazine genres, the setting, audience and even the effect of the texts are not 
determining factors for the assignment of the texts to genres, in the way that they are 
with other, context-bound discursive events. If I decide to discuss my medical 
problems with my friend, who is a doctor, over a cup of coffee, the interaction will be
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a hybrid genre between medical consultation and friendly conversation, and the 
participants will simultaneously occupy the subject positions o f doctor/patient and 
friends -  a ‘proper’ medical consultation would most probably have to take place in a 
doctor’s consulting room. However, whether I decide to read a magazine at my home, 
or someone else’s home, or in the tube, or in a waiting room does not change the 
genre o f the texts I am reading. And there is nothing to stop a young man, or elderly 
woman from reading a lifestyle magazine targeting young women, whereas not 
everybody can have access to exam papers, for example. In addition, the fact that a 
number o f texts are put together in one volume of a magazine, and can therefore be 
read in exactly the same settings by the same reader, does not mean they all belong to 
the same genre.
At the same time, texts are clearly restricted by their co-presence in the same medium. 
There are certain forms, contents and communicative purposes texts can have in order 
to appear in an academic journal, for instance, or in a lifestyle magazine. In that sense, 
one can speak o f lifestyle magazines as ‘super-genres’, that is, comprising a number 
o f genres and occupying a position superordinate to genres (see Figure 1 below). 
Such super-genres do play a role in and are associated with social activity. This is 
however best discussed in terms o f social activity and social context in the broad sense 
(Wodak, 2001: 67), rather than specific situations. We can still be concerned with 
what ‘communicative purpose’ the genres or super-genres in question have, and at 
least their potential effects, but also consider ideology which, as a social and cognitive 
structure, occupies a superordinate level to genres (see, e.g. Martin, 1992: 496). It is 
on that level that Martin discusses a rather different notion o f purpose emphasising 
that ‘genres are social processes, and their purpose is being interpreted here in social, 
not psychological term s’ (1992: 503). By using the Aristotelian term ‘telos’ instead of
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purpose , he a lludes to the overall con tribu tion  o f  genres as p rocesses to the 
o rgan isa tion  and function  o f  any  given culture, irrespective o f  the p rivate  purposes o f  
any ind iv idual involved in a com m unicative  event. It is in tha t sense tha t a lthough  w e 
m ay not have access to the purposes o f  the au thor o f  a tex t in the lifesty le m agazines, 
o r the various purposes people seek to fulfil by read ing  a m agazine, o r the effects o f  
the m agazines on specific  people, w e can still exam ine how  the tex ts in the m agazines 
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Figure 1-  Levels of text classification according to functions
T he question  then  is how  to go about d istingu ish ing  the num ber o f  genres p resen t 
w ith in  a m ulti-genre  m edium  (or ‘su per-gen re’) such as a lifestyle m agazine; none o f  
them  is stric tly  bound to a specific  situational con tex t w hile all o f  them  occur 
sim u ltaneously  w ith in  the sam e social context, and address roughly  the sam e
60 It should, however, be borne in mind that it is sim plistic to assum e that ‘the cultures as a w hole are 
goal-directed, with som e over-riding purpose governing the interaction o f  social processes’ (Martin, 
1992: 502), but rather, ‘[sjocial processes negotiate with each other and ev o lv e ’ (ibid.); thus telos 
should not be taken as an essentialist, deterministic ‘inherent purpose’ in any social activity, but rather 
as the role o f  every activity in this (ideological) negotiation o f  social relations and structures.
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audience. Moreover, we cannot have a list o f the generic characteristics o f the texts in 
advance to use as criteria for our categorisation.
Andrew Tudor observes this fundamental problem in categorising texts in 
preconceived genre categories and then discussing their generic characteristics:
To take a genre such as the 'western', analyse it, and list its principal 
characteristics, is to beg the question that we must first isolate the body 
o f films which are 'westerns'. But they can only be isolated on the basis 
o f the 'principal characteristics' which can only be discovered from the 
films themselves after they have been isolated (1974: 135, cited in 
Gledhill, 1999: 138).
In selecting, then, texts belonging to the same genre in order to analyse them, the 
analyst is faced with the paradox that s/he has to analyse them before s/he can 
categorise them.
5.3.3 Methodology of categorisation -  the two initial stages
Swales (1990: 39) and Bhatia (1993: 23) suggest using one’s already existing 
background knowledge of a genre and the speech community as an additional, extra- 
textual criterion for genre identification. Thus, I initially relied on my own insights as 
a member o f Greek society who has come in contact with both m en’s and women’s 
Greek lifestyle magazines, had informal conversations with other Greeks, as well as 
non-Greek colleagues who have had experience of lifestyle magazines in their own 
discursive communities (since often characteristics of lifestyle magazines transcend 
geographical and cultural boundaries and are as related to the magazine’s international 
‘brand’ as to the local social context o f its circulation - see Machin and Thomborrow,
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2003 and Machin and van Leeuwen, 2005). Despite the value o f these insights,61 the 
members o f the relevant discourse communities do not necessarily have category 
names for all kinds o f texts present in magazines, with the exception o f the highly 
conventionalised ones.
This inevitably leads to looking at the texts themselves for elements for their 
categorisation, and to the paradox identified by Tudor, which applies not only to genre 
categorisation but to every hermeneutic process. This is also known as the 
hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1965), which ‘implies that the meaning o f one part can 
only be understood in the context of the whole, but that this in turn is only accessible 
from its component parts’ (Meyer, 2001: 16). It is thus impossible to approach any 
category o f texts without a preconceived notion of what its members are, and it is 
impossible to analyse the parts of any text without a previous idea o f the function and 
meaning o f the whole text. In order to avoid misled or biased conclusions or 
categorisations, one cannot rely on first impressions alone and follow a linear ‘theory 
-  data selection -  analysis’ process. Initial insights are valuable but too intuitive and 
unsystematic, and therefore have to be informed by the data and reformulated 
accordingly, with the data selection revisited after some preliminary analysis, the 
resulting dataset followed by more in-depth analysis, and the theory informed by the 
data and the analysis consequently (Meyer, 2001; Wodak, 2001).
Thus, I moved on to the second step, which involved a closer reading of a sample of 
the data, beginning from the theoretical premise o f the primacy of function as a 
criterion for categorisation. I concentrated on a randomly selected sample, namely the
61 I am particularly indebted to Costas Gabrielatos and the members o f  the Gender and Language 
Research Group o f  the Linguistics Department o f  Lancaster University, w hose observations have 
helped significantly with my categorisation. The discussions with them highlighted even more the 
dim ension o f  function and its importance.
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February 2006 issues of all six selected magazines (one-third o f the total data). The 
categories found would presumably also be found in the March and April issues o f the 
same magazines o f the same year. The initial reading of the data (in conjunction with 
the background knowledge I already had o f the texts and the discourse communities 
involved) provided the first impressions and an initial categorisation o f the texts 
according to function. This was an interpretative first step, relying on the ‘overt’ 
(rather than ‘hidden’) communicative purpose o f the texts (cf. Askehave, 1999). 
Hidden communicative purposes would be the object o f the later stage o f in-depth 
analysis.
Hence I came up with a classification of texts on a level superordinate to genre, as it is 
based on function but does not initially address the issue o f the rest o f the generic 
characteristics o f the text; these I discuss later on in relation to the function of the text.
I suggest that a useful way of looking at texts in relation to the function is seeing them 
as broad types o f speech acts. Thus, the categories used are not genres but ‘speech act 
categories’ and/or ‘genre categories’, based on the overall speech acts performed by 
the texts. I suggest that two broad kinds o f speech acts are performed by the texts in 
lifestyle magazines, directive speech acts and commentary/expression o f beliefs, 
further broken down in categories of the genres performing the functions advice or 
promotion (directives), and social and personal commentary (commentaries) -  this 
classification is represented schematically in Figure 1. The categorisation has involved 
cyclical procedures of moving from theory to data and then back to theory again (cf. 
Wodak, 2001: 70), as well as from the data categorisation to analysis which feeds 
back into the data categorisation again, before moving on to further more detailed 
analysis (cf. Meyer, 2001: 16, 18). Below I am elaborating on what I have termed
‘speech act categories’ and ‘genre categories’ and how these different levels of 
categorisation emerged from examining the data.
The four main functions identified through my initial categorisation were: promoting 
commercial products and services, providing advice to readers, providing commentary 
on social situations and social groups, and providing information, gossip and 
evaluation of individuals. At this stage two theoretical observations emerged: first, 
that these function categories can include texts which can be readily identified as 
established genres in the discourse community as well as unclassifiable texts with 
characteristics o f form and content too unique or too common to determine genre 
membership. For instance, expert interviews (e.g. interviews with doctors, 
cosmetologists or nutritionists) are an established genre performing the function of 
advice -  but so do other texts which are clearly not interviews; for instance, a text in 
Marie Claire (February 2006 issue, pp. 70-73) entitled ‘One more drink after work... 
Yes, but are you overdoing it?’ (Eva and pa k o t o  psTa t o  ypafpsio... Nai, aXka pr/Kcog 
t o  napaKavEiq;) discusses the issues o f alcoholism and alcohol abuse and provides 
relevant advice -  it is a long text broken down in sections, which is a very common 
format o f many magazine texts. At the same time, expert interviews perform a very 
different function to celebrity interviews, although they have exactly the same format 
(question-answer) and layout (e.g. questions may be in different fonts from the 
answers, the initials o f interviewer and interviewee may precede the questions and 
answers etc.) -  celebrity interviews practically never provide advice (maybe only 
occasionally), and rather provide to the readers as ‘overhearers’ of the interview 
information about the interviewee’s work, gossip about their personal lives and in 
some cases promote the interviewee’s recent work (e.g a new album or film). It would 
therefore be misleading to consider all interviews as belonging to the same genre or
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performing the same functions merely because they have the same form and are 
referred to by the discourse community with the same name (‘interview’), whereas 
texts with functions similar to celebrity interviews could be grouped with them (see 
section on ‘commentary’ below). Thus, a categorisation on a level superordinate to 
genre can lead to a more fruitful data classification and selection, since it does not lead 
to the exclusion o f texts with the same function merely on grounds o f form or content. 
The categories at this level are too broad to be considered genres, although the 
category members do display shared generic characteristics. Indeed Askehave (1999: 
22) criticises Bhatia for speaking of ‘promotional genres’ (1993: 59), because this 
broad term can include many different kinds o f texts belonging to different genres. I 
would therefore propose to use the term ‘genre categories’ for categories or groups of 
genres (and texts of unidentifiable genre) which perform the same function.
My second theoretical observation is the striking similarity between the functions 
performed by discourse on the one hand and Austin’s notion o f speech acts on the 
other. The proposed genre categories can be seen as directive speech acts (the 
promotion and advice categories), or as expressions o f beliefs (social and personal 
commentary categories). I suggest that speech act theory can be extended from the 
study o f sentences or clauses, which was its initial focus, and the study of parts of 
texts (as suggested by van Leeuwen, 1993, 2008) to the study o f whole texts. We then 
end up with a hierarchy of scope when it comes to focussing on function, from the 
overall kind o f speech act performed by a text (which 1 will call the ‘speech act 
category’), to its genre category, moving down to genre (see Figure 1). I am focussing 
on these levels in this discussion, although this hierarchy can continue upwards to 
include lifestyle magazines, then the total o f Greek media and their ideological 
functions, ending up to the total of discourse activity taking place in Greek society as
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a whole, and downwards to include parts o f texts constituting structural elements of 
genres (or ‘moves’, see van Leeuwen, 1993: 195), to smaller units like phrases down 
to single words.
In the following section I provide a theoretical discussion o f the parallels between 
speech acts and text as belonging to genres and genre categories, and then move on to 
discuss the third step o f my data selection process involving textual analysis as a guide 
for identifying the genre category membership for the texts in the data, focussing on 
the ‘advice’ genre category.
5.3.4 Text types as ‘speech act categories’ and ‘genre categories’62
As Martin very aptly puts it, ‘[g]enres are how things get done, when language is used 
to accomplish them ’ (Martin, 1985: 250). The parallels between genres as a means of 
achieving communicative purposes, my broad ‘genre categories’ based on function 
and speech acts as defined by Austin and Searle, are many. The emphasis in Austin’s 
lectures (see Austin, 1962; 1975 for edited published versions of the lectures) is 
indeed on the fact that language is not merely used in order to describe states of affairs 
in the world, but rather in order to perform actions. Due to the multifunctionality of 
language, though, even a short phrase can perform more than one action (Austin, 
1975: 73) and Searle explicitly states that ‘the characteristic grammatical form of the 
illocutionary act [speech act] is the complete sentence’ (1969: 16) because words only 
have meaning as parts o f sentences.
62 For a similar approach, see Tsiplakou and Floros (2013).
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The question then arises whether we can speak o f whole texts, consisting o f a number 
o f sentences, as speech acts, or rather as the accumulation o f a number o f speech acts, 
each act performed by each sentence. According to van Leeuwen ‘the basic unit of 
generic structure is the speech act’ (1993: 195) and the speech act is not necessarily 
restricted to one sentence but constitutes a part of the structure o f a genre which 
surfaces as a text part o f indeterminate length, which can be clauses or sentences. Van 
Leeuwen points out that the speech act is the minimal linguistic unit which performs 
some action (ibid.). I would argue that we can concentrate on a higher than the 
minimal level and focus on the action performed by whole texts as a ‘speech act’. That 
is, whereas every utterance or part of a text performs a certain act (or acts), such as 
insulting or requesting, a genre as a whole is a resource we use to achieve broader 
purposes, such as acquiring a job or making a commercial transaction.
Thus, despite the fact that we can isolate sentences or phrases performing speech acts 
as the basic or minimal units o f generic structure, we can also see whole texts as 
overarching speech acts. Importantly, although Searle speaks of sentences, Austin 
speaks o f utterances, since the term ‘sentence’ refers to a specific grammatical 
formulation, whereas utterance refers to language in use (Levinson, 1983: 16 ff.). 
Levinson in his discussion focuses on comparing sentences with sentence-long 
utterances, in order to emphasise the context-bound nature of utterances. He does 
note, however, that an utterance can be a ‘sentence part, sentence, string of sentences 
or sentence parts’ (Levinson, 1983: 16). Thus, an utterance may consist o f more than 
one sentence and at least in theory it can be of any length - cf. Harris’s definition of 
utterance as ‘any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence 
on behalf o f that person’ (Harris, 1951: 14, cited in Lyons, 1977: 26). Arguably a 
written text o f any length can be perceived as the equivalent of a spoken utterance (see
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e.g. Loos et al. 2004 63) -  interestingly Bakhtin begins to define genres as ‘types of 
utterances (1986: 60). In that sense any (spoken) utterance or (written) text as a 
whole can be seen as performing one (or more) speech acts;64 Brown and Yule indeed 
observe that ‘[fjrom a speaker’s point o f view several sentences (or syntactic chunks) 
strung together may constitute a single [speech] act. Thus, a fairly extended utterance 
may be interpreted as a warning or as an apology’ (1983: 233).
A more interesting consideration is that, to echo Searle’s extension from the word to 
the sentence for the study of meaning, as words have meaning only within sentences, 
sentences only have meaning in the discourse in which they occur. For instance, we 
wouldn’t be able to identify the expression ‘don’t tell your beloved one ‘I love you”
(Mrjv neiq crrov ayaTO'jfisvo aov ‘a ’ayancb’, Madame Figaro, Feb. 2006, pg. 84) as 
advice rather than command or request without the co-text. Thomas provides a useful 
example o f how ‘speakers... ‘build up to’ the performance o f a particular speech act’ 
(1995: 200). She demonstrates how a speaker ‘prepares the ground’ for a request -  in 
my ‘advice’ texts the initial stage, where the problem or question is set up and 
elaborated, is ‘preparing the ground’ for the advice to be given in relation to the 
specific problem. Although most o f the sentences in the ‘problem setting’ part can be 
characterised as statements or rhetorical questions (rather than advice), the actual 
sentences performing the advising (including often imperatives or expressions such as 
‘I advise you’ and ‘I suggest’) would make no sense without the ‘problem setting’
63http://ww w.sil.org/LING UISTICS/G lossarvO fLinguisticTerm s/W hatIsAnUtterance.htm . last accessed  
19/6/2007.
64 Lyons also extends this definition o f  utterance to written texts (1977: 26); however, this definition  
encounters problems when we consider texts as the ‘representation o f  d iscourse’ (Brown and Yule, 
1983: 6), where discourse involves dialogue, whether spoken, transcribed or (as is the case in 
m agazines) written questions and answers. In texts like interviews w e cannot speak o f  the utterance o f  
one person but rather o f  two people taking turns. H owever, it is presumably one person who writes the 
text (the journalist -  although there may be editing by other persons too), and the interview ees are not 
involved in the representation o f  their own speech. As far as the readers are concerned, they never take 
a turn, and thus we can perhaps still treat an interview as one single text/utterance, with the turns within 
it constituting different m oves/units o f  structure.
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part. Moreover, ‘the pragmatic force of successive utterances can have a cumulative 
effect’ (Thomas, 1995: 201), so that a succession o f the speech acts o f advice within 
the same ‘advice’ text will contribute towards the overall advising function o f the text 
-  one more reason to consider the text as a whole rather than isolating parts o f the 
texts that can strictly be considered ‘speech acts’ according to Austin and Searle’s 
discussions. Indeed Wunderlich (1980: 293) points out that there is a continuum in the 
complexity o f speech acts according to the length o f the unit one is examining: ‘turn, 
move, speech act pattern, complex speech unit and discourse type’. He discusses the 
interconnection o f speech acts as they appear in larger units of interaction - as turns 
within a dialogue or as moves in dialogue or monologic text, contributing to moving 
on towards the final communicative purpose to be achieved. He also argues (1980: 
296) that a discourse type ‘is the most complex unit o f speech activity ... that can be 
realised by a whole conversation’ (or any text as a whole) and the examples of 
discourse types he provides roughly correspond to genres (‘getting-and-giving 
direction, instruction, interview, counseling’, ibid.). Van Leeuwen demonstrates how 
generic structure consists of a number o f stages, where each stage ‘consists o f one or 
more o f the same speech acts’ and ‘has a specific function in moving the text or 
communicative event forward towards the realization of its ultimate communicative 
aim ’ (2008: 348).
By classifying types of texts according to the overall speech act they perform in 
‘speech act categories’ I recognise the cumulative and joint contribution of the stages 
and respective speech acts within texts -  it should be noted that by speaking of the 
overall function o f a text as an overarching speech act I mean a complex, higher level 
speech act and do not attempt to reduce the complexity and multifunctionality o f texts 
into one single dimension, but rather to emphasise the role o f text as action.
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So far I have been speaking of text categories (the ‘speech act’ categories) as types of 
speech acts. That is, directive speech acts are all kinds o f speech acts that dictate a 
course o f action on behalf o f the hearer/reader, but can be divided further in ‘advice’, 
‘request’, ‘demand’, ‘command’, and so on. Likewise expressions o f beliefs can take 
place through statements/assertions, explanations, etc. (see Searle, 1971/1976 for a 
suggested typology of speech acts). Likewise, texts performing the functions of 
promotion and advice belong to the broader directive ‘speech act type’, whereas 
personal and social commentary are both expressions o f  beliefs (Searle, 1971/1976: 3). 
These more specific functions/ speech acts (according to which I assign texts to ‘genre 
categories’, as discussed above) are nevertheless still types or kinds o f texts, just as a 
number o f different utterances can be categorised as ‘requests’ irrespective o f what is 
requested or the specific phrasing o f the request. One can further distinguish between 
kinds o f requests, depending on the way the requests are expressed linguistically - e.g. 
polite and impolite, formal or friendly, expressed in the declarative, interrogative or 
imperative mood and so on. Thus, ‘genre categories’ can be further broken down into 
genres, but members o f every category will all share the same primary communicative 
purpose o f advice, promotion etc.
From the above identified genre categories, I decided to select the ‘advice’ category 
for the compilation o f the final corpus. As directive texts, the members of this 
category are more reader-oriented and incite action more directly, and from a social 
perspective they are linked to ideology in that they suggest on a personal(ised) level 
what (should) constitute problems for modern men and women in Greece and how 
these problems should be faced.
I then conducted a preliminary analysis of the texts I had originally assigned to the 
‘advice’ category, which either confirmed or disconfirmed my initial, more intuitive
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categorisation. The preliminary analysis also allowed me to see to what extent each 
text was (proto)typical o f the category, and identify hybrids and marginal members. 
The purpose o f the process described in this section has been to provide a motivated 
categorisation o f lifestyle magazine texts -  as I have already pointed out in 1.3, 
however, from the present thesis we cannot make any meaningful generalisations 
about advice texts based on the analysis in this thesis alone, and this is not the aim of 
the thesis (but for work on advice texts please see, for example, Mikkonen et al. 2013; 
Aubrey, 2010 specifically on health advice in women’s magazines; Koeing et al., 
2010; Tyler, 2008).
5.4. Selecting theme: Sexual health
The primarily theoretical focus of this thesis has not allowed for the analysis o f an 
extensive database, even narrowed down to only the advice texts o f 18 issues of 
magazines. In narrowing this down further, I aimed for selecting texts along the same 
or similar thematic lines. This was not a very easy task, because men’s magazines 
include much fewer advice texts than women’s, and the advice is not generally on the 
same topics. Eventually I selected three texts, in order to demonstrate the application 
of part of the framework outlined in Chapter 4. The three texts come from two of the 
women’s magazines, Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire, which differ in terms of the age 
o f their target audience {Madame Figaro is very similar to Marie Claire in that 
respect), and one o f the men’s magazines, Status, which is the closest one to the ideal 
o f upper-class consumerist hegemonic masculinity, with traces of ‘New M an’ 
aspirations (see also Polyzou, 2010), and they all deal broadly with the issue o f sexual 
health {Playboy and Nitro did not include any texts on this in the issues collected).
189
In reflecting on why I selected this seemingly arbitrarily chosen topic, a comment of 
Sara Mills came to mind. Mills observes that some people, inspired by Michel 
Foucault’s work, rather than applying theoretical insights from his work, choose to 
simply look at themes similar to the ones he examined, such as surveillance/methods 
o f preserving ‘social order’, sexuality and (in)sanity (2003: 110-111). She criticises 
this practice ‘[sjince Foucault was very concerned to question ways o f thinking rather 
than simply locating themes to apply’ (ibid.: 111). By contrast, for Critical Discourse 
Analysis, apart from the necessary openness and reflexivity on theories, methods and 
critique, the selection o f ‘them e’ or ‘topic’ holds also a very central role -  indeed the 
starting point is a social issue which needs to be shown to influence power relations, 
inequalities and/or the struggle for equality in context. It appears to me that the two 
issues my data are dealing with -  health and sexuality -  are issues where always high 
stakes have been involved when it comes to power, the authority to define what 
constitutes ‘knowledge’, and normativity, while also being somehow very ‘intimate’, 
‘personal’ and closely bound to the body. Viewing certain topics as ‘universal human 
concerns’ goes against Foucault’s approach, and probably against approaches of at 
least some strands o f CDA. Yet for both political and theoretical reasons, ‘humanism’ 
is not entirely without merit. Politically, Cameron (1992: 4) defines feminism as the 
struggle for the full humanity of women, which is a humanist account, while also 
demonstrating that ‘equal oppression’ for groups of women and men is simply not 
good enough. Furthermore, I claim that it may be politically more productive to focus 
on both the biological, cognitive and other similarities between men and women, 
treating both as ‘human’ and examining whether/how any differences result from 
unequal and/or different social circumstances and pressures (Polyzou, 2004: 9). In 
terms o f linguistic theory and the explanation o f the effects of discourse, cognitive
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approaches generally see human cognition and the mechanisms o f its operation in 
‘humanist’ terms (while actual mental representations are o f course context-dependent 
-  see also Chapter 2).
The question o f universality is not to be answered in this thesis, yet we can safely 
observe I think, that health and sexuality have been, if not always, then very often, 
sites o f personal/political struggle, and I thought it would be interesting to examine 
how the lifestyle magazines as cultural products approach these heavily loaded issues. 
In addition, when it comes to the particular texts I examine here, I think it is 
significant that the topic in van Dijk’s sense ( ‘what is actually at stake here’) is not 
sexuality per se, but health. In Status the text is part of a regular column entitled 
HEALTH: BO D Y  + SOUL, while for both Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire the texts 
are special features explicitly marked as ‘health’ features. This implies that, although 
lifestyle magazines are rife with deontic modality (Hatzidaki, 2011), and advice texts 
within the magazines more so (Polyzou, 2008a), the particular texts have the 
additional authority o f ‘medical expertise’, displaying features similar to other genres 
o f medical discourse. Moreover, as the focus seems to be (physical) health, the issue is 
not ostensibly moral, social or cultural beliefs related to sexuality, yet these are still 
present in the background. Thus, ideological beliefs related to gender and sexuality 
adopted in these texts are likely to be both ‘incontestable’ and ‘backgrounded’, 
constituting thus suitable candidates for the exploration of presupposition. This 
exploration, in turn, would contribute to shedding more light on the construction of 
heteronormativity in the contemporary Greek media landscape.
It needs to be emphasised, however, that any observations made here in relation to 
gender and sexual health are to be used rather as opening up directions for further 
study, rather than fully substantiated conclusions, due to the very limited amount of
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texts examined. The primary interest for the thesis is to demonstrate such observations 
can be usefully made by employing the presupposition framework outlined in Chapter 
4, and to suggest that the systematic application o f the framework to a larger body of 
texts could help us make some generalisations in relation to the social problem(s) we 
wish to examine.
5.5. Methodology of Analysis
In this section I will briefly discuss the methodology applied in this thesis to identify 
frame-level and mental-space level presuppositions, rather than the application o f the 
whole model outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 is concerned, among other issues, with 
the methodological issue o f identifying and categorising different types of 
presupposition, assigning them to different ‘levels’. I have analysed my data in terms 
o f the first level (the frames), and partially the second level (sentence level), looking 
in particular at main indicative clauses (or ‘assertions’), relative clauses and instances 
o f marked syntax involving main and relative clauses, and conditional constructions.
One o f the reasons for selecting these levels for analysis was practical -  since the 
largest part o f the thesis is devoted to theory building, the application and illustration 
o f the theory had to be more limited. Although I have applied the entire framework 
elsewhere (Polyzou, 2008b; 2010; 2011; 2012), these analyses were inevitably less 
detailed. Here I chose to demonstrate a more limited part o f the framework in more 
detail. The first two levels were chosen not only in order to start ‘from the 
beginning’,65 but for two other reasons:
651 would indeed suggest starting from these levels when applying the m odel, since the lower level 
findings feed into the higher level ones.
192
First, these are the two levels who have concerned pragmaticians for longer, and have 
been examined in more detail in relation to presupposed knowledge. So far cognitive 
accounts for these levels have been proposed (see Marmaridou, 2000), but never 
applied to a level beyond the sentence. Thus, I consider it necessary to complete and 
present here these first steps before proceeding further.
Second, I have already acknowledged that the lower the level, the narrower the scope 
o f background knowledge activated, and the higher the degree o f certainty about its 
activation. As opposed to the discourse and pragmatic competence level, we can more 
easily point to specific items in the text, and argue that specific lexical items or 
sentences convey particular meanings. By contrast, in identifying discourses we need 
contextual knowledge and social theory, and in analysing presupposed pragmatic 
knowledge we need a pragmatic theory. In response to criticisms for ‘reading things 
into the data’ (see e.g. Schegloff, 1997; Widdowson, 1995), clarifying the 
methodology for identifying discourses is a central concern for CDA. As can be seen 
from the analysis chapters (6-9), analysis of these first two levels already points to 
certain discourses/ideological assumptions in relation to gender. Sceptics might 
consider applying at least these two first levels of the framework given that they 
follow the principle of analysing only what the text itself orients to (as Schegloff, 
1997, suggests), although I would suggest that, from a critical perspective, the analysis 
is not complete until the broader social context has been taken into account.66
On the sentence level I have identified relative clauses as introduced with the 
pronouns ‘who’ and ‘which’, and conditionals as introduced with ‘i f ,  although I also 
look at some examples introduced with ‘when’, which I argue carries a generic
66 Arguably a reception study could also contribute to testing my analysis in juxtaposition with 
interpretations o f  the participants. H owever, this was beyond the scope o f  the thesis as it would require 
an entirely different research design.
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conditional function as well in these cases. I have focussed on these prototypical and 
relatively uncontroversial cases, as engaging with the finer details o f each category 
could result in a separate thesis for each category. For example, conditionals can be 
expressed through a wide range o f means, such as imperatives and prepositional 
phrases, while we could also argue that conditionals should be analysed as epistemic 
modality (see Gabrielatos, 2010). The present analysis is therefore far from exhaustive 
but rather a first foray in considering expressions of varying degrees o f emphasis, 
incontestability and ‘sharedness’ beyond the traditionally examined presupposition 
categories.
In relation to the frame level, as discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 , 1 broadly consider a 
‘frame’ or ‘mental m odel’ to be a cluster o f concepts stored in long-term memory, and 
activated every time a word signifying one o f these concepts is used in discourse. I 
have also addressed the point (Chapter 4) that a ‘frame’ does not have clear-cut 
boundaries, and noted that therefore we cannot assume that with every lexical trigger a 
whole frame and only that frame is activated. It is a matter o f scope in that concepts 
more closely associated in the mind are more likely to be activated with associations 
that may be looser or for some people not exist at all (when certain factual and/or 
evaluative knowledge is not there at all). We could generally, though, agree, that 
narrow-scope (see Chapters 2 and 3 on scope) closely connected concepts are 
necessary for communication to occur at all, as in understanding the word ‘Tuesday’ 
requires for all English speakers knowledge of the system of the ‘week’ and the other 
days o f the week.67 A broader scope item of knowledge that will not be shared among
67 In this thesis I focus on mental m odels activated by content words, which roughly correspond to 
mental representations o f  (abstract or concrete) entities. Grammatical/function words also correspond to 
underspecified clusters o f  concepts (as opposed to single concepts), with radial structure. H owever here 
I am concerned with these words only insofar as they set up mental spaces, and with articles when it 
com es to triggering existential presuppositions.
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all English speakers and may not even be activated among people who share it would
be, for example, that Tuesday is the day waste is collected from a specific area o f a
specific city — this would only be activated when shared and when relevant. Thus for
narrow-scope frame-level presupposition native speaker intuition can be taken as quite
reliable, as it would be default knowledge activated in most contexts. This could be
triangulated with large-scale psychological experiments, following perhaps
methodologies o f free association similar to those o f the ‘category norms’ 
68  •experiments. However it was not possible to conduct such research for this thesis. 
Broader scope knowledge activation is where the ‘frame’ fades into a ‘discourse’ -  the 
distinction between the two is largely a matter of scope and perhaps complexity. I 
have not always tried therefore to draw a rigid distinction between the two, but I need 
to point out that identifying a discourse as an analyst, as well as processing one as a 
text recipient, requires more and less certainly activated knowledge -  thus nuances of 
meaning such as evaluations presupposed to be shared may be lost on a reader who is 
an ‘outsider’. By the same token analysts are always open to the accusation of 
‘reading discourses into’ the text. Although the ‘discourse level’ is not included in the 
Analysis part o f this thesis, I can only reiterate that for that we can only rely on the 
knowledge o f the analyst as an ‘insider’ of the community under study, further 
supported by ethnographic/sociological and/or other research in the social context, and 
making explicit the assumptions and knowledge that led to identifying the ‘discourse 
presuppositions’ in question (see also Sunderland, 2004).
In Chapter 7, in the frame level analysis, it may appear that the three different texts are 
analysed for different things -  vagueness, metaphor, representation of actors, 
emotion/evaluation. However, these are all phenomena that occur on the frame level
68 It would be especially  interesting to try and find out narrow scope activated concepts for seem ingly  
neutral terms (such as ‘m an’ or ‘w om an’).
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of analysis, and their identification contributes towards answering the questions: what 
frames are triggered in the text? What parts o f frames are highlighted? What parts o f 
frames are accessed/ accessible, and what parts are not? These sub-categories o f the 
frame level emerged during the analysis. The emergence o f these categories serves to 
emphasise once more that the broad categories o f this presupposition framework are 
not to replace more specific categories so far used in the exploration of discourse. 
Rather, my approach would place emphasis on the cognitive component o f the various 
phenomena, simultaneously seeking to link this to the ideological functions o f the 
texts under analysis. Finally, specifically in relation to frames, I took the presence of 
these sub-categories as indicative of the fact that, as well as the other categories in this 
framework, the narrow scope level of frames/framing should also be considered in 
terms o f sub-categories. Just as on the sentence level we are concerned with a number 
o f different sentence types, and on the text level different genres, and underlying 
pragmatic knowledge encompasses a range o f pragmatic principles which become 
relevant at appropriate points in each interaction, we could also perhaps start to 
distinguish among different types of frame activation -  those that involve also 
activating another experiential domain (metaphor), those that emphasise 
evaluative/affective rather than factual content, or those that leave gaps that we think 
matter specifically from a critical perspective (such as strategic vagueness). Further 
research is required in order to consider more specifically what categories should be 
included in the frame level analysis. The current categorisation is simply a result of 
this exploratory, largely data-driven analysis. The analysis o f social actors has as a 
starting point the topic rather than the means o f representation, and I have chosen to 
include it (and discuss it separately) also in line with the critical assumption that
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representation o f people and social groups always matters as a significant part in how 
ideologies about the relevant groups are transmitted, consolidated or contested.
Following the data-driven hermeneutic approach to discourse analysis (see van Dijk, 
2001a: 98-99; Meyer, 2001), in CDA we simultaneously seek to identify what gender 
ideologies surface in or underlie the text, and what linguistic features in our data 
indicate this. As language is multifunctional and context bound, we cannot know in 
advance that ideology in any given text will be communicated through the means of 
metaphor, or conditionals, for example. Even if we start with a provisional checklist or 
guiding framework (such as the presupposition framework I apply here), we might 
discover categories which were not on our list, or not find anything significant based 
on the categories that are on our list. It may also be the case that a category occurs 
very often in one o f our texts and not at all in another -  if that is the case, this is yet 
another finding. For example, it is notable that in my data the texts in the women’s 
magazines include many expressions that would trigger fear, and the text from the 
men’s magazines doesn’t; the choice of language seems to echo the prevalent 
stereotypes of ‘emotional women’ and ‘rational men’ (a point that we could make 
when linking the findings of the frame level analysis to the discourse level 
assumptions underlying the data).
In particular in relation to metaphor analysis, I would like to point out that, for the 
purposes o f developing a theoretical presupposition framework, my analysis here is 
‘level 1’ analysis; level 1, the ‘theory level’, is “the level at which theoretical analysis 
and categorisation o f metaphor takes place” (Cameron, 1999: 6). Level 2 is concerned 
with the on-line processing o f metaphor by individuals, and level 3 with the neural 
activity which brings about metaphor processing at levels 1 and 2 (ibid.).
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Semino et al. (2004: 1272) state explicitly and discuss some problems o f level 1 
analysis:
•  The boundary between the literal and the metaphorical in the identification o f 
linguistic metaphors;
•  The precise identification o f tenor [target category] and vehicle [source 
category] in relation to each linguistic metaphor;
•  The extrapolation o f conceptual metaphors from linguistic metaphors;
•  The extrapolation o f conventional metaphors from patterns in the data
The boundary between the literal and the metaphorical is fuzzy rather than clear-cut 
(e.g. Goatly, 1997: 14ff; Grady et al., 1999; Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 236-237. See 
also Heywood et al., 2002) and it lies upon the analyst to decide what is metaphorical 
and what is not. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) emphasise that metaphor involves 
mapping between two different domains, but still the decision remains about what 
belongs to which domain.
Given that our cognition is embodied (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987) and that 
metaphors help us understand abstract notions in terms of more direct, often physical 
experiences (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff, 1993), in metaphor 
identification I initially try to trace a more primary meaning of the ‘metaphor focus’ 
based on one’s physical experience. For example, I consider the primary meaning of 
‘take’ literally stretching out one’s arm and taking an object in one’s hand - I took 
meanings o f ‘take’ like ‘have sex’ or ‘take as a spouse’ as metaphorical.
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At the same time in the data we often have the reverse situation: we have aspects of 
related to the body (sexual activity, disease) represented metaphorically, while the 
source domain used may be in fact a cultural experience (for example, war), which 
many readers may not have experienced directly. This contributes to the explanatory 
function o f the texts, in that they may, for example, help readers create mental 
representations o f and reason about micro-organisms they are not able to see (see also 
Cameron, 2003 on metaphor in education). At the same time, the choice of 
metaphorical framing imparts cultural understandings, ideologies and attitudes in 
relation to health and disease, healthcare, relationships and sex.
In Chapter 7 I focus on war metaphors, which occur most often in the data. In 
determining frequency I considered the presence o f linguistic expressions we could 
consider metaphorical, thus focussing, for the purposes o f this framework, on the 
frame/lexical rather than the clause level.69 Taking into account the Invariance 
Principle, according to which source and target categories maintain their internal 
structure (Lakoff, 1993), I look at the structure of source and target category, and how 
the one is mapped onto the other (for example, in metaphors from the source domain 
o f ‘w ar’ I discuss what parts o f the target domain are represented as the opponents).
Finally, I would like to acknowledge that in identifying meaning (and presuppositions) 
at any level, at least some semantic default knowledge on behalf o f the analyst needs 
to be accepted as shared, intuitive, native or native-like speaker intuition.70 This 
applies also to the identification of ‘mental spaces’ through expressions which
69 H ow ever the extrapolation o f  conceptual metaphors from the data, for the purposes o f  which we  
might want to identify and count metaphorical mappings on the clause level (Boers, 1999; Sem ino, 
2002; Polyzou, 2004; G ogorosi, 2005) would inform the discourse level analysis o f  the present 
presupposition framework. Here it is sufficient that certain frames (those o f  the source dom ains) are 
activated sim ply by relevant expressions being there in the text.
70 At the sam e time attention needs to be drawn to am biguities and contestation o f  m eanings (as in 
ideologically  loaded terms), even when this contestation does not occur explicitly  in the specific text 
under analysis.
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function as ‘mental space builders’ — to a large extent it is the semantics of these 
expressions that allow us to identify them as space builders.
With the above observations in mind I conducted a manual qualitative analysis o f the 
three texts, identifying every expression I would consider as activating a frame or 
building a mental space. I then searched for patterns according to a number o f 
questions. I asked:
>  What concepts and frames occur regularly in these texts?
>  What concepts are presupposed, and triggered as the bases o f activated 
frames?
>  What are the implications o f these frames, if any, for gender ideologies?
>  Is the information presented through indicative main clauses always ‘new’ 
information? And, if yes, what kind o f ‘new’ information is included and what 
information is not asserted?
>  Is information not asserted in main clauses left out because it is shared and 
self-evident, or because readers are not meant to infer it, and how do we 
know?
>  What are the implications of presenting certain propositions as incontestable 
and some as open to contestation, if any, for gender ideologies?
>  To what extent do relative clauses present information as shared and given, 
and what kind of information is included in relative rather than main clauses?
>  What kinds o f propositions are presented as possibilities via conditionals? Is 
the epistemic status o f //-clauses always undetermined, or are there any 
contextual factors that contribute to presenting these hypothetical worlds as 
more or less likely, and more or less contestable?
In line with the critical aims of the analysis, to which the framework can be put to use,
it is not all background knowledge we are interested in, but rather, the aspects that are
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related to gender ideologies. This is to serve as a guiding principle in selecting the 
aspects o f the text we focus on and the specific kinds/aspects o f background 
knowledge we are interested in. In considering the dialectic interrelation o f media 
discourse and society, when looking at sexual health-related media texts one might be 
generally interested to find out whether such discourse has any positive or negative 
impact on public health. Or we might be generally interested (say, from a Foucauldian 
perspective) in the normative functions of such discourse, its cultural underpinnings 
and the disciplinary practices it produces. From a feminist perspective, however, we 
are interested in some more specific aspects. Firstly, we might want to look at how 
such authoritative discourse, in addition to normative beliefs about health, also serves 
covertly as a vehicle of (re)producing stereotypes and beliefs about gender and 
sexuality in particular. Secondly, we might want to examine how and to what extend 
ideological beliefs interfere with the seemingly objective advice and information 
imparted to men and women -  for example, to what extent might risky behaviour be 
encouraged/tolerated, or certain safe alternatives suppressed, due to dominant beliefs 
about how a ‘proper’ man or woman should behave? Based on these questions, the 
examples I have chosen to discuss here are based not only on the concepts and 
propositions occur regularly, are presented as given etc., but also on the concepts and 
propositions that have implications for gendered ideologies, practices etc.
5.6 A note on translation
In the thesis I analyse Greek language data and consider ideological issues pertaining 
to the Greek context, and provide an English translation for each example. Analysing 
the original data, and not the translations, is crucial for CDA (Fairclough, 1995a: 191)
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— what is o f interest here is not just what is said, but how the way it is said might 
influence readers and promote or counter ideological assumptions. When it comes to 
analysing presupposition, this involves examining how language use results in fore- or 
backgrounding and assigning epistemic status, ways that may well vary across 
languages, while presenting something as new or shared information may also be 
achieved through some similar and some different devices across languages. 
Especially the first two levels of the analytical framework applied here (frame and 
sentence level) require close attention to linguistic detail, and on occasion ‘readers 
who have no access to the original language must put up with a severe loss of 
information’ (Stubbs, 1997: 108).
In providing translations for my data I have aimed for staying as close to the original 
as possible, even if that meant some awkward translations, as long as it seemed that 
the translation would still be intelligible for a non-Greek speaking reader. This has 
meant that the translation I intended as close often was not close at all, especially 
when it came to idioms or metaphors, and the analysis has often involved extensive 
metalinguistic commentary, for example in relation of aspects o f a frame 
conventionally triggered for interactants by a word, or in relation to the form of 
clauses as the subjunctive was lost in the English translation. In some cases I have 
foregone commentary when I thought that the effect of the original and my translation 
would be equivalent. For example, a metaphor describing a theory as being ‘dead and 
buried’ would be translated word-for-word as ‘it has left us years’ (‘pxxq s%ei cuppast 
Xpovouc;’), and idiomatic expression meaning ‘it has died’. As the focus here is not 
metaphorical/idiomatic representations of death in Greek and English, I simply chose 
a roughly equally idiomatic and often metaphorically used expression in English.
202
Nevertheless it needs to be noted that many phrases identified as ‘presupposition 
triggers’ in English (thus expressions on the lexical and clause level) were 
overwhelmingly similar in Greek, due to semantic and function similarities in the 
terms concerned.71 Thus, a definite expression in both languages triggers existential 
presuppositions, to accuse someone of something in both Greek and English 
presupposes that this ‘something’ is something bad, and so on. Therefore occasionally 
throughout the analysis I also point to similarities in meaning and function between 
the default uses o f Greek and English items, hoping that this would also be o f some 
help.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have explained the rationale and methodology for my choice of 
magazine titles, genre categories and text topics for my data. Through questionnaire 
research I selected the most prototypical women’s and m en’s titles. I further 
categorised the contents into genre types according to their broad communicative 
purposes, and chose to focus on advice regarding sexual health. I chose the topic of 
sexual health as a potentially fruitful epistemic site for the indirect manifestation of 
ideological beliefs on gender and sexuality, looking at three texts with different target 
audiences -  Cosmopolitan aiming at teenagers and younger women, Marie Claire 
aiming at women up to 45 years of age, and potentially older, and Status aiming at 
men of similar age to the Marie Claire target readers. Through this selection I have 
been aiming to examine a wider range of beliefs towards sex, sexuality and health,
71 This applies only to the data analysed, and in relation to the aspects o f  the framework applied. There 
are other parameters, such as telic clauses, which would generally be translated as infinitives, 
prepositional phrases or gerunds in English, on which further research is required.
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while at the same time considering the differences in what magazine producers 
consider as appropriate and appealing reading for their respective target audiences.
In the following chapter (Chapter 6) I delineate the contemporary Greek social context 
in terms o f research on sexual health, sexuality and gender, and review the few 
relevant works in relation to the contemporary Greek media landscape and the 
ideological positions o f various popular media products in relation to gender.
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Chapter 6: Social context, m edia discourse and gender in Greece
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will try to cover mainly two aspects o f the Greek social context -  
firstly, that o f (hetero)sexual relations as they have been observed by anthropologists 
and medical experts, as well as myself, and secondly aspects o f the media landscape 
relating to gender relations and their representations. Here I will discuss findings from 
research roughly up to the first decade of the 2000s, as my data are from 2006.72
A very extensive review of many aspects of the Greek social context in relation to 
gender (in)equality, at least up to the late 2000’s, is to be found in Kosetzi (2007), and 
shorter versions in Kosetzi and Polyzou (2009) and Kosetzi (2010). In summary, I 
would make the following observations: Greek society has been, and still is, lagging 
behind in progress towards gender equality in relation to the rest o f Europe, North- 
Western European countries in particular.73 Nevertheless, progress has been and is 
being made, which makes the situation somewhat fluid. Social changes in the 
direction of gender equality have been instigated by feminist struggles within, as well 
as top-down, through legislation and regulation (e.g. through the socialist government 
in the 80’s and later on through the European Union), and out o f what we might call 
‘sociological coincidence’. For example, women getting paid employment outside the 
home might often have been a financial imperative rather than a political choice, but 
this may have contributed to attitudes changing. ‘Sociological coincidence’ does mean
72 In the m eanwhile changes in Greek society have taken place, notably since the global financial crisis 
o f  2008. These have led to the challenging o f  many certainties, ideological shifts and material impact 
on the lives o f  people living in Greece, much o f  which has undoubtedly influenced gender relations and 
the position and lives o f  wom en in Greece. Much research is underway and still needs to be done on 
these issues.
73 This is not to say that gender equality has been achieved in these countries, or that progress has been 
in any way hom ogeneous.
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that analysing the gender situation (anywhere) becomes more complicated, but is not 
meant to discount the aspects o f gender (in)equality involved, nor to obscure other 
kinds o f inequalities involved (working class women who are forced to work are not 
necessarily more ‘liberated’ than upper middle class women who do not have paid 
employment). This is relevant to the general role o f ‘lifestyle’, although not directly 
related to the focus o f this thesis -  an ideological and socio-economic organisation 
allowing and encouraging women to earn (and spend) their own income does not
necessarily lead to gender equality, although it might, so this is an aspect worth
studying in its own right. The important point here is that in Greece there is an
ongoing negotiation of gender relations, often sidetracked or set back, at times
progressing.
As a critical discourse analyst the social problem I am concerned with in this thesis is 
the (inter)personal, and still political, issue of (hetero)sexual relationships - in 
particular, safe sex and sexual health. As Paxson observes, ‘[sjexual relations are 
profoundly shaped by cultural pressures and, in Greece, sexual responsibility for men 
and women include upholding asymmetrical gender relations. This gender asymmetry 
is inseparable from the meanings and practices o f sex and love’ (2002: 316).
Media discourses on these issues will be looked at in 6.4 -  for the time being I will 
concentrate on research on life ‘outside the media’, as it were, although of course 
findings have been motivated by the researchers’ methods and research questions. I 
will try to synthesise these findings, which will themselves be informed by the lens of 
my own experiences, observations and ideological positions, hoping to offer a 
reasonably comprehensive picture o f the context in which the texts in my data 
emerged and operated.
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6.2 Sex, health and ideology
When it comes to research on sexual and reproductive health in Greece, medical 
journals provide statistics and some classical social psychological attitude research 
through questionnaires, which of course cannot be interpreted through the medical 
research alone. Ethnographic research focuses on contraception, notably Paxson 
(2002), or on gender relations, attitudes and ideologies in general (e.g. Hirschon, 1978; 
Herzfeld, 1985; Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991b), some with a narrower focus on 
sexuality (e.g. Canakis, Kantsa and Yannakopoulos, 2010). After the 90’s there is 
some research on STDs, although it has not been possible to locate earlier research. 
This may be due to my own lack o f expertise in the area o f medical research, but also 
it seems to me that STDs have been, and still are, to some extent taboo and/or 
‘invisible’.
Medical literature shows some concern for the issue of Chlamydia and the 
repercussions of the disease for the overall health o f women, notably reproductive 
health (Polyzos et al., 2006; Spiliopoulou et al., 2005; Kalogeropoulos et al., 1993). 
Some literature is concerned with safe sex practices per se (Galazios et al., 2004; 
Kordoutis, Loumakou and Sarafidou, 2000).
Current medical research in Greece seems to me to be geared, to some extent, to
attributing STDs to an ‘Other’, notably immigrants, coinciding with the
commencement o f immigration to Greece from the 90’s onwards. HBV (Hepatitis B)
is said to be an issue mainly for non-Greek ethnic populations o f Greece, reportedly
Asian and Albanian (Elefsiniotis et al., 2007: 200). Gonorrhea in men is also said to
be associated with sexual contact with non-Greeks, as instances of infection ‘were
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strongly associated with contacts outside the country or with foreigners and their 
incidence presented erratic time fluctuations indicating that they have not been 
established as endemic in the Greek population’ (Kyriakis et al., 1999: 48). Although 
so far research has found that Trichomoniasis is very rare in Greece (4.6% o f a sample 
o f 502 women), the researchers report that ‘T vaginalis was more frequently detected 
in immigrants (7.9%) than in Greek women (3.3%)’ (Piperaki et al., 2010). Other 
work is conducted along similar lines, studying patients attending STD clinics and 
concluding that immigrants are found to suffer more often also from herpes genitalis 
and HPV/genital warts (Kyriakis et al., 2003; Kyriakis et al., 2005).
As socioeconomic factors are not necessarily examined in such medical surveys, and 
despite the fact that differences of infection are not always very large between Greek 
and non-Greek participants, as in the case of trichomoniasis mentioned above, these 
surveys have reinforced stereotypical associations of ‘outsiders’ with disease. 
Indicative o f this is an anecdote from a conversation at which I was present:74 in a 
discussion about a common [male] acquaintance who had contracted a very common 
STD, the first question an interlocutor asked, who is actually a health professional, 
was ‘Did he go with a foreigner[fem.]?’ -  when in fact the person in question had 
contracted the STD in a long term heterosexual relationship with a Greek.
‘Othering’ of the disease also occurs even within the medical community - safe sex 
practices are defined as including not only condom use, but also ‘previous knowledge 
of partner’ (e.g. Kordoutis et al., 2000: 6) -  it needs to be noted that by that they do 
not mean knowledge o f the medical history of the partner. Such beliefs on behalf of 
medical practitioners and researchers add a medical justification to previously
74 All persons involved in and referred to in the conversation are Greek. In order to protect their 
anonym ity no further information is included.
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morally/socially condemned sexual behaviours (promiscuity), while they are very 
dangerous in maintaining the illusion that a familiar person is ‘safe’ and ‘healthy’, and 
therefore no safe sex measures are needed.75
These attitudes towards disease (as belonging to ‘outgroups’) have influenced the 
discourse o f lifestyle magazines on sexual health to a certain extent. In the data I 
analyse in the thesis these attitudes seem to permeate especially the Cosmopolitan text, 
either as underlying presupposed and uncontested/-able beliefs (in particular when 
discussing the possibility o f a male partner suffering from an STD), or as presupposed 
shared beliefs that need to be questioned (as in when comforting a projected female 
reader suffering from an STD).
6.3 Gender and Sexuality- Tensions between Permissiveness and 
Normativity
The ideological background underlying heterosexual practices in Greece, and the
discourse o f lifestyle magazines, is that of heteronormativity, defined by Cameron and
Kulick as ‘an overarching system for organizing and regulating sexuality, whereby
certain ways of acting, thinking and feeling about sex are privileged over others’
(2006: 9). As such, heteronormativity is always context-bound. Describing Western,
predominantly Anglo contexts, Cameron and Kulick observe that ‘[t]he ‘ideal’
heteronormative sexuality is the kind stereotypically associated with the middle-class
nuclear family, involving a stable, monogamous {preferably marital) and reproducible
75 In criticising this and other assumptions by the socio logists Ioannidou and Agrafiotis (2005), the now  
deceased blogger Maria Papagiannidou, diagnosed with HIV during her lifetim e, writes:
W hy should we care to learn that the frequency with which people alternate their 
sexual partners has either increased or decreased? It only takes one HIV-infected  
sexual partner to pass the virus to his sexual partner and spread it. W hy should we 
care to know how  many Greeks knew their sexual partners beforehand? H ow  far into 
the past has [sic] an acquaintance have to go for it to be sexually safe? (n.d.)
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(within ‘sensible’ limits) sexual relationship between two adults (not too young or too 
old) whose social and sexual roles are differentiated along conventional lines’' (2006: 
9-10, my emphasis).
Looking at the Greek context, the notions of ‘honour’ and ‘shame’ have been well 
documented as potential effects o f the sexual behaviour o f women on their families 
and possibly even their communities (Campbell, 1964; Hirschon, 1978; Herzfeld, 
1985). As Dubisch (1993: 274) observes, in a large part o f anthropological research, 
women in Greece are claimed to be
viewed as inherently weak, associated with the devil and with Eve, and 
saddled with a sinful nature that must be controlled by themselves and others 
and redeemed through motherhood. In order to guard their own reputations 
and their families’ honor, women must restrict their public activities, maintain 
their chastity, and in general cultivate their sense o f shame ([dropi]).
Even though women’s behaviour has been more restricted and more closely 
monitored, marriage for both men and women has been seen as ‘completing’ someone 
as a person, followed by ‘starting one’s own family’ - having children (with male 
fertility seen as a sign of virility, see Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991a; and, on 
procreation, Paxson, 2002; 2003).
These ideological normative beliefs are very firmly rooted in tradition and 
unquestionably are still current and influential on men and women’s everyday lives. 
However it should be noted that the anthropological research cited above was 
published at least 20 years ago (and conducted even earlier). One would be justified in 
asking whether in the 2000’s we have seen in Greek society any ‘permissive’ beliefs, 
expressed in what Hollway (1984) has termed ‘permissive discourse’ while 
conducting her research in an Anglo context. As summarised by Sunderland (2004:
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58), permissiveness or ‘permissive discourse’ is the ‘validity o f sexual activity outside 
of monogamous marriage’ (for both men and women).
Social changes in Greece in recent years mean that things are no longer so simple as to 
say that marital sexual activity is the only acceptable heterosexual activity in Greece 
(although heterosexual is still pretty much the only acceptable sexual activity — see e.g. 
Canakis, Kantsa and Yannakopoulos, 2010). On the discourse level we have some 
signs o f ‘permissiveness’, as in the discourse of lifestyle magazines, or the TV series 
ZysSov n o w , the Greek equivalent of Sex and the City (Kosetzi, 2007; 2010; 2011 -  in 
Greek), where sex is depicted in ways that would have been inconceivable 50-60 years 
ago, if not less. So, talking about sex, and talking about sex publicly in specific ways 
(e.g. related to pleasure rather than reproduction) is no longer a complete taboo in 
Greece.
I also find it notable that in my last year of high school (1998-99) an optional module 
on Sexual Education was offered. The module was optional in two ways: students did 
not have to take it, and it was not assessed, and not all schools had to offer it. Another 
group of the same year, for example, in that high school was offered Environmental 
Education. Sexual Education has not become part of the national curriculum in Greece 
to this day, and if such optional modules continue to be offered, it is still upon an 
unsystematic and voluntary basis (see also Agrafiotis and Mandi, n.d.; Dinas, 
Hatzipantelis, Mavromatidis, Zepiridis and Tzafettas, 2008: 81; Patseadou, Galli- 
Tsinopoulou, Goulis and Arvanitidou, 2010: 358). Although in some ways the high 
school I went to could be considered ‘progressive’ (it was a ‘Classical’ as opposed to 
‘General’ Lyceum, with an emphasis on humanities), it is still significant that at least 
some high school students in Greece in 1998 were able to be offered institutionally
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ratified and, as far as I could tell, generally impartial information about contraception, 
abortion and negotiating sexual relations without this causing any sort o f objection.
When it comes to actual sexual practices among individuals, we can only rely on 
indirect evidence. As the average marriage age for Greek women was 28.47 y.o. in 
2007, and 27 or older in 2000-2007 (Kotzamanis and Sofianopoulou, 2009 -  in Greek), 
statistical evidence on teenage sexual activity, pregnancies and/or abortions, and/or 
STDs inevitably would include a number o f women (and men) engaging in sexual 
activity without being married. For example Creatsas (1997: 87- 88) cites the 
adolescent pregnancy rates in Greece as 7.5 in 1990 and 5.6 in 1995 (with average 
marriage ages 24.65 and 25.74 respectively these years; Kotzamanis and 
Sofianopoulou, 2009 -  in Greek). Creatsas (1997: 88) also lists a range of 
contraceptive methods used by adolescents in Greece, although he does not specify 
the sex o f participants or the percentage of participants surveyed who reported that 
they are not sexually active. In Patseadou et al. 48% of High School students surveyed 
reported onset o f sexual activity (ages 15-18 years), ‘half of whom stated this has 
occurred by the age of 15 (2010: 357). In Tountas, Dimitrakaki et al.’s sample of 
Greek women (2004: 191) the ‘reported average age at first sexual intercourse was 18’. 
We could assume that much of the teenage sexual activity reported occurs out of 
marriage because women in Greece tend to get married in their mid- to late twenties 
(and men at a similar age or later).
On abortion, Ioannidi-Kapolou (2004: 174) reports that in 2001 one in ten women in 
the 16-24 age group ‘had had at least one unwanted pregnancy ending in abortion’, 
while the average age o f marriage for women was 26.91 in 2000, according to
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Kotzamanis and Sofianopoulou (2009 -  in Greek). This again indicates that at least 
some (if not all) o f these pregnancies (and abortions) occurred out o f marriage.
In their research on contraception among female students o f an average o f 25 years of 
age, Dinas et al. report that ‘ninety-seven o f the 102 respondents were single (95.1%) 
and five were m arried’ (2008: 78), while from the way the article is written it appears 
that all o f them were sexually active; for example ‘[m]ost students (86.3%) stated that 
they discussed contraception with their sexual partner’ (ibid.).
Kordoutis et al. (2000) have actually looked at different types o f relationship among 
adults o f both sexes in relation to condom use, including casual and non-monogamous 
ones76 (relationship type was found to have no effect on consistency o f condom use). 
Kordoutis et al. also found that ‘[m]edian lifetime number o f sexual partners was 
Median=4 for men and Median=2 for women’ (ibid.: 772) and that o f the 458 
participants ‘155 individuals [had] had more than one relationship’ in the 12 months 
prior to the survey (ibid.: 772-773).
The above, together with the high frequency of ‘pregnant marriages’ (i.e. when the 
bride is already pregnant -  see Paxson, 2002: 327)77 suggest that sexual activity 
outside of marriage is not uncommon in contemporary Greece. Agrafiotis and Mandi 
(n.d.)78 go as far as to suggest that ‘ Greeks regard love and sex as a main part o f  their 
existence, as evidenced by the incidence o f extramarital relations and abortion, both of 
which are condemned by the Church. Greece’s abortion rate is among the highest in 
Europe’, (my emphasis), and that
76 A lso  Tountas, Dimitrakaki et al. (2004).
77 21.8 percent o f  births in Greece in 1989 occurred within the first year o f  a marriage (National 
Statistical Service o f  Greece 1992, cited in Paxson, 2002: 327).
78 They appear to have been writing this in the m id-90’s.
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[p jr e m a r ita l  sex u a l activ ities , e sp ec ia lly  in la rg e  cities, a re  n o t a n y  lo n g er  
so c ia lly  con dem n ed , and sexual intercourse begins between the ages o f 14 to 
17. Research showed that the most frequent types o f contact are through 
hugging, deep (open mouth) kissing, petting above and below the waist, 
sleeping together (without sexual intercourse), and oral and vaginal sex (ibid., 
my emphasis).
While it is important to take into account these social changes, it should also be borne 
in mind that they entail a different type of (hetero)normativity, and this relatively 
newly found permissiveness is not as widespread or as enthusiastically embraced as 
Agrafiotis and Mandi (ibid.) seem to suggest in the passages quoted above. For 
example at another point they acknowledge that ‘ it is very difficult for an unmarried 
couple to find an apartment and live together because of the strong opposition o f the 
majority o f Greek society’ (ibid.).
When it comes to schooling, where sexual education is unsystematic or non-existent, 
Religious Education is obligatory from the age o f 10 (3rd year o f Primary School) until 
the last year of High School (end of secondary education). Religious Education in 
Greece mainly imparts the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Christian religion, and 
one can be exempt by providing evidence of belonging to a different religion. It is in 
High School Religious Education Classes that premarital abstinence is promoted and 
abortion is condemned, while there is no emphasis on the issue o f contraception, at 
least not in the textbooks used on national level.
Furthermore, a range o f factors to be considered are generation, class, ethnic/cultural 
and other differences within the Greek population. Describing a situation on the other 
extreme, Agrafiotis and Mandi (n.d.) state that
[i]n more ‘closed’ rural communities and small villages, premarital relations 
and courtship are not yet the norm before marriage. Although freer than in the
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past, young adults and especially women do not have the opportunity o f 
dating their future spouse. The idea of arranged marriages and matchmaking 
(proksenio) is still present; the difference is that now women have the right to 
chose which matchmaking will end in marriage. In some areas a dowry (prika) 
is still required.
In fact, even in ‘closed’ rural communities, ‘unmarried girls’ enjoy more freedom than 
‘married women’ in some ways, as observed for example by Cowan on the social life 
o f a small community in rural Greece (1991). What I think needs to be explored 
further is the exact delineations of this relative freedom. For example, in examining 
heteronormativity Archakis and Lampropoulou describe a teenage boyfriend- 
girlfriend relationship as a ‘proper’ relationship (2010: 73), juxtaposing it to other, 
less acceptable forms o f heterosexual relationship (e.g. when there is a large age gap 
between the partners, and/or there is less emotional commitment). Young women 
from urban areas of Greece participating in focus groups have criticised the sexual 
practices depicted in the TV series ZxsSov IJore as ‘slutty’, not because o f extra­
marital sex taking place per se, but because o f the number o f the sexual partners o f the 
female protagonists, and the speed with which they were being replaced (Kosetzi, 
2007; 2010; and esp. 2011 -  in Greek).
Furthermore, despite the generally tolerated pre-marital sexual activity, it is notable 
that most pre-marital pregnancies end up either in abortion or marriage. ‘[T]he 
numbers o f children born to unmarried women is the lowest in Europe; between 1926 
and 1980, the rate changed from 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent o f all births’ (Agrafiotis 
and Mandi, n.d.). According to Kane and Wellings (1999: 18) in 1996 only 3% of live 
births occurred outside o f marriage, while the most recent data (from circa 2001) still 
suggest that ‘Greece has the lowest rate of children bom outside o f marriage (4.1
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percent) among the O E C D 79 countries, yet by Greek standards the increase is 
unprecedented... Only three percent of parents are lone-parents in Greece’ (The 
Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and Family Policies, 
last updated April 2004). Apart from parenthood, cohabitation outside marriage also 
seems to remain problematic -  ‘it is very difficult for an unmarried couple to find an 
apartment and live together because o f the strong opposition o f the majority o f Greek 
society’ (Agrafiotis and Mandi, n.d.).
6.3.1 Double standards
The negotiation and conflict o f the two trends o f permissiveness vs. traditionalism and 
restriction o f female sexuality is thus always present in the background, and faced by 
every young woman in Greece to different degrees and in different ways. Bajos and 
Marquet (2000: 1538) point out that ‘a gender-based double standard o f sexual 
initiation’ is confirmed by their research, whereby ‘Mediterranean men start their sex 
lives well before marriage, while women in these countries have only recently gained 
limited access to both premarital sex and the formal labour market’ (ibid. -  they 
specifically refer to data from Athens and Portugal). Survey responses from Athens in 
1990 indicate that 10.9% of men reported two or more heterosexual partners over the 
last 12 months vs. 1.5% of women (ibid.: 1539). Greek men report having twice as 
many (hetero)sexual partners as women in their lives (Kordoutis et al., 2000: 772).
Although the vast majority o f women in Kordoutis et al.’s study (had) had 
(hetero)sexual partners of the same age as or older than themselves, with only 2 out of 
279 reporting having a partner o f more than 2 years younger (2000: 773), men
79 OECD stands for ‘Organisation for Econom ic Co-operation and D evelopm ent’.
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generally report starting their sexual activity earlier in their lives. Patseadou et al. 
(2010: 360-362) found that Greek men are significantly more likely to start their 
sexual activity in High School than women (based on self-reporting) — ‘[controlling 
for the possible effect of all other variables, it was found that the probability o f the 
onset o f sexual activity was... 3.6 times higher in boys than girls’ (ibid.: 361). These 
findings are similar to those o f other European studies and in the USA, and more so in 
Balkan/Southern Europe countries (ibid.: 363-364).
Furthermore, according to Kordoutis et al. (2000: 777) ‘[m]ore women than men 
reported long-lasting, matrimonial80 and romantic relationships... In contrast, more 
men than women reported short-term, hedonistic and utilitarian relationships...’, and 
more women reported being monogamous than men. ‘These findings indirectly 
support the assumption that genders differ in the way they construe or cognitively 
represent relationships’ (ibid.), which, I argue, would be influenced by normative 
social beliefs and expectations.
With all self-reporting questionnaires
[t]here is always concern about how accurate information may be that is 
provided by interviewees regarding themselves. Critics are cautious about the 
self-reported questionnaires for adolescents. There is evidence that sexual 
experience may be under-reported by females and over-reported by males 
(Patseadou et al., 2010: 361).
Siegel, Aten and Roghman (1998) found that some teenagers, and especially young 
middle school males, reported themselves as being insincere when filling in a sexual 
behaviour questionnaire (which of course further creates the conundrum of whether 
they were insincere when they reported being insincere, which Siegel et al. also
80 B y the term ‘m atrimonial’ Kordoutis et al. do not mean necessarily ‘marital’, but characterised ‘by 
feelings o f  security and concern for the partner (2000: 768).
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acknowledge, 1998: 27). However, they also observe that the results o f their sexual 
behaviour questionnaires were too systematic to have been influenced by the small 
number o f respondents who were actually insincere when filling them in.
However, this is not necessarily the point. Siegel et al. (1998: 27) observe that
[o]ne might posit that sexually inexperienced boys in our [North American] 
culture feel some pressure to inflate their reports o f actual behavior in an 
attempt to measure up to some perceived standard o f sexual 
prowess. ...young female adolescents in middle school, if  dishonest, are at 
risk for understating not only whether they have ever had sexual intercourse, 
but also their frequency of intercourse in the recent past. The characterization 
in American culture o f young women who are sexually active as being 
irresponsible, promiscuous, or lacking in self esteem may very well be 
evidenced in this bias, whereas young males are seen as successful, powerful, 
and mature when they admit to sexual experience during their school years.
Patseadou et al. make similar observations in relation to the Greek context, and add 
that in the Greek context ‘data from self-reports can underestimate the real behaviour 
[of both boys and girls] due to the conservative Greek attitudes towards sexual issues’ 
(2010:363). Thus, if questionnaire responses are sincere, they indicate that there is a 
male-female divide in sexual behaviour in Greece, possibly because o f men feeling 
allowed to, entitled to or even obliged to be more sexually active, with more partners 
and from an earlier age, and women feeling that they have to delay the onset o f their 
sexual activity and limit their number of partners to as few as possible. If (some) 
questionnaire responses are not sincere, they still display a systematic pattern of 
tendencies towards gender-specific norm, with young men presenting themselves 
closer to the stereotypical ideal masculinity o f sexual prowess and young women 
closer to the ideal femininity of ‘decency’ and restraint.
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6.3.2 Transitional heteronormativity
I would argue that the issues surrounding permissiveness vs. restriction (especially for 
women) in relation to sexual life in Greece is framed by two overarching ideological
principles: the still prevalent importance of marriage and the issue o f visibility/social
81control. Thus, extramarital sexual activity is generally perceived as pre -marital -  
marriage remains the unstated telos of a person’s life. Before marriage young people 
generally enjoy a period of ‘relative freedom’, which I would term ‘transitional 
heteronormativity phase’, a transition to ‘proper’ heteronormative conduct (as 
mentioned, still marriage in Greece), sanctioned or ‘tolerated’ but still regulated. Not
all societies may allow a ‘transitional heteronormativity’ phase, and when they do,
82conventions and regulation will vary culturally. An example that springs to mind is 
the perhaps stereotypical ritualistic scenario of the middle class white American 
young man collecting a young woman of a similar background from the parental home 
for a date, when he has to make small talk with her parents first, and promise to have 
her home at a specific time. Watching this in movies and TV shows I have always 
found this scenario very unfamiliar and strange -  yet, where this applies, that would 
be a way of allowing young people to have a pre-marital romantic life while at the 
same time regulating it and subjecting it to quite detailed control (and re-producing 
gender ideologies along the way).
In Greece social control on sexuality is in some ways more implicit -  often there may 
be a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy’ in place between parents and their teenage or adult
81 I w ill not discuss this extensively here -  I w ill only com m ent that it is when pre-marital sex becom es  
‘v is ib le ’, through pregnancy or cohabitation, that it becom es more acutely problematic.
82 See also Polyzou (2012).
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children (Polyzou, 2011 -  in Greek), although due to double standards it is generally 
seen as easier for boys/young men to openly have/speak o f girlfriends, while 
girls/young women may only confide to their mothers or their closest friends.83 It is 
therefore worth inquiring how moral values and ideological beliefs on sexuality are 
transmitted if not explicitly through the traditional channels o f family and community. 
Both Kosetzi’s focus group members (2007; 2010; 2011 — in Greek) and my own 
observations of, and conversations with friends and acquaintances indicate a strong 
sense o f boundaries on behalf of Greek women, and o f what is appropriate or not 
appropriate, even in relationships that were not ‘public’ and therefore not ‘policable’, 
but in the realm o f 4illicitness’.
O f course exploring how gender-related values and ideologies are implicitly 
transmitted is a very broad issue. Mass media is one of the ‘central sites at which 
discursive negotiation over gender takes place’ (van Zoonen, 1994: 41), while at the 
same time media discourses do not translate directly into unanimously shared 
ideologies or practices. However, even media texts that depart from the commonly 
accepted ideologies of the social contexts in which they occur have to take these 
ideologies into account, and it is interesting to see how ideologies are incorporated as 
presupposed backgrounds and then meta-discursively commented upon.
6.4 Gender and Media in the Greek context
Paxson presents two quite compelling reasons why media are a site worth studying in 
relation to gender and sexuality in the Greek context in particular: first, because, 
together with word of mouth, they constitute the most accessible source of
83 For exam ple on the issue o f  contraception Tountas et al. (2004: 3-4) point out that ‘[mjaternal 
consultation for young w om en under the age o f  24 years was . ..  reported by a significant percentage’ 
(more than 40%, ibid.: 5).
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information in relation to issues of sexuality and sexual health (2002: 311, see also 
Tountas, Creatsas et al., 2004), and second because Greek media in particular ‘often 
mimic Western formats, [and therefore] they offer an incisive view o f the ambivalence 
that characterizes a young urban Greek gaze toward the West, emblematically 
represented by the United States’ (ibid.: 308), something that seems to hold true in 
particular in relation to lifestyle magazines (see also Polyzou, 2010). This is relevant 
in that it helps explain the complex ways o f reception o f these texts -  in a way they 
are ‘necessary’ for whatever information they offer, while on the other hand they may 
be rejected as unrealistic and foreign to Greek society (as in Kosetzi, 2010).
It has been noted that there is not much academic research on the representation of 
gender in the Greek media (Kafiri, 2002 -  in Greek; Kosetzi, 2007). Some 
commentators suggest that women are represented stereotypically as young and 
beautiful (objects of desire) or housewives/mothers (Sarris, 1980/1992 -  in Greek; 
Drakopoulou, 1988 -  in Greek, both cited in Kosetzi, 2007: 82; see also Diamantakou, 
2000 -  in Greek; Doulkeri, 1990 -  in Greek). Specifically in Greek comedies, 
Drakopoulou (1988: 87 -  in Greek) identifies ‘the types o f the grumpy (mother-in- 
law), the dependent or submissive (wife), the incompetent (driver), the stupid (the 
young blonde), the emotional (the young woman)’ (translated by and cited in Kosetzi, 
2007: 82). Somewhat earlier on, in the 80’s, Pantazi-Tzifa also identifies the 
representation o f women as sexually vulnerable and therefore in need of protection 
(1984- i n  Greek, cited in Kosetzi, 2010: 95).
Doulkeri (1990 -  in Greek) also looks at women’s magazines, observing that while 
women are represented as sexual objects, men are usually represented as successful 
businessmen. I have found this to be the case also in men’s lifestyle magazines, where
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upper-middle class masculinity is exalted at the expense o f women, gay men and 
working class men (Polyzou, 2004; Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009; Polyzou, 2010). In 
Greek m en’s lifestyle magazines, representations o f hegemonic masculinity ‘the 
dominant form [of masculinity], the one that counts as normal’ (Talbot 1998: 191) 
include a preoccupation with sports and career, ineptitude or indifference to 
housework, a ‘naturally high’ (and heterosexual) sexual drive, and fear o f marriage 
and emotional commitment (Kosetzi and Polyzou, 2009; Polyzou, 2010). Upper-class 
allegiance legitimises the consumerist imperative of the magazines and resolves 
tensions stemming from any associations o f consumerism and/or grooming with 
femininity (Polyzou, 2004; 2010). Women are generally represented as passive and 
sexual objects (Polyzou, 2004; 2010), and there is emphasis on what Sunderland 
(2004) has termed ‘Gender Differences’ and ‘Battle of the Sexes’ discourses. In the 
magazine Nitro women and men ‘are being referred to as different ‘species’, which 
implies they are naturally and inescapably different’ (Polyzou, 2004: 31), while war 
metaphors ‘emphasise not only that men and women are different, but also that they 
are enemies and their interests are different’ (ibid.: 32). A brief look at the 
representation of women’s sexual desire in Greek w om en’s lifestyle magazines shows 
that in some ways women’s sexuality is still to be seen as ‘other-centred’ and passive, 
focussed on being desired/desirable rather than desirzdg (Polyzou, 2008; 2012), 
although, unlike in other, more traditional types of discourse, in both m en’s and 
women’s lifestyle magazines sexual activity for both men and women is taken for 
granted without the prerequisite of marriage.
Nevertheless, despite the ethnographic research, medically-oriented surveys and 
aforementioned research on media text, there is a more heterogeneous range of gender 
and sexuality representations, at least in popular culture - for example women are
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often represented as sexual ‘hunters’ or ‘predators’ rather than ‘prey’ (Kosetzi, 2007; 
2011 -  in Greek). Kosetzi (2007: 34-35) presents a list o f media texts (specific TV 
show episodes and newspaper texts) which draw on the belief that the roles o f men 
and women in interpersonal (heterosexual) relationships have been reversed in this 
way, with men playing the role of ‘prey’. However, it is important to be noted that 
these representations are often ironic or otherwise subverted or criticised in the very 
texts in which they occur, and, even when they are not, they are not necessarily 
reflecting the reality, or accepted unequivocally, or even positively evaluated, as 
Kosetzi’s focus group findings indicate. And, equally importantly, I’m not sure 
whether representing any group of people as ‘predators’ or ‘prey’ contributes much 
towards gender equality.
Furthermore, Kafiri (2002: 57-58 -  in Greek) commends that both within academic 
and other research, and in media texts themselves, media representations o f gender in 
Greece are said to be ‘patriarchal’ and not following positive developments towards 
equality in Greek society. This points towards a post-feminist ‘Gender Equality Now 
Achieved’ discourse (Sunderland, 2004: 44, 46), namely assuming that gender 
equality has been achieved in Greece and media portrayals of unequal gender relations 
are anachronistic; this argument obscures the remaining inequalities between men and 
women in Greece. O f course, the very fact that such representations are acceptable, or 
at all possible, indicates that there is still much to be done towards gender equality in 
Greece. On the other hand, Doulkeri (1990 -  in Greek) and Paidousi (2000 -  in 
Greek) concede that since the 80’s there has been some acceptance o f women’s 
liberation (sexual and otherwise) and images of financially and emotionally 
independent women have been increasing.
223
6.5 Conclusion
Overall the research reviewed in this chapter in relation to the Greek social context 
reveal ambivalent attitudes, representations and practices. These vary between sexual 
permissiveness and restriction, traditionalist past and utopic (or dystopic) futures o f 
gender relations, tendencies towards ‘sameness’ or ‘gender differences’. Overall, on 
the issue o f sexuality, Greek society remains relatively conservative/traditional and 
restrictive, making the concession o f ‘transitional heterosexuality’. Homosexuality is 
still either invisible -  as in the women’s magazines - or presented at best with ironic 
distance -  interestingly, in the men’s magazines (Polyzou, 2004; 2010). For women 
‘transitional heteronormativity’ dictates for pre-marital sexual activity to be ‘discreet’, 
to involve a limited list o f suitably chosen partners in terms of age, socio-economic 
class, and ethnicity, and to lead to marriage and motherhood. The mere concept of 
STDs is a disturbance to this order, as illness is taken to represent an ‘other’, 
‘unknown’ and thus unsuitable partner, while at the same time they constitute a 
prevalent material reality. With my analysis I hope to shed some light in the 
negotiation of these beliefs and concepts within texts o f lifestyle magazines aiming to 
construct themselves as authorities on issues both o f health and sexuality while at the 
same time remaining appealing to their audiences.
84 For som e ethnographic work on attitudes towards hom osexuality see contributions in Canakis, 
Kantsa and Yannakopoulos (2010) and Canakis (2011 — in Greek).
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Chapter 7: Analysis -  Frame level
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 I presented a cognitive pragmatic definition o f presupposition as a 
prerequisite for meaning, constituting the ground in a figure-ground mental 
representation in discourse. I argued that this can take place on various levels o f 
discourse: the lexical/phrase level (frame level), the sentence level, the text level and 
the discourse level. Pragmatic knowledge is always (or at least by default) 
presupposed, and is a prerequisite for communication; that is, by default speakers act 
upon certain assumptions about their interlocutors’ pragmatic competence, and if 
these assumptions are mistaken, a breakdown or anomaly occurs in the interaction 
(see also 3.4.1 and 4.5.5). It is of interest (for this model at least) in two ways: when it 
surfaces in discourse (as meta-discourse), and in its interaction with the other levels in 
analysing specific texts, which influences interpretation.
All levels interact with each other and influence the processing o f the whole text 
anyway, although not in a strictly or solely compositional sense. That is, lexical items 
do not only constitute components of the meaning o f a sentence (thus forming part of 
‘sentence level’ as well), but they also influence the interpretation o f a whole text as 
coherence anchors, they can foreground associated concepts if repeated, and, 
depending on their position in the text and their connotations (associated evaluative 
meaning components), they may ‘frame’ the whole meaning of the text by triggering 
certain ‘knowledge networks’, including ideologies. Thus, analysing texts separately 
according to these levels is not meant to suggest that each level is distinct or 
independent from the others -  the term ‘level’ is mean to imply that they are all steps
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of the same ladder, as it were. There are, however, reasons to make this apparently 
formal distinction, apart from methodological convenience.
In relation to methodology, the level distinction helps us identify what exactly it is in a 
text that triggers a particular bit o f ‘presupposed knowledge’, contributing thus to 
systematicity. One point of discrepancy among discourse analyses of presupposition is 
that analysts have been conducting their analyses on different levels (usually the 
sentence level or the discourse level), or that they have not been explicit about which 
level they are talking about. This makes it difficult to replicate presupposition 
analyses, and can potentially leave certain analytical decisions appearing unjustified 
and impressionistic.
In terms of theory, there are two connected reasons for this distinction. First, for every 
linguistic unit we have a pairing of form and mental representation/conceptualisation. 
Figure-ground conceptual relationships are thus realised formally in different ways 
depending on the unit we are looking at. In a way, the basic unit o f analysis for 
discourse analysis should then probably be the text, because a text 
production/consumption/distribution can be seen as a discourse event in the context of 
which all smaller units (words, clauses, sentences) will be understood. Although no 
speech event is uninformed by a broader socio-cognitive context including 
conventions, ideologies and overall world knowledge, it is the speech event itself 
(namely, the participants and the conventions they follow) which make aspects of 
these relevant. Nevertheless (despite the significance o f the ‘text’ as a basic unit of 
analysis), discourse analysis can and does focus on smaller units in order to examine 
certain aspects o f the text. In the model applied here, the level differentiation spells 
out which elements of a speech event are presupposed because they belong to frames 
triggered by certain words (lexical/ frame level), which elements form the ground for
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certain clauses to be foregrounded (sentence level), which elements are presupposed 
as generic conventions or backgrounded due to their position in the text (text level), 
and which beliefs are (potentially) brought into the interpretation o f the text due to the 
expected world knowledge of participants in relation to the topics discussed (discourse 
level). This then refers to different conceptual structures/mental representations (for 
example the difference between a frame and an ideology), and also indicates different 
ways of drawing or deflecting attention from these different kinds o f representations. 
The second reason, most related to the theoretical focus of this thesis, is to explore 
what exactly presupposition is, and why it is (still) predominantly examined on 
sentence level. I would hypothesise that presuppositions on word level fulfil at least 
the criteria o f non-defeasibility of sentence level presuppositions (see discussion in 
Chapter 3). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is one main difference between 
frame level and sentence level presuppositions. On the frame level, it is usually only 
one element of a frame that surfaces in the discourse as a lexical item or phrase (e.g. a 
noun or verb phrase), while the rest of the concepts included in the frame are 
presupposed and inferred. On the sentence level, presuppositions always surface as 
referential expressions or subordinate clauses (at least if we follow a formal, truth 
conditional approach). The text level is the most complicated one, as issues of 
memory, attention and style and genre come into play, and, depending on the 
approach one might talk of (visible) parts of the text added to the ‘list of 
presuppositions’ of the receiver, that is, knowledge that after its assertion is taken as 
shared for all interlocutors (e.g. Stalnaker, 1973; van der Sandt, 1992), or of 
presuppositions not surfacing in the text at all because they are self-evident (Stalnaker, 
1974/1991; van Dijk, 2005). My level differentiation allows me to look at what
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constitutes ‘ground’ on each o f these levels, as well as whether it is manifest in the 
text or not.
In order to further explore the applicability o f the model, I engage below in an 
exploratory analysis o f three texts. Although all texts are related to the same overall 
theme (sexual health), Status topicalises condoms (as a means o f protection), 
Cosmopolitan discusses sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) themselves, presenting a 
detailed repertoire and Marie Claire focuses on one disease (the HPV virus) and the 
vaccine newly available in Greece for HPV prevention.
7.2 Visuals
Although this is not a visual analysis, description o f visuals is relevant when the 
visuals are salient (e.g. as large pictures) and reinforce or oppose the verbal text. This 
is a descriptive account o f the visuals in these three texts, as visuals also trigger 
mental representations of concepts relevant to the analysis such as health, sex and 
gender. Please consult Appendices 2, 3 and 4 for scanned copies of the originals from 
Marie Claire, Cosmopolitan and Status respectively.
The texts in Cosmopolitan and Status both have a white cross in a red circle on the top 
right hand corner o f the page. Status has a large photo of a condom in the middle of 
the page, which is quite salient, and 4 smaller pictures of different brands o f condoms 
at the lower part of the page in a hybrid of advice and promotion. As usual in Status, 
there is also a passport size photo o f a man in a white medical blouse next to an 
‘agony column’ (presumably by a doctor, as is indicated by a short bio-note at the 
bottom of the column, although this is in fact a footnote on the author of the text ‘The 
Bodyguard’).
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Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire both include sex- or relationship-related visuals, such 
as half naked couples (a man and a woman) embracing (in both Cosmopolitan and 
Marie Claire), looking at each other or sitting next to each other (Cosmopolitan), or 
the half naked torso and hips o f a woman {Marie Claire). This is not simply related to 
the fact that STDs are transmitted through sexual contact -  this is repeatedly stated in 
the verbal texts as well. The number and size of these images makes them quite salient 
visually, and bound to be noticed before the verbal text is read. Sex is thus emphasised 
also in this context, echoing the overall presupposed assumption that readers are 
(hetero)sexually active and interested in reading about sex (discourse level 
presupposition). Images triggering a ‘relationship’ frame occur all over Cosmopolitan 
(at least), even around texts unrelated to relationships. Images and presuppositions 
about sex are probably assumed to make these health-related texts more appealing. 
Moreover, the positive evaluation of sex as an activity is carefully preserved in all 
three texts discussed here, which focus on and topicalise the dangers o f sex -  it 
appears that the reader must be warned and informed, but not put off. All people 
depicted look young and conventionally attractive.
Cosmopolitan also includes two images of how skin affected by certain STDs might 
look (herpes and trichomoniasis), a drawing of female internal genitals and other 
images meant to make it easier to conceptualise aspects o f the article (e.g. the numbers 
o f people in the world infected by each STD every year are shown by one colourful 
pawn per million people). These images echo the didactic discourse often found in 
Cosmopolitan -  although all magazines assume a more knowledgeable position of 
advice-provider, Cosmopolitan in particular also addresses younger women and often 
constructs a didactic persona for itself. However, Playboy, for example, which also 
claims to address men of all age groups above 18, never does this.
229
7.3 Framing in language
In Marie Claire the issue is right away framed as a health issue through the single­
word label ‘HEALTH’ (as part o f the regular section iOnly4YOUr),i5 and other lexical 
items such as ‘vaccine’, ‘medical’ etc. Cosmopolitan labels its feature article as 
‘BONUS My doctor’ (vocative), and a white cross on red background. The Status 
section labelled ‘HEALTH1 and ‘BODY AND SO U L’ is also a regular section. The 
section also regularly includes a column entitled ‘My doctor’ (vocative) ( ‘agony 
column’ in form) accompanied by the white cross on red background.
7.3.1 Metaphorical framing
In the following analysis o f metaphor I will focus on war metaphors as the most 
prevalent type o f metaphor found in the data, and throughout the chapter I will 
mention other metaphorical representations where relevant.
7.3.2 War metaphors
As in most Western health related discourse, there are a number o f war metaphors (see 
e.g. Stibbe, 1996; Semino, Heywood and Short 2004). Generally it is to be expected 
that illness is metaphorically conceptualised as war between the illness (possibly 
personified) and the patient, with medication further mapped as weapons against the 
enemy (disease), and restoring health as winning the war.
85 Quotes from the data are in quotation marks. Italicised Roman characters indicate that the original 
text is in Roman characters (usually in English). N on-italicised English text in quotation marks is my 
translation o f  the Greek original. Capitalisation as in original.
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a. Cosmopolitan
Cosmopolitan does not include many metaphors o f this kind — a ‘protection’ frame 
comes up ( ‘be protected/protect yourse lf,86 ‘Can condoms protect m e?’), and there is 
some presentation o f STDs as agents or forces acting upon the reader (patient), e.g. 
‘How much will it harm me?’. Once, the Chlamydia-causing bacterium is said to 
‘attack’. There are other violence-related metaphorical frames (source categories), 
such as ‘the news that you have an STD can hit you like a thunder’ — these do not 
construct the disease specifically as the perpetrator of the violence. All of the above, 
however, contribute to a representation of the patient as a victim in need o f help -  a 
reader not suffering from an STD is further constructed as a potential victim. 
However, the construction of the reader as a victim is mainly constructed through the 
presupposed (as given), explicitly mentioned or implied, feelings projected onto her 
(see below).
b. Marie Claire
Marie Claire presents the virus HPV more as a human-like agent, which is facilitated 
by the fact that the word ‘virus’ in Greek (io<;) is grammatically masculine, as well as 
the lexico-syntactic properties of the clauses in which it is referred to. For example, 
the virus ‘is responsible for cervical cancer’ and ‘causes infection’. ‘His big advantage 
is that he acts... sneakily’. If not diagnosed, the virus ‘escapes arrest and acts 
unimpeded’. In these examples the virus is personified, not merely as a force but 
specifically as an agent who acts and causes damage almost consciously. The
86 Passive and self-reflexive constructions have the same form in Greek, and it is not always possible to 
tell from the context which one it is. This means that the com m on denominator which is bound to be 
inferred is that som ething happens to the se lf/su b jec t (regardless o f  who does it), as opposed to the 
active voice where the ‘s e l f  acts, often upon a patient.
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metaphor o f ‘arresting’ depicts the virus more specifically as a criminal agent. Female 
readers are also metaphorically represented as the victims o f this agent, more 
obviously in the phrase: ‘one out o f three of us gets in the gun sight of... HPV’ (i.e. is 
targeted), and also through the phrases ‘get protected/protect yourself.
The virus is also conceptualised as an inanimate weapon or instrument o f torture: 
‘scourge’ (paoxiya), which is a dead metaphor but more transparent than the English 
term, as the Greek cognates paaxlyio (lash, whip N) and paaxiyrirvco (to lash, to whip 
V) are still in use. The vaccine is a weapon of defence, as it ‘accoutres the organisms 
o f boys and girls’. ‘Accoutre’ or ‘shield’ would be the translation for the 
military/security term ‘GcopaKi^oo’, which could also be translated as ‘furnish’ or 
‘equip’, but literally means ‘providing an armour’.
Early in the article the area of medicine is referred to as ‘the medical front’. This is an 
intertextual reference to the novel and film title All Quiet on the Western Front/ Im 
Westen nichts Neues, translated in Greek as ‘Nothing Newer from the Western Front’. 
The link here is the word ‘new’, as the article is about a new development. Describing 
new developments in a field/area/aspect of life as news from the respective ‘front’ 
occurs very often as a witty allusion in Greek. Nevertheless the word ‘front’ (fiExcimo) 
is very clearly military-related in Greek.87 The etymological metaphor Kaxa7to?t£pr|(jr| 
( ‘fighting o f f )  refers to the treatment and prevention o f the virus. It is never used 
literally, but the root ‘war’ is still visible (-7tota|i-).
87 The military term is itse lf a metaphor, ‘psT007ro’ literally m eaning ‘forehead’, however, in the co-text 
the literal interpretation is excluded.
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c. Status
There are no war metaphors, except the danger/threat presupposed in the metaphorical 
frames o f ‘protect’ and ‘guard’, and the conceptualisation o f condoms as ‘the 
bodyguard/musketeer’ (o a©paTO(pi)A,aK:a<;) in the title and subtitle.
The metaphorical title ‘the bodyguard’ focuses on the ‘protective’ function of 
condoms, which makes the value o f condoms more salient, as a bodyguard is 
specifically hired to protect someone (it’s his/her job -  main function) and has 
connotations o f loyalty, bravery etc. In Greek the same word has been used to 
translate ‘musketeer’, which makes these positive connotations even stronger (as 
opposed to ‘security guard’, ‘security s ta ff etc., which have negative connotations). 
There is an element of wordplay here, since health literally has to do with ‘the body’, 
and condoms metaphorically guard the body not from human agents, but from disease. 
The word ‘safety’ is also mentioned in the description o f types o f condoms, which 
semantically presupposes danger.
7.3.3 Observations on war metaphors
In this section I have primarily looked at lexical items used metaphorically. Metaphors
are best examined on clause level (cf. Boers, 1999) or above, and can also be visual -
the focus here is single noun or verb phrases as triggering specific frames, but taking
into account the whole clause also evoking the frame, argument structure etc., which
is beyond the scope of this chapter In particular, as with all frames (also non-
metaphorical ones), the concept evoked by the word is profiled, and the
elements/concepts constituting the frame are also evoked as frame presuppositions
(ground). Metaphorical frames include the additional element o f concepts from one
frame (source category) mapped onto to another (target category), which can be
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inferred (because presupposed as part o f pre-existing knowledge). Concepts not 
mapped are backgrounded to the point o f not being inferred, unless one o f the 
interlocutors decides to bring them to the foreground through creative elaborations of 
the metaphor (see Semino, 2002).
There are two interesting findings in relation to war metaphors in these texts. First, 
physical violence and war are closely associated with hegemonic masculinity 
(Connell, 1995, see also Chapter 6), and war metaphors are very often used in 
discourse addressed to or about men (Polyzou, 2004; 2010; Koller, 2004). In Status, 
however, there are much fewer war/violence metaphors than in Cosmopolitan or 
Marie Claire in this case. One explanation could be that the Status text is only one 
page long, whereas the Marie Claire text is 2 pages long, and the Cosmopolitan text is 
8 pages long. However, Marie Claire has many more violence metaphors than 
Cosmopolitan, despite the difference in length. Moreover, ‘the bodyguard’ as a word 
is very foregrounded as a header in larger fonts, and again in the lead-in paragraph, at 
the beginning on the article.
It is likely that the lack of war and violence metaphors has to do with the subject 
matters o f the texts, and the tone adopted in relation to them. The combination o f the 
frame of ‘protection’ with the conceptualisation of disease as a sneaky attacker further 
construct the reader as a (potential) powerless victim, in many cases justifiably so 
since there are no early symptoms and no cure, e.g., for viruses such as HIV and HPV, 
and no 100% secure means of preventing infection. Marie Claire, through repetition, 
exaggeration and creative elaborations o f the metaphor emphasises even more the 
powerlessness of people exposed to HPV, and projects all (female) readers as 
potential victims. Cosmopolitan does this less, but the enacted ‘readers’ questions’ 
(see Thompson and Thetela, 2005 on audience enactment and projection) also project
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a powerless, scared reader, at the receiving end o f physical harm ( ‘How much will it 
harm m e?’).
Within the ‘protection’ frame, Status does not focus on ‘from what/whom’ the reader 
should be protected, but on ‘how’. Thus, no details are given on the ‘enemy’ (STDs), 
but rather on the ‘bodyguard’. The ‘bodyguard’ or ‘musketeer’ (grammatically 
masculine and usually a male person), apart from the aforementioned positive 
connotations, is also employed to protect a powerful figure, and can be seen as a sign 
o f prestige. Thus, Status evokes the ‘protection’ frame without constructing the (male) 
readers as powerless, and focuses on the means of protection as a commercial product 
(different kinds o f condoms), bringing in promotional discourse.
The second finding is related to the following section on vagueness. The use of 
metaphor as a tool for conceptualisation can help us conceive o f abstract notions, such 
as time, as concrete entities, and can be helpful in structuring our experience in a 
cognitively ‘manageable’ way. However, it can also obscure understanding by 
emphasising or constructing certain aspects of the target category, or by being vague. 
In the following section I discuss vagueness in more detail, both in cases related to 
metaphor and in other cases.
7.4 Vagueness and emotion
7.4.1 Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire
In this case, vagueness is related to the foregrounding or backgrounding o f danger in 
relation to STDs through evaluative vocabulary. Marie Claire in particular, but also 
Cosmopolitan, foreground the emotional element o f danger. Marie Claire almost 
never refers to the virus HPV without accompanying the noun with the adjective
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‘dangerous’ (and, once, ‘hated’); the vaccine against HPV is characterised 
‘miraculous’ (used similarly to ‘works wonders’ in English), and the news about the 
new vaccine are presented ‘with jo y ’. These expressions (as well as the metaphors 
discussed in 7.3.2) foreground evaluative and emotional aspects o f the referents, 
constructing a negative attitude towards the virus and a positive attitude towards the 
vaccine, without providing themselves any information on why and how the virus is 
harmful and the vaccine beneficial. The effects of the virus are similarly presented in 
the example: ‘...the hated virus, who can turn a night o f passion into a real nightmare’. 
The metaphor ‘nightmare’ here again emphasises negativity, but does not specify in 
what way.
Cosmopolitan’s use o f the words ‘safe’ (in the headline) and ‘protect’ presupposes a 
danger to be safe/protected from, and they twice refer to facts presented as new as ‘the 
most shocking [thing]’ and ‘the scariest [thing]’. In the lead-in paragraph young 
women are said to be statistically more likely to contract an STD through the phrase 
‘more vulnerable’. Overall, the Cosmopolitan article does not contain a lot of 
vagueness -  almost everything is spelt out in detail. Therefore, even if one lexical item 
is vague, it is immediately specified/clarified in the following clause(s) or sentences. 
Cosmopolitan does contain as much evaluative and emotional vocabulary, but for the 
most part the emotions of fear, guilt, embarrassment etc. are presupposed as known 
and given. Occasionally it is mentioned as given that the reader will feel ‘rage’ if her 
partner has an STD, and that she will be ‘embarrassed’ to inform her doctor fully 
about her sex life. The latter is presupposed to occur only when she displays unsafe or 
non-heteronormative sexual behaviour (the example provided is having sex with two 
men at the same time) -  a ‘normal’ sex life is not presented as embarrassing to 
discuss, with a doctor at least.
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The use o f evaluative words alone is not sufficient to cause mystification/lack of 
understanding — specific information about STDs can and is provided in the co-text in 
both the Cosmopolitan and the Marie Claire texts. However, they do foreground (even 
more) negative evaluations and emotions88 o f worry and fear, which may be already 
understandably present in relation to health issues, while not being helpful in any way 
in understanding or resolving the problem addressed. 89
There are cases however where the co-text does not provide more specific 
information. In Marie C laire’s metaphor ‘one out of three o f us gets in the gunsight of 
the dangerous virus HPV, who is often responsible for cervical cancer and is 
transmitted through sexual contact’, it is not clear whether that means that one out of 
three women actually contracts the disease, or that one out o f three women simply is 
in a high-risk category (and why the other two out o f three are not). This sentence is in 
the lead-in paragraph and by containing the words ‘gunsight’, ‘danger’ and ‘cancer’ 
(which is only a possible cause o f only one type of HPV), it immediately frames the 
issue as a scary one.
The link o f HPV with cervical cancer is emphasised on the text level through statistics 
and numbers of women dying from cervical cancer (these numbers are, o f course, not 
vague but specific, but they are still mystifying because they do not specify how many 
of these cancer cases were actually caused by HPV), followed by representing the 
available therapies as having ‘many disadvantages’ and being ‘rather ineffective’. 
Surgical operation, chemotherapy and radiotherapy ‘h id e 90 huge dangers, from 
disorders of the immune system and sexuality to infertility and miscarriages’. The
881 see evaluation and em otion as related, but exploring this relationship in detail is beyond the scope  
o f  this thesis.
89 On text/genre level these function to justify (and in som e other cases construct) the problem, rather 
than so lve it (see Polyzou, 2008a).
90 ‘hiding dangers’ is a conventional metaphor meaning the dangers are not always visible -  it does not 
necessarily mean that the subject is represented as an agent intentionally hiding something.
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topic o f the article is not cervical cancer per se, but HPV, so only enough information 
about cervical cancer treatments is provided to show how ineffective they are -  it is 
not clear what exactly happens to a patient with ‘disorders o f the immune system and 
sexuality’, but it is clear that they are negative (‘huge dangers’). Infertility as a ‘huge 
danger’, and the mention o f ‘miscarriages’ presuppose that some o f the readers are or 
want to be pregnant in the future, so they run the additional risk o f having a 
miscarriage. In the co-text it is easy to read these treatments (surgery, chemotherapy 
and radiotherapy) as ‘therapies for HPV’ rather than ‘therapies o f cancer’, thus 
blurring o f ‘HPV’ and ‘cancer’, which also could reinforce the element o f fear in the 
text.
Overall, the Cosmopolitan article is written (and visually laid out) in a textbook-style, 
as an instance o f initiation discourse similar to schoolbooks (but not, generally, 
academic textbooks, except for the pictures o f skin displaying the symptoms, which 
are also to be found in medical academic or professional texts). Although the 
‘description’ o f the problem (diseases, symptoms, ways o f transmission) is very 
detailed and not vague (despite some emotional language), interestingly some 
vagueness occurs in the ‘solution’ part of the text.
W hen/if the reader discovers that she has an STD, she is advised to ‘confront the boy 
who gave it to [her]’ (‘avxipsTdmias to ayopi 7iou as KoMajas’). This is probably 
back-translation -  the name of the author of the article is not Greek (Hallie Levine, in 
Roman characters) - much of this article would then be translated or adapted from an 
English-speaking original (although it contains some ‘Greek statistics’). Some of the 
meanings (including evaluative aspects) o f ‘confront’ (aviipsxco7i:^co) seem to overlap 
between Greek and English, as ‘facing’ (a problem) or facing a person ‘in defiance or 
hostility’ http://www.etvmonline.com/index.php?term=confront. both drawing
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etymologically on the metaphorical military term ‘front’ (jLiexcoTT-). However, in this 
co-text it seems that, unlike the English term conventionally used for talking to 
someone (albeit ‘in defiance’), the Greek word seems to window attention not on the 
process but on the outcome of this act, namely, successfully solving (a problem) or 
fighting off (a person or group). This might be signalled by the imperative or the fact 
that the patient is a human agent (as opposed to ‘we are facing a problem/difficulties’, 
which can also be expressed through avxip.£ico7c(^co/confront in Greek). In short, this 
unconventional use o f the imperative of ‘confront’ in Greek seems more aggressive 
than the English equivalent -  however, a reader reading fast for gist might not notice 
that, or draw on her own knowledge of English overlooking the awkward translation.
What is more significant here is that the reader is not given any concrete advice on 
what exactly ‘confronting’ entails -  the verb communicates the tone of the 
conversation, but not the content. The reader is further advised to ‘give him a chance 
to reply’ before she assumes ‘that he did it on purpose’. So the reader is advised to 
speak to her partner and give him ‘a chance to reply’ -  this is still vague and does not 
shed any light on what she is supposed to say, with the additional contradiction that 
she should be aggressive (‘confront’) and conciliatory at the same time (giving him a 
chance to reply).
Upon discovery o f an STD, the reader is further advised to follow ‘her usual routine’ 
(whatever that is), and is assured that this is not the end of her sex life. If her partner 
informs her he has an STD, she is told, among other things, that people with STDs 
will not give them to their partners if they are ‘honest and careful’, and that she could 
(temporarily or permanently) leave her partner if she needs time to take ‘the right 
decision for both’ o f them. There is a contradiction in the overall content o f these two 
(separate) sections, one on what to do if she has an STD and one on the case that her
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partner (but not her) has an STD. In the former case she is given the optimistic 
messages that she is still attractive and could/should continue her sex life (while 
‘confronting’ the person she thinks gave it to her), and in the latter she is partly 
reassured but partly given the option to ‘depart’/ ’retreat’ ( ‘aftoxcbpTicre’, another 
unconventional use in Greek which seems to also result from awkward translation 
from an English original to Greek -  see discussion in 8.3.3). In general, in these two 
sections the female partner is framed as a victim, whereas the male one, albeit not a 
wilful perpetrator, is definitely a cause for concern. Most importantly, apart from this 
rather subtle construction of an ‘us’ and ‘them ’ distinction, all advice on what to do in 
order to conduct a sex life upon discovery o f an STD is extremely vague, with the 
most concrete suggestion being to see a doctor. There is no mention of what to do, 
exactly, in order to conduct a safe sex life, what ‘honest and careful’ entails (with all 
the positive connotations o f the words), and what ‘the right decision’, or the right 
decisions would be. The text revolves around reassurance, diplomacy and mitigating 
the (presupposed) panic when one or both partners discover an STD, but all protective 
measures mentioned occur in different sections, namely, in the sections advising how 
to avoid  catching an STD when she knows nothing about her partner’s health (here the 
structure o f the text plays a role too). Some other rather obvious measures, such as 
testing and treating both partners before they engage in a sexual relationship, or 
temporary abstinence/medical treatment/use o f condoms when a partner is known to 
have an STD, are not mentioned at all at any part of the text. Thus vagueness occurs 
also through metaphor or/and hyperbole, but also through insufficient information in 
relation to numbers, causal relationships and description o f symptoms and therapies.
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7.4.2 Status
In contrast, Status does not discuss the characteristics o f STDs at all (therefore such 
knowledge is not inferable from the text), choosing instead to focus on condoms as 
products. The author only says that the ‘correct use [of condoms] can... save you 
[courtesy plural]... many pages of reading on venereal [diseases]’. Thus, the aspect o f 
(the frame of) contracting an STD which is emphasised here is ‘reading’ on them, 
presumably in order to find a way to treat the disease. This backgrounds the aspects of 
danger, fear, suffering etc. related to having a disease, and foregrounds an 
inconvenient but less harmful result o f the disease.
This is a case where the ‘reading’ frame is associated in the text with suffering from 
an STD, or worrying about it (the cause of the ‘reading on STDs’). I would say that, 
rather than presupposed because known, the frame is at least partially constructed on­
line in the text, as suffering from or worrying about an illness is not necessarily or 
typically linked with reading for all readers. However, we do have a case of 
metonymical windowing of attention (Talmy, 2000; 2007). If we construct a scenario 
o f ‘unprotected sex -  worry/illness -  reading about STDs/suffering/getting treatment’, 
although obviously the ‘problem’ is the worry and the illness, it surfaces in the text as 
one o f its less painful consequences (the reading). Clearly the less threatening ‘focus’ 
evokes the ‘ground’ of the illness, but at the same time preserves a less grave and 
rather optimistic tone (as does the focus on the ‘bodyguard’ as opposed to the 
‘attacker’). The vagueness lies in that, as it is not a conventional, well established 
scenario evoked, it is not clear whether the reading on STDs will be because o f mere 
worry, or because of actually suffering from an STD -  this also contributes to the 
concept o f ‘threat’ not being foregrounded here.
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One case that could be seen as vagueness due to emotional hyperbole (as opposed to 
providing information) is the phrase ‘basic virtues’ in the sentence
(1) Ei8ik& EM,a5a, to 77% xcov avSpcov r^ XiKiaq 20-45 excov 
ayvoei apK£T£<; ano xi<; patriK&g ap£T£q toik;.
Especially in Greece, the 77% of men aged between 20-45 years 
old are not aware o f quite a few of their [condoms’] basic virtues.
‘The 77% o f [Greek] men aged between 20-45’ foregrounds this demographic, either 
because this is the group o f men surveyed,91 or because it overlaps with the target 
readership o f the magazine (or possibly for both reasons). It is possible that the focus 
on this demographic either by a researcher or by the author of the text results also 
from the (generally shared and given) presupposed assumption that it is this age group 
that is more sexually active, including the (projected) reader.
It is categorically stated then that the majority o f the readers ignore/are not aware of 
(ayvoouv) many of the ‘basic virtues’ (Paaucsq apexsc;) of condoms. ‘Basic’ entails 
some form of prioritisation or importance - ‘basic’ can mean ‘main’, ‘elementary’ and 
also ‘necessary’. This, as well as the formal positively evaluative word ‘virtue’
92present/frame the following information as very important. As far as I know, the 
basic virtues o f condoms are preventing STDs and pregnancy, and most people in 
Greece are aware of them. The framing of the information by the author as ‘basic 
virtues’ then merely aims to highlight the information as ‘important’.
91 Information on the survey is not mentioned and not inferable.
92 ‘Virtue’ (apeTrj) also has a moralistic undertone, but I think that here it is either irrelevant or may at 
m ost have a humorous effect (due to the incongruity between subjects o f  ‘se x ’ and ‘m orality’). In any 
case, in Greek ‘virtue’ may be used for non-morality related advantages, but it sounds formal and dated 
(shifts in register also produce a humorous effect).
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Since the Status text is a hybrid between advice and promotion, there is a lot o f 
vocabulary evaluating positively not just condoms in general (‘the bodyguard’), but 
particular brands o f condoms as well. At the bottom of the page 4 types/brands of 
condoms are presented, their descriptions including the characterisations 
‘comfortable’, ‘fitting well’, offering ‘a pleasant sense o f sturdiness/strength and 
safety’, ‘great feeling, ‘very popular’. These 4 kinds o f condoms are chosen as the 
‘best’ in their categories (e.g. the best polyurethane condom), and there are some 
disadvantages mentioned, e.g. ‘more expensive’ or ‘not reliable for all uses’ (see 
below).
In 4.5.1 I mentioned that there is information not presented in a text that may only be 
inferred by readers with the necessary background knowledge; I found some instances 
of this in the Status texts, where some phrases could be seen as instances of 
vagueness, as they do not seem to evoke a specific schema/frame. However, it may be 
the case that some readers (the ‘ideal’ readers?) would have conventional associations, 
or draw on-line inferences, based on their background knowledge and social group 
membership. Interpreting the phrases below took more than average cognitive 
processing effort in my part, including a close reading of the whole text more than 
once, and thinking. Some readers might not be willing to put the same processing 
effort, or may not read the whole text, or may not have the required mental 
representations readily available while reading. I would then suggest that the phrases 
below may be mystifying for some readers, but not for others.
a. 'Jobs’
The sentence in example (1), repeated here for convenience
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(1) Ei8ik& cttt|v EM,a8a, to  77% tcov avSpcbv q^udac; 20-45 sta>v 
ayvoei apK8T8q ano Tiq paaiKeq apsTeq Tovq.
Especially in Greece, the 77% of men aged between 20-45 years 
old are not aware o f quite a few of their [condoms’] basic virtues.
Is followed by
(2) Avdpeoa Tovq, [eivai to  yeyovoq oti] im a p /o w  7rpoq)t)XaKTiK& 
ano noXka uXiKa Kai yia rcoXXeq dovXziEq.
Among those [i.e. virtues ignored by most men, is the fact that] 
there are condoms made of many materials and for many jobs.
This is then followed by a brief ‘history o f condoms’ (their invention by Goodyear) 
and presumably new information about different materials and sizes of currently 
available condoms in the market (the important ‘basic virtues’ mentioned in the 
previous sentence). The ‘basic virtues’ then are explained (‘the fact that...’), the ‘many 
materials’ are listed, but the ‘many jobs’ are not. Lifestyle magazines constantly 
oscillate between the issue of sex as taboo in Greek society in general, and the 
imperative to ‘sell sex’, prescribe it and describe it, both as an aim in itself (providing 
advice and thus delineating sexual identities on sale), and also as a means to sell 
products (the magazine itself, advertised products, products helping the reader 
approximate the ideal sexual identities). Euphemism, vagueness and humour are often 
recruited to that end. ‘Job’ (Soutaia, also translatable as ‘work’) can be used in Greek, 
as in English, to refer to sex euphemistically, but it can also be used for all sorts o f 
activities. (Notably the equivalent of ‘I’m busy’ in Greek is ‘ex© Soutaid’ -  I have 
work/[a] job [to do]). Due to the context it seems that ‘many jobs’ here does not refer 
to activities other than sex, but rather to sexual acts that are not heteronormatively 
sanctioned, such as anal or oral sex (similarly the phrase ‘for all uses’, see previous 
sub-section). One would have to have some prior mental representation of (the
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desirability of) these in order to infer this, or read the whole page down to the 4th text 
o f the section, a numbered list of ‘tips’ in a box, where anal or oral sex as mentioned 
(but not foregrounded) as examples of ‘different contacts’ requiring a change o f 
condom each time (tip no 5). ‘For many jobs’ might also include ‘preventing 
pregnancy’, which is also alluded to in the readers’ question in a separate section and 
is commonly shared (presupposed) knowledge about the function o f condoms.
Thus, the ‘ideal reader’ possessing all the ‘previously shared’ knowledge would 
immediately infer the above, but the initiate would either not get it, or would only 
infer it after more processing and/or reading every detail on this section. This is one 
example of the magazine catering to different audiences, with different levels and 
amounts o f presupposed knowledge. At the same time, the reader ‘in the know’ is 
privileged, and the missing knowledge is the one worth having for one to achieve the 
masculine identity projected (in this case, sexually ‘adventurous’).
b. 'Critical moment'
In the box o f numbered bullet points (‘tips’), one tip points out that no air should be 
left in the condom, or else it could break ‘at the critical moment’ (‘ir)v Kplaipr| 
cmyjufi’). ‘Critical’ as a ‘turning point’ (point o f ‘judgem ent’- ‘Kpiar|’ -  
etymologically speaking) cannot refer to the point one would catch an STD, since 
such a ‘point’ is hard to isolate, at least outside a science lab - some STDs can be 
contracted even with skin contact (in which case, all moments are ‘critical’). ‘Critical 
moment’ most likely refers to ejaculation as the point most likely for the condom to 
break (and also as the point where pregnancy is more likely). The existential 
presupposition (the ‘critical moment’ exists), and the choice o f words, presuppose (as 
shared but also given knowledge) penetrative sex resulting in male orgasm as the
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typical sexual act. Unlike with ‘many jobs’, the phrasing is not chosen (only) for its 
vagueness but exactly because it is (or should be) easily inferable by (target) readers. 
‘Critical’ indeed emphasises importance in general, even if one does not infer what is 
‘at stake’ just from that noun phrase (but from the co-text).
Thus, this phrase on the one hand perpetuates a heteronormative, phallocentric view of 
sex with no need for justification or explanation (it is the given ground of all 
discussions on sex by default anyway), and on the other, as with the women’s 
magazines, creates a sense of drama (‘crisis’) in order to reinforce the persuasive 
function o f the text, prioritising the emotive effect over informative content. In the 
main feature (‘the bodyguard’), it is mentioned that a very tight condom might break, 
while a very large might ‘leave its place on the most critical moment’. Again it is not 
clarified what ‘the most critical moment’ is. It does seem that the moment becomes 
‘critical’ by virtue of the fact that there is an accident with the condom. The cases of 
the condom breaking or leaving its place are framed in the next sentence as 
‘unpleasant surprises’, which does communicate negative emotion, but somehow 
downplays health risks as merely ‘unpleasant’ (in comparison to the extremely loaded 
vocabulary in the women’s magazines).
Thus, as I have already pointed out, Status does not generally employ vague 
expressions causing emotions of fear, with few exceptions. Apart from the word 
‘critical’, another such rare case occurring in the ‘tips’ section is the use o f the term 
‘dangerous’, which is relatively vague -  the phrase ‘an expired condom is more 
dangerous than an expired glass of milk’ highlights the danger, but does not explain in 
what sense the condom is dangerous. The reader is again left to infer what kind of 
danger this is based on co-text (prior mention of STDs and breakage o f condoms), and 
on the readers’ background presupposed knowledge. It is also suggested that ‘long
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nails can cause small disasters’. It is quite easily inferable here that ‘disasters’ means 
the condom might be torn, but the qualification ‘small’ again downplays the drama 
here.
7.5 Framing of actors
In the previous sections I have looked at various frames triggered relatively frequently 
in the texts with different effects. All three texts are framed early on as ‘health- 
related’ texts through both visuals and language. I have further looked at how they 
frame the problems and solutions they present, namely, the diseases and the means of 
prevention or treating the diseases. These representations have had implications on 
how the male or female addressees/readers are framed; the two women’s magazines 
frame the projected female reader as being in danger, or a victim. Status projects the 
reader more positively, as more active, and generally frames him as a consumer 
choosing a product. In this section I look more closely at how gendered actors are 
referred to and framed in the texts (most notably readers and their presumed sexual 
partners).
7.5.1 Marie Claire
Marie Claire states that HPV is one o f the viruses which ‘trouble millions o f men and 
women throughout the world’, and that the vaccine protects (‘shields’) ‘the organisms 
of boys and girls from childhood’. In that sense, there is a symmetry in the terms used 
for male and female adults and children, and it is mentioned that both men and women 
are at risk. This symmetry may be a result of the hybridisation with medical,
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scientific’ discourse. However, the text addresses the reader through 2nd person 
singular ‘you’, it refers more often to women (through statistics and mention of 
diseases such as cervical and ovarian cancer), and the overall vocabulary o f war, 
threat, risk and suffering is aimed mainly at the female reader. The partner is either 
not mentioned (suppressed -  cf. van Leeuwen (1996) -  cognitively draws attention 
away from the participants and windows attention on the outcome o f a process), when 
catching the disease is presented as the virus turns ‘a night o f passion... into a real 
nightmare’ (cf. Cosmopolitan), and once it is mentioned that if the reader needs 
medical treatment for HPV, so should her ‘love/romantic/sexual partner’. The word 
‘partner’ is grammatically masculine here, presenting the relationship as by default 
hererosexual. All 6 magazines use the ‘generic masculine’ form when the sex o f a 
person is unknown -  however, men’s magazines do use the feminine endings, articles 
and pronouns for partners. Moreover, the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ are often used in all 
lifestyle magazines to refer to ‘a partner’, with no further or previous definite noun 
phrase indicating a partner, which conventionally triggers the frame of ‘heterosexual 
partner’ (Polyzou, 2008b).
This occurs in the Cosmopolitan text: ‘[he] lives [in the same student residence], and 
you eat at the same restaurant... You trust him’. ‘[What to do] when he has an STD’. 
Also in the Status text: ‘Don’t let her apply [the condom] on you’. In these cases there 
is no anaphoric (and often, no cataphoric) reference to a noun phrase, but the reader 
automatically infers ‘your partner’ due to the presupposed shared knowledge.
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7.5.2 Cosmopolitan
Cosmopolitan also uses the terms ‘women’ and ‘men’ when referring to medical facts 
(like Marie Claire)', e.g. ‘women have more mucous membranes in their genitals than 
m en’. Other cases include citing research (female participants), or discussing the HPV 
vaccine (which protects women from the indirect risk o f cervical cancer), or the 
differences in symptoms of a particular STD in women and men. Terms like ‘people’ 
and ‘adults’ are also used when discussing medical facts related to both sexes. Twice 
it refers to ‘your partner [masc.]’ (cruvxpocpoc;). These may be traces o f medical 
discourse, but there are a lot of more ‘informal’ terms referring to partners and men in 
general used to evoke a frame/genre of ‘informal conversation among friends’. When 
it comes to partners, in Greek rather than ‘your boyfriend’ one can say ‘your friend 
[masc.]’ or ‘your boy’ -  the definite reference and possessive pronoun disambiguate, 
distinguishing the references from those to ‘a male friend’ or ‘a young male’ person. 
Such references are frequent throughout the text.
What I find interesting is the two cases when young men are referred to as ‘boys’. 
Although ‘girls’ is used widely also in Greek (as in English) to refer to adult females, 
‘boys’ is not symmetrically used; it is used in some contexts, but not as often. Here the 
usage might result from an awkward translation from the English term ‘guys’ (no 
equivalent in Greek), or an unsuccessful imitation of the style o f young women 
referring to young men as ‘boys’ (and themselves as ‘girls’). The incongruity might 
arise exactly because of the medical content of the text, and the attempt to make it 
sound more ‘friendly’.
Once, ‘boy’ occurs in the title of the section ‘What boys say’. This presents what 
appears to be statistics from questionnaire results (with participants being asked what
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they would do if their girlfriend had an STD, for example). This foregrounds the 
social aspect o f these male participants -  they are not mentioned as patients or 
potential victims, but as a category of people to whom the reader wants to relate, so 
their attitudes and feelings are focussed on. This is in contrast with the referring terms 
for females, which (when not addressing a projected female reader as ‘you’) is almost 
exclusively ‘women’ (regardless o f age). E.g. we have ‘women under 25’, ‘young 
women are more vulnerable’, ‘the fact that you are a woman increases the possibility 
o f infection’.
The second time ‘boy’ occurs is more incongruous. It occurs in the context of 
suggesting that condoms should be worn from the beginning o f penetration: ‘most 
boys have pre-ejaculatory fluid before they reach orgasm’. The usage o f a term 
primarily meaning ‘non-adult’ male is incongruous with a discussion on sex. One 
could argue that this usage might well occur in the discourse o f young women (I have 
encountered this usage, as with ‘girls’), because it refers to young men not as male 
patients or objects o f medical observation, but as partners discussed among friends. 
However, again, the term ‘girl’ is never used in the text; ‘women’ is used very often. 
This on the one hand frames the female reader as a potential patient, echoing medical 
discourse; on the other, both medically and socially, the frame triggered by ‘women’ 
entails ‘sexually mature’ biologically, in the case of medicine - socially it is more 
complicated, depending on the normative assumptions of each society, but consider 
the usage o f ‘girls’ to refer to unmarried women regardless o f age, as not fully mature, 
or the usage o f ‘women’ to refer to prostitutes. In this case, the reader is framed as a 
responsible and sexually active adult, something which is not done with the framing of 
male partners. The reader is a ‘woman’, but her partner (conventionally o f the same 
age or older) is a ‘boy’.
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7.5.3 Status
In Status women (as patients or partners) are never mentioned, except in the phrase: 
‘D on’t let her apply [the condom] on you; long nails can cause small disasters’. 
M etonymically ‘long nails’ are to be understood as part o f the frame o f ‘her’ -  the 
reader is able to make sense of this because o f the shared, presupposed, non-asserted 
stereotypical knowledge that ‘women have long nails’.93 Apart from this, though, 
women and partners are completely suppressed (in the terms o f van Leeuwen, 1996). 
The focus is the reader, and the choice of condom is framed as that of the reader 
alone. E.g. ‘extra large’ sized condoms are ‘very popular even with those [masc.] with 
more usual [average] qualifications’ (with the ‘qualifications’ metaphor 
conventionally but humorously referring to male genitals). The masculine ending o f 
‘those’ and the attribution of male genitals presents the choice as made by men alone. 
There are quite a few nominalisations and process-indicating nouns: ‘the [sexual] 
contact’ (intercourse), ‘pleasant feeling’, ‘excellent feeling’, ‘worse feeling’ -  the 
actual people who have intercourse or feel one way or another are not mentioned. It is 
more likely that the implied actor/senser is the addressee/reader, who is addressed in 
the text often as ‘you’.
What could create ambiguity in that respect is the 2nd person plural used throughout 
the text (mainly through verb endings, as pronouns in subject position are often 
omitted in Greek). This is generally courtesy plural. The medical expert persona 
responds to a question from a reader:
93 The association is made in the search o f  coherence through underlying sem antic relations, in this case 
between ‘her’ and ‘long nails’(see Brown and Yule, 1983. 194-195).
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(3) Aev £ivai SvvaTov va eutte aMspyiKO*; ara 7rpo<pvXaKTiKa ysviKa, a'k'ka
pdM,OV CTTO X<XT£^ , ....
It is not possible for you to be allergic to condoms in general, but rather to 
latex,....
(4) ... £7iioK£(p0£iT£ svav 8£ppaToX,oyo.
... visit a dermatologist.
(5) Ekeivos [o yictTpo*;], oupot) caq e^et&oei, ...
He [the doctor -  masc.], after he examines you [courtesy 2nd pers. p i .] , ...
here plural is clearly used to address one person.
The following can be read as both (courtesy) generic ‘you’, or addressing the reader as 
an individual, or addressing all male readers as a group (genuine plural):
(6) ... T| ooocmj XP1!01! [T(0V rcpoqwXaKTiictbv] ... p^opci... va aa<; yXiTCoasi 
and cteXiSe  ^Siapaapa p£ 0£pa ra a<ppo5iaia.
correct use [of condoms] can... save you many pages o f reading on 
venereal [diseases]
(7) ... 7rpE7t£i va 8oKipatr£TE 5ia<popa p£y£0t| p£xpi va ppEiTE avro nov aag 
raipia^Ei.
.. .you must try various sizes until you find the one that suits you.
(8) ... £7t£v5'6oT£ ps pia yspfj 5oot| auToyvcoaiaq.
...invest with a good dosage of self-knowledge [regarding choosing the 
size o f the condom].
(9) ... 8ev pnopciTE va aKovpTrfjasTE 7ravco tod yia okeg rig xpA<*£1$-
... you cannot rely on it for all uses.
(10) Mr\\ aq>fjv£T£ va aa<; to (popcaEi ekeivti:...
Do not let her apply [the condom];...
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From the above one can see that, even though genuine plural ‘you’ could in theory 
include female partners (as it is not marked grammatically for gender), as in ‘you [as a 
couple] cannot rely it for all uses’, in most o f the cases it is clear from the co-text that 
the addressee(s) is/are male (e.g. trying on the condom), as well as from the broader 
context of Status belonging to the genre of ‘m en’s magazine’. Thus, the projected 
male reader is the one choosing, buying and applying the condom, decides where to 
store it (‘do not store it in your back pocket’) etc., while women are presupposed as 
heterosexual partners but not mentioned.
7.6 Framing in readers’ comments
The Status and Cosmopolitan texts include text which seems to have not been 
produced by employees of the magazine, but by readers {Marie Claire does not). This 
content could be coming from actual readers’ letters or e-mails, which would normally 
be edited, or constructed. It could also be answers literally provided by ‘people on the 
street’, answering questions by the magazine authors in a kind of impromptu ‘mini­
interviews’. These interviewees however are always selected to fit either the ideal 
reader o f the magazine (young women in the case of Cosmopolitan), or people of the 
opposite sex whose opinion the reader is presumably interested in (or should be).
Either way contributions by ‘real people’ serve to present the content as 
‘authentic’/reliable, and project/construct the ideal reader, since the actual reader is 
positioned in the same ‘group’ as the writing persona. Stylistically it may make 
reading less monotonous and more interesting. For these reasons I analyse these 
sections here separately from the rest of the content. However, when accompanying 
other relevant material (like here), the content of ‘everyday people’s contributions’
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usually reiterates and reinforces the rest of the content, provides additional 
information and occasionally qualifies, but does not refute, the overall content. In 
terms o f presupposition these sections still contain underlying knowledge that is (or 
ought to be) shared with the projected ideal readers o f the magazine, perhaps even 
more so since the speaking personas are not constructed as ‘experts’ but as members 
o f the same group as the readers.
7.6.1 Cosmopolitan
The last page o f the Cosmopolitan feature on STDs includes 5 testimonials by 
‘Women with STDs’. Unlike the name of the author, the names (or pseudonyms) of 
these 5 women are Greek first names, written in Greek characters. It is not mentioned 
whether these women wrote to Cosmopolitan, or if they were interviewed, or how 
they were found. Their ages are stated next to the names, ranging from 21 to 36. So 
the sex, age and nationality o f these speakers match those o f the target readers.
The title and subtitle of this section is: “I caught an STD” -  Women with STDs have 
something to tell you. Like the title, the testimonials address the reader through 2nd 
person singular ( ‘you’). For the most part the frames emerging in these testimonials 
are the same as in the rest o f the feature, e.g. male partners are labelled ‘friend’ or 
‘boy’. It is interesting that, when ‘friend’ or ‘boy’ is used, the women either talk about 
their current partners (who are understanding despite their health conditions), or speak 
generically, as in ‘a proper boy[friend] will appreciate your honesty’. When speaking 
o f past partners who transmitted their STDs to the speakers, one woman (Ioanna) uses 
‘my ex’ (omitting the noun, also very conventional in Greek informal discourse,
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including in lifestyle magazines), and another (Vicky) just says ‘Two years ago I had 
a relationship with a stockbroker’.
Ioanna’s testimonial is the only part of the whole feature bringing up ‘cheating’, and 
the suspicion that ‘her ex’ was not faithful (and giving the advice that with the 
slightest suspicion the reader should see a doctor, like she did). I find it interesting that 
the frame of ‘cheating’ is carefully avoided in the rest o f the feature; it may be the 
case that it is presupposed anyway that the reader will be upset to hear that her partner 
has, or has given her, an STD, but it seems that exploring the reasons is moving 
beyond the informational and comforting purposes of the feature. The issue is, 
however, added, as an afterthought, through a ‘real story’, so that this possibility is 
covered as well (leaving emotional and trust issues aside).
Vicky also speaks o f ‘fooling’ in saying ‘Don’t let [his] appearance fool you -  even 
successful, well-dressed men may have been infected. Two years ago I had a 
relationship with a stockbroker. He seemed clean so I didn’t insist on [us] using a 
condom.’ The conventional metaphor ‘clean’ for healthy is also used a couple o f times 
in the rest o f the feature, but one can see its metonymic basis (lack o f sanitation 
causing disease). The prototype of the ‘clean’ man is a ‘stockbroker’ who is 
‘successful’ and ‘well dressed’, evoking an ideal of hegemonic masculinity. This is 
the (mental) model of the man who is presupposed to be desirable for Cosmopolitan 
readers. The readers’ frame of ‘desirable man’ needs to be modified to include the 
information that this type of man, contrary to the previous (stereotypical) frame, is 
also likely to suffer from an STD.
It is also interesting that using a condom is something that ‘w e’ do, not that ‘he’ does 
(although it is the female partner who has to ‘insist’). Other frames in the readers’
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testimonials also evoke negative emotions (‘horror’, ‘shame’, ‘scary’, ‘guilt’) to be 
dispelled by comforting, and mention o f ‘honesty’ in discussing it with their partners.
7.6.2 Status
Here we have a readers’ question in a section entitled ‘My doctor [vocative] — consult 
the expert’ [see section on visuals above]. This is visually framed with a picture o f a 
doctor and a white cross on red background at the top, and a footnote in small print at 
the bottom with the biographical details of a doctor (the author o f the text on the left, 
‘the bodyguard’), who is presumably also the one answering the question, and a 
disclaimer ‘our advice does not substitute your visit to the doctor’.
The reader signs with initials (no name), and the area of Athens where he lives. He 
asks:
(11) Ti va k & v e i K & m noq av cfvai aM p^yiKoq m a  7rpo<pv^aKTiK& ; Na 
y e p u y e i  t o v  7tX,avfjTii p e  t o i x ;  a T r o y o v o v q  t o d ;
What should one do if one is allergic to condoms? Fill the planet with his 
offspring?
‘One’ (kootoux;) here is grammatically masculine, as well as the possessive pronoun 
(‘his’, ‘tod’). The second part of the question relates to the part o f the frame of 
‘condoms’ that is associated with contraception, and is a rhetorical and somehow 
humorous question (the answer is obviously ‘no’, and the expert should provide an 
alternative solution). The rationale of the reader is that (a man) being allergic to 
condoms will not use them, this will result in lack of contraception, which will result 
in offspring. It is also presupposed as given that ‘one’ (i.e. the reader, but also the
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other ideal readers) is very active sexually, as indicated by the hyperbole that 
without contraception he will ‘fill the planet with his offspring’.
The expert begins his reply by reframing the problem, bringing in what he labels ‘the 
good news’, namely, that ‘it is not possible that you are [courtesy pi.] allergic [sing.] 
to condoms in general, but rather to latex’. He suggests visiting a dermatologist 
‘before blaming your poor condom’, which somehow personifies the condom as a 
potential agent o f causing harm (in the eyes of the reader), and patient o f the act of 
blaming.
The expert discusses allergy to latex as a minor problem (‘17% o f m en’ is a ‘small 
percentage’, ‘rarely is the allergy so acute as to prevent its use’), and the solution is 
factual, information-oriented and brief -  using condoms made o f different materials, 
which can be bought at pharmacies. This is related to the discourse level (unlike, e.g., 
Cosmopolitan, the content in general does not deal with emotional, evaluative or 
interpersonal issues such as honesty in discussing with a partner, or experiencing 
strong negative emotions, and linguistically we do not have evaluative frames evoked 
or vague terms with unclear informative content).
It is interesting that, in the whole feature, STDs are mentioned only once as a 
superordinate term (no specific STDs) and ‘offspring’ (rather than, e.g., ‘accidental 
pregnancy’) also once. These are both mentioned at the beginning o f their respective 
sections, but not referred to again. In the whole text, thus, the problem (disaster, 
danger etc.) is generally represented as the condom breaking, slipping etc., and the 
solutions presented have this as the focus (i.e. how to avoid, rather than solve, these 
problems in the first place). This is in stark contrast with Marie Claire, which does not 
focus only on the possibility of catching HPV, but also on the possibility of HPV
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causing cancer, and then it elaborates on the problems related to cancer therapies. The 
mention o f ‘offspring’ in the reader’s question introduces the other reason for using 
condoms (contraception), which is not asserted but easily inferable through co-text 
and readers’ background knowledge (coherence). The framing and the humour bring 
in another argument in favour of condoms, without bringing in issues such as 
pregnancy, abortion, the partner involved, or any other emotional or social issues. It 
does, however, presuppose as given a female partner (or more than one). So, the use 
o f condoms for contraception, the presence of (a) female sexual partner(s), and the 
fact that being allergic to something means avoiding it, form the inferred ground 
against which the problem of condom allergy and contraception is profiled. Other 
methods of contraception, STDs, abortion, any attributes o f the concept of partner 
other than ‘female’ and ‘fertile’, possibility o f homosexual partner are, however, 
backgrounded and not meant to be inferred (attention is drawn away from them).
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I focussed mainly on the frames triggered by noun or verb phrases, 
seeing what is being profiled by the phrase as ‘figure’ and on the rest o f the frame 
evoked as presupposed ‘ground’, which is inferred and necessary for the frame to 
make sense. In some cases I have contrasted evoked presupposed ‘ground’ with 
concepts that are probably not inferred (if already part of readers’ frames), and 
occasionally non-inferable, through attention being directed to other aspects o f the 
frame. Analysing a text for ‘absences’ occurs often in critical analysis o f discourse 
(Sunderland, 2004; van Leeuwen, 1996) -  it is interesting to reflect on what (based on 
the analysts’ knowledge at least) can reasonably assumed to be part o f the related
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knowledge o f the text producer, but not focussed on; what different aspects o f the 
same topic (related to the same ‘knowledge network’) different texts focus on, and 
also what is genuinely ‘mystifying’, and thus with different interpretations for 
different audiences (based on their level of attention and socio-cognitive 
representations).
I focussed on metaphorical frames, with knowledge of the source category and the 
mapping between source and target category serving as the ‘ground’, and generally on 
the framing o f ‘disease’, ‘sex’, ‘relationships’ and the readers and their (pre)supposed 
partners.
Frames, however, interact with other levels of discourse -  it is not words alone that 
construct the representation of any abstract or concrete entity. In fact, it proves very 
difficult (and artificial) to isolate words from their co-text, especially if we are 
interested in attention issues. On the other hand, as with content analysis and 
electronic corpus analysis, recurring frames or semantic fields at least indicate 
concepts which are in some way reiterated and thus allocated a certain amount of 
attention (and potentially influence the reception of the whole text). Even then, 
though, we are not talking simply about ‘words’, but about ‘semantic fields’, so if this 
analysis was to be done with quantitative methods, manual annotation would still be 
necessary prior to quantification.
In the next two chapters I move on to ‘sentence and clause level presupposition’, 
examining how clause structure (in interaction with other levels) may contribute to 
knowledge being presented as contestable or incontestable.
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Chapter 8: Sentence level — Main and relative clauses
8.1 Introduction
Moving on from the noun or verb phrase level to the sentence level involves an 
increase in complexity. Rather than the mere activation o f frames (in itself not 
insignificant, but methodologically easier to examine) here we start being concerned 
with the way the activated information is combined and how sentence structure 
influences the salience of elements within the sentence and present propositions and 
elements of propositions as ‘shared’ or ‘new’ information. In theory, then, every type 
o f sentence would indicate something about the negotiation o f knowledge, and 
consequently in my analysis I have looked at every single sentence in the three texts. 
However, due to space limitations I have had to exclude part of the analysis from the 
thesis. I have chosen to exclude the categories occurring less frequently in the data, 
considering that the most prevalent categories would account for more solid 
theoretical points. Nevertheless, even when considering only the frame level and part 
o f the sentence level analysis, patterns can be seen to emerge relating to the 
construction o f (the producers of) the magazines as health and sexuality authorities, 
assumptions o f gender and sexuality taken for granted and the legitimation of new 
information and advice within the matrix o f ‘old’ heteronormative assumptions.
8.2 Assertions in main clauses
It is generally assumed that main clauses in the indicative mood constitute 
‘assertions’, and that their content is ‘new information’ and more open to contestation
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than subordinate clauses constituting ‘presuppositions’. In the current section I would 
like to suggest that ‘assertions’ are not necessarily open to contestation. 
‘Incontestability’ is achieved, on the sentence level, by categorical modality, as well 
as the fact that often these assertions provide genuinely new information for the 
reader, which s/he has no resources of contesting without significant processing effort 
or research ‘outside’ the text, but also, importantly, has no obvious reason to contest. 
The content o f these assertions, and also their function on the text level, contribute to 
their incontestability. Sometimes these assertions are qualified by ‘boosters’ (Holmes, 
1983; 1984; 1990), or mitigated by hedging which may or may not present them as 
more open to contestation.
8.2.1 Assertions in Marie Claire
Headlines typically introduce new information, presenting the topic o f the text. Here it 
has the form of a full sentence:
(12) ErtixsXouq, pp£0T]K£ to £ppo)ao yia  xa KovSotaopaxa.
‘Finally, the vaccine for genital warts was found.’
The clause is new information in categorical modality, qualified by ‘finally!’ which 
indicates the desirability of the news.
New and incontestable information in main clauses includes information about the 
effects o f the virus HPV and cervical cancer:
(13) M ia axis xp£i^ ano £pa<; pnaivEi axo axoxaaxpo too etukivSovoo 
ioo HPV
‘One in three of us gets in the sight of the dangerous virus HPV*
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(14) E ^ am ai; tod 7T£0aivoov 40 yuvaiK£<; tt| pcpa ctttiv EopGmT]
Because of him[it] 40 women per day die in Europe
The assertions are presented as incontestable through categorical modality and the 
evidentiality expressed through the numbers/rough statistics.
Other assertions present the ineffectiveness of cancer treatments:
(15) H  /EiponpyiKfi £7T£ppa(7T|, r\ xTpi£io0£pa7T£ia Kai r\ aKTivo0£pa7T£ia 
Kpopoov T£p&<moi)<5 kivSdvodc;, a  no 5iaTapaxs<; to d  avoaoTrouiTiKou 
ovoTfjpaToq Kai Tip; aa^ooaXiKOTTiTa^ p c /p i oTEipOTpTa Kai a7ropoX,£<;.
Surgical operation, chemotherapy and radiotherapy [carry] huge dangers, 
from disorders of the immune system and sexuality to infertility and 
miscarriages.
and more details on the properties and effects of HPV:
(16) O £7tiidv5ovo<; io<; 7rpoKaX,£i ta u p c o ^ ,...
The dangerous virus causes inflam m ation,...
(17) To paya^o aTOu tod  aivai o ti  Spa... 67roDX,a,
His[its] big advantage/strength is that he[it] acts... sneakily ,...
(18) Opirrpavoi tdttoi tod edOdvovtoi y ia  tt] STjpioopyia KapKivoo tod 
Tpaxfj^-OD...
Certain types [of HPV] are responsible for the creation o f cervical cancer...
Other clauses present new medical and practical information on vaccination and 
diagnosis, for example:
(19) To veo apPoXio, kourov, otoxsvei ottiv  Trpotrraaia ano tov  io HPV, 
Kai ElSlKOTEpa OL7ZO TOD^  TD^OD  ^6, 11, 16, 18...
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The new vaccine, then [discourse marker], aims at protection from the 
virus HPV, and in particular from the types 6 , 11, 16, 18...
(20) ...ovopa^ETai Gardasil...
...[it] is called Gardasil...
(21) E M .a 8 a  0 a  E iv a i  S ia G c a ip o  t o  Trpcoxo E ^ a p ijv o  t o o  2007.
in Greece it will be available in the first semester o f 2007.
(22) O c p p o l i a a p o c ;  y iv c T a i  < tto  8 i a < m i p a  arco  9-14 /p o v r iW
Vaccination takes place in the period 9-14 years old
(23) Ett] y v v a iK a ,  tj Siayvootni y  iv E T a i pe t o  t e o t  I I A I I ,  a X X a  K a i ps 
Ka7roiE<; <Top7r>.TipcopaTiK£(; e ^ e to k te k ; .. .
In women, diagnosis takes place with the PAP test [cervical screening], 
but also with some additional tests...
Mitigation and/or modality in relation to frequency and likelihood also seem to 
present incontestable knowledge, with likelihood as an ‘objective’, statistical 
likelihood rather than the speakers’ assessment or doubt about the information 
presented:
(24) M c p iK s q  (popEq T a  K O v S u X ib p a T a  p r o p e l  v a  v T to x tD p fja o u v  a n o  p o v a  
to v < ;.
Sometimes the genital warts may subside by themselves.
(25) Oi u u  «t)\pr|X o'6 k i v 8 u v o v »  ...  8 e v  T ip o K a X o v v  T iavT a K o v S v ta b p a T a  
K a i 5 e v  e / o d v  o p a T a  a v p T r r tb p a T a .
The “high risk” [HPV] viruses... do not always cause genital warts and do 
not have visible symptoms.
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In all o f the above examples, information is presented as new (although some o f it 
might be already known to some of the readers).
An interesting example of incontestability is the below:
(26) O EnPoXiaafioq yivsToti <rro 8ia<mma and 9-14 %po\<hv
Vaccination takes place in the period 9-14 years old
One would expect deontic modality here, indicating that it is somehow desirable for 
vaccination to take place at this age. It would further imply some degree o f obligation 
o f the parents (or the state, if there is a national policy) to make sure that children get 
vaccinated. The categorical modality presents the factual information as incontestable; 
deontic modality might make readers feel patronised, and would perhaps create the 
need for justification of why vaccination at this age is desirable or obligatory. The 
choice of deontic expression would also make it necessary to indicate the degree of 
desirability or obligation (at least via the choice o f modal expression), and this is not 
easy in this case, since vaccination could equally well take place at the age of 15, for 
example.
Using categorical modality avoids the above, and backgrounds these concerns (a 
reader might not think to question these without prior knowledge). Unqualified, 
though, it includes a degree o f vagueness -  does it ‘always’ or ‘usually’ take place at 
this age? Since the article announces that the vaccine will soon be made available in 
Greece (not yet available at the time of publication of the article), in which countries 
does the vaccination ‘take place’?
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8.2.2 Assertions in Status
As with the other two texts, main clauses in the indicative tend to present the reader 
with information which is supposed to be new for him:
(27) H pa^iKrj 7tapay(oyfj xcov avSpiKwv 7rpo(pvX,aKxiKa>v ^ekiviicte rcpiv 
ano 150 xpovia...
Mass production o f male condoms started 150 years ago...
This is ‘historical information’, which is likely to be unknown but which is also not 
particularly important for the function o f ‘giving advice’. It is providing some ‘general 
knowledge/ trivia’ which functions as ‘introduction’ to the paragraph and might make 
the text more interesting.
(28) LfjpEpa, 0a Ppeite TrpoqjvtaxKxiKa ano XaxE ,^ ano 8£ppa fj ano 
;ro>a)ODp£0&VT| (xa Ttpcoxa, a7ro8£8£iyp£va, n:poaxax£nm)v KaXuxepa 
aTto xa a<ppo8iaia) Kai £7Tigt|<; pe Xi7ravxiKO rj x^P ^  XwravxiKo, Ka0cb<; 
Kai p£ aniEppoKxovo f| x^P^r
Nowadays you will find condoms made of latex, leather or polyurethane 
(the former are proven to offer better protection against STDs), and also 
with or without lubricant, as well as with spermicide or without.
The information may or may not be new, or may be partially new as readers may 
know of some of these types of condoms but not others. Thus, partially this has an 
‘informative’ function. In the context of advice, this means that readers can choose 
from this range the type of condom they find most suitable. Moreover, listing the 
materials (latex, leather, polyurethane) highlights the variety available, aiming to 
encourage readers to actually use condoms and implying that ‘not finding a suitable 
one’ is not an excuse for not doing so.
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The verb group you will find’, in terms of modality, involves an epistemic element, 
but also a deontic element of both obligation and volition, and a dynamic element (one 
can find these types of condoms). Rather than categorical modality simply stating 
what kinds o f condoms exist, the future tense projects something that is almost certain 
to happen, and possibly implies a conditional (‘if you are looking for a condom, you 
will find many different kinds’). It also implies that looking for, finding and using a 
condom is desirable, and that it is a possible and positive thing that one can find all 
these types o f condoms.
(29) IIoXv fTi^ pavriKO Koppan eivai stpappoyfj.
A very important part is the fit.
This is another case of categorical modality which indirectly provides advice (and thus 
contains an element o f deontic modality). The fact that the fit is important means that 
one must ensure that the condom fits properly. Foregrounding the importance o f this 
fact (via categorical modality, beginning the sentence with ‘very important’, boosting 
‘important’ with ‘very’, and also the mere fact that the importance o f this parameter is 
mentioned at all) strengthens the force of the indirect command to ensure proper fit 
above everything else. The reader is either expected to not be aware o f this, in which 
case the information is new and highlighted as very important, or to be aware o f this, 
in which case the reminder and accompanying boosters aim to raise the salience of 
this fact in his cognition.
This indirect advice is further reinforced by the elaboration in the following sentence:
(30) To 8va-neys0o<;-Yia-6Xa \iaq e%ei cupifaai xpdvou^, ©<; Ocopta.
‘One-size-fits-air as a theory is dead and buried.
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This presupposes that it used to be common/shared perception that the size o f the 
condom does not matter. Some people might still share this perception, while others 
not. ‘Theory’ is a loose (and technically inaccurate) use of the word instead o f ‘belief 
or ‘assumption’. The ‘death’ metaphor indicates how definitive this fact is (that people 
do not believe that anymore). Moreover, this is a conflation o f ‘what should be’ 
represented as ‘what is’ -  ‘the theory is dead’ can either mean that people do not 
believe it any more, or that it has been proven wrong (therefore people should not 
believe it anymore). Either way the authoritative speaking persona is in a position to 
know which theory is correct and which is not, and to state that in categorical terms.
The statements below provide information to the question o f a reader who complains 
of allergy to latex:
(31) To 17% tcov av8pd>v spcpavi^si K&7roia aXXEpyia <je auxo to dXiko.
17% of men display some allergy to this material.
This (new, categorically stated information) in itself can be read in two ways -  on the 
one hand, this is presumably a small percentage, so it is possible that the reader is not 
in fact allergic to latex. On the other hand, allergy to latex is presented as an existing 
problem, sufficiently well known for research to have been done on it (as statistics 
routinely ‘presuppose’ research).
(32) Oi TTEpicraoTepoi an'k&q anobibovy  Kdmno tmoKEipevo TrpopXiipa 
(not) ETTlTElVETdl \iZ TO XdTE^ ) fTTIlV ETrdtpq \IZ TO XdTE^ .
Most [of them] just attribute some underlying problem (which gets 
exacerbated with latex) to contact with latex.
‘Oi 7t£pica6TSpoi’ (‘most of them’) here refers to men who experience irritation when 
using latex condoms. In conjunction with the previously mentioned (now taken as
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shared ) information that only 17% of men are actually allergic to latex it suggests 
that the reader may have some other dermatological problem which he attributes to 
latex. On text level this legitimates the advice that follows, which is that the reader 
should see a doctor in order to find out what the problem is.
A section o f the text is entitled (capitals in original):
(33) KANAME TH «BPHMIKH AOYAEIA» KAI LA L
IIAPOYLIAZOYME TOYL NIKHTEL LE KA0E KATHrOPIA.
WE DID THE “DIRTY JOB” AND WE PRESENT YOU THE 
WINNERS IN EACH CATEGORY.
These are two co-ordinated statements, presenting events in temporal order. ‘We did 
the “dirty job’” is vague, as it is not clear what the ‘dirty job ’ is. However, both in 
Greek and in English, it means a job nobody wants to do. The negative, and here 
metaphorical, term ‘dirty’ thus carries the connotations o f ‘unpleasant’ and 
‘undesirable’, but it can also be more ambiguously connoted as related to sex, which 
can be positive or negative depending on one’s attitudes to sex, or particular sexual 
acts. In the context of Status, and other lifestyle magazines, it is positive as sexual 
activity is presented as given and desirable.
What follows (the next clause but also the whole section) indicates that the ‘dirty jo b ’ 
is a kind o f research into the various types of condoms, although the collective ‘we’ 
standing for Status obscures exactly who did the research. It is also not stated how the 
research was conducted, but the ‘insider’ commentary and the term ‘dirty jo b ’ could 
imply this was done by actually having sex using the condoms. This implicature is 
however quite clearly defeasible, as ‘dirty job ’ is still quite vague and it is up to the 
reader to make (or not make) the cognitive effort of figuring out what this might
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mean. The statement nevertheless functions as legitimation o f the (new) information 
in this section, as it is doing this job that enables the author(s) to have an authoritative 
evaluation o f the condoms and decide on their advantages and disadvantages.
‘we present you the winners in each category’ is a metalinguistic comment on what is 
to follow, and through existential presuppositions lets the readers know that condoms 
belong to different categories (which can be taken to be known, as different types of 
condoms have already been listed) and that certain brands are better than others in 
each category.
This is followed by ‘new information’ on specific brands o f condoms (the text is 
accompanied by the brand names and pictures of the types of condom in question):
(34) [Eivai] To avxioTOi/o svoq 7ravTckovioi) x i^v: po^ino, avexo Kai 
qmaypfivo yia otax xa yotiaxa, xi<; a>peq Kai oXeq xiq 7i:£pi<7xd<y£i<;.
[It is] The equivalent of a pair o f jeans: convenient, comfortable and made 
for all tastes, all times and all occasions.
(35) P ^ 1] KaXi] £<pappoyrj, fioxdpioxr] aiaOiiar] axipapoxtjxaq Kai 
aaipaXeiaq.
[It has] A good fit, pleasant feeling of sturdiness and security.
(36) Lt]pavxiKd ^ cT rxoxep o  and xa axavxap x o o  £ p 7r o p i o v , ... a<pfjv£i 
£^aipaxiKfi aia0T|tni Kai 5i£vko>o)V£i xijv £7ta<|>fj.
Significantly thinner than the commercial standard [ones], ... it leaves an 
exceptional feeling and facilitates contact.
The content o f these sentences, apart from the ostensive function of informing, also 
has a promotional function, presenting the advantages of the condoms deemed to be 
‘the best in their category’. The vocabulary/register is also similar to advertising.
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(37) To K tt> O )T E p0 7 rp O (p i)X aK T lK O  CtTTO 7TOX\)Ot>pE0&VT] c i v a i  T a D T O /p O V a  
E v a  ano  xa 7 u o  "kema rr|<; a y o p a q .
The best polyurethane condom is at the same time one o f the thinnest in 
the market.
This is factual information which can be interpreted as an advantage insofar as there is 
the underlying presupposed evaluative belief that, for a condom, ‘thin is good’, which, 
in this text, has been primed by first presenting ‘the best thin condom’ which ‘leaves 
an exceptional feeling and facilitates contact’ (via positive vocabulary such as 
‘exceptional feeling’ and ‘facilitates’).
Mentioning a disadvantage of the polyurethane condom appears to balance things out 
and give the text a more ‘informative’ and less ‘promotional’ character:
(38) M s y a X v T E p o  pEiovsKTTjpa t o d  [sivai] r\ /EipoTEpii a ia0 t]a ri (aav  
;rX,a<mKTj aaicouXa) Kai r\ EvOpavoTornTa.
Its largest disadvantage [is] the worse feeling (like a plastic bag) and 
fragility.
However, it should be noted that these disadvantages are characteristics o f all 
polyurethane condoms and not just the particular brand in question.
As is often the case, direct statements are used in order to not only present ‘new 
information’ but also to ‘justify advice’. In that sense they are presented as 
unquestionable beliefs, which are most likely to be new. Even in the case where they 
are not new, they still emphasise the importance of the advice, explicitly fulfilling the 
felicity condition that advice is to the benefit of the advisee, but also that the advisor is 
more knowledgeable and thus in a position to offer guidance and advice.
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Early in the text (1st paragraph) we have a disclaimer (example (39), which is the very 
first 1st sentence o f the first paragraph), and a ‘statement o f ignorance’ (example (40), 
the second sentence of the first paragraph), very common in advice texts, justifying 
the overall need for advice.
The disclaimer reads as follows:
(39 )  T a  7rpo(pvX.aKTiK& aiyoupa 5 e v  Eivai e v a  TrpcDTonmo 0spa , r\ o G x m j  
XpfjoT] todc; opcoq p;ropei, to  XiyoTEpo, v a  aaq  yX,iTCoa£i ano  7roM.£q 
(TEXiSEq b ia p a a p a  p£ 0spa  Ta aippodiaia.
Condoms are certainly not an original subject/topic, their correct use, 
however, can, to say the least, save you [courtesy plural] many pages of 
reading on STDs.
The first statement, ‘condoms are certainly not an original subject/topic’, concedes 
that most readers have, or should have, some knowledge on the subject o f ‘condoms’. 
This is a ‘metadiscursive’ comment, namely, a comment on the author and readers’ 
shared socio-cognitive representations. There is, however, the presupposed and 
implied assumption (on behalf of the author), that there is still knowledge lacking on 
the part o f the audience. This is confirmed by the following sentence:
( 40 )  E iS iK a  ( t t t jv  E M a 8 a ,  t o  77 %  tc o v  a v 5 pa>v rjX iK iaq  20-45  e tg > v  
a y v o E i apK£T£<; and ti<; p a a iK E i; a p sT E q  T o v q .
Especially in Greece, the 77% of men aged between 20-45 years old are 
not aware o f quite a few of their [condoms’] basic virtues.
Presented as new information, this assertion justifies the previously presupposed
(‘backgrounded’ but ‘given’) assumption that readers most probably do not have
adequate  know ledge on condoms. Therefore it fulfils the felicity condition o f  the
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speech act o f ‘informing’ that S informs H of something H does not already know. It 
also prepares the ground for (a) directive speech act(s) to follow, as H will need to be 
given advice for H ’s own benefit by the more knowledgeable S on how to use 
condoms properly.
Although this new information is presented as factual and incontestable (categorical 
modality, statistics), the source of this information is not given in any shape or form. 
The text relies on the commonly shared belief that such statistics derive from some 
kind of survey or research.
Apart from the overall ignorance of the audience as justification for the need o f advice 
and information, assertions are often provided as justification or explanation of 
specific pieces of advice.
(41) 'Eva X,t|Y|i£VO ;rpo<pt>XaKxiK6 eivai ;rio £7ukw5dvo ano cva rcoxfjpi 
yaka.
An expired condom is more dangerous than an expired glass o f milk.
(42) ...xa paKpia vvxia pniopei va 7rpoKa}*,£t70i)V piKpeq Kaxaaxpo<p£<;.
...long nails can cause small disasters.
(43) H axopaxiKfj, x\ TipfDKXiKfj Kai r\ cvxovti KO?jriKfi [eTratprj] p^opci va 
o8t|YfjcoDv o£ Gpavarj xov.
Oral, anal and vigorous vaginal [contact] can lead to its breakage.
(44) ...t| 0£ppoKpaoia Kai oi evxove^  xpip£? [axriv mao) xa£7rq oa<;] 0a
p£i(baoDV xiq avxo/cc; xov.
...the temperature and strong frictions [in your back pocket] will reduce its 
endurance.
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On the frame level all of the above contain negative (and in particular danger related) 
vocabulary, and these are the only examples that such vocabulary is used in this text 
(as opposed to the prevalence o f the frame of danger in the women’s magazines).
The statements appear to contain new information, presented as authoritative although 
sometimes modified in terms of certainty or frequency. An increased (vaguely termed) 
‘danger’, reduced endurance and the possibility of ‘small disasters’ and ‘breakage’ all 
point to the probability of something negative happening. The authority lies in that the 
reader might have not been aware o f these possibilities, while the author is aware o f 
all dangers and warns the readers against them.
8.2.3 Assertions in Cosmopolitan
Due to its genre and content, the feature article contains a lot o f information that is 
presumed to be new to the readers. There are very few main clauses, however, which 
have as their main function just presenting new information. Some o f them present 
information that might be shared, or expected, serving to link to a further more 
surprising piece o f new information (as is the case with adversative connections), or to 
move on to the ‘advice’ section of the text, which should contain advice new to the 
reader.
There is new medical information about the diseases discussed (STDs) in categorical 
modality and authoritative tone, but they may be modified for frequency, as in Marie
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Claire i.e. it may be indicated that something is not always the case, as in the 
example below .94
(45) £ovfjGcD<5 8ev 8T]pioopyoovxai Kovdotabpaxa, 8ev vicoGek; appcooxT] 
Kai p£xa ano p£piKoo<; prjvsi; pe^P1 rcoXtax xpovia to avoooTrouixiKo 
ODtm|pa a7ropd>J.£i tov io goto tov opyavtapo.
Usually no genital warts are created, you don’t feel ill and after some 
months to many years the immune system expels the virus from the 
organism.
(46) ...o ep^ Tp; EioEpxExai axo VEopiKO aoaxripa, KpdpExai <ttt| 
07rov5i))aKi) oTf]>vT] Kai noXXanXaaia^ETai axa vcnpiKa Kdxxapa yopco 
ano tt|v ^epioxfj ;too poXovGrjKE.
...herpes enters the nervous system, hides in the spine and multiplies in the 
nerve cells around the infected area.
(47) Ta eXkti axTipaTi^ovv <poi)GKaIe<;, oKavs Kai yiaxpEDOvxai pexd ano 
7T£pi7rou 5oo p5opa5£<;.
Ulcers form blisters, burst and heal after about two weeks.
(48) Ta LMN p£xa8i8ovxai pcaco xcov acopaxiKcov oypcbv Kai ano xi]v 
aTTCoGEiaq £7ra(pfj tod Scppaxoq. Oi 101 8ev £7upicovoov 7T£piaa6x£po 
ano pcpiKa 5£OT£p6^£7rxa axov acpa.
STDs are transmitted through bodily fluids and from direct skin contact. 
Viruses don’t survive for longer than a few seconds in the air.
(49) [H yovoppoia Eivai] Xoipco r^] 7ioo npOKateixai ano Evav tdtto 
PaKXTipiSioo 3tod ^£i axo <T7T£ppa, axa 7tpo<T7T£ppaxiKd oypa Kai axa 
oypa tod KotoroD. Mcaa cje Xiycq £p8opa5£(; o io  ^EiaEpxexai axov 
KoXno Kai ano ekei rcpocoGEixai axa ava7rapaycoyiKa opyava.
94 Although in the Cosmopolitan  text it is always clear from the co-text, in the analysis I do not always 
specify which STD is being talked about. This is because in this thesis I am more interested in how the 
information is presented to the reader, than STDs them selves. O ccasionally the choice o f  information 
(content) is also significant, or sim ply helps make sense o f  the sentence, and in these cases I elaborate 
as necessary.
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[Gonorrhoea is an] infection caused by a bacterium type living in the 
sperm, pre-sperm fluids and vaginal fluids. Within a few weeks the virus 
enters the vagina and from there is promoted to the reproductive organs.
(50) H Xoipco^ T| 0£pan£V£xai pe avxipicooTi.
The infection is cured with antibiotics.
(51) O io<; [HIV] ^ei cxo Gnsppa, axo TrpoaTTEppaxiKO vypo, axa vypa 
tov KoXnov Kai axo aipa.
The [HIV] virus lives in the sperm, pre-sperm fluid, vaginal fluids and 
blood.
The affinities with medical and educational discourse mean that most of the above 
information is provided so that the readers will be able to identify the diseases and 
their symptoms, be aware of the ways o f transmission and perhaps understand more 
the physiological makeup of these diseases (e.g. viruses vs. bacteria).
However the characteristics of the diseases, as well as statistics o f people suffering 
from them, also serve to accentuate the danger posed by carelessness/ignorance, and 
thus justify the advice and convince the reader to read on and follow the advice:
(52) Ta noaooxd avxcov xcov aaGeveicbv Eivai vij/rj^d.
The percentages o f these diseases are high.
(53) Oi yvvaiKsq exovv ^epioaoTEpE^ pX£Vvoyov£<; pspppdvE*; axa  
y£WT|TiKd tov<; opyava ano xov$ avxp£<; Kai oi Xoipcb^EK; EVt]|Li£povv <je 
avxo xo vypo Kai e^oto nEpipaXXov.
Women have more mucuous membranes in their genitals than men and 
infections prosper in this wet and warm environment.
(54) EmnXsov, p&XPl T,lv *lXuda tcov 25 oi 101 dianepvovv mo EVKoXa 
ttiv KoXmKtj KOiXoxr]xa.
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Moreover, until the age of 25 viruses penetrate more easily the vaginal
cavity.
(55) To HPV e/e i Xapei rq  popipq e;ri5qpia<; otic; qX,iKi£<; 20-25.
HPV has taken the form of an epidemic among ages 20-25.
(56) ... xa  KovSotaofiaTa eivai 7toM) (isxaSoTiKa...
...genital warts are very contagious....
At the end o f every section (one for every disease), there is a sub-section entitled 
‘conclusions’. Depending on the way of reading the article (from the beginning to the 
end, or just bits and pieces), this information may not be new, in the sense that it has 
been mentioned before in the text. It is ‘new’ in the sense that the reader is presumed 
to not know this before reading the article. Moreover, it is important, and its repetition 
and visual salience (text-final, heading ‘CONCLUSION’ in capitals, background 
colour o f this section different to the rest of the text) emphasise this. Whether read for 
the first time, or as a ‘reminder’, it is presented as the new information the reader must 
retain from this section about the respective STD:
(57) LY M IIEPALM A : Ano Turcot HPV \inopei va TrpOKaXeaouv
yewqxiKa KovSnXcopara. A>J,oi 15 xv;toi pTtopsi va bqpionpyqaoov 
aXloicooeic; axov xpa/qta) TrpoKaXcovTaq KapKivo.
CONCLUSION: Two types of HPV can cause genital warts. Another 15 
types can create cervical malformations causing cancer.
The epistemic can/may has two functions: it indicates that lack o f these symptoms 
does not necessarily mean that a person does not have the virus, and it also indicates 
that having the virus does not necessarily result in further health problems for 
everyone. The epistemic modality does not necessarily mitigate the threat, though, as
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its presence enables the author to discuss (and mentally activate) the worst case 
scenarios without being inaccurate.
(58) EYMIIEPAEMA: O ep7rr|q eivai evaq 109 nov  5ev 0epa7rei3eTai, 
uXka avTipeTC07ri^eTai. IIpoKaXei e^apaeiq pe eTrtoSDveq (povaKaXeq Kai 
peTaSiSexai peaco rrjq 87ra(pfj(; tod Seppaxoq.
CONCLUSION: Herpes is a virus which is not curable, but is treatable. It 
causes outbreaks with painful blisters and is transmitted via skin contact.
(59) EYMIIEPAEMA: Oi xpi/opovdSeq 7tpoKaX,oi>VTai an o  eva 
piK poopyaviapo Kai pexa5i8ovxai a /e5 o v  n av x a  pe to ae^.
CONCLUSION: Trichomoniasis is caused by a microorganism and 
transmitted almost always through sex.
Categorical modality in most of these examples is quite notable, especially as, in some 
cases, it is used instead of other, equally grammatical and stylistically more elegant 
constructions. For example, in the case I have translated as ‘Herpes is a virus which is 
not curable, but is treatable’, the word-for-word translation would be ‘Herpes is a 
virus which is not cured, but is treated’, although even in Greek dynamic/epistemic 
modality would be perfectly in order. The same applies to other examples, such as: 
‘Moreover, until the age of 25 viruses penetrate more easily the vaginal cavity’, ‘With 
the use o f a condom the danger gets reduced by 90%.’,’The intestine skin gets injured 
much more easily than the vagina...’. All of these examples could have been expressed 
with dynamic or epistemic modality, while in the example ‘Women have 1 out o f 1 
000 chances to catch HIV through vaginal sex,...’ ‘chances’ clearly indicates a degree 
o f likelihood. However the choice o f numbers/statistics with ‘have’ formally 




According to Fauconnier, restrictive/defining relative clauses are processed as part of 
the noun phrase they qualify (1994: 9, 33; 1984; 1971/1975). Grammatically, often 
they could equally well be rephrased as adjectives, participles or prepositional 
phrases. Consider the following examples from Marie Claire:
Originals (and translations, with relative clauses):
(60) o i  0£pa7T£i£<; rcoo £ < p a p p o ^ o v x a i a f j p e p a  e / o u v  rcoMa 
p e io v e K x fj  p a r a . ..
the therapies which are being applied nowadays have many 
disadvantages
(61) x a  x e X e o x a ia  o x a x u m K a  a x o i x e i a  rcou a tp o p o u v  x o  7rpopX ,T |pa x o u  
K a p K iv o u  x o v  x p a x f j^ o i)
the most recent statistics which concern/ concerning/ on the problem of 
cervical cancer
Alternatives (and alternative translations, without relative clauses):
( 60 ’)  ?  o i  o r j p e p a  £q> app o^ 6pev£<; 0£pa7T£i£<; c / o o v  noXXa p £ io v £ K x f j p a x a . . .
7
(60” ) oi Gvy/povsq Gspaneisg s/ovv nOl'ka peioveKxfjpaxa
the currently applied therapies have many disadvantages
( 61 ’)  x a  x e ^ e u x a ia  a x a x io x iK a  a x o i / e i a  a x s x iK d  p e  x o  7rp6p X t |p a  x o u  
K a p K iv o u  x o u  x p a /r jX o u
the most recent statistics concerning/ on the problem of cervical cancer
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Restrictive/defining relative clauses are thus taken to hold when the main clause o f the 
sentence in which they occur is negated, since they still serve to determine the referent 
o f the noun phrase they modify. They are presented as an incontestable part o f the 
frame evoked by the noun phrase they qualify, and actually contesting them would 
require cross frame negation.
Non-restrictive/non-defining relative clauses syntactically resemble main clauses in 
that they are always in the indicative in Greek, but they have a relative pronoun in 
place o f a pronoun or noun phrase. A rather significant difference between non­
defining relative and main clauses is that their syntactical position assigns them a 
parenthetical status, which renders them less prominent and therefore presumably less 
open to contestation than main clauses. They can function as reminders o f (presented 
as) shared information, or explanations/ elaborations which are not open to 
contestation.
8.3.1 Relative clauses in Marie Claire
Defining/restrictive relative clauses are best analysed in conjunction with the 
existential presuppositions underlying the noun phrases. In the above examples from 
Marie Claire, ‘the currently applied therapies’ and ‘statistics on cervical cancer’ are 
also informative, as the referents have not been introduced earlier in the text. The 
readers are being informed that there are therapies at the moment for cervical cancer 
(yet insufficient, in contrast to the new preventive vaccine), and that there are statistics 
on cervical cancer (rather than guesses and estimations).
279
The below examples suggest that non-defining/non-restrictive relative clauses 
introduce non-defeasible, presented- as- shared, information.
(62) To veo EpPoXio... cto/ evei orr|v 7rpo<rraaia otto... tov<; TV7tov<; 6,
11 ,16 ,18 , ran) £v0vvovTai yia tov Kapiavo tov Tpaxfj^ov,...
The new vaccine... aims at protection from... the types 6 , 11, 16, 18, which 
are responsible for cervical cancer,...
The knowledge that the types 6 , 11 etc. of HPV are responsible for cervical cancer is 
presumably not already shared between author and readers, but among the medical 
community. The fact that it has to be mentioned indicates that readers are not expected 
to know that, but, at the same time, it is incontestable information, and necessary for 
understanding the aims and effects o f the vaccine.
On the other hand, we may have information which is not really new, both because the 
readers will already have this knowledge, but also because it may have already been 
triggered or introduced earlier in the text.
(63) ...avTKrcopaTa EvavTia <tto picrriTO io, 7rov p^opei va peTaTpeij/Ei £va 
ppabv evtovov 7r&0ov<; <T£ npaypaTiKo £(piaX,TT].
...antibodies against the hatred virus, which can transform an evening of 
strong passion into a real nightmare.
Here the information is shared and expected. The modality indicates a degree o f 
likelihood (epistemic), or ‘propensity’/ability of the personified virus (dynamic 
modality) without presenting the nightmare scenario as inevitable. The dynamic 
aspect however (i.e. the ability of the personified virus) indicates that this is not just a 
matter o f chance (the text is indeed about how this personified agent can be stopped 
from fulfilling this potential).
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( 64 )  Oi 101 «v\|/r|Xov k i v 8 v v o v » ,  rcov £v0vvovTai yia t o v  KapKivo t o v  
Tpa/fj^ov, 8ev 7rpoKaXovv 7ravTa KovSvIcbpaTa Kai 5 e v  e / o v v  opaTa 
avpTTTCopaTa.
The ‘high risk’ viruses, which are responsible for cervical cancer, don’t 
always cause genital warts and don’t have visible symptoms.
Here the non-restrictive relative clause does not just provide additional information, 
but is presented as explanation o f the term ‘high risk’ viruses -  technically this means 
that ‘high risk’ should entail ‘cervical cancer’, but since this is not automatically 
inferable, explanation is needed. Explanations are, due to their function, necessarily 
presented as incontestable information, in that they are meant to provide readily 
acceptable support for what they explain. However, they are ‘new information’ or 
‘reminders’ in that they are taken to not be currently among the beliefs accessed or 
accessible by the recipient for the processing o f the discourse.
At the same time this relative clause could well be seen as restrictive/defining, in that 
it sets apart the viruses in question from other viruses, and thus are included in the 
mental model of the referent of the noun phrase. There is the issue here of taking 
punctuation as the deciding criterion of whether to classify a relative clause as 
restrictive or non-restrictive, as punctuation might involve mistakes on behalf o f the 
author, creating an effect different to the one intended by the author, or might be 
ignored or processed differently by the reader.
Compare with
( 65)  r\ v £ a  la T p iK tj p e 0o 8o^  a t p o p a  c t tt iv  K a T a ^ o X ip i ia r i  evoc; and  T o v q  
t u o  £ 7 u k iv 5 v v o v < ; iov<; rcov T a X a ir cc o p o v v  s K a T o p p v p ia  av8pE <; K a i  
yv v a iK £ < ; a v a  t o v  K o o p o .
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the new medical method concerns the fighting off o f one o f the most 
dangerous viruses which hassle millions of men and women around the 
world.
‘One o f the most dangerous viruses’ and ‘viruses of “high risk’” are both qualified by 
relative clauses, but, based on punctuation, in the former case the relative clause is 
restrictive, and in the latter it is not. It does not seem to me that whether the sentence 
is restrictive or not makes a significant difference in meaning in these two cases.
The noun phrase ‘one of the most dangerous viruses which hassle millions of men and 
women’ presumably sets the virus as a referent apart from some dangerous viruses 
which affect fewer people, while if it was a restrictive relative clause the information 
about the number o f people affected would be presented parenthetically as additional 
information. In both cases the framing of the virus as dangerous is presented as 
incontestable, and the number of people it affects is presented as also incontestable 
new information. I would suggest that this kind o f non-restrictive relative clause is a 
less prototypical example in comparison to the most prototypical function of non- 
restrictive relative clauses for reference, as in ‘The woman who is wearing the red 
coat’, setting the referent apart from other women not wearing red coats. In this text 
both restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses can be used to introduce potentially 
new information (which is not required for reference but for adding elements to the 
‘virus’ frame), and present it as incontestable.
Consider also the following:
(66) O Ercndv8vvo$ io<; rcpowaXEi Xoipco i^i, rcov e/ ei 8v<ydp£OT£<; 
avv£rc£i£<; yia t o v  opyaviapo.
The dangerous virus causes inflammation, which has unpleasant
consequences for the organism.
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The non-restrictive relative clause here is also not contestable. It could be qualifying 
the whole main clause or simply the noun ‘inflammation’. Either way, it is most 
probably not only incontestable but also shared and/or expected knowledge (part of 
cognitive frame of inflammation), because it is sufficiently vague. A reader may well 
not have the specific details of what each inflammation causes, but no inflammation is 
expected to be anything but negative/unpleasant. So its inclusion here is not so much 
in order to provide (questionable) information in an unquestionable way, but rather to 
reinforce the already existing and mutually manifest negativity, as a ‘reminder’. This 
could equally well be expressed through a restrictive clause, which would set the 
‘inflammation’ apart from other, less dangerous inflammations. This would then be 
similar to the construction ‘one of the most dangerous viruses which hassle millions of 
men and women around the world’.
Although in theory then restrictive relative clauses present information which is 
already shared and incontestable as a way of determining a referent, while non- 
restrictive relative clauses introduce new information, or reminders as additional and 
incontestable information, this is not a clear cut distinction. Both kinds o f clauses 
package the information as incontestable and given. Whether the information is 
backgrounded or foregrounded seems to depend more on the length o f the clause, and 
whether it re-iterates previously mentioned information, than the presence or not of a 
relative pronoun (while other syntactic patterns may contribute to directing attention 
and emphasis -  see examples in 8.4). At least in the current data, choosing whether to 
present information in a relative clause or not seems to contribute more than anything 
to stylistic variation -  i.e., in order to avoid a monotonous ‘list’ of main clauses; the 
content and  function of both relative and main clauses (presenting incontestable 
information in an authoritative tone) generally overlap in this text.
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8.3.2 Relative clauses in Status
In the Status text there are three relative clauses which seem to be non-restrictive/non- 
defining, and a restrictive/defining one. The non-defining clauses function similarly to 
the ones from Marie Claire, analysed above; they present incontestable information 
which may be new or a reminder o f shared information, providing some explanation 
or elaboration:
(32) Oi rcepKTadrepoi anXdyq anodidovv K&rcoio vrcoKEipEvo npo$h\\m  (nov
£7TIT£IV£T(XI p £  TO X & T £^) <TT1]V ETTatpfj JIE TO X(XT£^.
Most [of them] just attribute some underlying problem (which gets 
exacerbated with latex) to contact with latex.
(67) Av t v / £ i  Kai avi)K£T£ c£ at)TO t o  piKpo rcoaoaTO, rcov 6vtg><; E/ei 
rcpopiiipa [i£ Ta rcpo<pv .^aKTiKd, t o t e  prcopEiTE va
XpT|aipo7roirj(7£T£ Ta rcpotpvXaKTiKa arco §£ppa rcpopdTOi) (rcov 
vrcapxovv aTa (pappaKsia) fj, arc^ovaTEpa, Ta rcpoipvXaKTiKa and 
7roXvot)p£0dvT|.
If you happen to belong to this small percentage, which indeed has a problem 
with latex condoms, then you can use the condoms of sheep skin (which exist 
in pharmacies), or, more simply, the condoms from polyurethane.
All three clauses provide explanation or elaboration on the noun they modify. In one 
case they contain shared knowledge which is repeated to facilitate processing: ‘this 
small percentage, which indeed has a problem with latex condoms’. ‘This small 
percentage’ anaphorically refers to the 17% of men who are allergic to latex. ‘Indeed’ 
indicates some doubt as to whether everyone who thinks they are allergic to latex are 
actually allergic.
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The relative clauses ‘which gets exacerbated with latex’ and ‘which exist in 
pharmacies’ both occur in brackets and provide probably new information. The 
presentation o f this content in parenthetical relative clauses is partly in order to 
achieve a more economical and elegant stylistic effect, but also probably indicates that 
this information does not merit emphasis by being placed in a main clause, ‘which 
gets exacerbated with latex’ explains why someone who has a different problem 
would assume that it is a latex allergy, and ‘which exist in pharmacies’ provides 
information as to where condoms made of sheep skin are to be found (this information 
is not necessary for the more widespread polyurethane condoms, or for the latex 
condoms -  it is presupposed that the reader knows where to get those).
The example below is a defining/restrictive relative clause, and it functions like other 
constructions I have analysed as ‘marked syntax’ in the 8.4:
( 6 8 )  n p & y p a  nov rcpaK T iK a o r ip a iv e i  o t i  npenei va 8 o K ip a a £ T £  5 ia < p o p a  
p£y£0Ti p £ x p i  va pp£iT£ avro rcov a a q  x a ip ia ^ E i .
[A thing] which practically means that you have to try various sizes until 
you find the one that suits you.
In Greek it would be possible to just say ‘which practically means that you have to try 
various sizes until you find the one that suits you’ (without the subject ‘a thing’), not 
only as a continuation of the previous sentence but also at the beginning of the 
sentence (although probably, like in English, this would not be acceptable in academic 
written genres). This would then indicate a close connection between this and the 
previous sentence.
The whole construction ‘A thing which practically means that’ provides a lengthy 
preface to the oblique assertion/command ‘you have to try various sizes until you find
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the one that suits you’. This does not seem to have the effect o f weakening or 
backgrounding the speech act(s) performed, but rather the contrary.
8.3.3 Relative clauses in Cosmopolitan
The Cosmopolitan article is mostly translated from an English original, in some cases 
adapted. The author is named as Hallie Levine, a health and lifestyle journalist (now 
Hallie Levine Sklar). I assume the original is not British due to references to a health 
system quite different from that o f the UK, which are too many and extensive to have 
been simply adapted to become closer to the Greek context. From other online 
writings o f Hallie Levine on the subject, with references to health insurance, I assume 
that she is American/writes for an American audience.93
It appears that the article is a very close translation because the syntax, and 
occasionally the vocabulary, o f the article often sound quite awkward in Greek. In 
some cases it has been possible for me to guess the English phrase which has been 
translated almost word-for-word. In some other cases, however, this is not so obvious, 
and translating back to English has resulted in even more awkward constructions. I 
have tried to avoid this, but sometimes I deliberately draw attention to the 
awkwardness or prolixity of the Greek text, as it is this text that the Greek readers are 
confronted with and have to process. It should be noted that although this excessive 
use of relative clauses often results from lack of effort on behalf of the Cosmopolitan 
translator, equally often certain adjectives or participles of English cannot be directly 
translated into Greek equivalents, and (restrictive) relative clauses have to be used,
95 See last section here http://vyww.cosm opolitan.com /advice/healtli/youne-wom en-health-6. last 
accessed 11 Aug 2011. Unfortunately I have not been able to locate the English original o f  this 
particular article online.
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unless the text is revised quite drastically (which apparently is not the case here). 
Below I present a selection of examples from the data.
Restrictive/defining relative clauses mainly serve to clarify reference, and, as I 
mentioned above (in 8.3), could have been incorporated into more concise Noun 
Phrases. ‘The areas which got infected’ could be ‘the infected areas’; ‘an STD which 
doesn’t have symptoms’ could be ‘an STD without symptoms’.
Some nouns need this clarification in a relative clause e.g. ‘the areas... which came in 
contact with those o f your partner’s’, ‘the way [in which] he reacted’, ‘a subject 
[which] I don’t discuss easily’, as ‘area’, ‘way’ and ‘subject’ are quite vague nouns in 
themselves:
(69) . . .K O v S o ta o p a x a , XsvKa r\ a x o  x p d > p a  t o d  S c p p a x o q  c ^ o y ic c o p a x a  a x o  
a i8 0 1 0 , fTxov Kokno, otov x p a r j  o x o v  7rpcoKTO -  x a  c r j p s i a  S T i^ aS fj 
nov  f jp G a v  a s  ETraqjTj p e  a v x a  x o u  <n)vxpo<poo g o d .
...genital warts, white or skin-coloured bumps on the vulva, vagina, cervix 
or anus -  the areas, that is, which came in contact with those o f your 
partner’s.
(70) . . .E K x ip i io a  xov Xpojro Ttoo avxeSpaoe K a i  KaxaXapa oxi Eivai 
Kamnoq 7ron np&mi va Kpaxfjaco.
...I appreciated the way in which he reacted and I realised that he is 
somebody that I must keep.
(71) «Moo apsaEi nokv va sipa i  pa^i g o d , yi’aoxo GeXto va sipai 
Ei^iKpivfjq yia Eva G£pa 7roo 8 ev  x o  GD^xaco EVKoka. . . . »
‘I like being with you a lot, that’s why I want to be honest with you about 
a subject which I don’t discuss easily. ...’
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Women who have caught it’ in the below could also be ‘infected women’ or ‘female 
patients’ etc.:
(72) To 75% tcov yovauccov 71:00 exoov KoX-Xfjaei 8 ev vicbGoov TiTroxa oao to 
paKTtjpio Kavci ttj ^npia too.
75% of women who have caught [it] don’t feel anything while the bacterium is 
doing its damage.
However, the relative clause creates more distance between the referent and the 
property described -  ‘women who have caught it’ are still primarily women, who, 
among other things, have an STD, while ‘infected women’ or ‘female patients’ would 
be primarily described in terms of their disease. The same applies to the ‘areas which 
got infected’ and having sex with ‘someone who has been infected’ -  this generally 
seems to result in representing the infection as something separate from the bodies of 
the patients or the patients themselves. The use of tenses referring to the past 
(including present perfect, which implies a past action), which would have been 
impossible without the use of full clauses, contributes to this, as present tense in this 
context would imply a ‘timeless’ condition. Compare this to ‘10% of women who 
have Chlamydia cannot have children’ -  in this case the women referred to seem to 
still ‘have chlamydia’, and be unable to have children for ever (while someone who 
‘has caught’ an STD can still get rid of it).
There are some cases, nevertheless, which are quite obviously awkward in Greek, and 
could potentially make processing more difficult for readers. For example:
(72) [H yovoppoia Eivai] Xoipco^r| 7100 7rpoKaX£iTai otto svav totto
p a K T T lp ib lO O  7100 ^£1 OTO < 77 t£p |ia  ...
[Gonorrhoea is an] infection which is caused by a bacterium type which 
lives in the sperm
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In the English original this could have been something like: ‘[Gonorrhoea is an] 
infection caused by a bacterium type living in the sperm’. A more concise translation 
in Greek would be
(72’) H yovoppoia TipoKa^Eirai and cvav rvno  paKrrjpiSioo 7rov £ei...
Gonorrhoea is caused by a bacterium type which lives...
As it is, currently the use of relative clauses, although awkward, does not impair 
understanding (although it might make processing more demanding), and it is 
reminiscent o f scientific or academic writing, which also include many relative 
clauses in Greek.
An example I found particularly awkward/unusual in Greek was ‘I realised that he is 
somebody that I must keep’ (example 70). I suspect that the English original must 
have been ‘he is a keeper’, which, in itself, entails an element o f irony in humorously 
presenting a partner as an object or pet one can keep or discard, but by now it has been 
conventionalised. Since there is no one-word equivalent in Greek, one could use a 
similar noun (e.g. ‘Ke^STroupi’, slang for ‘bargain’, which would be perhaps too 
informal for the tone of the feature), or use a different relative clause, e.g. ‘somebody 
worth staying w ith’. The stylistic difference, however, is so small, and the semantic 
difference negligible, so that such translations would still be processed accurately in 
the co-text, and probably contribute to the influence of English as a lingua franca on 
Greek, not only on a lexical but also on a syntactical/stylistic level.
All o f the relative clauses identified are slightly more salient than adjectives and other 
elements o f noun phrases, because they are longer, but since they are still modifying a 
noun (or pronoun), they would still require ‘cross-frame negation’ in order to be
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question or negated. In that sense they are closer to presuppositions on a frame level, 
since they modify the framing of the referents in the text.
The below non-restrictive relative clauses present new information to the reader:
(73) . . .  7 rp o x co p o t)v  <tti] p f j x p a  k ou  Tiq c a lm y y tq  aov ^poKa^cbvraq 
oopapfj loipco^Tj, 7tov ae Ka7roi£<; ;r£pi7rrcocj£i<; o8qy£i <j£ oT£ipoTT|Ta.
...it progresses in your uterus and fallopian tubes causing serious infection, 
which in some cases leads to infertility/sterility.
(74) Ek£(vt| opox; pe £cp£p£ C£ £7rouprj p£ xr|v a5£X,q>fj tqq, nov £(/£
TOV 1 0 ,. . .
She however brought me in touch with her sister, who also had the virus,...
Although the clauses ‘which in some cases leads to infertility/sterility’ and ‘who also 
had the virus’ modify a particular noun in the preceding main clause, they seem to 
function as meta-representative explanations o f why the previous information was 
mentioned. Thus, it is important that the speaker got in touch with her friend’s sister, 
because the latter also had the virus. In the example ‘serious infection, which in some 
cases leads to infertility/sterility’, the relative clause justifies why the infection is 
characterised as ‘serious’.
8.4 Marked syntax
In this section I discuss cases of marked syntax which involve a combination of main 
clauses and relative clauses. I have identified such examples only in the texts from 
Marie Claire and Cosmopolitan, possibly because the Status text is much shorter.
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8.4.1 Cleft-like constructions and marked syntax in Marie Claire
Clefts, pseudo-clefts and cleft-like constructions constitute the ‘grey area’ in between 
syntax and non-syntactically marked emphasis, indicating figure-ground distinctions 
in discourse (see Levinson, 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1986). Sperber and Wilson 
(1986: 202) discuss cleft sentences together with other kinds of emphasis (including 
sound volume and intonation) as minimising processing effort by emphasising the 
new or important element in the sentence. The line between cleft sentences and other 
forms o f emphasis becomes even more blurred when we compare English to other 
languages. In Greek, which is a pro-drop language, including a pronoun can produce 
the same effects as a cleft construction in English, for example. Thus, it is difficult to 
identify and analyse a category ‘cleft constructions’ in Greek data. The examples I 
discuss in this section do not constitute marked syntax in that they are somehow 
deviant or unusual for Greek speakers; they are, however, choices of phrasing that are 
somehow convoluted ways of putting something which could have been expressed 
much more briefly and concisely. They include either the 3rd person verb ‘TipoKevuai’ 
( ‘It/this is about...’), or NP + relative clause where a main or relative clause alone 
could be used, or a combination of both.
(75) ...xa xeXEUxaia axtmtmKa cxoi/Eia not) acpopoDv t o  7rpopX,T|pa t o d
KapKivoo t o d  Tpa/TjXou, aoGevcia 7roo (x t to te X e i  xa 8 e d t e p t |  o d x v o t e p t ]  
aixia Gavaxou pexa xov KapKivo t o d  paoxoD psxa^D xcov y d v o u k c d v  15- 
44 xpovcov.
...the latest statistics which concern/concerning the problem of cervical 
cancer, [an] illness which constitutes the second most frequent cause of 
death after breast cancer among women 15-44 years old.
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an illness’ here is redundant — one could have said ‘cervical cancer, which 
constitutes...’. As it stands, the construction can be seen as appositional, functioning 
like a non-restrictive relative clause, in apposition to its antecedent ‘cervical cancer’. 
Alternatively, it could have been phrased as ‘cervical cancer, which is an illness 
which...’, or it could have been put as a separate main clause: ‘Cervical cancer is an 
illness which...’. It is easy to see that the latter two options could have been avoided 
for economy. Moreover, pragmatically, stating through assertion that cervical cancer 
is an illness could easily come across as patronising, since most readers o f Marie 
Claire would be expected to know that. The NP + relative clause construction allows 
for the inclusion o f the word ‘illness’, adding to the cumulative effect o f the overall 
fear-laden vocabulary of the text, as discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 7). 
The content o f the non-restrictive relative clause is new information, presented as 
given but probably foregrounded due to its length, the choice o f syntax and also its 
content.
A similar construction occurs in
(76) Zty\ \  «KGi)jL)T£pT|» 7r£p(;rrcG(ni 5r|piot)py£i KovSvtabpaxa, ...non 
rcpoKatanjv fj7tio novo,... rj anopa Kai KoX.7tiKfj aipoppayia,
(ropnxcbpaTa Tton Kpovovv tov KcbSeova tod kiv86vov k<xi o8i]yo\)v tows 
aG0£V£i<; oto yiaTpo.
In the “best” case, it [HPV] creates genital warts, ...which cause mild pain, 
...or even vaginal bleeding, symptoms which ring the alarm bell and lead 
patients to the doctor.
Through the main clause we have incontestable new information -  ‘in the “best” case’ 
intensifies the proposition expressed, because it means that if there are no genital 
warts, it can only be something worse.
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The fact that the preceding clause presents a list of symptoms makes the construction 
‘symptoms which ring the alarm bell’ more necessary than in the previous example, as 
‘symptoms’ summarises the list. Omitting it and simply including a non-restrictive 
relative clause ‘...pain... bleeding, which ring...’ would be syntactically awkward in 
Greek, because o f the number disagreement between the last noun in the list (singular) 
and the verb (plural). Also semantically the personification (because of ‘ring the alarm 
bell’) o f ‘symptoms’ would not work if the noun was omitted. However in this case it 
would be perfectly acceptable (not only grammatically but also stylistically) to start a 
new sentence with two main clauses: ‘These symptoms ring the alarm bell and lead 
patients to the doctor’. This information apparently is not deemed important enough to 
be allocated its own main clause(s), and indeed is not particularly relevant to the 
questions o f what the symptoms and what the treatments are for HPV. The inclusion 
o f yet another two relative clauses again adds to the syntactically elaborate style of the 
whole text and to the overall ‘alarming’ tone.
However, the non-restrictive relative clause qualifying ‘the genital warts’ may well be 
processed as an assertion, because it also contains categorically phrased and important 
information presented as new. The whole sentence constitutes a paragraph on its own 
(39 words in total, taking up 12 lines o f a column), and the list o f disturbing symptoms 
o f genital warts is likely to attract more attention than the preceding main clause or the 
following relative clauses.
(77) O i SuodpeoTOi Kai avETriGupTiTOi 87ritTK£7TTeq nov ctKouv crro ovopa 
KovSutabpara p£Ta5i5ovTai p£ tt | tJc o^uaXiKfj £7racpfj...
The unpleasant and unwanted visitors that listen to the name [that are 
called] ‘genital warts’ are transmitted with sexual contact...
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The word-for-word translation ‘listen to the name’ means something like ‘are 
called / have the name’. The whole Noun Phrase (with the embedded restrictive 
relative clause) is longer than normal, which creates a stylistic effect o f deviation 
adding emphasis. It does not add much information except evaluative content 
(unpleasant, unwanted, and, ironically, ‘visitors’). The expression ‘that are called 
X ’/ ’that have the name X ’ creates some distance from the referent X, implying that it 
is something new or unusual (in other cases it might imply that the Speaker either 
does not agree with the labelling, or criticises X). To illustrate the function o f the 
expression, I conducted a quick Google search in Greek (14 March 2011), which 
brought up 4 cases o f ‘that are/is called...’ followed by the proper name o f a criticised 
individual or group, e.g. ‘the disappointment which is called England’, 3 cases of 
technological innovations (i.e., new information) e.g. Gmail introduces a new e-mail 
characteristic ‘which is called Smart Labels’, and one case of new and unexpected 
information delayed, perhaps for the purpose of suspense: ‘The hot transfer for 
Juventus which is called Federica!’ (Federica is the partner o f a newly acquired 
football player). In the case o f genital warts the distancing effect o f the expression 
does not rely on suspense, since readers already know what this is about, but it does 
present the ‘genital warts’ as both something the reader is unfamiliar with, and
• 96something negative.
(78) I I p o K e iT a i  y i a  e v a  e p p o X a o  7rm) x o p T iy E ix a i a s  TE<TO£pi$... SotJE iq ...
It/this is about a vaccine which is administered in four... dosages...
As a declarative sentence this should be an assertion, presenting new information. 
However, the new information is not that ‘this is about a vaccine’, since the existence
96 In Gricean terms, the additional meaning em erges via implicature due to flouting the M axim o f  
Manner -  consider for exam ple a phrase such as ‘the man who calls h im self Prime M inister’ in English.
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of the vaccine has already been introduced from the title. The actually new 
information is the content of the following relative clause (i.e. that the vaccine is 
administered in four dosages), as well as other following subordinate clauses (not 
discussed here). The placing of the new and important information in the relative 
clause is what makes this sentence similar (although not identical) to an English cleft 
construction, equivalent to ‘the vaccine is administered...’ in terms o f truth-conditions.
The use o f ‘7rpoK£iTai y ia’ (‘this is about’) allows for the re-introduction o f ‘the 
vaccine’ as new information (with an indefinite rather than definite article), which 
emphasises the authority o f the magazine and the ignorance o f the reader, and for the 
(oblique) assertion o f the virtues of the vaccine through the restrictive relative clause 
(to be included in the framing of the referent) rather than assertion. However, we have 
seen that assertions in main clauses occur very often in the text without necessarily 
being more contestable. Apart from stylistic elegance, the construction ‘rcpoKsiTai y ia’ 
+ N + relative clause creates emphasis in topicalising the vaccine, as in emphasising 
that ‘this is the important thing in this text’, with all subsequent information (at least 
in the same section) being related to that.
(79) T ia  va ^£Ka0apwrovp£ ra  npaypara, opco^, 5ev 7rpoK£iTai y ia  
0£pa7T£VTiK6 EppoXio, aTJka y ia  p ia  p£0o5o 7rp6X.r|V|/ri<5 mm 0copaKi^£i 
t o v  opyaviapo...
To clarify things, though, this is not about [a] therapeutic vaccine, but 
about a preventive method which shields the organism...
The telic clause could be seen as qualifying an omitted main clause (‘we are saying 
this in order to clarify’). The ellipsis takes emphasis away from the omitted (but easily 
inferable, and semantically unimportant) main clause. We could then take the telic 
clause as adverbially qualifying the main clause ‘it is not about a therapeutic vaccine’,
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with the focus on that main clause (as well as on the coordinated clause ‘but [this is 
about] a preventive method...’).
However, by being placed at the beginning, the telic clause frames everything that 
comes next, as does the negative main clause ‘this is not about...’. Pragmatically this 
anticipates and responds to thoughts projected on the reader, i.e. it is expected that 
Point out that the negation will be dealt with in the ‘pragmatics’ section the reader will 
assume that the vaccine can cure HPV. In terms of emphasis on the sentence level, 
attention is drawn to the need for clarification (by opening the sentence with ‘to 
clarify...) and negating an assumption (the assumption that this is a therapeutic 
vaccine) before presenting (presumably) new information in the affirmative; this 
places more stress on the new information because of the build-up indicating that this 
is going to be unexpected, and that it will clarify existing confusions. The use of 
‘rcpoKsixai yia’ adds to this effect (stress on the vaccine and its properties) -  as above, 
the proposition could still have been phrased as ‘the vaccine is not therapeutic, but 
preventive’. The ‘TcpoKSixai y ia’ continues to present the vaccine as unfamiliar 
through indefinite articles (or lack of article):97 ‘this is not about [a] therapeutic 
vaccine’, ‘[this is about] a preventive method’, and again it allows for the inclusion of 
additional ‘new’ information through relative clauses qualifying the vaccine. Because 
this information is in fact not particularly new or useful (in the metaphorical 
perception o f medicine as warfare all vaccines can be said to ‘shield the organism’, I 
would say that its main function is to provide positive evaluation for the new vaccine, 
which would be difficult to elaborate on so much without a whole clause. Thus this
97 Grammatical in Greek, but I w ill not discuss the usage o f  definite or indefinite articles here. In the 
translation I have used the indefinite article where it would have been used in English with the same 
function.
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evaluative information is not placed in a main clause, but is also afforded a relative 
clause rather than just an adjective, for example.
In this particular example we also have the reframing o f the vaccine as ‘method’, 
which is a superordinate medical term, not as specific as ‘vaccine’, but bringing in 
medical discourse terms as an indication o f authority. This is also made syntactically 
possible by ‘7tpoK8ixai yia’.
8.4.2 Marked syntax in Cosmopolitan
Assertions in the Cosmopolitan text present their content as new, incontestable and 
important knowledge, which should become known and remembered by the reader. 
As we saw, in some cases this is emphasised even more by the layout o f the text and 
verbal co-text creating salience, as is the case with ‘Conclusions’. A similar case is the 
separation o f certain information from the main body of the text in colourful boxes. 
One o f these boxes bears the title ‘DID YOU KNOW THAT?’ (capitals in original), 
which, as a pragmatic level analysis would suggest, implies that the reader might not 
know what follows, followed by new (presumably newsworthy) information in 
categorical assertions.
Similarly, in the example
(80) Korn evTDTtcoGiaKo: Ta mwjecoq oovodeijovTai and
Kd7roio dMo paKTiipidiaKO LMN, O7rco<; r\ yovoppoia.
Something impressive: Chlamydia is usually accompanied by some other 
bacterial STD, like gonorrhoea.
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the new information about Chlamydia is not only presented authoritatively, but is 
explicitly introduced meta-linguistically as ‘impressive’, which increases the salience 
o f the following information.
As in Marie Claire, there are also certain cases o f marked syntax strictly within the 
sentence boundaries. This is what I have termed ‘cleft-like constructions’ in 8.4.1, and 
they could be seen as introducing ‘presuppositions’, although the information they 
introduce is not actually backgrounded and overall amounts to an assertion o f new 
information, much like simple main clauses:
(81) To 7rio ooKapioTiKO eivai oxi t o  yeyovoq t to x ;  eiaai yovaiica ao^avei 
Tt|v ni0avoTT|Ta va poXovOeic; Kara ;ro)a).
The most shocking [thing] is that being a woman [word for word: the fact 
that you are a woman] increases the likelihood of you getting infected by 
far.
(82) To 7tio xpopaKxiKO, 7rdvT<Dc;, eivai oxi 7io>J,d LMN 8ev ekSiiXxovodv 
aopTrxcopaxa axis; yovainet; Kai kootoioi yovaiKoXoyoi 8ev Kavoov tk; 
o/eTiKeq e^eTaoeii;.
The scariest [thing], in any case, is that many STDs don’t show symptoms 
in women and some gynaecologists don’t do the relevant tests.
And from the testimonial of an STD sufferer:
(83) ...To xeipoxepo eivai oti po)a)v0T|K£ 11 pia aaX,7riyya poo Kai iocoq 
5ev pxcopeoco ^oxe va Kavco 7rai8 ia.
...The worst [thing] is that one of my fallopian tubes got infected and I 
may never be able to have children.
In all o f the above cases the main information of the sentence is not presented in the 
main clause (‘the worst (thing) is...’ etc.), but in the ‘that’ clause. The main clause
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functions as a meta-comment on the facts to be presented next, and, in theory, they 
could equally well be expressed through adverbs, when equivalents are available (in 
practice in English we could say ‘shockingly’, and in Greek there are no close 
equivalents to any of the adjectives used, but still other adverbs such as 
‘unfortunately’ could be used). They could also be expressed as clefts or pseudo- 
clefts, as in: ‘It is X that is the worst thing’ or ‘What is the worst thing is X ’. Using a 
main clause just adds more emphasis to the characterisation o f the facts under 
discussion which, apart from new and incontestable information, is also shocking and 
scary. (More precisely, the last two examples above are information not mentioned in 
the text before, while the first clause includes information already mentioned in the 
lead-in paragraph ‘young women are more vulnerable’, which is repeated/ reminded 
for emphasis). Thus the information in the subordinate clauses is actually quite salient, 
so it is not prototypical presupposition in the sense of ‘forming the ground’.
One can see how these clauses function similarly to ‘did you know that?’ or 
‘Something impressive’, followed by main rather than subordinate clauses. A similar 
example is in the parenthetical ‘are you ready for this?’, and the adverbial ‘even 
worse’, in the following, from the lead-in paragraph:
(84) Kai -  E i a a i  7r p o £ T O ip a ( jp £ v r | y i ’a i r r o ;  -  01 V££<; y v v a iK eq £ i v a i  ;uo 
exmaQziq. AKopt] izipoTzpa, o y i a x p o ^  p ; r o p £ i  v a  pT] a £  £ / £ i
£VTlp£pcb<7£l.
And -  are you ready for this? -  young women are more vulnerable. Even 
worse, the doctor may not have informed you.
Cleft-like constructions can also involve the use of relative clauses (as with actual 
clefts and pseudo-clefts). As with the previous examples, I consider these cases 
marked because they could have been expressed much more concisely in order to
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convey pretty much the same content, and the longer construction attracts longer 
processing time and more attention.
8.5 Conclusion
Analysis of the three sample texts has shown that indeed main clauses in the indicative 
provide new information for the readers, mainly on sexually transmitted diseases, 
cures and preventive measures. These assertions may further serve to remind of, and 
bring attention to already known/shared information, justify the need for advice on the 
subject matter of the texts (problem construction), and justify particular pieces of 
advice. Finally, categorical assertions legitimate the positioning of the 
magazine/Speaker as an authority, more knowledgeable than the readers. These 
assertions are not easy to contest, not because they are backgrounded, but because it is 
very likely that a casual reader will not have the cognitive resources and/or motivation 
to do so.
By examining assertions providing new information we can also tentatively draw 
conclusions about what knowledge is presumed to be shared between text producers 
and readers, as this would be knowledge not asserted in the texts. Thus, all three texts 
presuppose that the readers are sexually active and have some knowledge of STDs and 
condoms -  thus the information on these will be more detailed rather than very 
general and basic. Marie Claire, in a hybrid between advice text and news report, 
presents detailed information on how dangerous HPV is and how ineffective cervical 
cancer treatments are presupposing that readers either do not know all the details 
about these topics, and/or need reminding. In both cases this information legitimates
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the purpose o f the text and enhances its news value as it introduces new information 
about the HPV vaccine.
Status implicitly acknowledges that readers have some knowledge about condoms, 
presupposes that readers use them, and undertakes to fill in small gaps in the readers’ 
knowledge. These details (e.g. historical background on the invention of condoms, 
information o f the variety of condoms available on the market) further serve to 
promote condoms as consumer goods. It is presupposed that readers are not 
knowledgeable enough about the issue o f latex allergies, on which a ‘medical expert’ 
is recruited, while statements about the dangers o f improper use o f condoms legitimise 
giving advice on how to use and store them while avoiding a patronising tone. 
Information on sexually transmitted diseases or other forms of contraception is not 
provided -  this could imply that readers already know all they need to know about 
these topics, but also gives indications as to what it is that men ‘need’ to know about 
these issues. The merely cursory mention of STDs and procreation indicate that the 
readers are aware of the two main functions of male condoms, but the focus lies on the 
male readers’ comfort and celebration of the variety o f types of condoms available 
nowadays, rather than the negative consequences of not using condoms.
The Cosmopolitan feature contains elements o f medical and educational discourse. 
The information that STDs are transmitted via sexual contact is taken for granted, 
because it is shared or at least very readily inferable. Thus we have more detailed 
information on how exactly each STD is transmitted via sexual contact, e.g. via 
kissing, skin contact, exchange of fluids etc., as well as medical/biological 
information on the type of microorganisms causing the diseases and their 
development, symptoms and results.
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In the analysis o f relative clauses and marked syntax we can see how relative clauses 
can function as ‘oblique assertions’, in van Dijk’s terms (2005). In longer sentences 
with heavy content of ‘new information’ these could attract just as much attention as 
main clauses, when they present equally important new information (e.g. in Status 
parenthetical relative clauses help fill in the ‘small gap’ in the readers’ knowledge 
about where to find sheepskin condoms). Occasionally they are added on as an 
afterthought, with the function of reiterating relative well-known information, which, 
however, emphasises the negative evaluation of the virus and positive evaluation of 
the vaccine (for example that HPV can result in a ‘nightmare’, or that ‘high risk’ 
strands of the virus cause cancer). The use of restrictive relative clauses in particular 
shows most clearly that ‘framing’ can supersede the Noun Phrase level, unless we 
classify them as embedded in the Noun Phrase to begin with. Through iconicity this 
draws attention to the referent of the Noun Phrase and its properties, although, as we 
saw in Cosmopolitan, this can also contribute to distancing the ‘person’ from the 
‘disease’, resulting thus in a comforting effect. Marked syntax is used in Marie Claire 
and Cosmopolitan for emphasis, mostly enhancing the alarming tone o f the texts, 
while in Marie Claire they also emphasise new/unexpected information, namely, the 
news o f the discovery and availability of the HPV vaccine.
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Chapter 9: Conditionals and hypothetical spaces
9.1 Introduction
In terms o f Mental Space theory, ‘i f  as a marker o f conditionality sets up a mental 
space o f a scenario (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 11), in a way very similar to that 
o f Possible Worlds Theory (Kripke, 1972/1980). There are two significant differences 
between Mental Spaces and Possible Worlds. Firstly, Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 
11) observe that
mental spaces represent a more general mechanism than possible worlds, referring not 
only to very partial cognitive ‘world’ or ‘situation’ constructions as well as to more 
complete ones, but also to a variety of non-world-like structures, which can be 
connected and mapped onto other cognitive structures.
They bring in metonymy as an example (metaphor could be another one), where the 
mental spaces in question constitute whole domains and/or elements within the 
domains, rather than worlds (for ‘domain’ see Langacker, 1987; Croft and Cruse, 
2004). For the time being I will leave aside the criticism that this is exactly one o f the 
major weaknesses of Mental Space theory (a mental space could practically be any 
sort o f mental representation), and focus on Mental Spaces on the sentence level, 
which prototypically evoke mental representations of (past, present, future or possible) 
‘states o f affairs’/ ‘worlds’ or ‘situations’.
Secondly, although ‘setting up a Possible World’ can be criticised as a rather 
metaphysical notion (Ken Turner, Personal Communication, 2008), which presumably 
is not sufficiently ‘realistic’ or ‘scientific’, a Mental Space is a mental representation 
exploiting the human capacity of imagination98 and does not tell us anything about
98 B y ‘im agination’ here I do not mean a particularly creative ability, but rather the human ability to
represent the world — and ‘possible worlds — mentally.
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whether the mental space/scenario set up is indeed possible, real or realistic, and to 
what degree, and its locus is the mind rather than some parallel Universe."
Mental spaces are different from possible worlds ..., most importantly in that they are 
not objective in nature, nor necessarily describable in terms o f Boolean truth 
conditions; and also in being local rather than global (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 
30).100
In this section I will be mostly following Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: esp. Ch. 1 
and 2) for the analysis of conditionals, further linking the textual examples to the 
ideological functions of conditionals in the data.
A category which occurs quite often in the data is that of generic conditionals (as in ‘if 
you heat water to 100°C, it boils’). Generic conditionals (and generic statements 
overall) are not surprising for the genre. Provision and legitimation o f advice involves 
establishing authority and imparting ‘knowledge/wisdom’, among other things. This 
would definitely involve general knowledge about facts/the world, statements that are 
not true within a particular interactional context but ‘always’, as it were (van Dijk, 
2003). Generic conditionals make sense here also because the addressee is not known 
to the author/speaker. The reader is addressed, but necessarily through ‘generic you’, 
as mass communication does not and cannot aim to provide tailor-made advice to each 
individual reader/addressee. Therefore the author needs to construct a variety of 
scenarios and provide advice for each of these scenarios. Some of the generic 
conditionals in the data could also be seen as predictive; and there is some overlap 
between them anyway (generic prediction -  for further details, see Dancygier and 
Sweetser, 2005).
99 Adm ittedly the mind is also a theoretical construct (van Dijk, 2003), and also I’m not entirely 
unconvinced that a theory o f  parallel Universes is such a misguided notion, but 1 w ill leave this for a 
thesis on Philosophy and Quantum Physics as it is beyond the scope o f  this one.
100 This definition o f  mental spaces is very close to the theory o f  Text W orlds and Sub-worlds as
discussed by Werth (1999).
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There is also overlap between if- and when- clauses when it comes to generic 
predictions in the cases where ‘when’ refers to the future (consider: ‘When you heat 
water to 100°C, it boils’). Therefore in the analysis below I will also analyse ‘when’ 
as a space builder and consider its temporal and conditional functions.
Throughout the analysis I will be providing some comments on form and aspect, but 
overall I have not investigated thoroughly the role o f form, aspect and tense as mental 
space builders (Fauconnier, 1985) and therefore I will not be focussing on these here.
9.2 Hypothetical spaces in Marie Claire
(85) H tr a o u S a io T r iT a  t o d  e p P o X io t)  y i v e r a i  avTiX,T|7rrfj a v  7raparr]pfjtT£i<; 
7rpoo£KTiKa x a  T £X ,£\)T aia ctt(x t i(j t i k <x (TTOixcia nov a tp o p o u v  t o  
7r p 6 p X T |p a  t o d  K a p ia v o t )  t o d  r p a x f j ^ o u ,  a c 0 £ V £ ia  7tov anoTeXsi r a  
5£U T £p r| cruxvoTfipr) a m a  G a v a x o u  p £ T a  t o v  K a p K iv o  t o o  p a o x o o  
p £ T a ^ o  tcov y o v a iK tb v  1 5 - 4 4  x p o v c o v .
The importance of the vaccine becomes perceivable/ apparent if you 
observe carefully the latest statistical evidence regarding the problem of 
cervical cancer, a disease which constitutes the second most frequent cause 
o f death after breast cancer among women 15-44 years old.
This conditional is unusual in that the protasis is in the form of ‘if + subjunctive’
(perfective -‘av 7capaxr|pf|a£i<;’), which should normally be accompanied in the
apodosis by future tense, whether perfective or imperfective ( ‘yivsiai avn?ir|7rrf|7
‘will become apparent’ or ‘will be becoming apparent’). That would then be a
predictive conditional. However the apodosis here is in (habitual) present tense
(‘becomes perceivable/ apparent’/ ‘yivsiat avTiXTpmV). I would argue that this, as
well as the fact that the apodosis precedes the protasis here, primes a generic reading
of the sentence, corroborated by the generic you and the content of the sentence. The
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syn tax  is aw kw ard , but it w ould  be even m ore aw kw ard  to use sub junctive  p rogressive  
in the  p ro tasis here ( ‘av  7tapaxr|p£l(;’, indicating som e sort o f  con tinuous observation).
However, at the same time, ‘if + perfective subjunctive’ is very common in uses of 
conditionals as indirect directive speech acts (as it is in English, for example ‘it would 
be great if you could...’ or ‘this will become easier if you...’). The conditional in such 
cases would function as a perfective imperative (as opposed to a progressive 
imperative, which is also possible in Greek), and this might have influenced the 
choice o f an imperfective verb form in the protasis here.
The protasis of the conditional in this case sets up not only a ‘possible’ but also a 
‘desirable’ world (thus functioning as deontic modality). The whole sentence is a 
preamble to the new information and statistics, some of it in the same sentence, some 
in the next. It frames what is to follow as important, but presupposing the importance 
o f the vaccine (through existential presupposition) and urging the reader to observe 
the following statistics carefully. This highlights the news value o f the text, as it 
justifies why the release of this vaccine is important, newsworthy, and relevant to the 
readers.
The two examples below (86 and 87) are generic predictions, the first one conditional, 
although I would argue that the second is also conditional:
(86) Ee eiSikec; mwefjKEq O 10<; p7top£i va p£Ta8o0£i Kai \ie ti] SEppaTiKtj 
£7taq>fj -  £i5iKd av trro 86ppa v7rapxoi)v £K5op£<; ;rou £7UTp£7roi)v tt]v 
avraXXayrj vyptbv avapEaa <rra a ro p a .
In/under special circumstances the virus can be transmitted also by skin 
contact -  especially if on the skin there are scratches which allow 
exchange of fluids between persons.
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The condition here is ‘in special circumstances’ -  it already sets up a mental space 
Special Circumstances’, within which the virus can be transmitted with skin contact. 
The clause ‘especially if on the skin there are scratches which allow exchange of 
fluids between persons’ could be one of the ‘special circumstances’. This would thus 
be a sub-space (one o f the cases where i f  ‘delimits generic subclasses o f generic 
categories’ (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 99).
The assertion is epistemically modified (although ‘can’ is also dynamic here), but by 
the default interpretation of i f  as i ff  (‘if and only i f ,  according to Dancygier and 
Sweetser, 2005) the virus can be transmitted via skin contact only if there are special 
circumstances, the most notable of which is the presence o f scratches on the skin.
(87) 'Oxav, Xourov, xa Kov8i)Xcbpaxa eivai apcoa opaxa, r\ ^poaoxfi 0a 
7cp£7t£i va Eivai XEpaaxia. Oi GE^ovaXiKEq £7ra(p£<; 0a 7rp£7i£i va 
amocpEuyovxai p i/p i va E^acpaviaxotiv xa Kov5t>Xa>paxa.
Thus, when the [genital] warts are directly visible, attention [care] will 
have to be huge. Sexual contacts should [will have to] be avoided until the 
[genital] warts disappear.
The extract occurs immediately after the example 86, and continues communicating 
generic meaning: in every case where genital warts are visible, care should be taken. 
Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 98) observe that when indicates inevitability, or 
certainty on behalf of the speaker that the w/7erc-clause represents a state of affairs that 
definitely is, or will be, the case. Yet we cannot interpret the extract as suggesting that 
all readers have or will acquire genital warts, which will in addition be ‘directly 
visible’. The when-clause clearly refers to a hypothetical situation where anyone 
having visible genital warts should take care. Notably the definite expression ‘xa 
KovSuXcbpaxa’ (‘the genital warts’) does not constitute an existential presupposition 
that the addressee (or anyone in particular) has genital warts, but rather evokes the
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genital warts within the mental space where there are genital warts ( ‘when the 
[genital] warts are directly visible’) — for economy, instead o f ‘when there are genital 
warts, and the genital warts are visible’. It does not, however, have the misleading 
effect o f convincing the reader that the existence o f genital warts (in the reader’s local 
context) is unquestionable,101 but rather of being an indefinite reference in fact, to 
genital warts existing in the hypothetical/conditional mental space of ‘special 
circumstances’.
Due to local coherence, ‘when the [genital] warts are directly visible’ can be read as 
an elaboration/explanation of ‘scratches’, or rather as one sub-set o f ‘scratches which 
allow exchange o f fluids between persons’, or, more likely (since genital warts are not 
scratches), as another sub-set of ‘special circumstances’ (in addition to scratches). 
Therefore, both ‘if on the skin there are scratches which allow exchange of fluids 
between persons’ and ‘when the [genital] warts are directly visible’ build and 
populate mental spaces embedded in the space ‘in special circumstances’, which are 
separate but on a par. Both states of affairs are possibilities of special circumstances.
It may be the case that in fact all of the text (and all magazine advice texts as a genre) 
builds a hypothetical world within hypothetical world (much like text worlds in 
Werth, 1999), and it is due to the genre that even assertions can be read in a 
hypothetical light. If that is the case, temporal-conditional w to -c lauses  have the 
conditional dimension not because of the meaning of when, but because the when- 
situation occurs within a mental space which is already hypothetical. However, in this
101 On the other hand, we might argue that it is indeed certain and inevitable that someone, somewhere 
in the world w ill have visible genital warts. H owever, mental spaces are local, and the interpretation o f  
conditionals (and w//e«-clauses for that matter) is also local (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 29-30; 
40).
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context there does not seem to be an epistemic stance indicating certainty any more 
than with //(contra Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 98).
The same observations can be made about the following example:
(87) Exov av8pa, oxav oi p^dpet; cw ai epqxxvsic;, r\ Si&Yvotrq axr|pi^£xai 
<rxr|v K/aviKij £^£xaai|, evco ae avxi0£XT] n£pmxo)or|, duaxn/coq, o ioc; 
7rapap£VEi... am)>Jjt;rxo<; Kai 5pa av£vox^T|xo<;.
In men, when the damage is visible, diagnosis relies on clinical 
examination, while otherwise, unfortunately, the virus remains... on the 
loose and acts unimpeded.
When sets up a mental space where the damage is visible, and an alternative mental 
space where the damage is not visible. ‘Men’ is generic (lit. ‘the m an’ in the Greek 
original -  definite singular nouns are often used generically in Greek), as well as the 
‘habitual’ present tense/ imperfective subjunctive. Again we have almost complete 
overlap between when and i f  not only in the generic meaning but also in the epistemic 
stance. Again, this does not comply with Dancygier and Sweetser’s (2005) distinction 
between the two -  when here does not suggest that it is expected that the protasis is 
more certain to take place than it would be if i f  was used. In fact, the alternative space 
(of invisible damage) is not only evoked, but is explicitly mentioned in the text: 
‘otherwise’ actually is phrased word for word as ‘in [the] opposite case’. Both 
‘otherwise’ and ‘in the opposite case’ set up alternative mental spaces, and indicate 
conditions for the fulfilment of the apodosis.
Both spaces (‘Visible Damage’ space vs. ‘Invisible Damage’ space) are alternative 
sub-spaces of a broader space where a (generic) man has the HPV virus. In that sense 
the presence o f the virus is presupposed for the extract to make sense at all. The 
existential ‘oi f&dp£<;’ (‘the damage’) presupposes that there is damage, caused by the
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virus, and it is the concept of ‘damage’ in conjunction with the topic o f the text (and 
immediate co-text) that the presence of the virus is inferred (‘damage’ triggers the 
frame o f ‘HPV virus’).
In comparison to the presentation o f diagnostic methods for women, fewer details are 
provided about the kinds of examination for HPV diagnose in men. It may be assumed 
that this is not of interest to the female reader, it may be not known to the author or the 
author might take it as irrelevant (or might want to present it as irrelevant). The 
explicit mention of the alternative possibility (that of non-diagnosis) makes it more 
salient -  note that this alternative space would have been inferred anyway. Perhaps 
stressing the fact that HPV can remain undiagnosed in men is meant to emphasise the 
importance o f safe sex for women, functioning as a warning. This is somewhat 
misleading though, since for women HPV can also remain undiagnosed -  the 
suggested tests for women also only detect visible damage, in a way. This might be a 
trace o f what occurs in the Cosmopolitan text on a much larger scale -  ‘double 
standards’ in alignment between the narrating/authorial persona and the assumed-to- 
be-female reader, with a focus therefore on the interests, fears and experiences only of 
(the projected, ‘ideal’) women.
(88) Av EKSWOq KplVSl OTI 7ip£7C£l VO D7TOpX,T|0£l^  0£ 0£pa7T£ia, £££ T)7t6\|/T| 
gov oti G£ a\aXoyx\ aycoyf| 0a  7rp£7T£i va o^opXri0£i Kai o cpomKoq 
oi)VTpoq)6<; aov.
If he [the doctor] deems that you must undergo treatment, bear in mind 
that your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too.
Here //builds the mental space of a possible scenario where the doctor deems that the
reader needs treatment (let us call it ‘the mental space o f the Treatment scenario ). he
deems that’ builds an embedded mental space within this scenario: the doctor’s belief
world, ‘you must undergo treatment is the content of the doctoi s belief. Due to
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interaction with real-world-knowledge, the doctor’s belief can be expected to be taken 
as true in the real world as well. That is, the proposition is inherited in the mental 
space o f ‘the Treatment scenario’ because the doctor is accepted as an authority (if the 
doctor thinks you should get treatment, then you should get treatment). The deontic 
modal through which the doctor’s belief/judgement is presented (‘must’) indicates a 
high degree o f obligation.
‘Bear in mind that’ is also a space builder. As an imperative it directs the reader to 
include the belief following in the ‘that-clause’ in her Belief World (i.e. ‘that your 
romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too’). The that-clause could in fact 
be taken as the apodosis o f the conditional (rather than the imperative), in that it 
represents an obligation which is only there if the protasis is also true (i.e. if the doctor 
indeed judges that the reader must undergo treatment).
The whole conditional could be rephrased as ‘Bear in mind that if he deems that you 
must undergo treatment, your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment 
too’. The sentence opens with the protasis probably for emphasis. In addition, even if 
the different position o f ‘bear in mind’ motivates slightly different readings (the 
second being ‘bear in mind that your partner will need treatment if and only if the 
doctor deems that you must undergo treatment’), this is not significant because the 
proposition following ‘bear in mind’ floats into the mental space o f the ‘Treatment 
scenario’ anyway. In both readings, ‘your romantic partner should undergo relevant 
treatment’ takes place in the mental space o f the Treatment scenario.
The fact that the reader is told  (via an unmitigated imperative) to include the 
proposition in her belief world makes the statement that ‘your romantic partner should 
undergo relevant treatment’ incontrovertible within the Treatment scenario. Due to the
pragmatics o f ‘advice’, the author is presented as believing that it is good for the 
reader to have the belief/knowledge that ‘if he deems that you must undergo 
treatment, your romantic partner should undergo relevant treatment too’. The deontic 
modal ( ‘should’) is also quite strong, and unmitigated (as opposed to, e.g. ‘should 
probably’, or ‘it would be desirable to...’). The tone is, overall, authoritative. Notably, 
in Greek the imperative ‘e%e vno\\fr\ ooo’ very often introduces new information 
(although the first person indicative ‘s^co i)7t6\|/r| poo’ not necessarily). It seems to 
metalinguistically suggest that ‘I’m telling you this because I predict that this will be 
useful to you although you might not have thought of it so far’.
(89) 'E to i  5ev np&nzi v a  T ra p a leiT reiq  v a  K d rm q  p i a  (p o p a  t o  / p o v o  to  t e s t  
IIAn -  EKToq K a i a v  o y ia T p o q  o o o  K p iv e i  5 ia < p o p £ T iK a  t t |v  s^ETaor] 
7Cov 0a aoi) Sei^ei a v  e x ei(? T1lv a ^ o / i a  v a  (pspE iq to v  ettikivSovo io.
Thus, you must not omit doing once a year a PAP test [cervical screening] 
-  unless [lit. except if] your doctor deems differently -, the exam which 
will show you if/whether you have the misfortune of carrying the 
dangerous virus.
There is no one-word Greek equivalent to unless, but ‘siccog xai av’, ‘ektoc; ki av’ and 
‘EKioq av word for word mean ‘except (and) i f .  ‘Except i f  (and the Greek equivalent 
EKioq (xai) av’) is semantically more transparent than ‘unless’, but other than that they 
seem to be near synonyms, and in Greek both the functions of unless and except i f  
need to be fulfilled by ektoq (xai) av (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 193 ff. on 
excep t i f  in English).
As with English, unless-cl&usQS also appear in Greek usually after the main clause and 
often separated by a comma (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005. 183). In example 89 
the separation of unless- and main clause is even more marked, as the w ^te-c lause  is 
presented as a parenthetical clause.
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Glossing the unless constructions as Q; [(not Q) i f  P] (where Q is the main clause), 
Dancygier and Sweetser (2005: 184) observe that
Q-clauses [can] stand on their own as assertions, speech acts or generic statements — 
which are then somewhat restricted by the following unless-clause. The Q clauses are 
added to the current mental space of the story or the conversation; and assuming this 
to be some highly accessible space (possibly the base space [‘Reality Space’] or some 
space construed as a real future or past counterpart of the base), there is no need to 
identify it explicitly. Indeed, the space in need of identification is the space wherein Q 
does not occur, namely in the ‘unless’ space [P], which is set up in the following 
clause.
In this case, the unmarked mental space Q ‘you must not omit doing once a year a 
PAP test’ is attributed to the ‘reality’ space (the ‘base space’) -  in fact a generic 
reality space as ‘you’ addresses a generic woman.
The marked unless space (P) sets up an exception mental space, one o f a hypothetical 
scenario which is not very likely to happen (but with a small likelihood to happen 
nevertheless). The clause ‘unless your doctor deems differently’ would cover 
possibilities not occurring to the ‘generic woman’ addressed which is presumed to be 
overall healthy, sexually active, within a certain age range, etc. The adverb 
‘differently’ would include medical recommendations for having a cervical screening 
both more and less often than once a year.
Moreover the unless-cl&usQ functions as a disclaimer, with the authority o f the 
magazine deferring to the authority of the doctor. Indirectly it implies that the 
instructions of the magazine not only do not supersede, but if fact do not replace the 
instructions o f the doctor, a disclaimer which Status states explicitly. The indirectness 
here functions as a reminder in that the only way for the reader to know whether the 
doctor deems differently or not is to visit the doctor and ask.
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(90) H 7 r p o o p o ^ fj  ( to d  arco t o v  io  y iv c T a i  7r io  7 t i0 a v fj  a v  t o  a v o a o T to n y r iK o  
( to d  (TDCTTtipa e i v a i  T aX ,ai7ra>pr|p£vo.
Your attack/affectation from/by the virus becomes more likely if your 
immune system is maltreated/‘in bad shape’.
There are two unusual features in this sentence — the choice o f verb and the 
nominalisation.
It seems that the verb ‘to be’ has an imperfective aspect, in that it can refer to an 
ongoing and/or generic ‘state of being’, while ‘to become’ is perfective, implying 
there is a change-of-state-process with a beginning and an end (this has to do with the 
semantic frame of ‘become’ both in English and in Greek). In Greek (as well as in 
English, for that matter) ‘is more likely’ would be a more normal way to put it, which 
would then form a generic conditional in historical/habitual present tense (in the 
apodosis) and imperfective subjunctive (in the protasis).
The awkward choice of verb might be because the definite article ‘H ’ ( ‘the’) in the 
noun phrase ‘H 7ipoapo?if| ood ano xov io’ (‘your attack by the virus’) seems to take 
for granted that the addressee ‘you’ is already ‘under attack’, i.e. has already caught 
the virus, which is obviously not the case. It is also not desirable that such a reading 
would be triggered at all (even to be rejected), as disease is an unpleasant thing. 
Furthermore, politeness norms dictate that we do not attribute unpleasant things to our 
interlocutors, or assume something bad will happen to them -  a norm Leech termed 
the ‘Pollyanna principle’ (‘be optimistic’) (Leech, 1983: 1 4 7 - 148).
One then wonders why one would choose the awkward nominalisation ‘your attack by 
the virus’ in the first place, rather than an (appropriately mitigated) verb such as ‘you 
might be attacked’ or ‘you are more likely to get attacked’ and so on. It seems to me 
that this is a stylistic matter, with the author trying to emulate medical discourse.
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Processes are often referred to through nominalisations (with a definite article in 
Greek) in instructional medical discourse. These often occur in such discourse in 
generic statements; this does not imply that the disease under discussion ‘exists’ in 
any specific local context.
9.3 Hypothetical spaces in Status
Early in the text in Status we have a mental space set up by when. The subtitle reads:
(91) 'Orav EmXsysi^ k&7toiov va oe (puX-asi, ttpettei va ^spcit; ano not) 
KpajdEi T| aKODqna tod.
When you select someone [masc.] to guard you, you have to know [where 
he is coming from].
When indicates positive epistemic stance (high certainty that something will happen -  
Fillmore, 1986; 1990; Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 31-32), which seems to 
presuppose that the reader will select a ‘bodyguard’ (i.e. a condom). Yet the sentence 
is generic,102 not predictive, which means it is not bound to local context and it applies 
only to the cases when the addressee will indeed select a bodyguard. In that sense 
when here is interchangeable with i f  -  it seems to admit the possibility that the reader 
will not select a bodyguard -  or will not do so in some cases. The obligation to obtain 
knowledge about the ‘bodyguard’ is therefore not applicable for these cases.
Here Dancygier and Sweetser’s point seems to hold (2005: 95 ff.): although not 
predictive, when seems to indicate an expectation that the when-oXmst proposition
102 The when-clause is in imperfective subjunctive and the main clause in habitual present 
tense.
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holds or will definitely holdin the future, or that it is a default, generic truth with 
universal validity. It does not only indicate that there are some cases when the 
addressee will choose (and use) a condom, but that it is expected that he will do so (cf. 
Gabrielatos, 2008 on //-conditionals).
Both on the level of this sentence and on the speech act level o f the whole text, the 
fact that the focus is on getting more detailed information about condoms, as opposed 
to justifying why the readers must use condoms, for example, indicates that it is both 
shared and incontestable knowledge that readers use condoms, and know the reasons 
why they should. Here, as well as underlying the whole text, is also the presupposed 
assumption that readers are sexually active. The assumption is initially evoked by the 
activation o f the frame ‘sex’ through the mention of ‘using condoms’, which itself is 
accessed through the metaphor ‘the bodyguard/you select someone to guard you’. 
These associations are made possible at first glance by the presence o f the salient 
photo o f a condom in the middle of the page.
On the speech act level it is also presupposed that the readers (a) may not have enough 
information about the kinds of condoms among which they can choose and (b) will 
not take the trouble to check the ‘credentials’ of the condoms they use. Hence ‘you 
have to know’ at the same time presupposes that they do not know and indirectly 
(through the deontic modality) urges readers to acquire this information (by reading 
the article) and take it into account in their future choices.
By contrast the use of ‘if you happen’ below indicates negative epistemic stance:
(92) Av r i> x e i  k<xi a v r |K £ T £  ere a o x o  t o  p iK p o  7 1 0 0 0 0 x 0 , 7 roo  o v x c o q  tfz  1 
7 r p 6 p X r ip a  p s  t<x X a x e ^  7tp o (p \)X a K x iK a , t o t e  p 7 ro p £ ix £  v a  
X pT ]oipo7toiT joE T £ x a  7tp o (j) 'i)X aK T iK a  tt7 to  § £ p p a  7 r p o p d x o n  (7 roo
316
V7tapxouv oxa (pappaKeia) fj, anXouoTepa, ra ^pocpvXaKTiKa ano 
7ro>wVODp80avri.
If you happen to belong to this small percentage, which indeed has a 
problem with latex condoms, then you can use the condoms o f sheep skin 
(which exist in pharmacies), or, more simply, the condoms from 
polyurethane.
Word for word ‘Av ru^st icon avf|K£i£’ corresponds to ‘if it happens and you belong’, 
but the same relation can be expressed by the more grammaticalised (more fixed and 
less transparent) ‘Av tdxov [avf|K£T£]’, ‘tu^ov’ functioning as an adverbial. The fact 
that the percentage o f men allergic to condoms is small ( ‘pucpo Tioaoaio’) already 
means that chances for every given man to be allergic are low, but this is further 
emphasised by ‘Av ru%£i koci’. This generally shows the disbelief on behalf o f the 
expert towards the implication of the reader’s letter that the reader is ‘allergic to 
condoms’, while at the same time providing the solution for the mental space in which 
the problem actually exists.103
Example 92 is part o f the answer to the below question(s) (example 93):
(93) Ti va Kav£i kootoux; av eivai aXX£pyiKo<; axa 7rpo(pvX,aKTiK<x; Na 
yepiaEi tov 7rXavfjTTi p£ tod<; a7roy6voD<; tod;
What should one do if he is allergic to condoms? Fill up the planet with his 
offspring?
The first question ‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms?’ presupposes that 
there is something one should do if one is allergic to condoms. It should be noted that 
‘Ti va icdv£i’ in Greek does not contain a modal verb -  the verb ‘to do’ is put in the 
subjunctive. Such uses o f the subjunctive can be used as an alternative of the 
imperative in the second person, and it is the closest to the function of the imperative 
in the 3rd person (there is no 3rd person imperative in modern Greek). The common
103 Here i f  does not mean iff.
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characteristic of the imperative, this use of subjunctive and my translation is the 
deontic function.
Therefore, the deontic function is not presupposed (it is actually encoded in the 
sentence), but what is presupposed is that it is possible to do something, because such 
a ‘something’ exists. There is some enrichment due to context, in that this ‘something’ 
is clearly something to do with sex and condoms, most possibly contraception and/or 
protection from STDs (which is confirmed by a follow-up question, to be analysed 
below). The expert also interprets and addresses this question as being about ‘doing 
something’ in relation to condoms.
The protasis ‘av civai aATispyucoq axa 7tpoqnAaKTiKa’ ( ‘if he is allergic to condoms’) 
through the background knowledge of the frame of ‘allergic’ implies that one cannot 
use condoms, at least not ‘normally’, as a non-allergic person would do. This is an 
assumption corrected in the expert’s answer (who points out that it is not possible to 
be allergic to condoms in general, but to latex). The reader sending the letter though is 
presented as equating ‘allergy to condoms’ to not being able to use condoms. Thus the 
protasis sets up a mental space where a person (most likely a man) is allergic to 
condoms, and cannot use condoms. On the genre level this is the problem, and there is 
no solution present in the current hypothetical mental space.
Notably this is a speech act level conditional (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 16) 
in that ‘doing something (about condoms/contraception etc.)’ does not rely 
conditionally on ‘being allergic to condoms’. The speech act is to be taken as effective 
within the set-up space (ibid.) —the problem expressed by the question (and the request 
for a solution) is to be perceived as taking place in the mental space set up by the 
conditional (i.e. in the mental space where one is allergic to condoms). However, as
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with If I don t see you before Thursday, have a good Thanksgiving!’ (ibid.), the 
speech act is not to be retracted if the conditional is not realised. Here, in fact, the 
conditional does not hold (technically nobody can be allergic to condoms, only to 
latex condoms), but the request for information is still legitimate, and its 
presupposition still holds (indeed there is something that should  be done).
‘Fill up the planet with his offspring?’ can be analysed as an elliptical yes/no question: 
‘If one is allergic to condoms, should one fill up the planet with his offspring?’ This is 
a hyperbole which makes salient the use o f condoms for contraception and the 
implicature that if one is allergic to condoms, one will not use condoms, and therefore 
no contraception (and therefore one will have offspring). There is clearly a causal 
relation between protasis and apodosis.
The leaps in reasoning and the hyperbole make it clear that this is a rhetorical question 
-  the answer is obviously no, one should not fill up the planet with his offspring, at 
least not just because one is allergic to condoms. Such rhetorical question 
constructions (‘what should I do? X?’) occur often in Greek, where X is an 
undesirable action, clearly not to be done. This emphasises the dead-end in which the 
speaker finds her- or himself, running out of options. Coupled with the hyperbole here 
it also has a humorous effect.
I think that this question is interesting here. The question ‘What should one do if he is 
allergic to condoms?’ could stand on its own. The elaboration however is important as 
it projects a number of thoughts on the ‘ideal reader’ -  ‘average sexually active man 
who is allergic to condoms’. By foregrounding the option of no-contraception first of 
all it assumes that allergy will result to avoiding condoms, one could just as easily say 
‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms? Spend his days scratching?’ -  the
319
latter option would assume that it would be possible for someone who is allergic to 
condoms to use them and put up with the itchiness or irritation caused by latex. One 
could also ask ‘What should one do if he is allergic to condoms? Stop having sex 
altogether?’ - which would make salient the option of not having sex, and therefore 
not having to use condoms. The option actually considered in the hypothetical mental 
space is only the one of having sex without using condoms (and therefore procreating 
endlessly). Considering this option then places emphasis on having sexual activity no 
matter what (evoking stereotypes of male sexuality as hyper-active and uncontrollable 
-  cf. Hollway, 1984), and on not sacrificing comfort regardless o f the consequences 
(perhaps evoking and legitimising a level o f ‘masculine’ self-centeredness).
Second, choosing to foreground one consequence of not using condoms (offspring) 
backgrounds the other possible consequence -  STDs. ‘What should one do if he is 
allergic to condoms? Catch Chlamydia and end up infertile?’ o f ‘Catch HIV and die?’ 
would hardly allow for any humorous hyperbole. The question seems to project (and, I 
would argue, reproduce) the most widespread concern of the male ideal reader as 
being that o f unwanted offspring. One could argue that this mentality (carelessness 
about using condoms, not considering STDs) is only reproduced here in order to be 
criticised, however, in the expert’s answer these assumptions are not being addressed 
at all. They are though implicitly dismissed in that the expert suggests a number of 
alternative materials to latex, thus constantly presupposing that a condom will be used. 
The option o f not using condoms is neither denied nor confirmed as a valid option 
(and, incidentally, other methods of contraception are also not mentioned).
The following conditional, due to context, has a rather positive epistemic stance:
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(94) Av 8JCETE 7Tpoa£ £^l K&TTOIOV £p£0l<TpO, ... £7tlCTK£(p0£lT£ £V(XV 
ScppaxoXoyo.
If you have noticed some irritation,... visit a dermatologist.
This speech act conditional is in answer to the reader who enquires about allergy to 
condoms (example 93). The expert answering the question thus assumes that it is 
likely for the reader to think that he is allergic because he has noticed some irritation, 
but he has no way of knowing that. So he sets up a hypothetical mental space where 
the irritation has occurred, and the apodosis ( ‘visit a dermatologist’) applies within the 
context o f this mental space. I would say that the epistemic stance is positive because 
there is no alternative hypothetical scenario presented, which means that the expert 
considers this as the most possible reason why the reader would consider himself to be 
allergic.
On the contrary, I would argue that the below indicates negative epistemic stance:
(95) AV £KTT£ TTEplTOpfj, TTplV (|>Op£<7£T£ TO TTpOCpvXaKTlKO, 
p £ p a ic o 0 £ iT £  o t i  n  P a X a v o q  £^£1 a 7 ro K a)a )< p 0 £ i 7iXfjpco<;.
If you are uncircumcised, before you put on the condom, make sure that 
the glans is fully uncovered.
The previous example (T f you have noticed some irritation...’) (example 94) is
apparently given as an answer to a specific reader, and involves ‘guessing a
dimension o f his problem in order to suggest a solution. It responds to a very specific
concern, allergy.
Unless otherwise indicated, though, the whole article provides generic advice, which 
is presented as applying to all men in general, although in fact it addresses an ideal 
reader’ with specific characteristics which are normatively projected to ‘all men’.
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Therefore categorical assertions and deontic expressions are by default attributed to 
the ‘Reality’ (base) mental space.
In that sense, building alternative, hypothetical mental spaces is meant to address a 
variety o f situations and/or ‘types of men’, when differences are acknowledged in the 
relatively homogeneous group encapsulated in the ideal reader. (For example 
alternative situations are presented when at some point it is asserted that a condom 
which is too tight may break, while a too loose condom may slip.).
On the surface ‘If you are uncircumcised’ indicates neutral epistemic stance -  the 
addressee may or may not be circumcised, and the speaker has no way of knowing 
this. However, it does presuppose that some of the addressed men/target readers are 
circumcised and some are uncircumcised (as all conditionals set up a conditional 
space and evoke an alternative space ~P - Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005). Moreover, 
if it was assumed that the majority of target readers are uncircumcised, there would be 
no need to set up an ‘uncircumcised’ mental space, as this would be by default the 
base space ( ‘Reality’). For example nowhere in the text is a mental space set up ‘if 
you are sexually active’ -  it is taken for granted that the Ideal Reader is sexually 
active. Thus, uncircumcised men are addressed here as an exceptional case, for the 
sake o f completeness.
I find this odd because circumcision is not common in Greece among non-Muslim and
non-Jewish populations. In fact, the default is that boys and men are not
circumcised. 104 Apparently in Greece less than 20% of the male population is
circumcised (World Health Organisation, 2007
h ttp ://w w w .w ho .in t/h iv /m ediacen tre/in fopack_en_2 .pdf). O f course in G reece there
104 This has been uncommon in Greece since ancient times, while it was widespread e.g. in ancient 
Egypt (see Herodotus, History, Book II, http://classics.mit.edU//Herodotus/history.html, translated by 
G eorge Rawlinson. Last accessed Novem ber 2012).
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are Muslim and Jewish men, some of them belonging to indigenous minorities and 
some of them immigrants. I find it very unlikely, though, that the default target/ideal 
readers o f Status come from these categories -  the target readership of Status is 
‘indigenous’ and ‘white’ Greek men, overall o f Christian background historically 
(although not practising, judging both by common practice in contemporary Greece 
and the contents of the magazine). Why is this not then taken as the default? One 
explanation could be that the authors may be influenced by North American 
discourses on sex and condoms (most likely via American lifestyle magazines), as 
USA is the only non-Asian country in the Northern hemisphere where non-religious 
routine infant circumcision is practised. Another explanation is again related to 
globalisation, but broader -  the author considers that male circumcision is a possibility 
even in Greece nowadays, for whatever reason, and has no (briefer and more 
convenient) way of separating the circumcised from the non-circumcised readers, in 
order to give a piece of advice only to the latter, without making them sound somehow 
exceptional.
9.4 Hypothetical spaces in Cosmopolitan
The Cosmopolitan article is not only the longest o f the three, but also the most 
complete, in the sense that it aims to present an ‘encyclopaedic’ comprehensive set of 
information about STDs, while Marie Claire deals only with one STD and the new 
vaccine developed to prevent it (HPV), and Status only deals with condoms.
As a longer and comprehensive account Cosmopolitan presents a pattern in the use of 
conditionals. The majority of conditionals in the text deal with either hypothetical 
problems or hypothetical solutions regarding STDs. I have categorised the mental
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spaces set up by the conditionals as ‘Solution spaces’, ‘Problem spaces’ (which 
include the sub-category ‘Problem signs spaces’) and ‘Danger spaces’. 105 Solution 
spaces are mental spaces where the generic addressee is represented as doing 
something which will result in solving or preventing the problem. The protasis 
contains the ‘solving action’, and the apodosis is the positive result of this action. 
Problem spaces are mental spaces where the generic addressee actually has the 
problem (has an STD), and the apodosis is used to either provide a solution to the 
problem (as a directive speech act), or to inform the addressee of the consequences of 
the problem. Danger spaces are spaces where the generic addressee does something 
that increases the risk of the problem (i.e. catching an STD), and the apodosis presents 
the result o f this risky behaviour. Because the result will not necessarily follow from 
risky behaviour, these apodoses are most often modified epistemically (possible 
results).
It needs to be noted that these spaces are not exclusive in Cosmopolitan, nor are 
conditional constructions the only way to set up ‘Problem’ and ‘Solution’ spaces, for 
instance. This analysis merely indicates how conditionals in particular contribute to 
the setting up o f such spaces, in conjunction with their ‘population’ with relevant 
lexical items (problem- or solution-related). In the analysis of Marie Claire I have 
named various hypothetical mental spaces ‘Visible Damage space’, ‘Special 
Circumstances space’, ‘Treatment scenario space’ and so on. Clearly the precision and 
affinity to content varies in the naming of these spaces (compare with the space I have 
simply identified as an ‘unless-space ), while such naming could also occur in the 
Status text (e.g. we could identify the ‘Latex allergy’ space). The reason o f following 
a categorisation of spaces as an organising principle in this section is primarily for
1051 focus only on these categories in the data although these are not the only ones -  they are, however, 
the most prevalent ones.
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convenience and systematicity in dealing with a somewhat longer text. Such an 
approach would perhaps be useful overall if the framework was to be applied to larger 
bodies of texts, although it would present issues of arbitrariness vs. systematicity 
much like the issue of naming ‘discourses’ or ‘topoi’ in other critical discourse 
analytical research (see e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Sunderland, 2004; 
Reisigl, 2007; 2011). Addressing these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet a 
difference needs to be borne in mind in relation to Mental Spaces vs. discourses or 
topoi; discourses and topoi are generally defined as relatively stable socially shared 
ideological structures, pre-existing any given communicative event. A reader or hearer 
brings such pre-existing knowledge to the text and co-constructs the meaning o f the 
text based on this knowledge in conjunction with the specific linguistic triggers to be 
found in the text. Mental Spaces, on the other hand, are constructed on line and ad  
hoc. Therefore, by naming mental spaces in this analysis I do not make any claims as 
to the existence or content of pre-existing mental/social representations. It may be the 
case that advice texts routinely set up ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ mental spaces, and any 
systematicity as to the types of problems and solutions set up in specific genres would 
be motivated by relatively stable ideological structures. Naming such structures (as 
discourses or topoi for example) would perhaps entail claims about their content and 
evaluative stance in a way that naming mental spaces here does not.
9.4.1 Solution spaces
The hypothetical spaces illustrated below constitute spaces in which the problem is 
being solved, or does not occur in the first place.
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(96) M ^ o p o v v  x a  7rpo(pvX aK xiK a v a  p s  7r p o a x a x £ tjc jo t)v ;  A v  x a  
XPT|aipo7roi£i<5 7 td v x a  Kai a c o a x d ,  p 7 r o p o v v .
Can condoms protect me? If you use them always and correctly, they can.
(97) IIpompaxTi EpsDva eSei^e oxi av P<x^ek; 7ravxa npocpoXaKxiKO, o 
Kivdvvoq xt]<; Xoipco^riq peicovexai Kaxa 60%  <m<; yvvaiKEq.
Recent research has shown that if you [sing.] always use a condom, the 
danger o f infection gets reduced by 60% in women.
(98) EKaxoppnpia avOpcoTroi e / o v v  EM N' akXa av sivai si)aKpiv£i<; Kai 
TrpooEKxiKoi, 8 e v  0a KoXXfjaovv xov^ avvxpocpov^ xovq.
Millions o f people have STDs; but if they are honest and careful, they will 
not [give them to] their partners.
The first two examples (96 and 97) are about Chlamydia and occur one after the other 
in the text. They set up a space where a condom is used (correctly) in every sexual 
contact. Within that space, a woman is safe from Chlamydia, at least 60% safer than 
she would be if no condom was used. These are generic spaces in that it is a general 
rule that condoms offer protection from Chlamydia, and ‘you’ is generic. The [second 
example] apodosis is a categorical statement in habitual present tense.
In the example 96 ‘they can’ seems to be dynamic modality -  condoms have the 
property o f preventing Chlamydia and, insofar as they are used properly and 
consistently, they will. I would say that the ‘ability’ aspect o f the dynamic modality is 
further made salient by the overall metaphorical representation o f disease and 
preventive measures, according to which we can interpret the question and answer 
sequence as personifying condoms (as agents who protect from the enemy/disease). 
However, by reading on one encounters the information that the danger is reduced by 
60%, but nevertheless is still there, and this highlights more the epistemic aspect of 
‘they can’, in that it is likely that condoms can prevent Chlamydia, but not 100% 
certain. In example 98 it is in the reality/base space that millions of people have STDs.
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In the hypothetical space where they are honest and careful, their partners are safe 
from catching the STDs.
In all three examples the fact that every hypothetical space P evokes a hypothetical 
space ~P is exploited, as well as the meaning o f i f  as iff, giving the conditionals a 
directive force. Whereas in the hypothetical spaces where P is fulfilled there is (some 
degree of) safety from STDs at least for a person who does not already have one, 
where ~P there is no such safety and the danger to catch an STD is much higher.
Thus, although the epistemic stance of the protases is neutral, there is a deontic 
element in these conditionals, due to the content -  it is to be inferred that it is desirable 
for the protases to be fulfilled, because it is desirable for the apodoses to be fulfilled. 
Thus the reader should take care to always use condoms, correctly, and if she or her 
partner suffer from an STD, they should be ‘honest and careful’ (these vague terms 
become more specific in the co-text, where extensive advice is given both on what to 
do if the reader has an STD, and what to do if her partner has an STD).
9.4.2 Problem spaces
Conditionals related to the ‘problem’ aspect of the advice texts are o f two kinds: those 
who provide advice/solutions on what to do if you are faced with the problem in 
question, and how to solve it, and those which deal with the problem of identifying the 
problem, which also occurs as a move in advice texts (Polyzou, 2008a).
The grammatical construction of the former type is that of a prototypically predictive 
conditional, but in fact they are generic. The protasis is in subjunctive perfective, and 
the apodosis in perfective future tense (Greek distinguishes between perfective and
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imperfective/continuous future tense), both giving the impression of a one-off 
instance. However this occurs because of the enactment of face-to-face conversation 
with the reader (synthetic personalisation), which is supposedly giving advice to one 
specific individual asking a question ‘What should I do if I catch [it]?’ The subsequent 
‘you’ in the answer then can be reasonably interpreted as direct address to the 
projected individual reader, while also generically addressing all readers.
Problem spaces are the mental spaces where the problem occurs:
(99) Ti v a  k& vco a v  K oXXfjaco; O y u v a iK o ^ o y o q  0 a  gov y p a i j / e i  p i a  a X ou p rj, 
(is t t |V  OTroia p e a a  a e  8  sp 5 o p a 8 £ < ;  7tp87t8i v a  e^ aX eix p B o u v  x a  
K o v b u X c o p a x a . Av a v x o  8 e v  a 7 to 8 c b a e i, 0 a  g o v  K a v e i K a v x T jp ia a p o  fj 
K p u o m j^ ia .  Y T ra p x e i, f l e p a ia ,  r c a v x a  r| ; r i0 a v 6 x i ix a  v e a  K O v S u X cb p a x a  
va £K 8r|X co0ot)v  o g o  7rpoa7ra0£i<; v a  a7raXXay£i<; a n d  x a  ^ p o i i y o u p e v a .  
What should I do if I catch [it]? The gynaecologist will prescribe for you 
an ointment, with which within 8 weeks the genital warts must be 
eliminated. If this doesn’t work, he will do to you cauterisation or 
cryoablation. There is, of course, always the possibility for new genital 
warts to appear while you try to get rid of the previous ones.
In the mental space where the projected reader has contracted an STD (HPV/genital 
warts in this case), initially any actions to be taken are ‘blank slots’ -  it is unknown to 
her what she should do. The response within the same mental space (the omitted ‘If 
you catch HPV/genital warts’) is that the patient will be prescribed an ointment. The 
attention is windowed to the final stage of all the things that need to be done before 
that — booking an appointment, seeing a doctor, being examined by the doctor. These 
are presupposed as elements of a disease frame/scenario (note the existential 
presupposition), while they are emphasised in Status in the ‘allergy to latex’ mental 
space. This might be because Cosmopolitan devotes quite a lot of space elsewhere 
explaining why, under what circumstances and how often a target reader (young
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sexually active woman) should see a doctor and/or get tested. Moreover, in this 
particular case it is the final stage of the process that actually offers the solution and 
may be more comforting, while certainly being more helpful (as ‘you will go to the 
doctor is not particularly informative — it is nevertheless inferred by the existential 
presupposition, so it is not entirely left out).
Within that mental space, where the patient has the disease and has used the ointment, 
there is a sub-space built, that of the possibility that the ointment will not work. The 
epistemic stance is neutral, since the ointment may or may not work in any given case, 
but it is in the case that it does not work that further action is needed. Thus the 
processes o f cauterisation or cryoablation occur within the mental space where there 
are genital warts, ointment has been administered, and the ointment has not worked.
( 1 0 0 )  L t o  t 8 g t  rittTi o  y v v a iK o X o y o q  con 0 a  5 c i  a v  dvGnXaaia K a i 0 a  
c o u  b c b a e i  x a  a ;rap a iT T ]T a  (p a p p a K a  y i a  v a  p tjv  a v a T rx v x O ei.
At the smear text your gynaecologist will see if you have a malformation 
and will give you the necessary medication so that it doesn’t develop.
Although ‘if you have a malformation’ is an indirect question and not a conditional, it 
also fills in the omitted protasis in the following main clause: ‘[If you have a 
malformation], he will give you the necessary medication so that it doesn t develop — 
‘it’ refers anaphorically to the malformation, and therefore to the hypothetical mental 
space where the malformation actually exists.
In all o f the above examples, the protasis sets up a problem, and the apodosis presents 
the solution, focussing on the final stage of the solution process — it is presupposed 
that the patient will go to the doctor, will actually use the ointment and will actually
have a smear test.
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Problem sign spaces’ are spaces where the existence of the STD/problem becomes 
apparent. These are speech act conditionals, in that the apodosis is a directive speech 
act in all examples, sometimes direct and sometimes indirect. These are also generic 
though, as they are meant to apply to all cases where the protasis is fulfilled, even 
though one individual reader seems to be addressed directly here as well.
(101) Av 7rpO(T£^ 8i<; s^oyiccopaTa, E^avOrjpaxa fj a t|p a5 ia , 8iaKO\|/£ t k ;  
CT£^ oua>,iK£<; 8paaTT|pi6Tr|T£<; apEoax;.
If you notice bumps, rashes or marks [in your boyfriend’s genital area], 
interrupt sexual activities immediately.
Here the urgent-sounding and authoritative advice ‘interrupt sexual activities 
immediately’ only applies within the mental space where the girlfriend discovers 
marks etc. on her boyfriend’s body. These are signs that he may have an STD, but at 
this point it is not yet certain that he does (the irritation may be because of some other 
reason).
(102) np£7T£i va E^ETaaTco; OmoaSfjTiOTE av Exeiq TTEpiEpya s^oyKCopara.
Do I need to get tested? Definitely if you have weird bumps.
The ‘bumps’ are a sign that the projected reader has HPV (they may be genital warts), 
and within the mental space where she has weird bumps, the advice is given that she 
should get tested.
However, ‘definitely’ (as well as ‘especially’ -  see example 105) does not mean that 
only ‘weird bumps’ warrant medical examination ( if  f  iff). It is in fact also 
presupposed (taken for granted and not even mentioned at all) that every young 




In the three examples below, the protases set up mental spaces/situations which cause 
danger and potentially harm. However, as it is not a certain causal relation (such as 
water boiling when heated at 100° C) the protases are all epistemically modified:
(102) Av £va ayopi ps Ep7rr| os (piXxjosi e k e i  koitco, 7ri0avoTaTa 0a
KOX^ fjaEK; Ep7TT|.
If a boy with herpes kisses you down there, you will most probably catch 
herpes.
(103) Av k &vek; pa^i t o d , pTropsi va KoM,fja£i<; k i  s o u .
If you have sex with him, you may catch [it] too.
(104) Av 8ev t t |v  £VT07tuy£i<; syK aipa, r\ yovoppoia pnopEi va  TtpoxcoprjoEi 
axiq adX.7riyy£<; Kai va  £7TT|p£da£i t t |  yovipoTT|Td aon.
If you don’t spot it in time, gonorrhoea can move on to your fallopian 
tubes and affect your fertility.
It is clear that the apodoses represent undesirable results -  in context, advice is given
on how to avoid the realisation of the protasis (e.g. how to spot gonorrhoea in time),
or about how to realise the protasis without it causing the apodosis (e.g. how to have
sex without catching an STD). The 2nd example is a hypothetical sub-space of an
already hypothetical space, where the possibility exists that the sexual partner has an
STD to begin with.
The examples below are speech act conditionals (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005: 69f.) 
-  the advice in the apodoses is to be understood within the mental spaces where the 
protases hold, but it is to be understood as good advice, to be followed even if the 
protasis does not hold (so inhere does not mean iff).
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(105) HIIATITIAA B: Ta 7rpo(pvX,aKxiKa 0a as 7rpoaxax£i3<Tm)v, aXXa 
KaXmspa va kcxvek; xo epPoXio, EiSiKa av e^ e i^ TiEpwyooxEpovq aTto 
Evav EpcoxiKOvq avvxpotpoDi; xo E^apijvo.
HEPATITIS B: Condoms will protect you, but it’s better to have the vaccine, 
especially if you have more than one sexual partner per semester.
(106) Av e% eiq  x tjv  mxpapiKprj oTroijna oxi xo ayopi aot) <te a 7raxT|<y£, 
7rfjyaiV£ y ia  E^sxdaEiq.
If you have the slightest suspicion that your boy[friend] cheated on you, go for 
testing.
In example 105, it is always recommended to get vaccinated against Hepatitis B, but 
having more than one sexual partner per six months simply provides an additional 
reason to do so. In example 106, getting tested for STD is not suggested only for the 
cases when one suspects being cheated on, but when such a suspicion exists, 
immediate testing is imperative (note again, as in example 101, the unmitigated 
imperative conveying a sense of urgency and authority. This is still understood as 
advice and not as command because in terms of Felicity Conditions it is meant to 
benefit the addressee, not the speaker).
(107) Av £££1? 7rapoi)tnd< T £i x o v  io  K d rro ia  a x iy p f j  o x i}  £cofj aov, 7rp £^ £i v a  
K a v £ i<5 x o  x e o x  Han K a 0 £  e ^ i prjv£<;.
If you have [manifested] the virus at some point in your life, you have to 
have the smear test every six months.
The apodosis here is also a directive speech act, albeit indirect, expressed through 
deontic modality. The smear test is desirable to be taken yearly anyway, and the new 
information here is 4every six months , which applies only (or at least mainly) to the 
scenario that one has ‘manifested the virus at some point in [her] life’. The expression 
‘having manifested the virus’ is vague though, mainly because HPV very often has no 
symptoms, and presumably the manifestation of carcinogenic HPV would be through
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cervical malformations, in which case a smear test should be done every six months. It 
is not clear, however, whether genital warts also mean that one should have a smear 
test every six months. I think that for the fast reader, or the reader with not much 
background knowledge, it is not made immediately clear what counts as ‘manifesting 
the virus at some point in your life’, and therefore the extract is more scary than 
informative for such a reader.
9.5 Conclusion
Conditionals by definition do not present incontestable truths, but mere possibilities. 
However, other elements in the data, like statistics about how frequent STDs are, 
present certain possibilities as more likely than others. When it comes to the 
conditionals themselves, it is significant that certain possibilities are considered at all 
-  contracting an STD or being allergic to latex, for example, are not necessarily 
problems every reader has, but problems every reader is invited to consider as very 
likely, and invited to be prepared as to what to do in these situations. Thus, 
Cosmopolitan and Marie Claire readers might find themselves mentally checking 
whether they have observed any marks or warts, or whether their sexual practices 
meet the safety conditions presented in the texts. In Status such possibilities are not 
primarily presented through conditional constructions, but through other devices not 
explored in this chapter -  for example stating that the correct use o f condoms can save 
readers from (needing to read about) STDs, or that a tight condom would be 
uncomfortable, set up hypothetical spaces where condoms are used correctly or 
incorrectly, and where condoms are too tight or too loose or fitting properly. The
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hypothetical mental spaces where one is allergic to latex, and where a man is 
uncircumcised, are considered but not necessarily presented as very likely.
Although the limited amount of data does not allow for much generalisation, the 
present analysis does indicate that in analysing conditionals context is crucial in 
determining epistemic status and degree of contestability; it is not merely the case that 
a conditional creates the possibility of either P or ~P being the case. Moreover, once 
the hypothetical mental spaces have been set up, the protases of each conditional may 
set up ‘incontestable truths’ much like assertions, depending on factors like modality 
and degree o f mitigation. They also legitimate the authority o f the magazine vs. the 
reader in a fashion similar to assertions, further highlighting that the magazine 
producers are knowledgeable about and are able to provide advice for a number of 




The main argument of this thesis has been that critical, socially oriented analyses of 
discourse present inconsistencies in their approaches to presupposition, and that this 
creates theoretical and methodological issues that need to be addressed. Often a truth- 
conditional approach to presupposition is employed, which is theoretically 
inconsistent with a socially informed approach acknowledging that social structures 
and understandings influence and are influenced by language as a system and 
discourse as language in use. Other analysts acknowledge that there are links between 
presupposition and (social) cognition in that presupposition, as ‘ground’ in figure- 
ground distinctions in discourse, is often shared or assumed to be shared among 
interactants, and normatively creates the impression that the presupposed ground 
should be shared and not questioned. Methodologically, however, the identification 
process o f such presupposed beliefs in discourse has not always been transparent, 
which suggests the need for a re-examination of the theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings o f presupposition analysis, and the application o f a theoretically 
consistent and methodologically systematic framework.
It is such a framework that I have tried to put together here, further putting it to the 
test by analysing a sample of texts I believe to be ideologically charged, albeit not 
obviously so, namely, texts about sexual health in lifestyle magazines.
I have focussed on Greek lifestyle magazines in order to examine common normative 
beliefs pertaining to the personal sphere of the lives of men and women living in a 
society in the process of social change (Kosetzi, 2007), facing tensions in an
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intersection of traditional heteronormative beliefs, egalitarian/feminist discourses and 
new, often covert forms of sexism.
I have aimed to operationalise these aims through three research questions. In the 
following section (10.2) I will reiterate each question and summarise the tentative 
answers to these questions as they have emerged from the thesis. As with every 
research project, this has also had its limitations, and it seems to me that in answering 
these three questions many more were raised -  these limitations and questions will be 
addressed in 10.3, as well as possible venues for further research on the topics dealt 
with in the thesis.
10.2 Research questions - and answers 
RQ1
How can presupposition be theorised and applied in a cognitively and pragmatically 
informed methodological framework for the critical analysis o f texts, and to the 
exploration of gender and language in particular?
The thesis has begun to develop a systematic framework o f presupposition analysis. I 
have suggested that three parameters should be examined, namely whether 
information is presented as shared or new, whether it is presented as incontestable or 
open to contestation, and whether it is foregrounded or backgrounded. I have argued 
that to this end presupposition phenomena need to be studied as figure-ground 
distinctions on five levels of discourse, and analysis should be examining all three 
aforementioned parameters on each level (fore- vs. backgrounding; presentation of 
information as shared or new; and degree of contestability). Thus I distinguished
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among the following levels, acknowledging that in discourse processing all o f the 
levels interact and are processed simultaneously:
frame level 
sentence level
- text level 
discourse level and
- pragmatic competence level
For the purposes of this thesis I have focused specifically on the first two levels o f the
framework, examining the frame level and partially the sentence level o f figure- 
ground distinctions in discourse. At each level, the analysis was done by applying 
Frame Semantics and Cognitive Metaphor Theory in respect to triggering 
(metaphorical) frames, and by applying Mental Space Theory in examining sentence- 
level presuppositions.
In applying the framework to the analysis of gender, sexuality and discourse I have 
advocated a socio-cognitive approach. I have argued that ideologies are socially 
shared systems of mental representation surfacing or evoked in discourse, informed by 
discourse and other social experience and influencing the ways people talk about and 
experience aspects of social life, in this case sexual relations and medical aspects of 
sexual activity, and subsequently the ways they evaluate and act towards their peers 
and sexual partners and medical experts. I hope to have shown that adopting a socio- 
cognitive account o f presupposition can contribute to a fruitful analysis of ideological 
assumptions underlying gendered discourse.
RQ2
How can presupposition as an analytical category be operationalised for critical 
discourse analysis based on theoretical insights from Frame Semantics, Conceptual
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Metaphor Theory and Mental Spaces, and what further observations can be made 
when applying the theories and relevant methodologies to Greek language data?
Examining texts word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence indicates that there is a wide 
range of knowledge underlying even a short stretch of discourse. I have focussed on 
selected examples here, but I think it is important to acknowledge that not all 
knowledge/beliefs underlying discourse will necessarily be ideological. Moreover, one 
needs to consider how much of the ideological knowledge will be triggered in 
discourse processing (the issue of scope), and what are the factors that lead to 
ideological beliefs not only being recognised or activated but actually reinforced and 
perpetuated in discourse, or being contested. The analysis has shown that factors 
presenting propositions as incontestable include triggering them indirectly, by 
activating frames with presupposed evaluative elements, and presenting them as 
categorical truths via categorical modality, attributing them to the Reality Space 
jointly acknowledged by text producer(s) and text recipient(s).
In relation to discussing presupposed ideological knowledge in discourse, one also 
needs to recognise the issue of the scope of any given research project and the aims of 
the research question. For example, all three texts I have analysed have presupposed 
(as indicated mainly through existential presuppositions and frame activation but also 
other devices) a particular type of healthcare system, and assumed the readers’ 
familiarity with and acceptance of this system. There are clearly culture-bound and 
ideological issues in perceptions concerning doctors, medical tests and medical 
treatments, but I have not focused on them very strongly here as they were not central 
to my research questions. In relation to the particular dataset, on the text level, it is 
still perhaps notable that socio-medical assumptions about the vulnerability of young 
people, and especially women, to STDs co-occur with fear-triggering vocabulary and
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present sexual activity as a serious (medical, among other things) issue for young 
women in women’s magazines. No such assumptions apply to men in the Status text, 
yet it is still felt necessary to emphasise the authority o f a doctor over the advice 
presented in the magazine.
Applying a presupposition framework that takes into account the methodological 
distinction among levels of discourse has shown that it is possible to point to specific 
triggers that have the potential of evoking presupposed socio-cognitive 
representations, but when it comes to discussing the representations themselves one 
needs to acknowledge that they will emerge as a result o f multi-level meaning 
activation. Thus the framework would distinguish among frame activation, setting up 
o f mental spaces on sentence level, underlying schematic knowledge of generic 
structure and online processing of the structure of specific texts, overall socio- 
cognitive processed and representations and application of pragmatic knowledge for 
the understanding of discourse in general. Yet in discussing ideological gender-related 
beliefs (in order to answer Research Question 3), even when conducting an analysis 
on, for example, assertions on the sentence level, I have made reference to potential 
understandings of the text related to text level, or pragmatic competence, and to 
commonly shared beliefs or ‘discourses’ which I would attribute to the discourse 
level.
Analysing Greek data has not presented major problems for the present analysis, 
although further exploration and application of the theories to Greek discourse would 
help provide further insights. For the identification of frames and mental space 
builders I have relied on my semantic knowledge of Greek (in interaction with 
contextual knowledge about the Greek society). I set out with the assumption that
mental space builders in Greek would be on a par with those identified in English, and
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focussed mainly on their semantic content as assigning epistemic status to a 
proposition, for example. On occasion I have found it useful to comment on tense and 
form, especially in discussing conditionals, which has meant addressing different 
categories and conventions for the use o f categories in comparison to the English 
language. Overall the analysis has involved a degree o f metalinguistic commentary on 
Greek semantic and grammatical categories, which I believe would have been 
necessary even in analysing English data. However, as the methods of analysis are 
relatively new, particularly in analysing Greek language data, more comprehensive 
research would be useful in providing insights as to emergent methodological and 
theoretical issues.
RQ3
What are the ideological assumptions regarding gender and sexuality underlying 
sexual health texts in Greek men and women’s lifestyle magazines, namely Marie 
Claire, Cosmopolitan and Status?
All three texts analysed presuppose that the readers are sexually active, with 
heterosexual partners. Cosmopolitan evokes frequently the (presumed to be male) 
partner and his relationship with the (presumed to be female) reader, while Marie 
Claire and Status not so. For Cosmopolitan the partner is a potential perpetrator (of 
infecting the reader with STD) or victim, but, even under extenuating circumstances, 
sympathies lie with the reader. However, Cosmopolitan focuses more on the various 
STDs and their symptoms, and the advice related to romantic interpersonal 
relationships here is rather vague. Marie Claire presents men also as potential 
patients, on a par with women. In Status women as partners are evoked indirectly 
twice, once through the mention of ‘offspring’ and once through the pronoun ‘she’ as 
someone who can damage a condom with her long nails.
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The topics in the Marie Claire and Cosmopolitan texts are STDs and a lot of factual, 
detailed information is provided. However, there is a lot o f informationally vague 
vocabulary emphasising aspects o f the diseases related to the emotions the reader is 
assumed to be feeling. Status chooses to elaborate more on the topic of condoms as a 
means o f preventing STDs and pregnancy, which are both mentioned as a justification 
for why condoms are important, but not further discussed - here we have factual and 
evaluative information with a mainly promotional function, and the projection of an 
ideal reader who is knowledgeable enough to not need to be informed in detail about 
the reasons for using condoms. Information in the two texts by Marie Claire and 
Cosmopolitan has at least partially the function o f inducing panic (e.g. details on 
symptoms of diseases, logical leap/ overgeneralisation by Marie Claire from HPV to 
cancer) in order to emphasise the importance of safe sex (and, in the case of HPV, 
vaccination).
Overall women’s magazines therefore evoke a representation of sexuality and sexual 
activity as something a young woman needs to worry about, not for morality but for 
health reasons. Morality does come in, though, in presupposing a negative evaluation 
and blaming o f a male partner who suffers from an STD, and also in assuming that a 
young woman who finds she has an STD will feel ashamed or guilty. These 
assumptions are explicitly addressed and challenged, although indirectly an element of 
blame remains in relation to a range of behaviours which could possibly occur in such 
a situation (e.g. not being honest with one’s partner or with one’s doctor). Status not 
only does not emphasise such possibilities of danger and emotions of fear or guilt, but 
also emphasises the advantages of various condoms on the market from the 
perspective of comfort and pleasure for the male user, while warnings tend to be put in 
a humorous, or at least witty manner (e.g. comparing an expired condom to an expired
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glass o f milk). The Status text presumes that comfort and pleasure are of utmost 
importance to male readers, even to the point o f endangering themselves and their 
partners by not using condoms, while the possibilities o f enduring any discomfort or 
abstaining from sex are not even mentioned. This is in line with commonly held 
assumptions about male sexuality, masculine risk-taking, as well as a general 
disregard of women in general, and of women as romantic partners in particular, in 
men’s lifestyle magazines.
Although the above ideological assumptions do not directly lead to women being 
terrified, or men being inconsiderate, such beliefs and behaviours are taken for granted 
and legitimised by their constant unquestioned presence in the background.
10.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research
The thesis has in many ways been a theoretical and methodological exploration, and 
although it has made some proposals, it does not claim to have resolved all issues 
pertaining to presupposition theorisation and research. The framework proposed in 
many ways constitutes a systematisation of currently applied methods in studying 
presupposition in discourse, which in many ways builds on Marmaridou s (2000) 
initial observations about the potential of cognitive linguistic approaches to account 
for pragmatic meaning.
It has not been possible to demonstrate the application of the whole framework within 
the thesis, although I have done so elsewhere (Polyzou, 2008b; 2010; 2012). Here I 
have presented a frame level analysis, and parts of the analysis of mental spaces 
triggered on the sentence level. The framework is still at an early stage, and the
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amount o f texts I have analysed based on it is very limited. It is therefore expected 
that further empirical work through the analysis o f more texts would indicate 
weaknesses and areas for potential improvement.
One quite readily observable issue is that the framework is qualitative and proposes to 
deal with a wide range o f analytical categories. This poses the question o f how the 
framework might be operationalisable for the analysis o f larger bodies o f texts. I have 
no good answer to this at the moment, save for the fact that one can select to apply 
only parts o f the framework, as I have done here. The selection could indeed be more 
systematically motivated according to one’s research questions and linguistic 
expressions salient in the data (for example directive speech acts were particularly 
salient in the texts analysed in Polyzou, 2010, which resulted in a largely 
pragmatically oriented speech-act level analysis).
One might further enquire to what extent analysis o f the levels presented but not
analysed here (text, discourse and pragmatic competence) differs from more
traditional, non-cognitive based analyses o f genre, ideology and pragmatics in
discourse. In many ways it does not -  one would still need to identify generic
conventions, ideological representations (relying on lower levels o f analysis as well as
knowledge o f ideologies pertaining to the social context under analysis) and pragmatic
categories such as speech acts and their felicity conditions, implicatures, interaction
norms and so on. The difference lies in theoretical explanation, and in focus. Firstly,
cognitive theorisation does not necessarily aim to change the way we conduct analyses
(although it may well do so), but it does provide insights as to the potential effects of
discourse based on empirical and theoretical insights from the study of cognition in
relation to discourse processing, for example. Moreover, this multi-level cognitive
approach accounts for the fact that various analysts have been using the term
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‘presupposition’ to refer to phenomena as heterogeneous as frames, felicity conditions 
and discourses as ideological systems of belief. The framework postulates that the 
above do entail triggering underlying knowledge types, but at different levels. When it 
comes to focus, the current framework aims to examine how specific aspects o f fore- 
and backgrounding might interact with the text recipients’ knowledge and other 
linguistic devices in order to communicate ideological meaning in covert or less 
contestable ways -  or not. In doing so it aims to avoid oversimplified equations o f 
specific linguistic expressions (‘presupposition triggers’) with unquestioning 
compliance, while trying to explain why this is the case when unquestioning 
compliance is indeed a response to the discourse.
The theoretical focus of the thesis has also meant that further empirical validation is 
required for the framework not only in terms o f its application to a larger number and 
range o f texts, but also in terms of triangulation. I have based my identification of 
frames evoked by lexical items on my semantic knowledge of Greek. Frame theory 
based discourse analysis could benefit from independent methods triangulating the 
accuracy o f (at least some of the) semantic contents attributed to frames, whether via 
corpus-based quantitative methods or via participant-based qualitiative and 
quantitative methods. Likewise, mental spaces as determinants o f epistemic status, as 
well as figure-ground distinctions on all five discourse levels proposed in the 
analytical framework here, have been justified on theoretical grounds and would 
certainly gain in validity through empirical psychological research.
When it comes to Mental Spaces, it needs to be acknowledged that Mental Space 
theory was developed in order to account for a number o f phenomena, and the concept 
o f Mental Spaces is also used in a number of ways, as for example in Blending Theory
(Fauconnier and Turner, 2002/2003) and its applications. A typology of kinds of
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mental space might be in order, possibly in conjunction with exploring the 
construction o f discourse schemata in online discourse processing. I have also defined 
mental spaces, in the way I employed them, as having similarities with W erth’s (1999) 
text worlds, although I have not explored W erth’s model here. I believe that it could 
be fruitful to explore the possible integration o f text world theory and mental space 
theory in developing further the presupposition framework that I have put forward in 
this thesis.
I have made references to Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; 1995) but 
have not explored it in great detail. In principle I believe that Relevance Theory and 
Cognitive Semantics are not incompatible, and closer attention to Relevance Theory 
could potentially provide additional insights in the issues o f salience and focus in 
discourse processing. I have also not explored Discourse Representation Theory (van 
der Sandt, 1992; Kamp, 1995), which could provide further insights for the processing 
o f presupposition. To my knowledge Discourse Representation Theory has not been 
used for the critical analysis o f discourse, and to explore its possible applications 
would require an entire research project on its own right.
Clearly the contribution of this thesis to the study of discourse on the social issue at 
hand, gender relations in (hetero)sexual relations and sexual health, has been 
relatively limited due to the theoretical and methodological focus. I have, however, 
put forward an argument for the incorporation o f cognitive insights to the study of 
gender and language in general, and presented a sample analysis of how this could be 
done using my proposed presupposition framework. It would be further useful to 
examine a larger number o f texts on the same topic from lifestyle magazines, and also 
from other genres, such as institutional medical discourse and classroom discourse on
sexual education, as well as conducting reception research in order to provide
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additional empirical evidence to theoretical analytical findings on how the texts are 
consumed and processed by audiences.
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APPENDIX 1 - ‘her hair’ 
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